Prospects, obstacles to peace in
Sudan
Interview: Dr. Riek Machar
Executive Intelligence Review, March 13, 1998, pp. 27-31
EIR:
Dr. Machar, could you bring us up to date on where the peace process
stands, one year after the peace treaty was incorporated into the
Constitution?
Machar:
After we promulgated the agreement, and the Constitution was made, we
thought that, for the peace to be complete, there was a need to bring in
other players, who were not involved, and particularly John Garang [head
of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, SPLAI, on the question of the
South. I made efforts to meet face to face with John Garang, and this
happened in June, in Uganda). My aim was to explain to John Garang that
the political issues on which the war has been fought, had been resolved.
Whether it was the national state we wanted to establish in Sudan-Sudan
being multi-ethnic, multi-racial, multi-religious, multicultural, with the
definition of citizenship as the basis for rights. So, I explained to him
that this was the cornerstone solution to resolving the conflicts in the
country, whether there are differences on rights and freedoms, or
differences on the system of government. We recall that the South, since
1947, has been calling for implementation of a different system for the
country, be- cause Sudan is so large and so diverse. So, I explained to
him that we can resolve all these issues within a multi-racial,
multicultural ' multi-religious Sudan.
Now,
I also explained to him that the South has its special characteristics, as
has been addressed in the Coordinating Council; therefore, the South can
handle its own problems. The Coordinating Council would give us an
umbrella government for the whole South, and even if there were
legislation which we felt were not good for the South, the Coordinating
Council could seat this legislation off, [preventing it] from affecting
the population in the South. And, finally, the permanent solution depends
on the people, to exercise their right of self-determination, through the
referendum, with the two options open: unity, or opting for secession.
So,
what I was telling him was, "Look, there is no political reason for
the war today." What remains is, if he wants power, then this can be
achieved, not through the barrel of the gun, but through the ballot box.
Therefore, if he came and bid for this, saying the country was not
democratic, that there was no pluralism, I indicated to him that Sudan was
marching toward democratization, and as of Jan. 1, this year, Sudan now
has many parties that have been registered. We have now registered the
United Democratic Salvation Front: The front that signed the peace
agreement, has now registered as a political party.
With
this, we hope that if the question is power, in the country, or in the
South, anybody can bid for power at any level: the level of the South, the
level of the Coordinating Council, or the level of the federal government.
So, the SPLA should be free to come in, and establish itself as a
political party, and make sure that it abandons the armed struggle.
Because after all, they can achieve the objectives they stand-
for, whether it is unity in the multiplicity of Sudan, or secession
for the South, this can be done through peaceful means,
instead of the continuation of destruction in the South or in
the East.
So,
originally, we explained these concepts, contained in the peace agreement
in the Constitution, to the neighboring countries, and our belief is that,
if Sudan can be stable, it would actually bring about stability and peace
in the region. We are a big
country, and border on about nine countries, and once we are unstable, it
will affect others, because of the nature of the composition of African
countries. You will find, across the borders, tribes that share the same
language, same culture; for example, I come from the Nuer, and, in western
Ethiopia, nobody would question my being a Nuer. So, anything that
destabilizes the Nuer land in Sudan, has repercussions on the Nuer land in
Ethiopia, and the same goes for the tribes in Equatoria, or Zandi in
western Equatoria, some of whom are in Democratic Congo and some in the
Central African Republic. If you go into western Sudan, also, you'll find
that we have common tribes with Chad, and so on. So, any instability in
Sudan spills over into neighboring countries.
Thus, our contention was, that if a comprehensive peace was
achieved in Sudan, the rest would he stable.
Now
that we have addressed the fundamental problems which made us different,
whether it be the southern problem, or the question of democratization and
pluralism, or with some northern political parties, and took up arms, we
have now resolved this. Our
main concern is that we may not reach an agreement with the northern
political parties or the SPLA in the South; this is because the American
position has not really shifted, it is not yet for peace in the Sudan. 44
Strategic Studies
There
is no logical explanation, because we know the three reasons for which the
U.S. administration was at odds with Khartoum. One, was the question of
peace and war in the Sudan. The steps taken by the Sudan government on the
question of war and peace, particularly toward peace, are known. What we
had expected was that the American administration would support the peace
process, support it politically, support it morally, support it
financially, but today, one of our handicaps is [the lack of] financial
support for the implementation of the peace agreement. And we had expected
the Western world, the U.S., to support this noble process, because this
would bring stability to the country. With the peace agreement, a lot of
things have changed.
