The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council
1 Northumberland Avenue
London
WC2N 5BW
England
Tel: 0207 872 5434
Fax: 0207 753 2848
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date of Publication: December 2000
You cannot have people saying 'We have proof of certain things' against a whole country but nobody knows what that proof is. There is a difference between whether something is proved sufficiently to bring a man before a court...and whether it is sufficient to prove to adopt one's political line.
Raymond Kendall, International Secretary-General of Interpol (1)
The cornerstone of the Clinton Administration's rationale for its policies towards Sudan are repeated claims that Sudan is a supporter of international terrorism. This is manifested in statements by Administration officials and is constantly cited in media coverage. The Clinton Administration listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993. Sudan joined Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Cuba on the American list. Whatever other states on the list may or may not have done, Sudan was included in spite of the fact that there was not a single example of Sudanese involvement in any act of international terrorism. And it is also clear that Sudan was listed without any evidence of its support for terrorism. This much is a matter of record. Former United States President Jimmy Carter, long interested in Sudanese affairs, went out of his way to see what evidence there was for Sudan's listing. Carter was told there was no evidence:
"In fact, when I later asked an assistant secretary of state he said they did not have any proof, but there were strong allegations." (2)
This set the tone for all future American claims about Sudan and terrorism. Amazingly, on 3 November 1997, President Clinton signed executive order 13067, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703 et seq) and the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1641 c), which imposed comprehensive trade and economic sanctions against Sudan. The order declared "that the policies of Sudan constitute an extraordinary and unusual threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" citing "continued support for international terrorism." (3)
The focus for the Clinton Administration's allegations has been the United States Department of State publication, Patterns of Global Terrorism. It is important first of all to put Patterns of Global Terrorism into its legal context. The publication states that it is prepared in
"compliance with United States law, Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (a), requiring the Department of State "to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a) (1) and (2) of the Act. As required by legislation, the report includes detailed assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts occurred, and countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding give years pursuant to Section 6 (j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorism list countries that have repeatedly provided support for international terrorism)." (4)
The 1992 Patterns of Global Terrorism, the year before Sudan's listing, stated that: "There is no evidence that the Government of Sudan conducted or sponsored a specific terrorist attack in the past year, and the government denies supporting any form of terrorism activity." (5) The report did record that: "In 1992 the Government of Sudan continued a disturbing pattern of relationships with international terrorist groups...Elements of the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the Palestinian Islamic Movement (HAMAS), and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist organizations continue to find refuge in Sudan". The London Independent newspaper described this as "keeping dubious company".(6) The same groups, and many others, can be found organised and active in Western capitals across the world. In Britain many of the same "elements" are living as refugees on state benefits. They have even found a "refuge" in the United States. HAMAS, for example, held its third world congress in Kansas city, and has held meetings in Phoenix attended by Hamas leaders and 4000 supporters and sympathisers. (7)
The 1993 Patterns of Global Terrorism, the first report which included Sudan on this list, once again clearly stated:
"Although there is no conclusive evidence linking the Government of Sudan to any specific terrorist incident during the year, five of fifteen suspects arrested this summer following the New York City bomb plot are Sudanese citizens." (8)
Various newspapers and journals also recorded the simple lack of evidence for terrorist support before and after Sudan's listing. The London Independent of 9 June 1993, for example, stated: "So far, no major terrorist incident has been traced to the Islamic regime in Sudan. The Sudanese lack the logistical abilities to run terrorist networks...even if they wished". The London Guardian of 19 August 1993 reported that: "Independent experts believe...that these reports [of terrorist training camps] have been exaggerated, and that Sudan is too short of money to make it an active sponsor of terrorism". The Independent's Robert Fisk writing in December 1993, several months after the American decision, described Sudan as:
"a country that is slowly convincing its neighbours that Washington's decision to put Sudan on its list of states supporting 'terrorism' might, after all, be groundless. Even Western diplomats in Khartoum are now admitting privately that - save for reports of a Palestinian camp outside Khartoum like those that also exist in Tunisia, Yemen, Syria and other Arab countries - there may be no guerrilla training bases in the country after all." (9)
One year after Sudan's listing, the Independent returned to the theme. Referring to the presence of Palestinian and Lebanese dissidents: "Intelligence assessments reckon that these groups are allowed to live and study and perhaps to plot in apartments in the capital". (10)
It would appear, therefore, that despite no evidence whatsoever of involvement in any act of terrorism, Sudan was listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. In addition to former President Carter, Donald Petterson, the United States ambassador to Sudan at the time of Sudan's listing, stated that he was "surprised" that Sudan was put on the terrorism list. Petterson said that while he was aware of "collusion" between "some elements of the Sudanese government" and various "terrorist" organisations:
"I did not think this evidence was sufficiently conclusive to put Sudan on the U.S. government's list of state sponsors of terrorism." (11)
Moreover, it would seem that Ambassador Petterson, the Clinton Administration's ambassador to Sudan, was not even briefed prior to the decision to list Sudan being taken. When he queried the decision, he was told by an assistant secretary of state that the "new evidence was conclusive". (12) One can only speculate as to whether the assistant secretary of state briefing Ambassador Petterson was the same assistant secretary of state who told former President Carter a few days later that the Clinton Administration did not have any proof, but that there were "strong allegations".
It should be pointed out, in any instance, that the extent to which inclusion on the list is dependent on policy considerations at any one moment in time rather than evidence, is exemplified by the case of Iraq. Iraq was first listed in 1979, was de-listed in 1982 when it went to war against Iran, something seen as being in the American interest, and was put back on after the Gulf war. Nothing had changed in the meantime - Saddam Hussein's government was in power throughout. Expediency had dictated Iraq's removal and then relisting.
The Clinton Administration's listing of Sudan served clear objectives. Sudan was projected as a state sponsor of terrorism and thereby to a great extent isolated internationally. The listing also brings with it specific sanctions, financial restrictions and prohibitions on economic assistance. These include a ban on arms-related exports and sales and a tight control of "dual-use" goods and technologies. The United States must also oppose any loan from international financial institutions for a country on the terrorism list.
It is important to record the Sudanese government's response to claims that Khartoum in any way supports terrorism:
"Sudan has not, and will not, allow its territory to be used for any act of terror or to be used as a shelter for terrorists or by those who have eluded justice. Sudan, like many other states, suffers day after day with those innocent civilians who lose their lives or who are harmed as a result of terrorist acts perpetrated in many parts of the world. Killing women and children, terrorizing peaceful citizens, destroying property and taking innocent civilians hostage cannot be accepted under any divine law; nor can they be accepted by any human being who believes in justice and peace." (13)
Speaking in 1994, the then director-general of the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, and subsequently Sudanese ambassador to the United States, Mahdi Ibrahim, touched on American double-standards:
"How can you prove a negative? We have always believed that in Western countries the defendant is innocent until proven guilty. In our case, it is not like that. Until today, no information has been provided about a terrorist harboured in our country." (14)
The 1994 Patterns of Global Terrorism once again stated that: "There is no evidence that Sudan, which is dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), conducted or sponsored a specific act of terrorism in 1994". The report did claim that people associated with ANO, the Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Egypt's Islamic Group are present in Sudan. In what was described as a "positive development", the report did record that the international terrorist "Carlos", Illyich Ramirez Sanchez, was extradited to France. (15)
It is clear that the Clinton Administration's listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, in the absence of any proof or evidence of such activity, was an abuse of United States anti-terrorism legislation for policy reasons.
An even more clear cut example of the Administration's misuse of anti-terrorism legislation for political reasons followed the Administration's cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa medicines factory in Khartoum. It is now abundantly evident that this attack, allegedly on a chemical weapons facility owned by Osama bin-Laden, was a disastrous intelligence failure. As will be outlined, every one of the American claims about the al-Shifa factory proved to be false. Clinton Administration officials also subsequently admitted that when they attacked the factory they did not know who the owner was, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering stating that who owned the plant "was not known to us".
