Crises and Response in Rwanda:

Reflections on the Arusha Peace Process

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Ami R Mpungwe1

Published in Monograph No 36: Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? April 1999

Most treatises on the Rwandan crisis of the early 1990s have focused on the failure of the international community to prevent the genocide and to bring peace and security to this tiny African country. This is not surprising, for the tragedy of these events should indeed continue to sound a wake-up call for those who turn a blind eye to the plight of victims in Africa. However, by concentrating too hard on the negative aspects of a perceived ‘UN failure’, some of the positive lessons may be missed that can be learned from a regional peace process that actually worked, and worked well — up to a point.

Political tensions and conflicts in Rwanda have had a long history, dating back to the colonial period and even prior to that. The aim of this contribution, however, is to provide some perspective on that part of the conflict situation in Rwanda which immediately preceded and eventually culminated in the Arusha peace process. The emphasis is on regional and international response patterns and strategies in the conflict which erupted into civil war in Rwanda in October 1990. In particular, this is an attempt to share personal experiences gained during the Arusha peace process, beginning with the preparatory stages to its conclusion in August 1993.

While some thoughts are also shared on the long-term prospects for sustainable peace and stability in Rwanda and the entire Great Lakes region, the conclusion focuses on lessons learned. It is hoped that a few of these lessons particularly arising from the nature and character of the conflict, as well as the regional and international responses to it, may be noted by those engaged in attempts at resolving the ongoing conflicts in the Great Lakes region and elsewhere in Africa.

Despite its small geographic size and landlocked position, the nature of the conflict situation in Rwanda is essentially much more complex and deeply rooted than is generally perceived. Its roots are probably as deep as the apartheid conflict in South Africa, and its complexity can be likened to that of the conflict in Palestine, Northern Ireland and, to a certain extent, in Bosnia. These conflicts, by their very nature and character, are extremely tenacious because they revolve around the fundamentals of human life: land, safety, security, identity, recognition, esteem and unhindered opportunities for human development as a whole.

Within Rwanda, the above characteristics are further reflected in the equally deeply rooted mutual suspicion, fear, distrust, hatred and even contempt among members of the two main ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi. These cleavages have persisted despite the fact that the two groups share a common language and culture, with intermarriages across ethnic lines further serving to blur objective differences. However, many decades of conflicting ethnic ideologies led to unequal opportunities for the different ethnic groups of Rwanda. One group would deny the other the right to freely enjoy the most fundamental political and human rights; to rise to the fullest potential; to be respected and esteemed; and to secure those rights and conditions for themselves, their children and their children’s children.

Under such conditions, ethnic and political tensions have defined the Rwandan society. Ethnic-driven (although sometimes camouflaged) violent political eruptions assumed a cyclical character in the late 1950s, 1963, 1972 and again in the genocide of 1994. The Tutsi people became the main victims of these repetitive cyclical massacres and political killings, in addition to the continual internal repression of both Tutsis and Hutus in various geographical locations (depending upon who wielded the power).

Throughout this period, there had been significant numbers of Tutsis in exile, many of whom had frequently but unsuccessfully attempted to return to Rwanda. However, following adequate political and military preparations inside Uganda, the political crisis in Rwanda reached a climax on 1 October 1990, when the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded the country, using Uganda as its rear base. At that stage, the fundamental issues nationally were the power structure and powersharing, and the related issues of refugee repatriation and an immediate halt to massacres and political suppression.

The external military pressure from the RPF, coupled with internal political pressure, compelled the late President Habyarimana, very unwillingly, to undertake political reforms and embrace the concept of multiparty democracy in December 1990. However, these measures turned out to be too little and were instituted too late in the day: the war between the government and RPF forces raged on while the internal political pressures and resistance further intensified.

The nature and character of the initial response by regional neighbours, when the war broke out in October 1990, fell squarely within the prevailing paradigm of African responses to internal conflicts. It was based on the ‘summit’ approach. The initial objectives were to achieve a peaceful settlement to the conflict, beginning with a cessation of the hostilities or a cease-fire agreement.

Several rounds of regional summits were held in this regard, with the first held in Mwanza, Tanzania, on 17 October 1990. Subsequent summits were held in Gbadolite, former Zaire (26 October 1990); Goma, former Zaire (20 November 1990); Zanzibar, Tanzania (17 February 1991); Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania (19 February 1991), N’sele, former Zaire (29 March 1991), and again in Gbadolite, former Zaire (18 September 1991).

