The Peace Process in Somalia

	Introduction to the Symposium
	Roots of the Conflict and Fuelling Factors
	The Colonial Legacy
	Somali Nationalism
	The Conflict with Ethiopia
	The Civil War - Phase One
	The Failed Coup d'Etat 1978
	Armed Rebel Groups Against the Government
	The SSDF ( 1978)
	The SNM (1982)
	The SPM (1989)
	The USC (1989)
	The Fall of Siyad Barre
	The Civil War - Phase Two
	Somalia Lined Up Along Clan Lineage
	Self-appointments and Main Attempts to Tackle Problems: Their Impacts
	The First Djibouti-Sponsored Peace Conference 1991
	The UN-Sponsored Peace Conference 1993
	Aided Appointed Himself as President 1994
	The Cairo Peace conference 1997
	The Birth of the Puntland State of Somalia 1998
	The Second Djibouti Peace Conference 2000
	Facts Concerning Abdilqassim Salad Hassan
	The New anti-Abdilqassim Line-Up
	Strategic Issues and Security Relations on the Horn of Africa
	Conclusions

I wish first to thank all of you for coming to share with us the discussions on issues related to Somali Peace Process.

About two months ago the African Research Institute of the La Trobe University assigned to me the topic of the Peace Process in Somalia, for this symposium. It is not an easy topic to talk about, given its complexity, ramifications and sensitivity for those who do not want to approach the issues in an objective way. On the other hand, it is an argument that concerns everybody; it concerns both the Somalis and the international community at large. Therefore it is worth talking about.

I would like to remind the audience and the readers of this paper that I wrote a paper on the same topic, in March 2000, on the eve of the Djibouti government sponsored peace conference for Somalia. I wrote that paper from a different prospect; I was very enthusiastic about the conference and I focused on the way that I thought the conference would succeed. However, events in Somalia are occurring dynamically, so that a paper written even few weeks ago might lose its actuality.

Today's discussions will be based on a presentation of the topic 'The Peace Process in Somalia'. We will cover a short account of the origins of the problems, and major events that have occurred during the conflicts. We will see the major attempts that have been undertaken so far to reconcile the conflicting parties of the country, and will also look at the impacts of these attempts on the peace process. We will analyse major actors of the events and their relationship with external supporters. Finally, we will try to illustrate the strategic importance of Somalia for the security and trade of the countries in the region and of the world at large; we will see the bleak outlook of the current confrontations and we will also answer and discuss the following questions:

Before we start our discussions of this multidimensional and highly complex topic I would like to draw to your attention that up to now the events in Somalia affected each other negatively. There have been reactions to every outcome of the peace conference, and of course to self-appointments, which would mean that there were issues not properly addressed or left out completely in the process. For this reason, we have always had tit-for-tat reactions and confrontations, to the detriment of the defenceless population of
Somalia.

Since 1991, the country has experienced reactions against attempts of self-appointment and agreements made in conference, for example:

In the light of these Tit-for-Tat situations one may ask why the outcome of every attempt made has generated new conflicts. What was not considered? A logical response to these questions could be that there were always some issues that were disregarded and not given due weight in the process. Reconciliation processes were always characterized by political campaigns with unworkable zero-sum outcomes. In Somali traditional culture solution of disputes is based on consensus, a win-win solution.

The exact origins of the present conflict go back in history to the partition of the Somalilands on the eve of the European scramble for Africa in the late 19th century. From that colonial legacy problems spread wider, and the Somalis were always confronted with dilemmas, where every problem led to another. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries European colonial powers (France, Britain, and Italy) divided the Somalilands, among themselves, and occupied the areas. The Ethiopian Empire also shared in the division of the Somalilands.

A turning point of colonial redefinition of the Somalilands was the post-Second World War period. In 1941 British-led Commonwealth forces had driven the Italians out of the Horn of Africa, occupying and controlling the whole region: Ethiopia, Eritrea, and all the Somalilands, with the exception of the small portion colonized by the French, the French Somali Coast (now the Republic of Djibouti).

Britain returned Emperor Haile Selassie to the Ethiopian throne. He had fled from the country after Italy occupied his empire in 1936. Britain ceded Ogaden to Ethiopia in October 1948 and gradually withdrew from it, during the summer and autumn of that year.¹

Earlier Britain had supported a Pan-Somali movement, which claimed the unity of all the Somalilands. It supported the idea of Great Somalia under its trusteeship, being actually in possession of the whole area, but later on Mr. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, abandoned the idea because of Ethiopian refusal to surrender Ogaden². Britain then together with the USA and France, in September 1948 at Paris, agreed to place the Ex-Italian Somaliland colony under Italian Trusteeship. ³

2.2 Somali Nationalism

On 21 November 1949 the UN General Assembly voted yes to Italian Trusteeship, against the will of the Somalis. The Somali Youth League (SYL), the Pan-Somali political party, fought for complete independence of the country or otherwise for a joint Trusteeship of the United Nations, opposing Italian Trusteeship. There were demonstrations in Somalia against the UN decision, and prominent party leaders were imprisoned⁴. This decision had shocked the SYL delegation at the United Nations headquarters:
"Abdullahi Isse Mohamud, who represented the 'SYL' and the 'Hamar Youth Club', made a poignant appeal against Italian Trusteeship. He spoke with great bitterness of the considerable support given to the Bevin-Sforza [the two foreign ministers of Britain and Italy] Agreement in the previous United Nations Assembly. Thus, declared Mr. Abdullahi, the supporters of Italy's unjust claims were endeavoring to compel a group who strongly supported the independence and unity of Libya to sacrifice the Somali people to Italy [apparently implying the Arab group]. Some members had felt compelled to vote for Italian Administration in Somaliland in order to obtain the support for other questions of the most powerful bloc in the General Assembly"⁵

Subsequently, when the Italian Trusteeship, Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia (AFIS) took over the country in 1950, it started punishing and persecuting the Pan-Somali Party (the Somali Youth League) for its objection to Italian Trusteeship. Many leading elements of the SYL fled to Ethiopia. After Somalia became independent in 1960 there were two wars between Somalia and Ethiopia (1964 and 1977). Britain's rearrangement of the borders of the Somalilands with Ethiopia, which included the secession of Ogaden to Ethiopia, gave birth to the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia.

For the sake of this topic, that is, the Peace Process in Somalia, the paper starts by examining the events of 1977-1978, when Somalia lost the war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region, now the semi-autonomous fifth province of Ethiopia.

In July 1977 a war broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden region. Ogaden is also called Western Somalia, by many Somalis, to avoid the clan connotation of the word 'Ogaden' and because there are other (non-Ogden) Somali clans which are also part of the region. Somalia had almost captured the disputed region when the Soviet Union, which had close military and economic ties with Somalia since its independence in 1960, shifted support to Ethiopia in November 1977, giving it massive military aid. Soviet military advisers, Cuban and South Yemen troops fought along side the Ethiopian army to push back the Somalis.