When, several days later, the American government learnt, from subsequent media coverage of the attack, who actually owned the factory, that person, Mr Saleh Idris, was then retrospectively listed under legislation dealing with "specially designated terrorists". On 26 August, 1998, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the unit within the U.S. Treasury Department charged with the enforcement of anti-terrorism sanctions, froze more than US$ 24 million of Mr Idris's assets. These assets had been held in Bank of America accounts. On 26 February 1999, Mr Idris filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, for the release of his assets, claiming that the government's actions had been unlawful. His lawyers stated that while the law used by the Clinton Administration to freeze his assets required a finding that Mr Idris was, or had been, associated with terrorist activities, no such determination had ever been made. Mr Idris had never had any association whatsoever with terrorists or terrorism. On 4 May 1999, the deadline by which the government had to file a defence in court, the Clinton Administration backed down and had to authorise the full and unconditional release of his assets. (16)
The listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism provides a macro example of the Clinton Administration's abuse of anti-terrorist legislation. The case of Mr Idris provides us with a micro example of this misuse. The Clinton Administration's clear perversion of anti-terrorist legislation and its manipulation and distortion of legal measures for political expediency and convenience is not just immoral; it also discredits American anti-terrorist legislation internationally.
At the same time, when convenient, the Administration has chosen to ignore its own anti-terrorist legislation for economic and business reasons. The Clinton Administration has, for example, granted sanctions exemptions for the import of Sudanese gum arabic, an indispensable foods, soft drinks and pharmaceutical stabiliser, of which Sudan has a near monopoly. And, in an equally clear cut instance of hypocrisy, it is also the case that in late 1996 the Clinton Administration had sought to grant an exemption to Occidental Petroleum, an American oil company, to become involved in the Sudanese oil industry.
The Occidental issue caused the Administration considerable embarrassment. At a January 1997 press briefing, a State Department spokesman defended the Administration's position by stating: "If...individual financial transactions are found not to have an impact on any potential act of terrorism or to fund any group that supports terrorism, then these transactions...may be permitted". (17) The New York Times commented that:
"Recent days brought word that last summer business considerations led the White House to waive a law prohibiting American companies from doing business with countries that sponsored terrorism. Specifically, officials gave approval to the Occidental Petroleum Corporation to take part in a $930 million oil project in Sudan...Washington's policy toward the Sudanese regime now seems hopelessly confused. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did little to clarify it at her introductory news conference last Friday. Even as she called for new United Nations sanctions against Sudan, she endorsed the decision to let Occidental bid for the oil contract." (18)
The Washington Post also commented:
"[T]he elasticity of the law as it comes to US economic interests - and especially when those interests also happen to contribute generously to the Democratic National Committee - will not go unnoticed...It can only undercut U.S. efforts to isolate what it considers - or says it considers - rogue states." (19)
The American government has claimed Sudanese involvement in the 1995 attempted assassination of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. In June 1995, while in Addis Ababa, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was the target of an assassination attempt. Several Egyptian terrorists tried to kill him in a gun attack on his limousine This was one amongst many attempts by Egyptian extremists to kill Egyptian ministers and government officials. Islamic extremists had tried to assassination Mubarak on several occasions, the first attempt being on 25 April 1982. The London Independent newspaper of 2 July 1995 reported that the Egyptian government initially accused the Ethiopian government of involvement in the assassination attempt: "Egyptian investigators claimed three Ethiopian security officials took part in the failed assassination attempt". The Ethiopian government issued an official statement refuting the Egyptian claim, stating:
"Egyptian officials have over the past week been spreading all sorts of self-serving fantastic stories solely based on their imagination...It is now appearing that the Egyptian appetite for the fabrication of lies in connection with the crime committed by Egyptian terrorists is proving to have no limit and they have at this point reached a state where Ethiopia can no longer refrain from putting the record straight...The Egyptian authorities are being requested through this statement...to refrain from continuing with their unacceptable campaign of lies and defamation, the full motive of which is known only to themselves." (20)
The then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin blamed the murder attempt on "Islamic fundamentalists with the encouragement of Iran". The Iranian government countered by accusing Israel of involvement in the incident. (21)
Shortly after accusing Ethiopia of involvement, however, Egypt then accused the Sudanese government of having been involved. Sudan had condemned the incident and strongly denied any involvement whatsoever. The Egyptians claimed that three of the gunmen had fled to Sudan. Thirty-two days after the assassination attempt, the Ethiopian authorities provided the government of Sudan with the details of one of the suspects who left Addis Ababa by air on the same day as the incident. Among the only descriptions of these suspects were that one wore a Casio watch, and that one was married. Over the following weeks and months the United Nations demanded that Sudan extradite these men. The Sudanese government called in Interpol to assist with the manhunt. The government also published prominent 'wanted' notices in all the Sudanese Arabic daily newspapers for three days running. The notice was also published in the weekly English-language newspaper. Similar notices were broadcast on national television and radio. The notices were also sent to all Sudanese states, municipalities and localities. By March 1996, the Sudanese government had exhausted most if not all of the options open to it in its manhunt and stated that it was possible that one or two of the wanted men may have transited through Sudan. None could be found given the limited information provided by the Egyptian and Ethiopian authorities.
The only named suspect in the assassination attempt, Mustafa Hamza, one of the three said to be in Sudan, was subsequently located and interviewed by the international media in Afghanistan. A long interview with Hamza was published in Al-Hayat newspaper on 21 April 1996. Hamza stated that the Egyptian group, Al Gamaa al Islamiya, was responsible for the murder attempt. He stated that most of the gunmen involved came from Pakistan, travelling on passports issued by an Arab country, and that one or two men had entered Ethiopia from Sudan, having received visas from the Ethiopian embassy in Khartoum. He said that only one of the gunmen had left through Sudan and that he was now in a third country. Hamza stated that Sheikh Omer Abdel Rahman was the movement's spiritual leader. Al-Hayat reported that Hamza stated that there were "deep differences between the ruling Islamic Front in the Sudan and his Group (Gamaa Islamiya). He accused the Sudanese Government [of following a] distorted and deviated application of Islam". Simply put, the Sudanese model of Islam was too liberal for him.
In spite of the fact that at least one of the alleged gunmen was clearly in Afghanistan, that another was said to be in a third country, and that the otherwise forthcoming chief suspect denied that a third suspect had even been in Sudan, the United Nations, under American pressure, still imposed limited sanctions on Sudan for not extraditing these suspects. As late as December 1996, and in the face of clear evidence such as the above interview in Afghanistan, the Ethiopian government was still insisting all three of the suspects were still in Sudan. (22) The subsequent trial of those suspects caught in Ethiopia itself was held in closed session.