One
accusation of the U.S. administration, was that Khartoum was harboring
international terrorism. Since 1997, this talk has totally died down,
because it has been proven that it is not there. If at all, if it had
existed before, now no longer. One would have thought the American
administration would have been happy, and supported the peace process.
The
third reason why the U.S. administration was against Khartoum was the
question of human rights. They used to talk about religious persecution,
detention of political opposition figures, but this is no longer there. I
remember the speech of Sudanese President Gen. [Omar] Bashir on April 5
this year, when he opened the Parliament, and he said, "We do not
have a single political prisoner." This would also be attributed to
the fact that the peace agreement has brought about liberalization,
respect of human rights, and therefore people are free to express their
political views without fearing intimidation or detention. So, one [would
have] thought that the U.S. administration would see the qualitative
change that had taken place.
The
fourth issue over which the U.S. administration was at odds with Sudan,
was the question of democratization and pluralism. Now we have made it.
The parties are registered, and one felt that the U.S. administration
would support this process, so that a comprehensive peace would be brought
about. And before the U.S. Ambassador, Mr. [Timothy] Carney, left Sudan, I
had a long conversation with him. By then, Sudan was drafting the
Constitution. My advice was, "Why doesn't the U.S. support this move
to constitutionality?" But it was not supported. I was surprised that
the move toward democratization and pluralism was not even being
supported.
These
were the four issues the U.S. administration had raised, in its opposition
to the Sudan government. I thought, on the international front, the Sudan
government has done its best. On the internal front, it has pushed the
peace process, and all it needs is support from the international
community to ensure that those who have been fighting come to the peace
process. There is openness for it.
Let
us say, Sudan has been declaring a comprehensive cease-fire from time to
time; prior to any peace talks, the Sudan government would declare a
cease-fire. But strangely enough, the SPLA would refuse the cease-fire.
And when people were dying, the humanitarian situation was not a good one;
in Bahr al Ghazal, it was so bad-in the areas controlled by the SPLA. But
then we opted for a comprehensive ceasefire, so that this humanitarian
situation could be corrected. That was not heeded by the SPLA, the
international community could not exercise influence on the SPLA, so that
the humanitarian situation could be corrected. In addition, the world made
a lot of noise about what was happening, but they could have pressured the
parties to accept a comprehensive cease-fire. It didn't happen.
In
a way, as if condoning the mass deaths from starvation in the South-but
then, the liberation process would be meaningless, because if people are
dying, what are you "liberating" after all? Mainly, people were
dying in the areas controlled by the SPLA. So, we thought, by July 1998,
that the SPLA would have come to reason and said, "Look, enough is
enough. The Sudan government has shown good faith, in settling the problem
peacefully." That was not the case. After all, we got bombed, on Aug.
20. We did not see the justification for the bombing. We did not see the
need for that pressure, to get to peace, because, already, steps had been
taken by the Sudan government, whether on the question of the South,
whether on the Constitution, and there was a program to reach democracy
and pluralism. And yet, they dropped the bombs. And before that, it was an
economic and trade embargo. These pressures do not have any justification.
Sadiq al Mahdi and Othman Mirgani have to be pressured, to come to peace. If they think that they have the majority in the streets, if they think the population would vote for them, they should have the courage to come here, register their parties, and run for elections. This could be done by the U.S. administration. Most probably, the British stand would not allow that. So, in a way, it looks as if the peace process that was started in 1996 and completed in 1997, is to collapse. But that would mean going back to a war, where they expect support. If today we have difficulties implementing the peace agreement, it is from the financial aspect; it is because the West and particularly America has not supported it. So nobody is moving to financially support the implementation of the peace agreement..
EIR:
What do you think motivates Garang to be so stubborn? His own people are
dying because of the war, and he still refuses.
Machar:
I think he has not gotten the message. And the other side is telling him,
don't do business with this government. They don't want it. The U.S.
administration doesn't want this government.