The Somali army was short of arms and ammunitions and other supplies when, on 8 March 1978, President Siyad, to avoid a worse situation, ordered the troops to pull out, immediately, from all their positions in Ethiopia. The defeat was very demoralizing for the army and for the general public and it was attributed to the government's bad foreign policy. In many parts of the front the army abandoned military hardware and, sadly, many wounded soldiers on the enemy's soil for lack of transport. They had no fuel for their vehicles. The commanders were compelled to destroy what they could of their abandoned armaments before leaving. No survivors of the abandoned soldiers were ever reported. Besides that humiliating defeat, the high military command of the war based in Hargeisa - where General Mohamed Ali Samater, the minister of defence and commander of the army was in charge of the operations in Ogadenia - conducted barbaric executions of military officers and soldiers both inside Ethiopia and in Somalia. Many soldiers and officers were slaughtered at Jig-Jigga and Dire-Dawa fronts, and also, in Hargeisa, after the Somali troops withdrew from Ethiopia. This, on the spot murdering of innocent people, was intended to divert public attention from the government's responsibility for the defeat, and blame powerless soldiers and officers for the humiliation. Among the slaughtered were six high-ranking officers executed in Hargeisa soon after they came back from the front.

This spectrum of mismanagement, injustice and cruelty created great frustration, anger and disaccord among the high-ranking officers in the army, particularly those involved in the war. The human loss in that war is still unaccounted for. The government never published details of the nation's loss.

Having lost the war, the army was dissatisfied with the management of the war with Ethiopia. On 9 April 1978, a group of military officers, led by Colonel Mohamed Sheikh Osman (Irro) who had come frustrated from the frontline attempted to overthrow the government in Mogadishu. Colonel Osman had been a member of the high command joint-officers in Hargeisa. This coup d'etat failed, and in response, the government undertook repressive measures against army officers and civilians. Hundreds were imprisoned while 17 officers, including Col. Osman, were executed in Mogadishu, on 26 October 1978. 12 of the 17 executed officers were from Majeerten clan. Consequently, many officers and soldiers of the army fled to Kenya and from there to Ethiopia, particularly officers and soldiers from the Majeerten clan, targeted by the regime as authors of the coup.

Among those who fled from the army was Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, (hereafter Abdullahi Yusuf) the current president of Puntland. He came from the front, where he was the commander of the Somali army fighting in southern Ogadenia. The fleeing officers were forced to seek refuge in the country that they had fought against just a month earlier.

The fleeing army officers, led by Abdullahi Yusuf, formed the first armed rebel group, the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) later renamed the SSDF, to fight the military regime in Somalia. They were predominantly of the Majeerten clan. . The rebel group was welcomed in Ethiopia and given military support and recruitment bases; they obtained also substantial military hardware, logistic supply and training from Libya. It was not long before the armed front started cross-border clashes with Somali forces, which intensified gradually along the border. From their bases in Ethiopia, the dissidents made increasing armed incursions inside Somalia. In response to those incursions the government undertook repressive measures against the civilian population, imprisoning many people without trial, destroying privately owned rural water-catchments, burning entire villages in Mudug and Nogal regions and destabilising the civilian population. Military police squads rounded up civilians from the villages, with the pretext of conscripting them for the army, and then murdering them in front of their families. The massacre of Ba'adweyn village is the most remembered. These atrocities impelled many people to cross the border and join the ranks of the armed dissidents. These new dissidents included university students, prominent clan chiefs and rural people, with their herds. The armed rebellion culminated with SSDF forces, backed by the Ethiopians air force, finally captured two border Somali districts, Galdogob and Balanballe, in 1984. The control of these two districts created a dispute between the SSDF leadership and the Ethiopian government, the issue being which flag would fly over the captured territory: Somalian or Ethiopian flag. This armed rebellion marked the start of the civil war in Somalia in 1978.

Other rebel groups, following the example of the SSDF one after another, took up arms against the government. The Somali National Movement (SNM), predominantly of the Issak clan, was formed in 1982 and it too established bases in Ethiopia and got military support from it. SNM, from its bases, conducted military operations along the north-western border of Somalia with Ethiopia and gradually increased military incursions inside the country, which culminated in a full-scale war later. The SNM increased its incursions inside the country and Somali government forces oppressed the civilian population. Many people were imprisoned, and many others murdered both in the towns and in the villages of the regions of Northwest, Togdher, Sanag and Mogadishu.

In 1988 the Djibouti government negotiated an agreement of non-aggression and non-interference between President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and President Siyad of Somalia to ease the tension between the two countries. The two countries were supporting rebel groups against each other, which eventually ousted both of them from power in 1991. Despite the agreement neither government gave up supporting the rebel groups that continued to operate.

In the aftermath of the Siyad and Haile Mariam agreement, the SNM apparently fearing being isolated in Ethiopia undertook a full-scale war. They violently attacked the headquarters of government forces in the major northern centres. On 27 May 1988 SNM forces attacked Burao town, overrun the government forces, and captured it; four days later they attacked the city of Hargeisa, the second capital of Somalia, and captured more than half of the city. This extensive military confrontation marked the most serious blow that the Somali military regime had so far experienced and undoubtedly it was the major single cause of its fall in 1991. The human tragedy in this operation was enormous as indiscriminate shelling and air bombardment had caused the loss of many innocent lives and uprooted entire population. Soldiers and officers of Issak clan, who were in the government forces in Hargeisa and its surroundings, were rounded up and massacred. Burao, Hargeisa and other centres were deserted. Hundreds of thousands of people on foot crossed the border fleeing to Ethiopia. When the government drove out the SNM forces, it did not even protect the abandoned properties from the lootings of its soldiers, where even the roofs of the houses were taken off. Hargeisa and other centers and villages became ghost towns.

One of the most remembered incidents of the atrocities committed by government forces was the Jazira massacre, on the outskirts of Mogadishu, conducted in the night of 14 and 15 July 1989. In that night 47 innocent civilian men, of the Issak clan, were kidnapped from their residences in Mogadishu, and mass murdered at Jazira. No inquiry was made about how this massacre occurred and no one was arrested for its responsibility. This created in the minds of Issak people a sense of nationalism, a perception of Issak versus the rest, and a move towards complete secession from the rest of Somalia.

In 1989 two other armed rebel groups took up the arms; they were Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the United Somali Congress (USC). SPM conducted its military operations in the Southern region of Lower Giuba where its forces confronted the government's armed forces in guerrilla warfare and many lives were lost.

The USC operated in the central regions and then in Mogadishu. In 1990 USC intensified its military operations in the central regions, and gradually extended to the outskirts of Mogadishu. The government forces in the central regions murdered many innocent civilians during that period. The worst massacre occurred at Wargalo village south of Galcayo town where many innocent civilians, of Habr-Gedir/Sa'ad clan of Hawiya, were massacred by government forces. These victims included prominent businessmen of Galcayo town who had already been displaced by government motivated and stirred up clan fighting among the clans of Darod and Hawya in the central regions.