Middle East International reported in its 7 July 1995 issue that: "It will be difficult to prove - or to disprove - the Sudan government's involvement in the assassination attempt...But this is not a police investigation, it is a political clash." That the Egyptian attitude was variable was also revealed when one year later, Middle East International reported that, on the occasion of meetings between Presidents Mubarak and al-Bashir during the 1996 Arab Summit, the issue of assassination attempt was described as a "triviality" by the Egyptian state media. (23)
Despite the questions surrounding the Mubarak assassination attempt, the United Nations Security Council passed resolutions 1044, 1054 and 1070. Resolution 1054 introduced limited diplomatic sanctions, the scaling down of Sudanese embassy staff and restrictions on travel by Sudanese government officials. Resolution 1070 had sought to impose restrictions on the international flights of Sudanese airlines but was never implemented. The fact that in May 1997, the United States government was still expecting Sudan to extradite someone, Mustafa Hamza, under pain of continued sanctions, who had clearly been in Afghanistan for almost two years, beyond Sudanese jurisdiction, shows how the issue is being clearly exploited for propaganda and policy reasons. (24)
It should be noted that the Sudanese Government assurances that no trace has been found of the three men in question were subsequently accepted by both Egypt and Ethiopia. Khartoum has consulted extensively with both the Ethiopian and Egyptian authorities on the issue, stating that there is "complete understanding with the two Governments on all security issues, including that of the three suspects". (25)
In keeping with this understanding both Egypt and Ethiopia have supported the lifting of sanctions in question. (26) The Egyptian government stated that having seen "a number of positive and encouraging indications from the part of the Sudanese government" aimed at improving Sudan's relations with Egypt, it supported the rescinding of the sanctions. (27) The Ethiopian government said that "it is the conviction of the Ethiopian Government that the concerns that gave rise to the sanctions...no longer apply...Ethiopia is, therefore, of the view that it is now time for the lifting of the sanctions imposed on the Sudan". (28)
It may well be the case that the American government were eager to deflect as much focus on the issue of "Islamic terrorism" onto other parties. As James Adams, the London Sunday Times Washington correspondent, has pointed out, it was the United States which had spent three billion dollars in training, equipping and, where necessary, motivating Islamic fundamentalist combatants:
"The roots of this new terrorism lie not in Tehran but in the ten-year war in Afghanistan which began after the Soviets invaded the country in 1979. Following the invasion, the American government embarked on what was to become one of the largest covert efforts ever to fund, arm and train a guerrilla army. Over ten years, the US spent a total of £3 billion in secret aid, which was running at around £600m a year just before the Soviets withdrew in 1989. That money was spent largely on supplying the guerrillas who were trained and housed by the Pakistan government. Other Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, also contributed to the underwriting of the guerrilla effort...At the time the covert operation was under way, there was little concern in Washington about who actually received the money or guns." (29)
The Economist in April 1993, touching on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's concerns about Islamic terrorism:
"During the 1980s, America provided full-scale support for the fundamentalist mujahideen, including the 20,000 or so outsiders who at one time or another joined the Afghan fighters...Times change, but the Afghan veterans continue to cause trouble, in Algeria as well as Egypt. Mr Mubarak blames America for creating the basis of a terrorist network; some conspiracy-minded Arabs believe that the old links between fundamentalists and their American ex-supporters cannot simply have faded away." (30)
Adams echoes the Economist's reporting when he states that "Both the Pakistanis and the Egyptians blame the CIA for this legacy of terror". (31) The London Observer newspaper referred to this phenomena as the "Frankenstein the CIA created". (32)
Given its own somewhat tangible involvement in the funding and sponsorship of what it itself would subsequently come to describe and define as Islamic terrorists and international terrorism, much of it subsequently focused upon allies such as Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, and then on America itself, it makes considerable sense for the United States government to cast around for people they can transfer blame to. Sudan is one such candidate. It is also convenient for the Egyptian government to blame Sudan for its problems just as it has previously blamed the USA for creating a terrorist network.
The fact is that the United States government through its various defence and intelligence agencies had spent up to three billion dollars in training Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas from around the world, as well as Afghans, in not only the use of weapons of war and explosives but also how to master the logistics of how to supply and carry out acts of war and sabotage against a variety of targets. All this training took place within CIA-supervised camps in Pakistan. The United States government had also extensively armed these same Islamic fundamentalists, providing them with assault rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers, explosives and quantities of American Stinger surface-to-air missiles.
The World Trade Center in New York was bombed in February 1993. One person died and dozens were injured when a car-bomb parked in the Center's car-park went off. In March 1994, four Arabs were convicted of having caused the explosion. Ten other people were later also convicted in connection with the World Trade Center bombing and other terrorist conspiracies. In a remarkably clumsy way, the Clinton Administration has from time to time sought to insinuate that Sudan was somehow involved in the bombing.
Given the Clinton Administration's obvious eagerness to attribute any act of terrorism to Sudan, it is clear that had there been the slightest evidence of the Sudanese government's involvement in such a direct attack on the United States, it would have both been heralded around the world immediately and acted upon. Given that the World Trade Center/New York conspiracies had been extensively penetrated by both the CIA and FBI, as was clearly revealed during the trials (33), had there been the remotest link between Sudan and the bombings it would have been documented. It is an ironic fact, as the Economist has also documented, that several of the suspects in the bombing of the World Trade Centre had 'Afghani' connections. (34) One of the prime suspects, Mahmoud Abu-Halima, was himself an 'Afghani', having been militarily trained in Pakistan at an American-sponsored base.
In its attempts to implicate Sudan in the World Trade Center bombing, the Clinton Administration has contradicted itself on several occasions. In March 1993, for example, the United States government stated that the World Trade Center bombing was carried out by a poorly trained local group of individuals who were not under the auspices of a foreign government or international network. (35) In June 1993, the American authorities again stated there was no evidence of foreign involvement in the New York bombing or conspiracies. (36) The American government then reversed its position in August 1993 alleging Sudanese involvement in the New York bomb plots. (37) (This may well have been related to the fact that it was then convenient to do so given the policy decision to list Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism). This finding was in any event subsequently comprehensively contradicted in 1996 by Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox Jr., the Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism. On the occasion of the release of the 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism, on 30 April 1996, Ambassador Wilcox made it very clear that there was no Sudanese involvement whatsoever in the World Trade Center bombings:
"We have looked very, very carefully and pursued all possible clues that there might be some state sponsorship behind the World Trade Center bombing. We have found no such evidence, in spite of an exhaustive search, that any state was responsible for that crime. Our information indicates that Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and his gang were a group of freelance terrorists, many of whom were trained in Afghanistan, who came from various nations but who did not rely on support from any state." (38)
Yet, earlier that month, on 3 April, the then American ambassador to the U.N., Madeleine Albright, in meetings at the United Nations, claimed that two Sudanese diplomats had been involved in the World Trade Center bombing, and other "plots". (39) This presents an interesting situation. The political appointee, Mrs Albright, with a political and policy line to follow, claiming one thing, and the professional anti-terrorism expert, Ambassador Wilcox, saying something completely different. On an issue as serious as allegations of terrorism, allegations involving the murderous bombing of the World Trade Center and a conspiracy to bomb other targets in New York, such as divergence is totally unacceptable and once again only but undermines the credibility of American claims with regard to Sudanese "involvement" in terrorism.
It is disturbing to note that in March 2000, seven years after the World Trade Center bombing, and four years after Ambassador Wilcox gave the definitive answer stating there was no Sudanese involvement, President Clinton's special envoy to Sudan, former Congressman Harry Johnston, was still insinuating Sudanese complicity, stating that all those involved in the bombing has carried Sudanese passports. (40) First of all, as stated above, only five of the fifteen people arrested were Sudanese. Nationality in and of itself is no evidence for a state's involvement in terrorism, and particularly in the case of the World Trade Center bombing. A number of those involved were Egyptian, would this mean that Egypt was complicit in the bombing? Others were Americans and Palestinians. Two other American citizens have been indicted for their involvement in the East African embassy bombings. Does this necessarily imply that the American government was somehow involved?
[T]he strike in regards to the Khartoum chemical plant cannot be justified...These are pretty harsh words. I know one thing for sure. The intelligence agencies of other countries look at that and they think, 'Wait a minute, if you hit the wrong target or if in fact the justification was not accurate, it is either ineptitude or, to get back to the wag-the-dog theory, something else is going on. That gets to our credibility. And that is why both the administration and the Congress must insist on a foreign policy where if you draw a line in the sand, if you make a statement, your credibility is tremendously important.
U.S. Senator Pat Roberts (41)
The Clinton Administration's cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa medicines factory in Khartoum in August 1998 provides a case study of the Administration's bumbling and incompetent intelligence and policy process with regards to claims of Sudanese involvement in international terrorism.