This proliferation of summits which characterised the regional response to the conflict in Rwanda, between October 1990 when the conflict erupted, until September 1991, did eventually produce a cease-fire agreement (at N’sele on 29 March 1991) which was later amended at Gbadolite on 16 September 1991. However, the cease-fire agreement was short-lived, as President Habyarimana, despite his political and diplomatic overtures, still believed in the military solution, and conflicting interests among regional and international players denied the agreement the total and genuine support that was imperative for its success.

The breakdown of the N’sele cease-fire agreement resulted in the continuation and intensification of the war in Rwanda. However, the subsequent military realities on the battlefield, experienced during the first quarter of 1992, forced both parties to genuinely reach out for a peaceful solution, even if for a limited spell and on a trial basis. As a result, the parties to the conflict (the Rwandan coalition government and the RPF delegations) decided to meet directly in Belgium and France between May and June 1992, to negotiate and finally reach agreement on a framework for a settlement. While President Mobutu remained the mediator of the talks, President Mwinyi of Tanzania was unanimously appointed to be the facilitator, and Arusha became the preferred venue for the negotiations. The parties also requested the continued active involvement of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in the negotiations, as well as that of regional neighbours. Other observers came from France, Belgium, the United States, Germany and the United Nations.

In its preparatory work, the Tanzanian team2 co-ordinated and presided over the negotiating process. It spent much time between February and June 1992 in an attempt to evolve a comprehensive appreciation of the deeply rooted character of the conflict, in both its historical and prevailing dynamics. This was done largely through quiet but regular and consistent communication with all the key players in the conflict. The team also learned valuable lessons from the gaps that became apparent in the ‘summit’ approach, as well as from the experience of the resolution models of other conflicts in Africa, particularly those in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and the transition process that was taking place in South Africa at the time.

Potentially successful factors were built into the negotiation framework, while factors that could lead to failure were set aside or eliminated. One major decision was to move away from the ‘summit’ approach and focus on the finer details of the conflict. The team also took note of the positive disposition that had evolved among the parties to the conflict. This was largely occasioned by the fact that the government forces had suffered serious defeats at the battlefront while the RPF force, though victorious, was still perceived to be a Tutsi minority force and doubts remained with regard to the sustainability of its control over a Hutu majority country.

A comprehensive settlement framework was finalised with the two parties in Dakar, Senegal, in June 1992, during the OAU summit. It contained clear goals and objectives for the entire process, including an elaborate road map and visible signposts for a negotiation process that would lead to sustainable peace and stability in Rwanda, through a working democratic order, respect for human rights and good governance. The challenge, of course, would be to reach a negotiated agreement on appropriate implementation strategies.

Two days after the negotiations started on 10 July 1992 in Arusha, a cease-fire agreement was signed. At that stage, it was particularly brought to the attention of the parties to the conflict that no meaningful peace negotiations could start unless a working cease-fire was in place. Besides outlining modalities for the cessation of hostilities, the cease-fire agreement also provided for a monitoring role to be played by the OAU, through the deployment of a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG). Military observers were provided by Senegal and Mali (Francophone) and Zimbabwe and Nigeria (Anglophone), with a mandate to monitor both the RPF and the government forces.

Observers from neighbouring countries were deliberately excluded, in order to avoid any undue influence arising from regionally vested interests. Furthermore, the parties had also agreed to the creation of a Joint Political Military Commission (JPMC) with the dual mandate of monitoring and implementing the cease-fire agreement and ultimately, the peace agreement. It is important to note that, as a result of the high level of trust and confidence that was built into the Arusha peace process, a working cease-fire prevailed throughout the thirteen-month negotiating phase, with only fifty monitors on the ground to undertake oversight under the auspices of the OAU.

The negotiations, forging ahead almost on a continuous basis and building on the momentum gained on the way, saw the signing of the Protocol on the Rule of Law on 18 August 1992. This Protocol identified and addressed the main sources of the conflict and defined the principles, structures and processes of establishing a new order in Rwanda based on national unity, reconciliation, democracy, pluralism and respect for the fundamental principles of human rights.

The Protocol on the Repatriation of Refugees and Resettlement of Displaced Persons was eventually signed on 9 June 1993. It laid down the mechanisms for voluntary repatriation of refugees who were scattered all over the neighbouring countries and further afield, as well as their resettlement in Rwanda. The resettlement of refugees and that of internally displaced persons would have to take place amid the practical realities of the shortage of land in Rwanda.

