

The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan

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General Translator's Introduction:

In 2000, a mysterious book appeared in the streets of Khartoum under the title “The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan”. The mystery of the book was strengthened by its impeccable method of distribution necessitated by the Regime’s firm grip over information in the country. The launch of the work consisted of a once-off distribution at gates of major mosques, following Friday prayers. Soon after, the circulation of the Book gained momentum. Spontaneous photocopying made the Book available all over the country and abroad. The book soon became the most talked about document in the country. It was an envy of any writer, the world over. Most readers had never seen the original copy of the book. Illiterate people too became familiar with the Book as it was debated in every gathering.

The thesis of the Book is simple but disturbing. Using statistics, the authors claim that Sudan is controlled by only one Region (Northern Region) with just over 5% of Sudan’s population. Within this hegemonic Region, power is monopolised by only three ethnic groups. The Book then gave detailed statistics about the hegemony of the Northern Region over the whole the county. All Sudan’s Presidents and Prime Ministers came from this Region. Members of this Region also controlled all key positions in the country ranging from ministerial posts to heads of banks, developmental schemes, army, police, etc.

Part Two of the Black Book did not appear until August 2002. Unlike Part One, this one joined the global world and appeared in a website (Sudanjem.com). Part two has less talk but more statistics. Altogether, there are more than 200 Tables in it.

As of last year (March 2003), some of the activists involved in the preparation of Book took arms against the government. The armed uprising, referred to as Darfur Conflict, constitutes Africa’s youngest civil war. To date, this war has resulted in 800,000 displaced, 120,000 refugees and no less than 100,000 fatalities.

In translating the Book from Arabic, I did my best to remain faithful to the text. Passages that are of no value for the English reader have been eliminated. These passages are either steeped in Arabic metaphors, or elsewhere presuppose some knowledge that is particular to Sudan’s history, folklore and traditions. Retaining them in the text requires substantial explanation that lies beyond my role as a translator.

22/03/2004

Translator

Dedication:

To those who filled themselves of haughtiness, arrogance and feeling of superiority, wishing to silence our Black Book or elsewhere replace it with their White Book.

To the Sudanese people who have endured oppression, injustice and tyranny

To the majority of the Sudanese people who still suffer marginalization of power and wealth

To those, who work for justice and equality with extreme honesty and self-denial.

Introduction to Part 1.

We present our work “The Black Book; Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan” as a document that exposes the performance of successive governments which ruled the Sudan in its recent history. This book is not driven by narrow motives that seek to incriminate or blame certain circles in the country. Rather, it is a critical work that documents objective facts that are hard to overlook.

This book is an exposé of the injustice that was visited on the Sudan by successive governments which ruled it since independence –(1956). The pattern of injustice remained almost the same throughout, irrespective of the political orientation of incumbent government: secular, theocratic, dictatorial or –presumed- democratic. They all displayed blatant favouritism of one particular circle in the Sudan to detriment of all others. The favoured part of the Sudan attracted disproportionate attention, care, services and developmental resources from those successive governments. That favoured part of the Sudan is the Northern Region where most of the ruling elite come from.

For the purpose of this Book, we have divided the Sudan into five Regions:

1. Northern Region: Current River Nile and Northern States.
2. Eastern Region: Gadharif, Kasala and Red Sea States
3. Central Region: Gezira, Sinnar, Blue Nile and Khartoum States
4. Southern Region: Upper Nile, Bahr Alghazal and Equatorial States

5. Western Region; Kordofan and Darfur States

In its blatant favouritism for the Northern Region, successive governments in the Sudan have systematically breached rights of its other citizens. They deviated from the principle of treating all citizens as equal. They have accused others of racism, a crime that they have themselves practised every single day of their reign.

Successive governments of the Sudan have thus lost their credibility and have, therefore, disqualified themselves in so far as support of the Sudanese citizens is concerned.

In presenting this Book, we intend to shed light on this unfortunate reality and make it crystal clear for all.

The new Millennium is now approaching, full of hope and optimism. Due to its recent history, Sudan meets the new Millennium steeped in poverty, illiteracy, disease and lack of development. Despite, the Sudanese citizens are invited to rise to the challenge by appropriating the same powers which have so far crippled them. Let them do that in collaboration with other global citizens whose rulers have delivered and have prepared them for the new area.