On 7 August 1998, terrorist bombs devastated United States embassy buildings in Kenya and Tanzania. Hundreds of people, some of them American, were killed in the explosion in Nairobi and dozens in the blast in Dar-es-Salaam. Thousands more were injured. The American government linked Osama bin-Laden, the Saudi-born millionaire funder of Islamic extremism with these attacks. It is worth noting that the Sudanese government immediately and repeatedly condemned the embassy bombings. The Sudanese foreign minister, Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail, stated, for example, that: "These criminal acts of violence do not lead to any goal." (42) On 11 August, Agence France Presse reported the Sudanese foreign minister's statement that "We must pool our efforts to eradicate all the causes of terrorism" and he had called for:
"the solidarity and cooperation of all the nations in the region and the international community to stand up to international terrorism." (43)
It is a matter of record that the Sudanese government took its condemnation of the Kenyan and Tanzanian bombings one step further. Sudan offered to help in tracking down the terrorists involved. The foreign minister stated that: "Sudan supports Kenya in its efforts to reach the people who committed the incident and is prepared to cooperate fully with it in this regard." (44) The government of Sudan also immediately granted United States requests for access to Sudanese airspace to evacuate American diplomatic staff and citizens from Kenya, and to provide emergency assistance to those affected in the bombing. When the United States requested further humanitarian overflight authorisations they too were granted. No one, not even the Clinton Administration, can claim that the Sudanese Government in any way supported or even sympathised with these despicable bombings.
On 20 August, the United States government launched missile attacks, involving 75 Cruise missiles, on installations said to be part of Osama bin-Laden's infrastructure inside Afghanistan. Washington also chose to attack the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, alleging that it was making chemical weapons as part of Osama bin-Laden's infrastructure of international terrorism. The al-Shifa plant was badly damaged by the 17 Cruise missiles used in the American attack. Several workers were injured in the attack. A nightwatchman died of his injuries. Two food processing factories were also damaged in the strike. (45)
The United States government made several, widely-reported, claims about the al-Shifa factory. In the news briefing given by United States Defence Secretary, William Cohen, on 20 August, he stated that the al-Shifa factory "produced the precursor chemicals that would allow the production of...VX nerve agent". Secretary Cohen also stated that Osama bin-Laden "has had some financial interest in contributing to...this particular facility".(46)
The American government also claimed that no commercial medicines or drugs were made at the factory. The New York Times, for example, reported: "statements by a senior intelligence official hours after the attack that the plant in Khartoum...produced no commercial products." (47) President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, went on record stating:
"There is no question in our mind that facility, that factory, was used to produce a chemical that is used in the manufacture of VX nerve gas and has no other commercial distribution as far as we understand. We have physical evidence of that fact and very, very little doubt of it." (48)
ABC News also stated that senior intelligence officials had claimed that: "there was no evidence that commercial products were ever sold out of the facility." (49)
In the briefings shortly after the bombing United States officials also claimed that the al-Shifa facility was heavily guarded. (50) In a briefing on the al-Shifa factory soon after the strike on Khartoum, a senior American intelligence official told reporters in Washington that: "The facility also has a secured perimeter and it's patrolled by the Sudanese military." (51)
One would presume that the intelligence officials involved in these, and other briefings, would have been the cream of the American intelligence community. They would also be presenting the latest intelligence material the United States government had to hand to justify its Cruise missile attack on Sudan - information which would have been gathered by the intelligence agencies of the most powerful country on Earth, intelligence agencies which have budgets running into billions of dollars. Every one of their claims proved to be demonstrably false.
Within hours of the attack, the Sudanese President, Omer al-Bashir, said that Sudan would be bring an official complaint at the American action before the United Nations Security Council and that the Sudanese government would also ask the United Nations to establish "a commission to verify the nature of the activity of the plant." (52) President Bashir flatly denied American claims that the al-Shifa plant was being used to make chemical weapons. He accused President Clinton of lying:
"Putting out lies is not new for the United States and its president. A person of such immorality will not hesitate to tell any lie." (53)
President Bashir also stated that Sudan was critical of the United States government, and not of American companies or citizens: "We have no animosity towards the American people and non-government agencies." (54) In a formal letter to the United Nations Security Council, Bishop Gabriel Rorich, the Sudanese Minister of State for External Affairs, condemned the American attack on the factory. The Sudanese government stated that the factory was privately owned and had been financed by several Sudanese investors and the Bank of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), also known as Comesa. The factory produced more than half of Sudan's need for medicines. The Sudanese government stated:
"The allegations in U.S. statements that Osama bin-Laden owned this factory and that it produced chemical weapons and poisonous gases for terrorist purposes are allegations devoid of truth and the U.S. government has no evidence for this."
Sudan requested the convening of the Security Council to discuss the matter, and also requested a technical fact-finding mission to verify American claims. (55) The United States deputy ambassador to the United Nations, Peter Burleigh, dismissed Sudanese calls for independent verification of the site:
"I don't see what the purpose of the fact-finding study would be. We have credible information that fully justifies the strike we made on that one facility in Khartoum." (56)
The Sudanese government also stated that it was prepared to allow Americans to visit Khartoum to establish whether the al-Shifa factory was involved in the production of chemical weapons. (57) The Sudanese interior minister, Abdel Rahim Hussein, repeated invitations to investigate the site to the London Sunday Times: "We are ready to receive specialists from the Americans and the West to investigate that the factory had nothing to do with chemical weapons." (58)
The Sudanese foreign minister also invited an investigation committee from the United States government itself to come and investigate "whether this factory...has anything to do with chemical (weapons)." (59) On 22 August, the Sudanese President invited the United States Congress to send a fact-finding mission: "We are fully ready to provide protection and all other facilities to enable this mission to obtain all information and meet anyone it wants." (60) In the weeks and months following the al-Shifa bombing, the Sudan would repeatedly call on the United Nations and United States to inspect the remains of the factory for any evidence of chemical weapons production. The Americans have steadfastly refused to inspect the site. This is ironic given that in 1998, the United States and Britain militarily attacked Iraq because that country would not allowed the inspection of certain factories and the remains of factories, but when the Sudanese requested a similar inspection of a site claimed to have been a chemical weapons factory, the Clinton Administration pointedly refused. The Washington Post quoted a Sudanese diplomat at the United Nations:
"You guys bombed Iraq because it blocked U.N. weapons inspectors. We're begging for a U.N. inspection and you're blocking it." (61)
Almost immediately following the American attack and their claims that the factory was producing chemical weapons, credible voices began to doubt the American justification for their strike. Amongst these voices were several Britons who had either worked at the factory, or who had visited it. What the factory produced, and its ownership, was addressed by Ghazi Suleiman, the lawyer representing Salah Idris, the owner of the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory. It should be noted that that Mr Suleiman is no friend of the present government in Sudan. He is, in the words of The Economist, "the country's leading human-rights lawyer and an outspoken critic of the regime". (62) He spent 25 days in detention earlier in 1998. Mr Suleiman said that Mr Idris did not know Osama bin-Laden, and that the factory produced only drugs, not chemical weapons.
He said:
"I think the Americans are under bad information and they are not well briefed.... I think it would have been prudent before destroying the plant to come and investigate the site."