EIR:
But if he is an African, why is he listening more to them than to his own
people?
Machar:
Maybe because he thinks there's only one super-power today which decides
the fate of many nations in this world. Probably. As I'm telling you, we
didn't get any financial support, from anyone, to implement the peace
agreement. So, he may be holding out; if the U.S. doesn't want a peace
agreement with this government, then where does he implement it? But the
resources which are now going into the continuation of the war, could be
used to implement the peace. But the main reason, is what the superpower
says.
EIR:
Is this what John Garang told you?
Machar:
This is what we understand. Because there is no reason for continuation of
the war.
EIR:
But what was his actual response?
Machar:
He was dismissive. He was dismissive in the sense that he held back. Those
people are buying time, they are not serious. There is a war, but it is on
all of us, the North and the South. The South is worse, because the war is
being fought there; people get displaced, others die because of disease,
others die because of hunger and the problems like floods, drought, and all that. So, in a way, he needs to be helped.
There
is also the psychology of war, and he has become afraid of peace. I think
John Garang is afraid of peace. He has become used to war for so long that
he has lost the political will to come to peace. But, he could be helped.
If he needs international guarantees, the IGAD [Inter-Govemmental
Authority for Development] forum, supported by the IGAD partners, is a
good international forum for guaranteeing any agreement he arrives at with
the government. He says that he lacks confidence in this government.
EIR:
On IGAD: Are there other governments associated with that process which
are supportive of the peace process?
Machar:
Yes, I think the Germans and the Italians, maybe the Norwegians; those are
clearly in support of getting a peaceful settlement.
EIR:
On other occasions, we have discussed the possibility of bringing the
truth about the peace process to the U.S. population. A delegation could
go there and lobby Congress, to present the reality of the peace process.
Have you had the opportunity to go to the U.S. as a representative, a
leading protagonist of this process?
Machar:
I don't think the American public, the American people, know that there
are children, women, and elderly people dying because of war in the Sudan.
They do not know about it. They do not know how long this war has gone on;
it is now over 44 years since the first shot [was fired]. And over 52
years since the conflict was raised. And the very political solutions
suggested during those years, whether in 1947 or in 1956, are today the
ones that are being implemented.
Now,
if we've got a political solution, our conflict that had lasted so long,
we expected the American public to support it. I don't know whether they
know that people who should explain it to them are barred from going to
the U.S. There was a conference held at the U.S. Institute of Peace [USIP].
The Sudan government was belatedly invited. I had a long talk with Dr.
[Thomas] Smock [of USIP], who was the organizer.
I told him, "Look, the, Sudan government is ready to send a
high-level delegation, led by the First Vice-President, if they were going
to be let into the U.S." I talked to the guys responsible for the
[U.S. State Department] Sudan desk, I talked with
(Matt] Harrington, and with [Thomas] Gallagher, responsible for
Sudan, trying to persuade them to move for top-level Sudan government
officials to be at that conference if the opposition is invited. Because
we strongly feel we have a case to make, to the Congress, to the American
public; we have a case to make to the world. That, sometimes, we are being
denied.
I
don't think it is easy for Sudanese diplomats to go into Britain, a former
colonial power in Sudan, which should keep its doors open, for dialogue. I
even don't think there is a sincere dialogue, that the U.S. administration
is serious about dialogue with the Sudanese government on the issues they
raised. Because if they had dialogued seriously, they would have found out
that the issues they raised, on which the U.S. administration imposed
trade and economic sanctions, and bombed one of the medicine factories,
these issues would have been resolved. I think the U.S. administration, or
even the public, would ask themselves-the American taxpayer is paying for
most of the humanitarian aid in south Sudan, but can this humanitarian aid
be shifted to development, to empowering the people to produce for
themselves? If this war is stopped, I think this can be done. But how do
we explain that to the American public, to the Congress, to the U.S.
administration, when the U.S. administration is shunning dialogue, is
ignoring whatever positive steps have been taken?
EIR:
And what happened with the USIP conference? Did a delegation go?