Introducing Sudan

Sudan lies between lines 14 and 38 Latitudes East, and 4 and 22 longitudes North of Equator. It occupies 968,000 square miles. The White Nile, the Blue Nile and River Nile zigzag their way through it and provide rich source of water and food. Sudan is surrounded by nine countries: Chad, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt and Libya. The position of Sudan between these countries is source of wealth but equally of trouble. Sudan also touch the Red Sea with a shore that extends to 309km. Sudan has three distinctive geographical zones. North of Latitude 16 is barren desert. Below Latitude 16 is a region rich in equatorial climate. In between is a savannah belt that gets drier the further you move to the north. These distinctive climatic variations have their impact on Sudan's populations and their cultures.

The last National Census, 1993, put Sudan's population at 24,940,703 with annual growth of 2.6. For the purpose of this document, we divide Sudan into five regions. Each of these Regions has its historical, cultural and administrative particularities. Furthermore, each Region consists of a number of provinces – see Table 1.

Table 1
Populations of Sudan Regions

Region	States	Population	%
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Eastern	Kasala, Gadharif, Red Sea	3,051,958	12.2%
Northern Region	Northern, River Nile	1,291,620	5.3%
Central Region	Gezira, Sinnar, White Nile Blue Nile, Khartoum	8,829,367	35.4%
Western Region	Kordofan, Darfur	7,912,285	31.7%
Southern Region	Upper Nile, Bahr Alghazal Equatorial	2,845,480	11.4%
Total	-	24,940,703	100%

Khartoum, the capital, which we include within the Central Region has a population of 3,413,034. More than half of this population come from deprived Regions of the West and the South, primarily fleeing lack of development and war.

Natural Resources:

Sudan is rich in natural resources, particularly agriculture and forestry. It has no less than 120,000,000 acres suitable for agriculture. Only 16,000,000 of that are currently under use. Agriculture is still dependent on rainfalls despite ample underground water. The economy of Sudan now rests on rain-fed agriculture. Major products include peanuts, hibiscus, sesame seeds, watermelon seeds and gum Arabic. Animal resources, like camels, sheep and cattle also feature in Sudan export economy. Recently, petrol and gold have been added to the export wealth while the country still awaits exploitation of other minerals like copper and natural gas.

Administrative Division of the Country:

A recent constitutional Decree, 1996, divided the Sudan into 26 States. These are then grouped into five Regions: three in the East, two in the north, five in the centre including the capital Khartoum, six in the west and ten in the south. Each State has its government and its legislative council. If we exclude the south which is still a war zone, whatever development we can find in the country has been confined to the north, Khartoum, part of the Central Region and an even smaller part of the Eastern Region. The entire Western Region now lacks a single developmental scheme which could support one province for a single week. The oil refinery in Alobeid, Western Region is now classified as a national project. As such, its proceeds are controlled by the central government in Khartoum. The oil wells at Abu Jabra and Maglad, also in the Western Region have also come under similar strategy. Employment of local people is confined to digging these wells. All jobs from drivers and above are filled by labour imported from outside the area. Officers of the security personnel and most of their foot soldiers are carefully selected from one known ethnic category, so that not a single Dinar goes to those who do not deserve.

Defining the state and its authority:

Scholars rarely agree on how to define the state. Nonetheless, a consensus occurs regarding its essence and constituents. Calsen refers to the state as “a constellation of the nation”. Others like Degi stress the constituent elements of the state like territory, population and authority. Gamal Albanna, another scholar in this field identifies five requirements for an Islamic state:

- a) Primary aim is to develop the land (*Allah said I am making a Khalifa on the land. Koran, Albaqra Sura, Chapter X, verse mm*)
- b) An environment that guarantees freedom (no compulsion on faith)
- c) Justice as the main axis of state operation (*be just for justice is the essence Almaida Sura* of piety; Prophet Mohamed said: I have declared injustice haram <strongly disallowed> for myself. I also made it haram for all of you so never be unjust)
- d) Decision making rests on consultation (seek views of stakeholders first and when you act trust on Allah)
- e) Rule based on Allah’s diktat (Let the rule be based on Allah’s words and let Allah be the sole God to be worshiped in the land)

In our modern understanding, a state must display the following:

- a) Territory: A defined territory that is endorsed by relevant international authorities.
- b) Population: People who live in the specified territory.
- c) Ruling authority: The power that is legitimated to administer the territory and its people according to specified laws and institutions. The ruling authority must demonstrate its commitment to work for peace and for meeting basic needs of all within its domain.