The factory had been designed by an American, Henry Jobe, of the world-renowned MSD Pharmaceutical Company. Interviewed by the London Observer newspaper, Mr Jobe stated: "We didn't intend a dual use for it. We didn't design anything extra in there. The design we made was for pharmaceuticals." (63) It is perhaps indicative of the pattern of American intelligence incompetence in its assessment of the al-Shifa factory, that Mr Jobe revealed that he was interviewed for the first time by the CIA about the plant and its equipment, one week after the American missile strike. (64)
The Sudanese government invited journalists from the print and electronic media into the country to inspect the bombed factory. The Washington Post reported that whereas the government has "routinely declined visas to American journalists because the United States has declared it to be a terrorist state" it now "ushered in reporters by the score...to photograph, videotape and broadcast live". The Washington Post reported that visiting reporters from American, British, French, German, Japanese and Arab media outlets were "picking through the rubble". (65) Amongst the dozens of journalists and news services who visited the site, was the flagship American international news gatherer, CNN. It reported:
"The utter destruction in the wake of a missile attack...Laid out in display: what the government says are remnants of the missiles salvaged from the rubble, all part of a concerted campaign to persuade the international community that Sudan has nothing to hide. And repeated calls, too, for an independent inspection team to investigate the site. The government here apparently confident that no trace of any agent used in the manufacture of chemical weapons will be found." (66)
It is evident that there was distinct unease amongst Khartoum's foreign diplomatic corps at the targeting of the al-Shifa factory. It was reported that the German ambassador to Sudan, Werner Daum, had immediately contradicted United States claims about the factory. In a communication to the German foreign ministry, he stated: "One can't, even if one wants to, describe the Shifa firm as a chemical factory." (67) The German ambassador also stated that the factory had no disguise and there was nothing secret about the site.(68) The Guardian, reporting from Khartoum, stated that "most European diplomats here are as aghast at the raid, and above all the choice of target, as they (the Sudanese government) are". The paper interviewed a senior European diplomat who said that: "There was absolutely nothing secret about the plant and there never has been." (69)
The American intelligence claims about the al-Shifa factory fell by the wayside one by one. The United States government made five claims about the al-Shifa factory in its attempts to justify its Cruise missile attack on the plant. These were as follows: the al-Shifa plant was making precursors to the VX nerve gas, namely a compound known as Empta; that Osama bin-Laden either owned or had a financial link to the al-Shifa factory; that the al-Shifa factory did not produce any medicines or drugs; that the al-Shifa factory was a high security facility guarded by the Sudanese military; and that there were weapons of mass destruction technology links between Sudan and Iraq. An examination and assessment of the evidence released by the United States found it to be confused, inconclusive and contradictory. After just over one week of sifting through American government claims, The Observer newspaper spoke of:
"a catalogue of US misinformation, glaring omissions and intelligence errors about the function of the plant." (70)
The claim that the al-Shifa plant was making precursors to the VX nerve gas was immediately challenged by American and European scientists, chemists and chemical warfare experts. Evidence of such claims was demanded. While claiming to have "physical evidence" to support their attack on al-Shifa, United States officials initially said that they would not be able to release it for security reasons. Speaking on CNN's Late Edition on 22 August, the President's National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, refused to describe the "physical evidence" the government had, saying that it was necessary to protect intelligence methods and sources. In the days following the attack, Bill Richardson, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, said that that the United States government was in possession of "undeniable physical evidence" that al-Shifa was being used to manufacture chemical weapons. He admitted that the American government had not presented this evidence to the United Nations Security Council, but that it had been shown to United States congressional leaders. Richardson stated that "We believe that is sufficient". (71)
After further international pressure, the United States government officials then stated on 24 August that the United States had material from the plant, including equipment and containers which carried residues of a chemical substance with no commercial uses, but which it was said was exclusively used in VX nerve gas. (72) It was additionally stated by the two anonymous officials that the CIA had used light spectrum data collected by spy satellites to analyse emissions from the plant and that they may also have employed banded migratory birds that fly through Khartoum to gather information about production at the plant. (73)
The United States position then shifted, and on 25 August it claimed that the key evidence justifying its destruction of the al-Shifa plant was in fact a soil sample of a precursor chemical in the making of the VX nerve gas obtained months previously from the factory. (74) The United States government then refused to identify what they claimed to be the precursor. (75) The White House press spokesman, Mike McCurry, speaking on 24 August, stated, for example, that: "The nature of that information is classified now." (76) After several days of attempting to avoid naming the compound, the American government stated that the chemical was said to be O-ethylmethyl-phosphonothioic acid, or EMPTA.
The American Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering went on record to claim that:
"The physical evidence is a soil sample, analysis of it shows the presence of a chemical whose simple name is EMPTA, a known precursor for the nerve agent VX....We think that it was this evidence, and evidence like it, which made our decision to carry out this strike on this particular target the correct and proper decision under the circumstances." (77)
The soil samples were said to have been obtained from the factory itself. (78) An American intelligence official added that:
"It is a substance that has no commercial applications, it doesn't occur naturally in the environment, it's not a by-product of any other chemical process. The only thing you can use it for, that we know of, is to make VX." (79)
This was immediately challenged by the New York Times, which stated that: "The chemical precursor of a nerve agent that Washington claimed was made at a Sudanese chemical factory it destroyed in a missile attack last week could be used for commercial products." (80) The New York Times cited the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as stating that the chemical could be used "in limited quantities for legitimate commercial purposes". These purposes could be use in fungicides, and anti-microbial agents. It should be noted that the OPCW is an independent international agency which oversees the inspections of governments and companies to ensure they are not making substances that contravene the chemical weapons ban treaty.
There also appeared to be confusion in the official American government claims about the Empta compound. On 26 August, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stated that Empta was listed as a so-called Schedule 1 chemical - an immediate chemical weapons precursor with no recognised commercial use - by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency then changed its public stance within a matter of hours, after OPCW officials said that Empta could have commercial uses. Contradicting American government claims, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said that the organisation classifies Empta on its Schedule 2b of compounds that could be used to make chemical weapons but which also have commercial uses. The OPCW said that Empta is identified with a process to make plastics flexible and also with some fungicides and anti-microbial agents. (81)
Sources at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons also pointed out that Empta is difficult to isolate when in soil. A chemical weapons expert at OPCW also stated that pesticide traces in the soil could result in a false-positive result. (82) Mike Hiskey, an expert at the world-renowned Los Alamos National Laboratory in the United States, said that the chemical had commercial uses, including the manufacture of some herbicides and pesticides. (83) The Guardian also reported that: "a search of scientific papers showed that it could be used in a variety of circumstances." (84)
The London Observer also stated that:
"US credibility has been further dented by Western scientists who have pointed out that the same ingredients are used for chemical weapons and beer, and that mustard gas is similar in make-up to the anti-clogging agent in biro ink. It has also been pointed out that the cherry flavouring in sweets is one of the constituent parts of the gas used in combat. Empta also has commercial uses not linked to chemical weapons." (85)
The Sudanese government directly challenged American claims to have a soil sample. The Sudanese information minister, Dr Ghazi Saleheddin, stated:
"They have not produced any convincing evidence. We have to be satisfied that the United States is not making this up. It's not enough to produce soil which could have been made up in the United States itself, and to claim that the soil contains toxic agents. For a factory to produce toxic agents, you need special facilities, special preparations, special storage areas and preparations facilities. You can't keep things to yourself and keep claiming you have the final proof without allowing people to verify your claims." (86)
The Observer reported that American intelligence sources were moving to "less and less credible positions". (87) On 6 September 1998, The Washington Post, in an editorial entitled 'Intelligence Lapse?', called American intelligence claims about the al-Shifa factory into question:
"the possibility of an intelligence failure in the choice of targets in Sudan is so awful to contemplate...But enough questions have been raised, and the administration's story has been often enough revised, to warrant further inquiry...How could the CIA not have known more about the factory - not have known what so many ordinary citizens apparently knew? Some officials reportedly pointed to a search of the factory's Internet site that listed no products for sale. We can only hope that, if the administration could speak more openly, it could make a more persuasive case. At a minimum, there is room here for congressional intelligence committees to inquire further."
This Washington Post editorial was amongst the first of many American newspaper editorials and articles explicitly questioning the Clinton Administration's attack on the al-Shifa factory. In February 1999, extensive tests by Professor Thomas Tullius, chairman of the chemistry department at Boston University, on samples taken from the wrecked al-Shifa plant and its grounds, found that "to the practical limits of scientific detection, there was no Empta or Empa, its breakdown product." (88)
The claim that Osama bin-Laden either owned or had a financial link to the al-Shifa factory also quickly unravelled. The United States government claimed that Osama bin-Laden either owned or had a financial interest in the al-Shifa factory. This was denied both by the owner and the Sudanese government. Mr Suleiman, the al-Shifa company's lawyer confirmed that the owner was a Sudanese businessman, Salah Idris. The plant had been established by Bashir Hassan Bashir, and had been sold in March 1997 to Mr Idris. (89) Interviewed in late 1999, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering admitted that when the U.S. Government attacked the al-Shifa factory, who actually owned the plant "was not known to us". (90) That is to say that despite the fact that Mr Idris had owned the factory for 18 months prior to the American attack, the American intelligence community were unaware of that fact. All any of the U.S. government's many intelligence agencies had to do to ascertain who owned the al-Shifa factory was telephone the factory, or ask any of the European ambassadors - including the British ambassador - who had visited the plant and knew the owner.