Machar:
What we did, some of our supporters, Sudanese, as individuals, attended,
people who could serve their country. We said to them, the Sudan
government cannot send a delegation because the U.S. administration cannot
give them, visas. You are Sudanese citizens in America; attend on our: behalf, this is our position. So, I would say, intentionally,
a forum was created to lash out against Sudan, and intentionally, the
Sudan government was denied an opportunity to defend itself. You cannot
try somebody in absentia when that person is not refusing to be present.
Particularly when we heard that John Garang was going to attend, we said
we would send a high-level delegation.
EIR:
How do you respond to the new allegations of slavery, which are being
spread massively in Canada and in Britain?
Machar:
I saw a video shot in areas controlled by the SPLA. Now, the question is: Who is sanctioning the slavery? Is it
the SPLA? ... Since that time, it has been our concern that, if at all
such is happening, it will stand out, and then we see the North and South
have very long borders.
The
war was very intensive in northern Bahr al Gazal, in Wahabi state, which
are adjacent to southern Cordofan and southern Dafur states. There was big
displacement in the areas of Waharat state, and northern Bahr al Gazal
state. There was famine in that area. So, desperate people would also
abandon their children. The intensive fighting can cause abductions.
We have tried our best. I am part of the government: If there is
slave trade of people of the South going on, and people of the North [are
involved), we try to get at the truth: Where are the markets for that?
Abduction-I can understand how it happens. Recently, there was a
conference in Bahr al Gazal, a peace and reconciliation conference between
the Dinka and the Nuer people. In the resolution of that conference-which
was successful, with the international community involved, people from
America were involved-one of the resolutions was about locating
people-children, women-who had been abducted during seven years of
conflict. If you turn that into the slave trade, that is wrong. Let us
say, even if it were happening in that part of this country, what would be
the cause of it? It would be the war. It would be the fact that there is
lawlessness created by the war. Why, then, not resolve the fundamental
problem? The problem is this war. Get to a peaceful settlement, and then
impose authority of government in that area. To me this would be the
approach to take, that is why we are pushing for peace.
EIR:
You mentioned the financial constraints. Can you say something about what
has been achieved, despite these constraints, on the ground over the past
year?
Machar:
You know that the South is made up of many states. Now there are
governments and state assemblies in place, doing their normal work,
providing security, providing services to the people, doing limited
development with the resources they have. We in the Coordinating Council
have rebuilt some of the infrastructure destroyed by the war. The main
emphasis is on agriculture, so that our people can have food security, and
the other is security itself, so that they can produce for themselves. The
third is that we try to open up roads and river transport, so that this
infrastructure can help us carry out development. Some industries,
particularly the labor-intensive industries, we have revived during this
time. This we are in the process of doing.
But
our main handicap is financial support. In 1972, when the first agreement
was made, it was possible to take off very fast, setting up the political
institutions, and the administration, in a very short time, because then
the war stopped and there was financial support externally. This we lack.
EIR:
Is there no financial support coming from the outside?
Machar:
Nothing, nothing. The policy of strangulating the implementation of the
peace agreement through withholding of finances, has effectively worked.
EIR:
You also went to Kampala, Uganda, during the last year. What attitude
toward a peace settlement did you find there?
Machar:
I met [Ugandan] President [Yoweri] Museveni more than three times, and I
was persuading him that we were going to get regional peace and stability.
There is a need to see the peace agreement on the table in a positive
manner. I tried my best to explain to him in detail, that the Ugandan
government and the people in the region would get a return if there were
peace. There is one of the big corridors for our exports and imports.
There could be very strong trade links, as the people are culturally one.
There could also be economic integration with Uganda. Politically, I
wanted President Museveni to see that this peace agreement made inside, is
stronger than the 1972 peace agreement, which was supported
internationally, and with us having the stability, he would be stable. He
definitely has problems, and I think with stability in southern Sudan,
these problems would find resolutions very quickly. And I wanted President
Museveni to use his influence on John Garang, and that if Garang wanted a
guarantee, Museveni could give one, since he is part of the IGAD mediation
team.
The
fear with Garang is that, coming in, the peace agreement may not last
unless it has international support, regional support from governments
that supported him. So I said, that is understandable all right. Museveni
would be in a good position, someone who knows Sudan.
EIR:
And what was Museveni's response?