Conditions for accepting the authority of the ruler/ governing power:

The authority must demonstrate its commitment to maintain sovereignty of land against foreign intruders; treat its citizen equally; afford them peace and protection; guarantee dignified life; spread freedom and dignity, and must enable its citizens to fully participate in conducting their public affairs. All that is to take place within an environment that is conducive for participation of all without religious, ethnic, skin colour and gender discrimination.

The state authority can not only implement that without commitment to its national laws that regulates and divides powers among different state organs. Most important here is the separation between state powers, and in particular the political, the judicial and the legislative.

Reflection on state Authorities:

Executive Powers:

These are vested in specified offices that are delegated to implement state policies regarding economy, politics, social needs, security and general state-citizen relationship. Executive state organs must be subordinate to and committed to state legislative authorities.

Legislative Authorities:

Duty of these bodies is to enact laws regarding state policies in the political, social, economic and ethical areas. Legislative authorities draw their laws from religious, traditional, natural and legal conventions. Legislative authorities should be committed to observe these laws which they make and ensure that state and the public will do like-wise.

Judicial Authorities:

Their main function is to implement the law, protect the state constitution and restore justice when disputes occur. These authorities can only function adequately if they maintain and respect their neutrality and independence. Independence of the judiciary should be maintained throughout its entire hierarchy ranging from its lowest level like the village court to its highest level, the Constitutional Court.

Media:

Media has only recently surfaced as an important player in modern state apparatus. It has since carved itself a space that has become indivisible from any democratic state. The media now plays an important role in guarding state laws and constitution, similar to the role traditionally played by legislative powers. Moreover, it has become the avenue for channelling complaints regarding abuse of power, infringement of law by the powerful, corruption and injustice at large. It has also become a voice for the powerless and a guardian for the dispossessed.

Examples of Imbalance of Division of Powers:

State authority is a source of power and a tool for achieving prosperity for all within the nation. Sudan state is no exception in this regard. At its independence, 1956, it declared itself a sovereign state and raised its flag together with other slogans promising full commitment to work for good of all within the new nation. Discrepancy between slogans and actions however appeared as early as the birth of the new state. Politics in Sudan was sectarian and dominated by the two religious houses, the house of the Mahdis and the house of the Mirghani. These two Houses corresponded (still do) to the two leading political parties: the Umma Party of the Mahdis and the Democratic Unionist Party of the Mirghanis. In some ways, these two Houses inherited colonial powers on golden plates. In order to monopolize power in the country, both of these parties pegged leadership of their parties to that of their respective religious sects. Hence party leader were also sect leaders. The trick was that sect leaders had to come from families of the founding fathers of these religious sects. Moreover, a second strategy was also devised for the same purpose that was of exporting electoral candidates. Important party members from the centre were encouraged to stand for elections in areas other than own. The practice effectively made it impossible for emergence of locally borne political representatives. These practices ensured domination of the Northern Region over all other Regions in the country and established a pattern for dealing with so-called marginalized areas. The pattern also meant that legislative powers remained under personnel who were primarily drawn from the Northern Region.

The pattern described above had (still has) wide ramification on political representation in the country. High representation of the Northern Region in the central government remained the same irrespective of knowledge gains in other Regions and changes in the political environment. Throughout its recent history, the Northern Region was represented by well over 50% at the central government. Its representation occasionally climbed over 70%. From independence to this day, not a single Prime Minister/ President came from any Region other than the Northern Region. Like many 3rd World countries, Sudan was ruled by several governments which came to power through a coup. However several attempt to overthrow governments failed simply because its leaders came from Regions other than the Northern Region.

In the coming pages, we will examine the influence of state on distributions of power in the country. Figures and statistics will be used to explain that, and here they follow:

Ministerial Representation:

For the period 1954 to 1964, 73 ministerial positions were served in central government in Khartoum. Share of different Regions are presented in Table 2.

Table 2
Ministerial Positions 1954 – 1964.