On 25 August a United States intelligence official, giving an official briefing to the media on the American missile strikes admitted that the ties between bin-Laden and the al-Shifa factory were "fuzzy". (91) On the same day, Reuters reported that a United States intelligence official had said that he: "could not confirm any direct financial link between Bin Laden and the plant." (92) The Washington Post reported that: "Within days, however, U.S. officials began pulling back from directly linking bin Laden to El Shifa Pharmaceutical." (93) By 31 August, it was being reported by The New York Times that: "Some U.S. officials now say Mr. bin Laden's financial support...did not directly flow to the plant itself"
In a 1 September briefing, American Defence Secretary Cohen was forced to admit that the evidence linking bin-Laden to the al-Shifa plant "was a little tenuous". (94) That is to say, two weeks after the American government destroyed the al-Shifa factory because, in large part, American intelligence claimed that Osama bin-Laden either owned, part-owned, or had a financial interest in, the al-Shifa factory, the best the American Defence Secretary could come up with was that the claimed link was "a little tenuous".
The Clinton Administration's claim that the al-Shifa factory had no commercial products was also quickly disproven. The American news service, ABC News, stated that senior intelligence officials had claimed in relation to the al-Shifa factory that: "there was no evidence that commercial products were ever sold out of the facility." (95) President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, personally stated that the Al-Shifa factory: "has no other commercial distribution as far as we understand. We have physical evidence of that fact and very, very little doubt of it." (96)
The factory's lawyer, and Sudan's most prominent anti-government activist, Ghazi Suleiman, said that the factory produced 60 percent of Sudan's pharmaceutical drugs, including antibiotics, malaria tablets and syrups, as well as drugs for diabetes, ulcers, tuberculosis, rheumatism and hypertension. (97) He stated that the factory had employed three hundred workers, supporting some three thousand people. (98) Mr Suleiman also echoed Sudanese government calls for a fact-finding mission to examine the factory ruins to verify American claims of chemical weapons production. (99) The factory's components had been imported from the United States, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, India and Thailand. (100) Mr Bekheit Abdallah Yagoub, the deputy commissioner of the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission, said the factory supplied 70 percent of the drug needs of southern, eastern and western Sudan, areas wracked by famine and disease. (101) Journalists who visited the site were able to find thousands of containers and bottles of human medication and animal drugs, clear evidence of the factory's commercial production.
If this was not enough evidence, al-Shifa had been in the process of filling a United Nations-approved contract to provide Iraq with $200,000 worth of 'Shifzole 2.5 percent (Albndazole 2.5 percent for Levamisole)', a deworming drug for animals, a contract approved in January 1998 by the United Nation's Iraqi sanctions committee in January 1998 as part of the "oil for food" programme. (102) One would have presumed that the American government, and particularly its intelligence agencies, would have been vigorously monitoring any of the United Nations contracts for Iraq.
The United States government eventually conceded that the al-Shifa factory had in fact been commercially producing medicines and drugs. Some days after the missile strike, State Department spokesman James Foley admitted, for example: "That facility may very well have been producing pharmaceuticals." (103) The London Times also confirmed the Clinton Administration's belated acceptance of this fact: "Now they admit it made 60 percent of Sudan's medicine." (104) On 31 August, it was reported that the Pentagon itself admitted that there had been an intelligence failure on the part of the United States government in not being aware of the commercial production of medicines and drugs: "Some of the intelligence people didn't know they would find any of that there." (105)
For the National Security Advisor to have publicly made such a mistake over what should have been the very easily verifiable issue of whether al-Shifa produced medicines or is yet another key indicator as to the quality and accuracy of American intelligence on the factory. A simple telephone call to the Sudanese chamber of commerce would have sufficed.
On 1 September 1998, in an extraordinary development, in a special briefing to United States senators by a senior intelligence officer, it was further stated that the al-Shifa plant had been targeted, at least in part, because, in the words of Associated Press, "no evidence that any pharmaceuticals were being produced or sold" by the al-Shifa factory had been was available on the al-Shifa website. That is to say, one of the official reasons given as to why the factory was hit by Cruise missiles was in effect because it had not updated its internet site. (106)
The Clinton Administration had also claimed that the al-Shifa factory was a high security facility guarded by the Sudanese military. In a briefing on the al-Shifa factory soon after the strike on Khartoum, a senior American intelligence official told reporters in Washington that: "The facility also has a secured perimeter and it's patrolled by the Sudanese military." (107) United States government claims that the factory was a heavily-guarded, military installation with restricted access, were almost immediately comprehensively contradicted by western journalists. The Economist, for example, reported that the al-Shifa factory was "open to the street", contrasting with other heavily guarded areas of Khartoum. (108) Associated Press stated that: "There are no signs of secrecy at the plant. Two prominent signs along the road point to the factory, and foreigners have been allowed to visit the site at all hours." (109) The only "military" guard was the old nightwatchman killed in the missile attack.
The Clinton Administration also attempted to justify its strike with the claim that there were weapons of mass destruction technology links between Sudan and Iraq. Some four days after the attack on the al-Shifa factory, the United States government position and focus shifted once again. Unable to prove anything specific, the American government then fell back on to broader claims. In a news article on 25 August 1998, entitled 'U.S. Intelligence Cites Iraqi Tie to Sudan Plant', for example, Associated Press reported that: "Intelligence officials are leaning toward the theory that Iraq was spreading its knowledge of chemical weapons production to other Muslim countries." (110)
On the same day, in an article entitled 'Times: U.S. says Iraq aided Sudan on chemical weapons', Reuters reported on American government claims of weapons of mass destruction technology transfer from Iraq to Sudan. (111) The United States government then claimed that the factory was attacked because of alleged links with Iraq. The Guardian reported, for example, that:
"President Clinton's decision to launch the strikes was at least partly influenced by reports that intelligence officers had intercepted phone calls between scientists at the factory and top officials in Iraq's chemical weapons programme." (112)
It is perhaps needless to say that the Clinton Administration refused to name the Sudanese scientists who were said to be in telephone contact with people in Iraq, and has not released transcripts or tapes of the alleged conversations. It is a matter of record, however, that in February 1998, the United States government had itself denied that there was no evidence for chemical weapons or technology transfers from Iraq to Sudan, stating that
"We have no credible evidence that Iraq has exported weapons of mass destruction technology to other countries since the (1991) Gulf War." (113)
In addition to the American government, in February and March 1998, the British government also stated that there was no evidence for any weapons of mass destruction technology transfers from Iraq to Sudan. This was the view of both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Defence Intelligence staff of the British Ministry of Defence. On 19 March 1998, Baroness Symons, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, stated in the House of Lords in relation to claims of weapons of mass destruction technology transfers, including chemical and biological weapons, from Iraq to Sudan, that:
"We are monitoring the evidence closely, but to date we have no evidence to substantiate these claims.... Moreover, we know that some of the claims are untrue...The defence intelligence staff in the MoD (Ministry of Defence) have similarly written a critique which does not support the report's findings." (114)
Baroness Symons also stated that: "Nor has the United Nations Special Commission reported any evidence of such transfers since the Gulf War conflict and the imposition of sanctions in 1991." (115) Even the broad American claim of weapons of mass destruction technology transfer from Iraq to Sudan was simply unsustainable.