Machar:
Initially it was positive. But I think he got external pressure. I think
the U.S. policy in Africa is having bloc countries-in Central Africa it is
a bloc, led by Museveni, with that bloc moving together and sanctioned by
the U.S. administration. There are difficulties: It is crumbling in
Central Africa; Congo is fighting Uganda, Uganda has invaded half of the
country. So, the policy is failing.
EIR:
What is the situation with southern faction leader Kerubino Kuanyin Bol
[who signed onto the April 1997 peace accord between southern leaders and
the government of Sudan, but quit the peace charter in late 1997, and
re-defected back to the SPLA]?
Machar:
When Kerubino left the peace process in January 1998, he was pushed by
parties opposed to the peace agreement, and he thought he would find an
alternative. But when he got there, he found that the peace agreement he
had left was the one that met the needs of the people of the South. We
then contacted him, when we realized that he had himself gotten a shock
from the other side. We were clear that he was positive to come back to
the peace process; we gave him guarantees: All that is needed is that we
join in a peace settlement, if you think it was a mistake that you left
and you now believe that this is the solution tome problem. We welcomed
him back. So, he made a unity statement.
EIR:
Recently, at a forum on peace and reconciliation in Munich, a Ugandan
parliamentarian, Mr. Mao, the editor of the Monitor, said that after
apartheid was dissolved in South Africa, now the next big threat to peace
and reconciliation is the Sudan government. The parliamentarian explicitly
spoke of the "appetite" of the Sudanese government for the rest
of Africa. How would you respond?
Machar:
I think there is a lot of misinformation, and this is intended. Really
what is happening in the Sudan: I fought for 13 years as a guerrilla
leader, against oppression, and when I found out that we could make a
peaceful settlement with this government, we did it. Sudan should be
judged on what it is doing and what it has on paper. Sudan is a federal
government. When you take the steps of implementing a federal system of
government, it is a higher stage to democratization, and you are ensuring
more participation of the people in their own affairs. We have 26 states.
If this system is a monster, it would not have chosen federalism as a
system of government, because with federalism you have a broader
participation of the people. On top of that, now, we have moved to a
multi-party system. Anybody can form a party, a number of 100 can form a
party, to propagate their views.
There
is misinformation about Islam, the cultural differences. I am not a
Muslim, but it looks like the countries that are Islamic and which try to
bring their religious background into their political life, get misjudged.
To the Muslims, Sharia, or Islam to them, is a way of life, it regulates
their way of life; it is also a religion, it plays a part in the
governance. And, this comes to the question of what is your source of
legislation. Sudan today has three sources of legislation:
One, is the Sharia, the Islamic background-the majority in the
North has [this background]. The other is custom, and this is particularly
meant for the South. The third is consensus, or commonality, what we see,
as Sudanese, common among ourselves; we can use it as a source of law when
legislating. I don't think this is unique to Sudan.
We
have no state religion, but other countries, Islamic countries, take Islam
as a state religion. In the Sudan, it is not a state religion. There is
only mention that a majority of Sudanese are Muslims. As for eligibility
for holding public office, your religious background is not necessary,
your creed is not necessary, your cultural background is not a condition
for eligibility to public office.
Now,
when statements are made, to equate the Sudan with apartheid, I think this
is a gross misrepresentation, and I even think it is lack of information.
Apartheid can be based on race, where power is exclusively with one race,
which is what happened in South Africa, or when voting rights are denied
on the basis of race. But I can also see institutionalized religion. We
are talking here, this is the Republican palace, I am assistant to the
President of the Republic and I am not a Muslim. I am not even alone:
There is another Vice-President who is not a Muslim. So, there is no way
of constituting apartheid based on religion.
Apartheid
can be instituted on the basis of culture. We have Islamic, African
cultures in this country. Our Constitution says, citizenship is the basis
of rights and duties, it is not done on the basis of culture. So, there
can be no justification for saying there is apartheid in the Sudanese are
the three basic factors, on which apartheid can be instituted. I think
that what brothers somewhere are saying, is not true. If they talk of
power-sharing and wealth-sharing, this is the cornerstone on which we
fought this war: Let's share the power equitably, let's let the wealth be
distributed equitably, so that each has a
fraction of the national cake. So, I think it's untenable to
support a theory of apartheid in the Sudan.