During the phase-one civil war period (1978-1990) - between the government forces and the different Somali rebel groups - atrocities and human right abuses were also committed by the rebel forces against civilians whom the rebels associated with siding with the government forces. For instance: the SSDF killed civilians of Marehan - the Siyad's clan - in Cel-Habred in the Galgadud region in the early 1980's. Likewise, the SNM forces executed civilians from Darod clan, when they attacked and entered Hargeisa and Burao towns in 1988 and later on in 1991 at Berbera town. Finally, the USC, in 1990, in their military operations in the central regions, killed Darod clan civilians on their way to and from Mogadishu, and in the refugee camps of the Hiran region. Thus, no rebel group can claim to be immune from the atrocities committed against the Somali civilians, but rather there were differences in the magnitude of the atrocities perpetuated.

3.3 The Fall of Siyad Barre

Finally, in January 1991 at Mogadishu, a full-scale popular uprising of the supporters of USC overthrew the Mohamed Siyad Barre's government; he was forced to flee and seek refuge in Gedo, his native region in the Southwest of Somalia. During the 13 years, from 1978 to 1991, the Somali government engaged in violent conflict with its own people. Siyad never took a meaningful step toward reconciliation and peace. In this regard, he dealt with powerless elders ordering them to talk to their people and stop the fighting. He never attempted to sit and speak with the armed rebel groups, or with politicians in exile who might have been able to create an atmosphere of dialogue. He just called the rebels unrealistically the 'antirevolutionary terrorists'. Barre did not realise the magnitude of the danger that he himself and the country were facing even in 1990, when he was nicknamed 'the mayor of Mogadishu. This implied that he was virtually only in control of Mogadishu city. He was blinded by his golden years of despotic rule, with no one daring to counter him. He could not understand the situation even when his own artistic flock that always chanted his praises turned against him and chanted his shortcomings in front of him at the stage.

In the last days of his draconian rule, in June 1990, a group of former civilian politicians, high-ranking military and civilian officers of the pre-Siyad government and prominent businessmen signed a petition known as 'Manifesto' in which they openly challenged the president, accusing him of mismanagement and treason. They were from all the clans of Somalia. The 'Manifesto' group proposed to rescue the country from collapse. But their suggestions were rejected both by Siyad and by the armed rebel groups; they were seen as a powerless retired group wanting to grasp the momentum of Siyad's fall and steal the power. They looked like a kind of third party wanting to make the most of the two quarrelling parties 'tra due litiganti un terzo gode'. In fact, the 'Manifesto' group, in the eve of the last days of Siyad Barre and the Mogadishu uprising, and in the immediate aftermath of the government institutions' collapse, contributed nothing to prevent the rampage and stop the already visible clan motivated bloodshed.

Siyad was ousted from power on 26 January 1991 and the jubilation was great among the supporters and ranks of USC. Despite the victory the image of the USC was overshadowed by two huge mistakes, which had disastrous consequences to Somalia. The first was that USC militiamen targeted the civilian population of the Darod clans, which remained in Mogadishu and in many other USC-controlled places, murdering many innocent civilians, looting and seizing their properties. The second mistake was on 28 January 1991 two days after Siyad had left Mogadishu, when USC political leaders unilaterally proclaimed the formation of a national government headed by Ali Mahdi, without prior consultation with the other groups, such as SNM, SSDF, and SPM. These two contemporary steps exacerbated the already tinderbox situation left behind by Siyad. The move angered all the parties particularly SNM, SSDF, SPM and within USC itself, the Aideed's supporters. Meanwhile, the Siyad supporters were reorganizing themselves in the southern regions for counterattack and Barre was claiming to be the legitimate president of the country.

Apparently, those who rushed to appoint Ali had been afraid that Aideed would appoint himself as head of government, and they did not want a military man to head up the new government. From that position, they had been able to constrain Aideed and persuade him to accept Ali Mahdi appointment, but they underestimated Aideed's power and intransigence. Aideed had already seized and controlled the bulk of arms left behind by Siyad in Mogadishu. There was also a perception that having captured Mogadishu and the arms, the USC led by Aideed was given itself a hegemonic power to dictate to the other groups. This attitude has been quite visible since 1991, as later events have shown.

In response to this unilateral decision the SNM leadership in the northwest of Somalia declared secession from Somalia, despite its close relationship with USC. This relationship originated from an Ethiopian brokered agreement in Dire Dawe, in 1990, to share the power among SNM, USC and SPM, after the fall of Siyad Barre's government, which was imminent and visible to everybody.

In the south, at the port town of Kisimayo, Darod clan groups organized an 'ad hoc' coalition front to counter the USC attacks from Mogadishu. The coalition lacked cohesiveness, as some of the leaders wanted to restore Siyad Barre to power, while others were quite frustrated by even hearing his name. The only commitment they had in common was to counter the USC forces of Hawiya and their associates. The SPM faction of Mohamed Omar Jess even though in the coalition was loyal to Aideed of USC, and he was temporarily in the loose coalition because of his clan lineage.

In the Northeast, the already disengaged SSDF was reorganizing its forces. The Ethiopians had disengaged the SSDF forces after its leader Abdullahi Yusuf was imprisoned in 1984 in Ethiopia, following a dispute within the organizations' leadership and with the Ethiopian government too. The SSDF formed a coalition with Siyad's own clan (Marehan) in the region to fight the USC forces in the central regions. Majeerten and Marehan clans, who were opponents during the whole 21 years of Siyad Barre rule, joined together in a coalition along Darod clan lineage to counter and fight against the Hawiya.

In the meantime, in the early days of February 1991, the USC political wing tried to make a remedy of the mistakes and Ali Mahdi called for a peace conference to form a national government, which would be convened on 28 February 1991, while the country was already in a state of warfare. Some prominent politicians of SSDF, SPM and SDM had welcomed the call. But both SNM and the Siyadist in the south had rejected it. Aideed of the USC military wing had also rejected it and on 24 February 1991, attacked the north-eastern town of Galkayo, massacring hundreds of civilians. He thus brought the war to the north, which was quiet at that time. The SSDF counter-attacked and by then the conflict extended to the central regions of Mudug and Galgadud. The southern regions were already in a state of rampage and so a full-scale war was mounted in the whole country, except in the breakaway Somaliland.

As a result of these conflicts, the Somalis had aligned themselves according to clan lineage and the second phase of the civil war began. From the onset of 1991 Somali had been experiencing civil warfare, which continues in some parts of the country today. The aftermath of government collapse created an unprecedented human catastrophe in Somalia. The loss of human lives and materials greatly exceeded the destruction inflicted on the north-western regions. The new plight uprooted millions of people from their habitual places of residence; these people ended up either in refugee camps in the bordering countries of Ethiopia and Kenya, or are internally displaced in different parts of their country while others drifted in an exodus all over the world. Hundreds of thousands of innocent people had lost their lives and property, and hundreds of thousands are now refugees or are settled in Western countries, while others in the Diaspora live in African, Arabian and other Asian countries.