The Clinton Administration's attack on al-Shifa was roundly condemned within the international community. On 23 August, 1998, both the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, a pan-Islamic organisation representing Islamic countries, and the League of Arab States, made up of 22 Arab countries, condemned the United States missile strike on Sudan, calling the attack "a blatant violation" of the Charter of the U.N. (116) The Organisation of African Unity also called for an independent investigation of the al-Shifa site. American allies such as France and Italy also expressed doubts about Washington's claims about al-Shifa. (117)
On 3 September 1998, the summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, meeting in Durban, South Africa, and representing well over one hundred countries, passed the following resolution:
"The Heads of State or Government...expressed their deep concern over the air attack carried out by the United States Government against the El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant in the Sudan on 20 August 1998, and considered this as a serious violation of the principles of international law and the UN Charter and contrary to the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes as well as a serious threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan and the regional stability and international peace and security. They further considered this attack as a unilateral and unwarranted act. The Heads of State or Government condemned this act of aggression and the continuing threats made by the United States Government against the Sudan and urged the US Government to refrain from such unilateral acts. They further expressed support to the Sudan in its legitimate demands for full compensation for economic and material losses resulting from the attack." (118)
Far from isolating Sudan, American policy had led to an unprecedented level of international support and sympathy for the Khartoum authorities, as well as strengthening the government domestically.
What was perhaps even more disturbing than the systematic unravelling of the Clinton Administration's stated reasons for attacking the al-Shifa factory itself, was the shambolic way in which the factory was targeted. It was revealed in the weeks after the raid that the decision to attack the factory was taken by a very small number of predominantly civilian aides to President Clinton. The White House went ahead with the attack on al-Shifa without informing four of the five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Neither was the FBI informed, even though the agency was directly responsible for investigating the terrorist bombings of the two American embassies which precipitated the attack. The US Attorney General Janet Reno was informed, but she was ignored when she questioned the strength of the evidence available. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's own intelligence service, was also not informed of the attack. (119)
It has, of course, been openly speculated upon that the decision to attack Afghanistan and Sudan was intimately linked to the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Articles such as Vanity Fair's 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' articulated just such concerns.(120) It might be pointed out, in passing, that President Clinton showed a marked reluctance to agree to scientific tests in both cases.
In a New York Times article published one year after the bombing, further details of the intelligence blunders surrounding the decision to attack al-Shifa emerged. There was considerable doubt about the targeting of al-Shifa even within the small group of people involved in the decision to attack. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research had cautioned the Secretary of State before the attack, questioning the links between al-Shifa and bin Laden. These concerns were put in writing. Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering conceded that intelligence analysts had expressed concerns about the target before the attack. Asked how serious these concerns were, Pickering stated that "[t]hey were serious enough to send a memorandum..." When the Bureau of Intelligence and Research attempted to raise the issue again following the attack, their report was spiked by Pickering. Following the attack other intelligence officials questioned the validity of the al-Shifa strike. These have included the head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, the Directorate's Africa chief and the head of the CIA Counterterrorism Center. (121)
The al-Shifa bombing has been compared to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during NATO's war over Kosovo. While the Belgrade incident was the result of similarly mistaken targeting by CIA intelligence sources, that is where the comparison ends. The Chinese embassy bombing was one of thousands of targets selected during NATO's intensive bombing campaign against Yugoslav targets. It is a sad reality that when one bombs thousands of targets, some mistakes will be made. No such excuse exists for the bombing of the al-Shifa factory. Given the Clinton Administration's repeated claims of Sudanese state sponsorship of terrorism, and that the al-Shifa factory had allegedly been under suspicion and observed for months, there is simply no excuse for such an intelligence failure.
Highlighted by the al-Shifa fiasco, the Clinton Administration's intelligence and information on Sudan in general and "terrorism" in particular, and the way the administration has chosen to interpret and use intelligence, has self-evidently been abysmal. The Clinton Administration is served by thirteen separate intelligence agencies. Their budget amounts to almost thirty billion dollars a year: 85 percent of this budget is dedicated to military intelligence. The primary mission of these intelligence agencies is "to collect, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence to assist the President and senior US Government policymakers in making decisions relating to the national security". (122) Amongst the many resources at the disposal of these intelligence agencies are satellites that can see everything imaginable and that can monitor every electronic communication on the face of the earth.
One would have assumed that allegations of weapons of mass destruction technology, and factories allegedly engaged in the production of such weapons, particularly in the hands of people apparently of people such as Osama bin Laden, would have been of considerable significance to American "national security". One would have imagined that some of the immense resources briefly mentioned above would have been focused on every facet of the al-Shifa factory in Khartoum. Indeed, the Clinton Administration claimed that the al-Shifa medicines factory had been under surveillance for several months before the Cruise missile attack which destroyed the plant. (123)
It would appear, however, that despite having monitored the al-Shifa factory for all that time and despite the awesome array of intelligence resources and assets at their disposal, it was beyond the ability of the American intelligence community to ascertain who owned Sudan's biggest pharmaceutical factory, and in spite of the fact that the factory was publicly mortgaged. It is also clear that far from being able to ascertain whether the al-Shifa medicines factory produced any chemical weapons, the American intelligence community were not even able to ascertain whether al-Shifa produced any commercial products - despite the fact that the factory produced two-thirds of Sudan's medicines and animal drug needs, and held United Nations drug contracts. A simple low-tech telephone call to the Sudanese chamber of commerce, or to the factory itself, or to any of the various ambassadors - including the British ambassador - who had visited the factory, would have answered several of the questions which the Clinton Administration so publicly got wrong in the days following the bombing. This almost unbelievable intelligence failure is also all the more surprising given the fact that Washington had previously enjoyed a warm military and intelligence relationship with Sudan in the 1980s, and despite the fact that unlike intelligence gathering in other countries such as Libya, Iraq or Iran, which is very difficult given the closed nature of those countries, Sudan is, in the words of the Guardian, "one of the most open and relaxed Arab countries". (124)
That the Clinton Administration chose to act on what has subsequently been seen to be faulty intelligence is a reflection of poor judgement on the part of the Administration. Equally unacceptable has been the Administration's tendency to ignore intelligence concerns when they conflicted with stated policy. To have allowed intelligence gathering and analysis on Sudan to degenerate as much has it clearly did is a reflection of bad government. Both are compounded by the Administration's clear attempts to then defend questionable stances towards Sudan by hiding behind "intelligence" which could not be "revealed."
Former President Carter established in 1993 that, despite listing Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, the Clinton Administration had no evidence, and no intelligence, to support the listing. Several years later the absence of any intelligence to support the Clinton Administration's continuing allegations of Sudanese involvement in terrorism continued to be documented. In a 26 December 1996 International Herald Tribune article by veteran American investigative reporter Tim Weiner, it was clear that no evidence or proof had emerged: "U.S. officials have no hard proof that Sudan still provides training centers for terrorists". The article stated that "The big issue for the United States is that Sudan has served as a safe house for stateless revolutionaries". Mr Weiner also interviewed key American officials "responsible for analyzing the Sudan". The answer to whether or not Sudan was involved in supporting terrorism, was "we just don't know". Sudan, nevertheless, continued to be listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. (125)
What is clear is that American intelligence agencies have not able to find any proof of Sudanese involvement in international terrorism, before or after the Clinton Administration listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism. The singular lack of judgement on the part of the Clinton Administration and the American intelligence community was amply illustrated by its eagerness to accepted fabricated claims concerning the Sudanese government.
The Clinton Administration's poor record and questionable judgement with regard to intelligence and the issue of terrorism was further highlighted by the September 1998 New York Times revelation that:
"In February 1997, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir sent President Clinton a personal letter. It offered, among other things, to allow U.S. intelligence, law-enforcement and counterterrorism personnel to enter Sudan and to go anywhere and see anything, to help stamp out terrorism. The United States never replied to that letter."
In April 1997, there was another invitation, once again inviting the Clinton Administration to send FBI counterterrorism units to Sudan to verify any information they may have had about terrorism. The letter was addressed to Representative Lee Hamilton, the then chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and is part of the Congressional Record. (134) This offer was eventually turned down four months later.