Apart from the Protocol on Power Sharing, perhaps the most difficult protocol to negotiate in the Arusha process, was the one on the formation of a new national army, through the integration of the two forces of the parties to the conflict. The negotiations started in January 1992 and were concluded on 3 August 1993 with the signing of the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces. In addition to the provision of a formula for vertical and horizontal integration, particularly in command and control areas, the adjusted proportional composition of the rank and file also offered ethnic balance and assurances. This substantially allayed fears about the possibility of one element of the military surprising or over-running the other. The Protocol defined the mission, size, and structure of the force, as well as procedures for the assembly and integration of the two forces into a National Army and gendarmerie (police). It did the same for other security organs, i.e. Security and Intelligence, Prisons and Immigration. The role of the Neutral International Forces, which was to oversee the transitional process, was also clearly defined.

The Protocol on Miscellaneous Matters and Final Provisions was also signed on 3 August 1993. It dealt with additional issues such as:

For the first time ever, the people of Rwanda, across all ethnic and political divides, had resolved their armed conflict peacefully, on their own, but with the strong support of their regional neighbours and the active participation of the OAU which provided a Military Observer team. A working relationship between the OAU and the UN also evolved out of the Arusha peace process, including a clearly defined role for international co-operation. The Arusha peace process also became a positive prelude to the formation of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution that was instituted after the adoption of a resolution at the Cairo OAU Summit of July 1993.

The greatest success of the Arusha peace process is to be found in the manner in which it managed to restore trust and confidence among Rwandans of different ethnic groups — through addressing all the key areas in detail which had contributed to the conflict situation in Rwanda over decades. This was largely made possible by adopting a negotiation strategy which encouraged the parties to negotiate issues directly and in their own language with a view to achieve clear and common understanding on every issue that was negotiated.

The negotiation process, which lasted for thirteen months, had all the time that was needed, and tackled every piece of detail which helped to remove fear, distrust and hatred. In turn, the process built confidence and trust in an evolutionary and incremental manner among the parties to the conflict.

The successful implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, therefore, depended greatly on the sustainability of this trust, confidence and positive spirit, throughout the implementation phases. This could only be achieved if the time schedules, which were painstakingly negotiated and agreed upon, were adhered to — particularly those related to putting the transitional structures in place. These structures were critical in keeping the positive spirit alive, removing obstacles, and pushing the process forward.

The UN, which was entrusted with the responsibility of creating the requisite environment for the establishment and operation of those structures through the deployment of adequate military and civilian observers, would therefore play a decisive role in the success of the implementation process.

Without attempting to apportion any blame, it was unfortunate that the bureaucratic procedures of the UN did not allow for the timely deployment of the requisite number of military observers. This had an extremely negative impact on the adherence to time schedules and delayed the establishment of the transitional structures. Other developments within the region also opened up old fears and distrust that had been allayed by the Arusha process. In particular, the assassination of the democratically elected Hutu President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, revived animosities among the extremist Hutus of Rwanda. Rwanda’s regional neighbours and the OAU should also have maintained closer observation of the developments in the immediate post-Arusha phase, instead of putting all the hope and responsibility in the hands of the UN.

The combination of the above omissions availed much time and space for the forces supporting the status quo inside Rwanda to plan, train and arm the Interahamwe forces, without the existence of any neutral structure to monitor, control and prevent. Those extreme Hutu elements saw danger in peace and security in war and were thus able to bring the Arusha spirit to a sad end, through the genocide in April 1994, which led to the loss of a million lives.

When the massacres started, the response of the international community to the collapse of the Arusha Peace Agreement was disappointing to say the least. The little action that was taken, was largely ad hoc, incoherent and unco-ordinated. At best, this was limited to the provision of relief and emergency supplies to refugees and displaced persons — particularly during the short period that CNN, the BBC, Sky News and other media networks were broadcasting shocking television images of the genocide.

Even that minimal response was largely driven by the concerned and sympathetic attitudes and outcry expressed by public opinion, and not by the moral and political leadership of the so-called pioneers and leaders of the new global order of humanisation. The limited response in providing relief and emergency supplies to victims of genocidal murder had about the same effect as an aspirin would have on a dying patient.

Without going into the details of the final and bloody round of civil war in Rwanda, the peace that has eventually emerged, is a fragile one that has to be nurtured. Medium to long-term prospects for sustainable peace and stability in Rwanda would very much hinge upon the continued ability of the RPF government to stabilise the country. This will require the maintenance of sufficient political space to establish and strengthen an inclusive political system that is underpinned by democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and good governance.

There must also be effective regional dimensions to these endeavours. Certainly, the political developments surrounding Rwanda, in the rest of the Great Lakes region, should be considered. Significant support by the international community should also aim at the strengthening of the regional economic co-operation structures such as the Kagera Basin Organisation (KBO), East African Co-operation (EAC) and the Great Lakes States Economic Community (GLSEC). Strategies that would lead to internal and regional economic integration are quite critical in the endeavours to widen political and economic space inside Rwanda, as well as in the rest of the Great Lakes region.