In June 1991, under the sponsorship of President Hassan Guled Aptidon of Djibouti a preliminary meeting of a peace parley was held in Djibouti between prominent politicians representing the SSDF, SPM, USC and SDM. An agreement was reached for an immediate cease-fire on all fronts, and a call to all parties to participate in a Peace Conference on 15th July 1991. The cease-fire was observed, within the USC by forces loyal to Ali Mahdi, who withdrew from the conflicts in the south, and by the SSDF in the Northeast.

The Conference was held as scheduled in Djibouti on 15 July 1991. The USC, SDM, SSDF and SPM factions participated in the preliminary meeting, and two others joined, the SDA and the USF, not present at the preliminary parley. The SNM did not participate in and there were not existed other factions, at that time.

A panel of former civilian government political leaders chaired the Conference: Aden Abdulle Osman, former president; Skeikh Mukhtar Mohamed Hussen, former speaker of the House of Parliament; Abdirizak Haji Hussein, former Prime minister and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, former Prime Minister. It was agreed to form a central government for Somalia and Ali Mahdi was appointed as interim president for two years. On 18 August 1991, at Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi was sworn in as interim president, and in October 1991 a government was formed.

The outcome of the 1991 Djibouti peace conference split the USC. The USC chairman Aideed refused to accept the appointment of Ali Mahdi as interim president albeit he himself had nominated his faction's delegation to the Djibouti conference, which selected Ali Mahdi. On 18th November 1991 Aideed attacked Ali Mahdi's headquarters in Mogadishu. He believed that only the UCS had the legitimacy to form a central government for Somalia, with only a small share to go to SNM. General Aideed accused Ali Mahdi of connivance with the Darod clans. He believed that the Darod clans had been defeated with their leader Mohamed Siyad Barre.

The battle for Mogadishu's control between the two USC sub-factions was the worst war ever fought in Mogadishu. Thousands of innocent civilians lost their lives and a great number of properties were destroyed. The indiscriminate shelling obliterated most of the buildings in the central districts. This conflict between the two rival factions in Mogadishu protracted the agony of the city; it continued for almost four months before elders negotiated a ceasefire, in early 1992. There was no one winner in this the deadly confrontation for control of the capital. The city has remained divided since then.

Aideed then continued his search for power by turning his attention beyond the USC to the southern regions. In mid 1992 he captured the stronghold of Mohamed Siyad Barre in the Gedo region, forcing him into exile, where he died in January 1995. Aideed then captured the port of Kisimayo, the SPM-Darod coalition strong hold, in the south. This was not a lasting victory for Aideed, as the warring factions counter-attacked and the fighting escalated until he was driven out, first from Gedo region and then from Kismayo. Aideed disappeared from the war scene for more than three months; it was believed that he was badly injured, and some assumed that he was dead. It was the worst fighting since the collapse of the government in 1991, and the perpetual attacks and counter-attacks reduced the six regions of southern Somalia considerable bloodshed. These wars created hatred between the clans involved in the war, particularly among the Darod, Hawyia and Digle-Mirifle. The tension still persists in the area in May 2001.

The ICRC estimated a loss of about half a million lives in the area, either by direct massacres, or through war related diseases and miseries, up to the time the American force, Operation Restore Hope arrived to deliver food aid and other assistance to the people, in December 1992. The entire population of the southern regions was uprooted, the towns of Baidoa and Kisimayo and the areas around them being the most affected places. Their inhabitants experienced the most wretched conditions, and all sorts of human rights violations. This continues to be an issue, as militiamen from other parts of Somalia still forcefully occupy some regions and towns of the southern area.

The Security Council of the United Nations, on 3rd December 1992, passed Resolution 794 and the United Nations International Task Forces (UNITAF) - led by the United States - arrived in Somalia on 9 December 1992, which became the United Nations Operation for Somalia (UNOSOM) in the early months of 1993, after other states had contributed military contingences to take part in the internationally sponsored unprecedented humanitarian effort. It was hoped that this international intervention would bring a lasting peace to the war-torn nation, a hope that has not so far been realised. Nevertheless, the Somali people (except the sub-USC faction of General Aideed) recognized and acknowledged the unforgettable efforts made by the, Egyptian born, Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali, to involve the world body in the humanitarian and, in an unprecedented, militia disarmament mission to Somalia.

The UN called a Peace Conference, which was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in March 1993. All parties had participated in the conference, including the breakaway Somaliland and a number of newly established unarmed factions. All the participants, except the Somaliland, signed a peace deal, which contained two important points: the establishment of regional administrations, aimed to restore law and order from the grassroots, and the establishment of a Transitional National Council (TNC) to be nominated by the signatory factions and by the regions - one member to be nominated by each participant faction and three members to be appointed from each region. There were 18 administrative divisions/regions in the country at the time of the institutions' collapse. The aim was to reconstruct the central government from the bottom and create the local government institutions first. The establishment of regional administrations and the TNC were two preconditions of institution building, which needed to be accomplished, before any formation of central government in Somalia.

The process was started in many parts of the country soon after the conference and some administrations were quickly established. But Aideed was reluctant to implement the project. He objected to UNOSOM involvement in the process of administration rebuilding and claimed that only he had the legitimacy to nominate administrations in the areas he controlled, as his militia were still in control of all the areas that he had in hand before the arrival of the international forces. Aideed was concerned that the United Nations administration would conduct a democratic process and give opportunities to the legitimate inhabitants of the districts that his militiamen were forcefully controlling, particularly the southern inter-river regions of Digil and Mirifle clans. Furthermore he was worried about the composition of the TNC, which would place him in a minority position in the coming central government formation. As the result of these concerns he mounted a propaganda campaign against UNOSOM, accusing it of imperialistic intentions. The UN then raided his radio station and in retaliation to this his militiamen killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers, on 5th June 1993. Then, in compliance with the Security Council's warrant of arrest, a war of chasing Aideed was undertaken by UNOSOM. Many civilians had died in a number of attempts to arrest him, including well-known elements of his supporters. The chasing continued until 18 American peacekeepers were ambushed in a military operation to arrest him on 3rd October 1993. The death of the Americans affected American public opinion and the United States administration decided to reconsider its commitment to peace enforcement in Somalia. At a Humanitarian Conference in November 1993 at Addis Ababa, in Ethiopia, an American delegation made clear that if Somalis did not want to make progress in their own affairs there was nothing they could do about it. In fact, no progress was made to implement the Addis Ababa accord of 1993, even though the UN reversed its policy towards Aideed in November 1993. Dropping the Addis Ababa accord, the UNOSOM tried to bring together the major warlords to move towards formation of a central government, and at a conference held at Mogadishu in 1994 the UN appeared to support Aideed as leader of a new government. Agreement was never reached because of internal tension over the distribution of power in the proposed government. Aideed of USC/SNA, Abdullahi Yusuf of the SSDF and Abdirahman Mohamed Ali "Tour' of SNM though he was not at the time holding power in Somaliland, attended the conference. This attempt also failed because of Aideed's intransigence. Aideed showed preference to Mr. Abdirahman Mohamed Ali over Abdullahi Yusuf; following which Abdullahi Yusuf walked out of the conference.