There is a further, even more disturbing example of the Clinton Administration's questionable judgement regarding Sudan and international terrorism. In a series of investigative articles entitled "U.S. Fumbles Chance to Nab Bombers: State Department Stopped FBI from Pursuing Leads in East Africa Blasts", "State, FBI Questioned Over Africa Blasts: Congress Questions Sudan Missile Strike, 'Missed Opportunities'" and "Was Sudan Raid on Target? Did FBI Botch Chance to Grab Embassy Bombing Suspects?", the American MSNBC new network reported that in early August 1997, shortly after the terrorist bombings of the American embassies (and before the bombing of the al-Shifa factory), the Sudanese authorities had arrested two prime suspects in the embassy bombings. These suspects had been observed monitoring the American embassy in Khartoum, and were arrested after attempting to rent an apartment across the street from the embassy. The two men had Pakistani passports, Afghani accents, and a list of known bin-Laden contacts in Sudan. They had also both been in Kenya for the three weeks before the embassy bombing. The reference on their visa applications to enter Sudan was the same company accused by the American authorities of supplying explosives and weapons to Osama bin-Laden.
The Sudanese authorities notified the FBI and repeatedly offered to turn the two suspects over to the American authorities. Senior American law enforcement officials have subsequently stated that while the FBI were eager to taken up the offer, the State Department prevented any such investigation. After the bombing of the al-Shifa factory, the Sudanese government deported the two men to Pakistan. (135) In July 1999, MSNBC further documented that there had been Sudanese offers to assist even after the al-Shifa bombing:
"Still, despite fierce protests from Sudan over the missile attack, the Sudanese government has continued to court U.S. officials with intelligence allegedly collected during the interrogations of the two before they were deported and observations made during the period between their release and deportation. As late as last month, FBI officials had renewed their requests to the State Department to sanction official contacts with Sudan that might lead to new information about the bin Laden network's plans. Again, the State Department declined." (136)
The MSNBC report also quoted a Kenyan diplomat, who described his government as "furious" that the U.S. had passed up on an opportunity to apprehend men suspected of involvement in the bombing which killed hundreds of Kenyans.
It is a matter of record that both House and Senate intelligence committees began an investigation into why the Clinton Administration passed up on the chance of interviewing two prime suspects in the embassy bombings. By any standard, the Administration's studied disinterest in the opportunity of interrogating these two suspects in the bombing of two American embassies is deeply questionable. Perhaps it was ineptitude on the part of politicians, intelligence and law enforcement officials. Perhaps it was an unwillingness on the part of sections of the Clinton Administration to address any development that might have invalidated the attack on Sudan and the al-Shifa factory that was to follow a week or so afterwards, a strike that was necessary and urgent in order for President Clinton to appear "presidential" in the midst of the Lewinsky scandal.
The Clinton Administration's capacity for own goals is clear. The issue of Osama bin-Laden is a case in point. As was outlined in the 1993 Patterns of Global Terrorism, Pakistan had then begun to "expel Arab militants affiliated with various mujahedin groups and nongovernment aid organisations". (137) It is no secret that many of these individuals, denied entry to their own countries, took advantage of Sudan's then non-visa policy for Arab nationals and sought refuge in Sudan. One such person was the Saudi Osama bin-Laden. Previously a CIA asset and the recipient of considerable American funding during the Afghan war, Osama bin-Laden chose not to return to his home country, and also went to Sudan. A man of considerable wealth, bin Laden became commercially involved in Sudan. One of his construction companies began building roads.
The Clinton Administration brought pressure to bear on the Khartoum authorities to expel him from the Sudan. The Sudanese minister of information, Dr Ghazi Saleheddin, revealed that:
"We gave [U.S. officials] a piece of advice that they never followed. We told them: 'Don't send him out of Sudan because you will lose control over him...Now, the United States has ended up with war with an invisible enemy'". (138)
In May 1996, at the insistence of the United States, Sudan expelled bin Laden and over one hundred of his followers and their dependants. They chose to leave for Afghanistan, perhaps the single most difficult place in the world from which to monitor bin Laden and his activities. The results of this relocation are sadly all too well known. While in Sudan he did not engage in any terrorist activities. It was comparatively easy for the Sudanese and American authorities to monitor his activities, and, in the case of the Sudanese authorities probably to exercise a moderating influence of sorts.
It is evident that the Clinton Administration has barely, if at all, acknowledged Sudan's efforts to address American concerns about its alleged support for terrorism. It is difficult to see what more Khartoum could have done in this respect. Sudan arrested and extradited Illyich Ramirez Sanchez, "Carlos the Jackal" to France, and, as requested by Washington, it expelled Osama bin Laden, and his associates, from Sudan. In September 1995 Sudan imposed strict visa requirements on visitors to Sudan, ending its no visa policy for Arab nationals.
In May 2000, Sudan completed the process of acceding to all of the international instruments for the elimination of international terrorism. It has signed the following international agreements:
Sudan has also become a party to regional agreements and a participant in regional programmes for the suppression and elimination of terrorism on the African continent through the Organisation of African Unity. Sudan has also signed similar agreements within the framework of the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. In April 1998, for example, Sudan became a signatory to the Arab Agreement for Combating Terrorism. The Sudanese ministers of internal affairs and justice signed the agreement on behalf of Sudan. (139) In August, 1998, the Sudanese ambassador to Egypt stated Sudan welcomed an Egyptian proposal to convene an international conference on combating terrorism. (140) Sudan has also signed the chemical weapons convention in May 1999. (141) Furthermore in March 2000, Sudan also comprehensively updated its own legislation for the suppression of terrorism. The Sudanese Government has repeatedly invited the United States to send its own anti-terrorist teams to Sudan to investigate and follow-up any information they may have about Sudan's alleged involvement in terrorism. The Clinton Administration eventually did so in early 2000. So far there has been no statement of its findings.
For all the allegations it has made, and despite the awesome and unprecedented intelligence, information-gathering and surveillance tools at its disposal, the Clinton Administration has not been able to point to a single act of terrorism sponsored or supported by the government of Sudan. It has admitted as much in its own reports. Neither has the Administration identified a single "terrorist training camp" in Sudan: had any such camp been located it would undoubtedly been attacked at the same time as the al-Shifa factory. Senior European diplomatic sources in Khartoum have questioned whether these camps ever existed. The hundreds of news and sensation hungry journalists who flooded into Khartoum following the attack on the al-Shifa factory, all eagerly exploring any terrorist link, were also unable to find any evidence of terrorists or terrorist camps. What the Administration did "identify" as a chemical weapons-producing facility, the al-Shifa plant, is now internationally acknowledged to have been nothing more than a medicines factory.
The Clinton Administration is also guilty of turning a blind eye to crucial intelligence opportunities in the war against terrorism. The Administration chose not to accept two offers by the Khartoum authorities for American intelligence and counterterrorist personnel to carry out whatever investigations they wished to in Sudan. In 2000 it eventually accepted a third such invitation. An even more questionable Clinton Administration decision was to ignore repeated Sudanese requests that they interrogate two suspects in the Nairobi embassy bombing who had been arrested by the Sudanese authorities in Khartoum while renting accommodation overlooking the American embassy. The Clinton Administration would appear to have ignored this vital opportunity as it would have been inconvenient given that they intended to attack Sudan because of its alleged complicity in the Nairobi bombings.
The Clinton Administration's policy and actions with regard to Sudan have been characterised by repeated intelligence failures. These have included failures with regard to evaluating the nature of the Sudanese government and the Islamic model it presents. There has also been a failure in that the Administration has not been able to substantiate any allegations of Sudanese involvement in terrorism, despite Washington's listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism. The Clinton Administration partially evacuated its embassy in 1993, and actually withdrew all its diplomats and their dependants in 1996, on the basis of intelligence reports subsequently revealed to have been based on fabricated claims by unreliable sources. The Administration then used the fact that the Sudanese government had been unable to respond to these fabricated "terrorist threats" as yet more evidence of Khartoum's complicity with terrorist elements. Washington has consistently refused to justify any of its claims, invoking the need to protect "intelligence" sources. On the only occasion when the Administration reluctantly attempted to justify its claims, allegations that the al-Shifa medicines factory was owned by terrorists and manufacturing chemical weapons, its "intelligence" crumbled in the face of media reporting.
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