It is heartening to note that, inside Rwanda, particularly after many years of wars and massacres, a critical mass of citizens exist who perceive themselves as national rather than ethnic members. These people only need a supportive environment to entrench and expand into a dominant political force, that would enhance and reinforce a civic culture and national ethos that seeks to establish and deepen the roots of democracy, respect for human rights and principles of good governance. They have realised that conflict and wars are running out of fashion in the world, as so many countries become focused on issues of economic growth, based on sustainable peace and stability.

In the midst of renewed turmoil and armed conflict involving several countries and many peoples in the Great Lakes region, there are some pertinent lessons to be learned from the Arusha peace process. It is clear, for example, that the endeavours of African countries to deal effectively with political conflict on the continent should begin with a proper and objective appreciation of the nature and character of those conflicts. Deep-rooted conflicts are obviously more difficult to resolve than more recent conflicts which revolve around disagreements over, for example, common boundaries (as in the case of the Namibia-Botswana border dispute) or the authenticity of election results (as in the case of Lesotho).

This factor challenges anyone who attempts to resolve deep-rooted conflicts on a lasting and sustainable basis, to evolve a different model and strategies of conflict resolution than those that are usually applied in short-lived conflicts. The Arusha peace process amply demonstrated this fact, as opposed to the ‘summit’ approach that had preceded it. The Arusha peace process included only one summit that occurred, appropriately, during the signing ceremony of the Arusha Peace Agreement on 4 August 1993.

The commencement of the negotiation process should be preceded by sufficient evidence of the existence of a positive disposition to a negotiated settlement among all parties, arrived at on their own or through inducements and assurances that discount the efficacy of military solutions. In the absence of such a positive disposition, the process would be characterised more by posturing than actual movement, as indeed happened during the ‘summit’ phase of 1990/1991.

There must also be adequate preparations on the part of the mediators, in terms of a negotiation framework which has clear and shared goals and objectives, as well as a thoroughly worked out road map and signposts that can guide the peace drivers to the intended destination. The negotiation process requires sufficient time, energy and resources, in order to address and reverse all the elements that, until then, sustained mutual hatred, fear and distrust. This must be done in a manner that also builds trust and confidence among the belligerents, in an evolutionary and incremental manner. It is a serious miscalculation to assume that the resolution of a deeply rooted conflict can easily be achieved through inducing changes in attitudes among the belligerents — or that their hate, rage, fears, distrust and expectations can simply be dealt with through moral and political appeals or the imposition of political or military force.

It is unfortunate but quite understandable that a ‘summit’ approach usually runs short of both the time and the details that are required to address all the critical issues. However, such an approach to deeply rooted conflicts has the positive advantage of raising the moral and political profile of the conflict. It demonstrates a high level of commitment and may unleash sufficient synergy to advance any generally supported subsequent initiatives and processes. Summits and their available resources can be used effectively to advance the peace process where more detailed negotiations get stuck.

The experience gained from the ‘summit’ approach to conflict resolution in Rwanda has also brought to the fore the importance of unity of purpose among the regional and external players engaged in mediation. The existence of divisions and the pursuit of vested interests among regional and other external players, at the expense of the core focus on the internal challenges of the conflict, tend to reduce rather than enhance the chances for early solution. Similarly, multiple rather than unified and focused initiatives tend to confound the search for solutions. When there are multiple initiatives, it is always difficult to confine one or some of the parties to a specific framework which enjoys broad support.

In view of the profound distrust, fear and suspicions that characterise deep-rooted conflicts, the neutrality of and confidence in the mediator among all parties to the conflict, are quite critical. The initial designation of the late President Mobutu as mediator did not augur well for the meaningful resolution of the Rwandan conflict, largely because of his vested interest and personal friendship with the late President Habyarimana. The best case scenario would be to encourage the parties to the conflict to negotiate directly, where possible on their own territory, as happened with the conflict resolution process in South Africa. If this should not be possible, a neutral mediator who is acceptable and enjoys the confidence of both parties should be identified and deployed.

Finally, the most meaningful response in dealing with deeply rooted conflicts needs to encompass effective follow-through mechanisms and requires the active engagement of all regional neighbours and the international community as a whole. Regional developments must also be closely monitored as they tend to affect the implementation of any peace plan. Unfortunately, this was the weakest point in the Arusha Peace Agreement, which contributed greatly to its collapse.