Finally, at the end of 1994, with the UN close to pulling out, Aideed appointed himself as president of Somalia, forming an administration that was not effective; it was not recognized either by the international community, or by any Somali faction. In supporting an administration headed by Aideed - once the most wanted fugitive foe of the UNOSOM - the UN was seeking a face-saving solution to pull out from Somalia. In fact, when the UN pulled out at the end of February 1995, the peace enforcement project in Somalia died with the 18 Americans, as also did the hopes of ending the dreadful warfare.

What surprised everybody was the joining of Abdirahman Mohamed Ali 'Tour' to the Aideed's new administration. Abdirahman was the author of the Somaliland's declaration of secession from the rest of Somalia, in May 1991, and now after he had lost the seat of the Somaliland presidency to Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, he changed his mind and volunteered to participate in a final UN sponsored attempt to form a central government for Somalia which would claim jurisdiction over Somaliland also. He became Vice-president of Aideed's USC/SNA 'Sulballaar' pseudo-administration.

Aideed the main actor of the civil warfare, after Mohamed Siyad Barre, was quite myopic in envisaging what would be the final results of a prolonged civil strive in Somalia, in terms of destruction for the country, loss of human lives and future balance of power between the clans. He also miscalculated the possibility of getting rid of Ali Mahdi, whose supporters, the Abgal clan, were deeply rooted in Mogadishu and the area nearby.

The following three things motivated General Aideed's intransigence, apart from his innate personality traits: militarily, his position had been enhanced by the capture of the bulk of the military hardware and ammunitions left behind by Siyad Barre in Mogadishu and other regions; secondly, his hold on the capital city, Mogadishu - in which the outside world also invested great importance - gave charisma and constituted an important power-bargaining resource in the psychology of the Somalis, even though he could not win full control of it from Ali Mahdi; thirdly, he had connections and was getting support from a number of actors outside Somalia - some states of the regional organizations of IGAD and Arab League, such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Libya, and international Islamic organizations.

Aideed's 'Salballar' pseudo-administration was far from being even a regional government, but he continued to claim to be the president. In the meantime, Aideed's attitude towards Abdullahi Yusuf's goodwill gesture to join him in a government angered members of his own USC sub-faction, including his luogotenent Osman Hassan Ali Ato (hereafter Osman Ato). Abdullahi Yusuf came to Mogadishu in 1994 to join Aideed in a government in defiance of his SSDF's refusal to have any dealing whatsoever with Aideed's USC faction. These alignments and divisions prevented any real moves towards satisfactory central government.

During the 1996-1997 period three major events occurred in Somali politics. Firstly, a bitter hostility broke out within Aideed's USC sub-faction. They fought an elimination war against the important elements in the group: an anachronistic tit- for-tat typical Somali style vengeance. In this war, on 31st July 1996, Aideed himself lost his life, after he was ambushed and seriously wounded in clan fighting in Mogadishu. Some people hoped that with his death the prospect for peace in Somalia would improve, as he had been a thorn in the peace plans for six years. Hussein Mohamed Aideed (hereafter Hussein Aideed), succeeded him in the leadership of the faction. He sometimes seemed more flexible than his father, perhaps due to his education.

Secondly, a process of destabilizing Mohamed Ibrahim Egal's Somaliland administration began in the early days of 'Salballar' in 1994, and war broke out in Hargeisa, Burao and around. It was largely believed that Abdirahman Tour's group who joined Aideed's administration had stirred up the civil strives in Somaliland among Issak clans.

Thirdly, the factions opposing 'Sulballaar' claim of central government met in Sodare, Ethiopia, in 1996 and made a convenient marriage of political coalition. This group included all Darod clan factions and some Hawiya leaders, including Ali Mahdi and Osman Ato. The Ethiopian government supported the group and the factions agreed that a conference would be held at the port town of Bosaso in the Northeast of Somalia, in mid 1997, to establish a central government and to overshadow the younger Aideed's claim of the presidency. In the meantime, the Digil and Mirifle clans' territory was occupied by the USC - Hussein Aideed's faction; they were an unarmed population neglected by the UN and left to the prey of the cruel militiamen.

In an attempt that seemed to boost the proposed Bosaso conference, the Arab countries Egypt, Libya and Yemen proposed to bring the Hussein Aideed's (hereafter Hussein Aided) faction to the negotiation table and to dissuade Aideed from his unreasonable claims. Some leaders of the coalition supported the move. These included Osman Ato, perhaps facing the dilemma of being isolated from his USC Haber-Gedir faction and seeking sympathy from his people. Ethiopia agreed to a changed venue for the peace conference, in which all but Somaliland participated in. It was held in November 1997 at Cairo, Egypt.

In the negotiations, the two groups, the 'Sodare' coalition and the Hussein Aideed's faction, were given equal weight in the representation; though the Aideed faction had been in effect from the Haber-Gedir, sub clan of Hawiya. But before reaching the final agreement, the Sodare group split into two. The Hawiya elements of the 'Sodare group' did not support the original agreement to convene at Bosaso, in the SSDF area. They voted, instead, for Baidoa, which was an unstable war-torn center, still controlled by the opposing Aideed faction. Abdulahi Yusuf of SSDF and General Aden Gabyow (hereafter Aden Gabyow) of SPM abandoned the conference in protest; and despite some later efforts by the Ethiopian government to safeguard the peace deal, the proposed Baidoa conference never materialized. Baidoa was put on the table just to refuse Bosaso. What was bizarre in that Cairo meeting was the lack of support of Ali Mahdi of Bosaso town to host the conference? He was quite popular in the Northeast and was the chairman of the political coalition SSA that SSDF was part of, and he had more probability than anyone else to be elected again as interim president in Bosaso. His move also frustrated his own supporters in Mogadishu and reduced his popularity

4.2.5 The Birth of the Puntland State of Somalia - 1998

In an angry protest the people of the Northeast, dismayed by the attitudes of Mogadishu warlords, in public rallies expressed their will to detach from the proposed dealing requesting the SSDF executive council to change policy. Consultative mini-conference was held, on 25 February 1998 in Garowe, in which was decided that, enough time had been spent waiting for a central government formation. It was decided to establish a provincial government, which would be a state of its own, a legal entity with separate political and administrative structure but still remaining in the sphere of a future federal system of the country.

On 15 May 1998, a constitutional conference was held in the town of Garowe at which about six hundred delegates from five regions participated in. These included the other Harti sub- clans of Sol, East Sanag and the district of Buhodle who their traditional leaders and political faction the USP had, at the preliminary consultative meetings of February, decided to join the newly forming Puntland state of Somalia. On 1 August 1998, the congress elected Abdullahi Yusuf of SSDF as the president of the new state and Mohamed Abdi Hashi of USP as his vice president. The formation of Puntland marked a historical watershed in the Somali political landscape. It created a new precedent moving from a highly centralized government system since its independence in 1960 to a new political and administrative structure of decentralization, based on the democratic principle of self-determination without secession from Somalia, and coming from the will of the people.

Later on, when the Baidoa conference was not realized Ali Mahdi joined Hussein Aideed in an effort to form a regional administration in Mogadishu. They established a police force for Mogadishu, which was financially supported by Libya. The two faction leaders became co-chairmen for the administration, but it failed after a short time because they had by-passed powerful elements of the Abgal clan, such as Muse Sudi Yalahow and Hussein Bot.

Meanwhile, in the southern regions, in 1999, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) captured their home territory of Bay and Bakol regions including the important town of Baidoa from Hussein Aideed faction. In the same year General Mohamed Hersi Morgan lost the port town of Kisimayo to a new coalition of Marehan (Darod) and Habar-Gidir (Hawiya) clans.

Finally, after almost eight years in vain striving for a peaceful solution in the war-torn nation since the outset of President Siyad, in September 1999, at the General Assembly of the United Nations, President Ismail Omar Gheulleh of the Djibouti republic, denounced the warlords in Somalia of obstructing peace in Somalia failing to end the anguish of their people. He called for a conference for promoting civil society to be held in Arte, in Djibouti, which his government would sponsor.

The United Nations welcomed the proposition and the Somali public, by and large, applauded the initiative. The content of the initial procedural program was good, but showed lack of knowledge and experience of the magnitude of the problem. The schedule of the meetings and the time framework allocated for each stage of the conference seemed designed for the meeting sessions of sophisticated bureaucrats representing well-organized institutions. In fact, the schedule was revised but there was no written and agreed-upon procedure to follow in deliberating issues on agendas, passing the motions, solving the problems and overriding the obstacles. In short there were no plans to meet the enormous challenges ahead for a real problem-solving conference.

The conference started according to schedule, but from an early stage, it was conducted with ad hoc procedure at the discretion of the chairing panel and went on in that way from May to August 2000 when the chiefs chose the members of the legislative body. There were two features that stood out at the beginning of the conference: a clan-based procedural orientation, where the chiefs made all major decisions, and a Siyadist campaign outlook, where the conference leaders and the leading technical experts were not independent impartial elements, but rather were politically motivated and highly interested parties. The key decision makers, in the chairing panel and technical committee, were campaigners for the powerful and well-connected candidates for the presidency.

Although the responsibilities for this apparent misconduct falls on the Somali managers, as the two dimensions constituted the whole spirit of the conference, the Djibouti government cannot escape from sharing this responsibility, for three reasons. Firstly, it was the Djibouti tycoon Abdirahman Bodhe who was apparently the real force manoeuvring the campaign spirit of the conference and to whom the conference managers were well connected. Secondly, the clan oriented climate was encouraged by the Djibouti government, which either by negligence or by ignorance could not understand the great difference between Somalia, and the mini-state of Djibouti whose ethnic Somali 'Isse' clan customary law 'Heer Isse' is above any other law in the country. Thirdly, the Djibouti authority rejected or turned a deaf ear to any genuine proposal brought forward, either by good-will elements of the Somali participants, or by any interested international community representatives. A temporary moratorium on the process was requested by the external facilitators, including the UN, to enable them persuade important Somali leaders to join the conference.

There were two circumstances that really overshadowed the reconciliatory spirit of the conference. First was the Siyadist style - where motions proposed by the chairing panel were adopted by acclamation from an uncounted chanting crowd composed mainly of former cadres and activists of the President Siyad's orientation centres of his 'Socialist Revolutionary Party'. The second was the conference's clan representation style which brought together virtually, at the venue of the conference, people from all the five parties that the Somalilands had been divided into during the colonial era (Ethnic Somalians from Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti itself) - and not just Somalians from the collapsed Somali Republic as ought to have been the case.

The great majority of the participants of the conference were people who, though they experienced difficulties during the civil warfare, had preserved the emotional spirit of following blindly a conductor of an orchestral political concert, typical of the Siyad regime. Indeed, the faces of the conductors and the followers of the concert at Arte, Djibouti, were familiar to each other; they shared the past regime's political values and experience.

In Arte, Djibouti, decisions were made by the elders/chiefs. They approved the conference, decided the criteria for the choice of delegates, nominated the participants in the conference, appointed the MPs, and also determined the kingmakers for the political positions. One could understand that in an anarchical society, where administration representing the people does not exist, as is the case in many parts of Somalia, the legitimacy of representing communities might be invested in elders, if they enjoyed the trust of the members of their communities. But once that legitimacy is transferred, the process should stop there. The elders lacked professionalism, were prone to political manipulations and often fell into traps. What that conference really lacked was an intellectual role to act professionally in processing, analyzing, negotiating and making decisions on issues on the agenda.

Three important incidents had occurred during the process of the conference in this respect. Firstly, the delegation from the Puntland community was humiliated when the provisional Charter was passed at the venue of the conference while they were absent from the floor because of deadlocks posed on some issues. The dilemma of the Puntlandians was so great that in the Charter their administration was denied to exist at all (only 18 administrative regions were recognized in it) and their proposition to distribute the seats on the basis of constituency, rather than on a thorny and divisive clan option, did not prevail yet, and it was in a deadlock. The issue being, who represents whom? If the decisions on issues had not been of the elders, the bulk of the members of the Puntland community delegation would have abandoned the conference.

The second event was the split of the RRA during the process of the conference, which the conference managers were largely blamed for. The participation of the RRA was important because it boosted the conference being the only Somali organization that had consented to come in.

The third event was a diplomatic incident, caused by the Djibouti tycoon Abdirahman Bodhe; he mistreated the special envoy of the European Union Ambassador Sigurd Illing. Abdirahman Bodhe, apparently acting on behalf of the government, prevented in a very discourteous manner, the Ambassador from proceeding to a ceremony to which he had been officially invited. Many Somalis present at the scene, including myself, were angered by Bodhe's behavior and attitude towards the ambassador. The EU is the major contributor of the aid program currently given to Somalia and Europe and Somalia have historical link and permanent interest in each other, and for these reasons the Ambassador was there to contribute to conference financial donations and to exercise his good offices towards the success of the conference.

Two international events coincided with Abdiqassim's accession to power at Arte, the Arab Summit at Cairo, and the Millennium Summit at New York. In mid August 2000, 245 members of a provisional parliament were appointed including 20 chosen by President Ismail Omer Geulleh of Djibouti, and on 26 August they elected Abdilqasim as the interim president. The international community described this event as an important step towards a full reconciliation of Somalis, which is yet to be completed, thus giving a mark of approval to the election of Abdiqassim.

On 30 September Abdiqassim led a large delegation of the provisional parliament to visit Mogadishu, where he received an unprecedented warm welcome by huge number of people lining the Mogadishu streets; the event attracted the attention of both the Somalis and the international community. Then, on the second September, Abdilqassim, heading a delegation composed of prominent members of the different groups, left for Cairo to take part in an Arab League foreign ministers summit, and then, from there he went to New York to participate in the Millennium Summit of the world head of states. In both meetings Abdiqassim was given the privilege of speaking on behalf of the Somalis as interim president of Somalia. It was the first time in ten years, since Siyad Barre was ousted, that someone had such an opportunity in an international event. Col. Hassan Mohamed Noor 'Shatigadud' (hereafter Hassan Shatigadud) of RRA also took part in the delegation. Hassan Shatigudud would later abandon Abdilqassim's administration, after their return to Djibouti.

Returning to Djibouti on 21 September, Abdilqassim started the consultation to nominate the Prime Minister for his administration. He consulted the different groups of the provisional parliament, which overwhelmingly, in writing, supported the nomination of Ali Khalif Galeydh, (hereafter Ali Khalif) a member of the Darod/Harti clan, Dhulbahante sub clan. But to the astonishment of everybody Abdiqassim S. Hassan then insisted on proposing the appointment of Ismail Mohamud 'Bouba' (hereafter Ismail Bouba). There were speculations that Mr. Bouba had close connections with the Saudi Arabia government and his nomination would be very beneficial financially. Abdilqassim met intense resistance for his refusal to accept the outcome of the consultation process, which angered many people from the different groups. In a spirit of clanism, the various clans of Darod, threatened to abandon his administration if he did not appoint Ali Khalif. Abdilqassim succumbed and appointed Ali Khalif on 8 October 2000, having been virtually forced to do so.

Abdilqassim's appointment was internationally welcomed and defined as an important step toward a comprehensive Somali reconciliation. Accordingly, he was expected to act towards meaningful all-inclusive steps of peace dealings; but in fact, he acted differently taking the path of destabilizing activities.

Judging from his attitudes and statements to the international media during his international tour, it would seem that Abdiqassimm was not capable of dealing with the challenges awaiting him. His stand on the sensitive issues related to Puntland, Somaliland, his opponents in Mogadishu and the southern regions were very disappointing. When asked about some of these issues he stated that the people of Kisimayo had invited him to visit them, apparently contacted by the coalition of militiamen who captured the town in 1999 (of which his own sub-clan was a part). He finally recognized those militiamen as his forces, sending them financial and logistic support.

In Puntland, Abdilqassim relied upon initial popular support for the Djibouti conference, which gradually faded after the frustrations of their community delegation at Djibouti. Through the international media, Abdilqassim publicly praised the destabilizing activists that a group of locally recruited agitators had, allegedly, stirred up.

With regard to the faction leaders Abdilqassim relied on recruiting their militiamen and then using them against their leaders. His failed attempt, of 19 December 2000, to capture Muse Sudi Yalahow's stronghold in Balad town, 30km north of Mogadishu, was an example of using recruited militiamen against faction leaders of Mogadishu, and in regard to the RRA, he was relying on the members in the administration to make a breakthrough and isolate or oust the RRA chairman, Hassan Shatigadud. In fact, on 6 January 2000, the speaker of the provisional parliament, Abdullahi Derow Issak, who was visiting the RRA area in Bakol region was nearly killed and was humiliated. In the Gedo region, a delegation sent there had exacerbated the already boiling situation in the region, and the new conflict erupted did not turn to Abdilqassim's favor.

4.2.8 The New anti-Abdiqassim Line-Up

In an effort to stop Abdiqassim's escalating attempts of destabilization, an unprecedented coalition of faction leaders of Mogadishu, southern regions and RRA meeting was held in El-Berd, Bakol region, in January 2001. Puntland also attended the meeting and supported it. It was agreed to form an anti-Abdiqassim administration coalition, and to hold a further meeting. In March 2001, they met again in Awasa, in Ethiopia, where they formed a new organization, 'Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council' (SRRC) and agreed on the principle of 'bottom up' administration rebuilding. This means establishing regional administrations prior to any central government formation. This is apparently a Puntland prototypical structural government, which was a clear indication of the outcome of the study, sponsored by the EU, and conducted by the London School of Economic and Political Science - a Decentralized Political Structure in a future Somali government, (see: A Menu of Options - Seminar One of August 1995 and Seminar Two of November 1996, both held in Kenya).

The effectiveness of this new coalition in putting forward their stated plan is yet to be seen. We will see if they can reconcile the people and restore regional and central administrations in Somalia. In a similar coalition in the 1996-1997, the so-called 'Sodare' group - an anti-Sulballa', the Aideed's self-styled government - split when elements of the group, in a spirit of clanism, joined their opponent's position at the Cairo conference. At the moment, Abdiqassim administration members have been isolated in Mogadishu hotels for seven months, since 13th October 2000. Mogadishu factions have so far impeded them in the opening of the port and airport of Mogadishu.

In this circumstance of antagonistic grouping two questions need to be answered. Firstly, was the new group built on a spirit free of clan animosity and based only on political interest in this semi-final round of the power struggle? If the answer is yes, all will depend upon how cohesive the group will be and how supportive its members will be to each other, in the event of conflict of interest that will certainly arise in the course of shaping the structure of any future regional administrations. Secondly, are the 'Awasa' group's external supporters more powerful than the external supporters of Abdiqassim's administration? This is a difficult question to answer; it depending on the kind of measurement used to assess the balance of power between the two external supporters.

In this argument, no one expects that the Somalis should be left alone to independently solve their own affairs; history tells us that the Somalis have been in dilemmas since the division of their territories from the 19th century. We know that when the Somalis were in conflict among themselves or with a foreign country, they always sought alliances and support from other groups within themselves or from outside actors.

Since the Somalis, from 1978 onwards, have been unable to approach the issues assertively and take meaningful steps towards reconciliation, they have always depended on external support. Mohamed Siyad Barre himself was dependent on crucial external support; he lost the war with Ethiopia when the Soviet support shifted to Ethiopia. After the war, he received aid from the West because the West, in the mid Cold War, had interests in this strategic crossroad in the Horn of Africa. He received money from the West to recruit soldiers and weapons to fight his people and they continued to provide him with this assistance until it was clear that the Cold War was over, on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Empire. In 1988 the United States suspended shipment of arms and ammunitions to President Siyad, and in July 1989 suspended $21 million in economic aid, which was reprogrammed to other African countries in September of the same year.⁶

During the ten years of the bloody civil warfare, the group who enjoyed external power connections had the upper hand in the stalemate, as was the case with Aideed of USC/SNA faction, the SNF in Gedo region, and the RRA in the Bay and Bakol regions. No one can win a war in the present civil strive without powerful external support, taking into account that no one wants to turn to costless independent conflict resolution among Somalis themselves. External support is an undeniable reality because everyone needs crucial resources.

Likewise, in the eventuality of an open conflict between the two currently antagonistic groups, every group has its own external supporters. At the moment, some countries of the Arab League are giving financial support to the Abdilqassim administration; and the newly formed coalition (SRC) counts on Ethiopian support in their effort to balance power.

Somalia is victim of its geographical location. As Raman Bhardwaj, describing the geo-strategy of Somalia, wrote in 1979:

Somalia is a strategic place, if not for world powers as it was in the Cold War period, it is for the regional countries and for the international trade. The Arabs (Arab League) on one side, and the mainland African organization of IGAD (Inter Governmental Authority on Development) countries, such as Ethiopia and Kenya on the other side, are interested in for their security, stability and trade relations. Somalia belongs to both these regional organizations, but there is one reality, which came to the surface during the last two decades of torment in Somalia; and that is the Somalis are only Africans, not Arab-Africans. This is an important consideration.

Even though, Somalis are Muslims and members of the Arab League, no Arab country had opened its door freely to the Somali exodus as refugees. Only a few showed some tolerance and acceptance of the Somalis in their countries; the South Yemen accepted the boat people from Somalia, only after the United Nations High Commission for Refugees pressured it. Thankfully, Syria had not impeded the Somalis entry, but it is too far away and does not provide any material support to the deprived people. Likewise, the United Arab Emirates is quite tolerant to the Somalians and accepts Somali Passports. Saudi Arabia, which is the richest country and once considered to be closest friend to Somalia, regularly imprisons and deports the Somalis to Ethiopia. Not to mention the economic problems created by banning Somali livestock, the backbone of Somali economy, and buying charcoal from the local mafia thus contributing to the Somali environmental devastation. Export of charcoal was forbidden before the Somali government was collapsed. In contrast to most Arab countries, the African countries, from Eritrea to South Africa and from Kenya to Nigeria, opened their doors without any condition to all Somalis, except the initial resistance of the Kenyan government and the continuous harassment of its policemen. Ethiopia stands out first in this African humanitarian gesture of fraternal acceptance and tolerance to the Somali exodus. This is not a rhetorical argument but a reality that Somalis had experienced and will keep in mind forever.

In the past the Arabs, particularly Egypt, were allied with Somalia against Ethiopia, while Ethiopia was allied with Israel but has always had diplomatic and trade relations with the Arab countries. Somalia never had any kind of relationship with Israel for the sake of its Arab Muslim brothers. Now new events have occurred; Somalia is collapsed; the Arab brothers have not done what was expected for the Somali brothers; but Ethiopia did the unexpected. It opened its doors to the disparate Somali exodus.

Now the question is which of the two contending groups for the control of Somalia will prevail, each counting on its external supporters?

Abdilqassim has taken the traditional path by allying with Arabs, loudly accusing Ethiopia for interference and resorting to Somali nationalism. Surely, Ethiopia, since the collapse in 1991, is involved in the Somali political struggle as other nations of the region do. But, can Ethiopia be a scapegoat for the Somali shortcomings? Certainly, it cannot be. Somalis should blame themselves for not being able to solve their own problems.

Contrary to Abdiqassim, the 'Awasa' group aligns with Ethiopia against the Somali tradition. However, this circumstance draws similarity with the Somali rebel groups who fought President Siyad's regime in the 1970's and 1980's and finally overthrew him in January 1991.

However, in this stalemate of alliances, the Arabs are more resourceful, in terms of money, than the Ethiopians, while the Ethiopians are closer and more committed, because of their security concerns with Somalia with which they share a long unstable border.

Does the present standoff, between the Transitional Government in Mogadishu and its opponents, have a solution? If yes, what is the solution? If not, what would be the consequences? In my opinion it is yes. It has a solution if all parties agree to compromise and recourse to an all-inclusive Somali solution, without any party claiming a privilege over the rest. It is only in that way those external forces would not have a role to play except a genuine support of problem solving.

Conversely, should the parties reject a fair Somali solution, the antagonism will continue as far as the external actors will be committed to support the contending parties, hence the nations' agony will be further protracted with none eventually to win control of the country. External support may prolong the survival of one party against its opponent, but it does not help to bring about a permanent defeat of any party over another. The matter is not between a government and dissidents against it - as it was in the case of President Siyad's regime - but it is rather between clans, and/or clan rooted administrations, where one clan cannot overwhelm another clan.

This antagonistic political struggle and alliances is not in the interest of Somalia. By now, Somalia should have a better relationship with Ethiopia. A future relationship should be based on mutual fraternal comprehension of all issues between the two nations in order to achieve peaceful coexistence between the neighbouring countries, and to strengthen the already existing natural trade relations and social interactions between the two long-term isolated, from each other, populations. The interest of Somalia also lies in maintaining the traditional good relationship it has had with its Arab Muslim brother countries, but without seeking support against Ethiopia. This can only be achieved if the present antagonism between the Somali groups is resolved without recourse to force. Otherwise it will end with an externally supported zero-sum outcome, and the vicious circle of Tit-for-Tat reactions will continue.

The 17th century English political theorist, Thomas Hobbes described, "the three causes of quarrels as competition, difference (i.e., distrust), and glory. Competition leads to fighting for gain, diffidence to fighting to keep what has been gained, glory to fighting for reputation."⁸ All these elements of quarrel are present in the Somali conflict.

Since 1991, in the process of the civil warfare, no clan, coalition of clans, or warlords has won control of Somalia. During this period, clanism was the dominant force in the peace dealings, in competing with each other and seeking support for political positions, but it then generated sub-clan conflicts. Clanism is not a unitary-rational entity; it breaks down into anarchic and divisive smaller and smaller cellular unities, hence a clannish political leader is unlikely to be endowed with a national loyalty above his group. Therefore, from the beginning of the civil strive; suspicion has mounted among the Somali communities due to fear of a clan- dominated regime, which might subjugate the rest.

In these circumstances of reciprocal distrust and mental anarchy, two important facts need to be considered for future negotiations. Firstly, considering the current anarchical situation in the country, law and order cannot be restored by adopting a centralised approach, (i.e., from a central government), but from local communities adopting a bottom-up approach. This latter approach was experimented in Somaliland and Puntland and was very successful. Secondly, a compromise on all issues is necessary in future negotiations; compromise, being the key dimension of conflict resolution, was always disregarded in the previous competitive dealings.

1	E.Sylvia Pankhurst, 'Ex-Italian Somaliland, ed. 'New Times and Ethiopian News', London, Watts & Co., 1951 p.260.
2	Ibid. p.180
3	Ibid. p.160
4	E.Sylvia Pankhurst, 'Ex-Italian Somaliland, ed. 'New Times and Ethiopian News', London, Watts & Co., 1951, p.325
5	Ibid. pp.323-4
6	African Watch Report, 'A Government at War with its Own People, Somalia', Washington, January 1990, p. 216
7	Raman G. Bhordawaj, 'The Dilemma of Horn of Africa', New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1979, p.166
8	Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", in C.W. Kegley (ed.), "Controversies in International Relations Theory", (New York: St Martin's press, 1995), Ch.3, p.79

[Note for writers: Bookmarks are installed at the beginning of each section, i.e. 3, 3.2, and 3.2.1, and for each footnote, i.e. fn1 - fn8]