No	Region	Positions	Overall %
1	Eastern Region	1	1.4%
2	Northern Region	58	79%
3	Central Region	2	2.8%
4	Southern Region	12	16%
5	Western Region	0	0%

To place Table 2 within perspective, we have to refer to Sudan's population some decades ago. 1986 census was the mostly reliable for our purpose.

Table 3
Sudan Population Distribution, 1986

No	Region	Population	%
1	Eastern Region	2,212,779	11.8%
2	Northern Region	1,016,406	5.4%
3	Central Region	4,958,038	26.5%
4	Southern Region	4,407,450	23.7%
5	Western	6,072,872	32.6%

Note that 5.4% of Sudan's population were represented at 79.5%, executive/ ministerial posts in the Khartoum, the seat of the central government. During that period, five different governments took office but the pattern remained the same.

Table 4
National Governments 1954-1964

No	Government	Years	Leader
1	1 st National Government	Jan. 1954	Alazhari
2	2 nd National Government	1955	Alazhari
3	3 rd National Government	1956	Alazhari
4	Kkaleel Government	1958	Khaleel
5	1 st Military Government	1958-1964	General Aboud

All of the above governments based their powers on the afore-mentioned religious sects. General Aboud was no exception.

Following national uprising in October 1964, Aboud was removed from office, thus giving way for a democratic government 1964-1969. Let us now see what happened to executive representation under democratic Sudan.

Table 5
Ministerial Positions 1964-1969

Region	Positions	%
Eastern	2	2.05%
Northern	55	67.9%
Central	5	6.2%
Southern	14	17.3%
Western	5	6.2%

Total of constitutional posts for this period was 81 positions. Strangely enough, Western and Southern Regions contributed a lot to bringing the interim Government under Presidency of Sir Alkatim who prepared the country for 1964's elections. Those who were selected as ministers from the Central Regions were of Northern Region origin.

The Reign of Nimeiri, 1969-1985.

Nimeiri's military rule was characterised by internal instability leading to numerous cabinet reshuffles. In total, 115 ministers served in his different cabinets with the following regional distribution (see Table 6):

Table 6
Ministerial Positions, 1969-1985

Region	Positions	%
Eastern	4	2.5%
Northern	79	68.7%
Central	19	16.5%
Southern	9	7.8%
Western	4	3.5%

Despite tremendous differences between the politics of Nimeiri's and what went before him, domination of the Northern Region seemed to have persevered. Continuous flow of new ministerial blood and the reputation of Nimeiri as a man for all Sudan did not dent the supremacy of the Northern Region. This situation increased the hegemony of the Northern Region and sabotaged all attempts to attract development projects for non-Northern Regions. A good example was the defunct Kafa road which was meant to connect Libya with Alfasir the capital of the Darfur in the Western Region. The desert highway road was to be financed wholly or partially by Libyan aid. Obstruction against construction of this road is well known to all and had caused tremendous loss of faith in the central government in the Western Region.

Following demise of Nimeiri, a transitional military government took over for a year to prepare the country for election. The new government operated under what came to be known as Transitional Military Council headed by Swar Aldahab. Table 7 shows the constitution of the Transitional Military Council.

Table 7
Transitional Military Council, 1985-1986

Region	Positions	%
Eastern Region	0	0%
Northern Region	21	70%
Central Region	3	10%
Southern Region	5	16.7%
Western Region	1	3.3%

Please note that the Sudanese Army has always been a national institution. That aspect of the army fared rather poor with the regional representation of the Council.

The Transitional Military Council was aided by senior members of the Transitional Government but imbalance remained as before.

Second Democracy 1986-1989:

The Transitional Military Council kept its words. It organized democratic elections and handed down power to the new elected Prime Minister, Sadiq Almahdi whose cabinet are presented in Table 8.

Table 8
Ministerial Positions of Almadhi's government 1986-1989

Region	Positions	%
Eastern Region	3	2.6% %
Northern Region	55	47.4%
Central Region	17	14.7%
Southern Region	15	12.9%
Western Region	26	22.4%

Almahdi was the only leader who came close to perfection in the sense of forming a government in which all Regions were reasonably represented, notwithstanding the evident over representation of the North. Although the North was also over represented and the cabinet did not reflect the regional distribution of Sudan's population, we would like to acknowledge that Almadhi deserve praise for having gone further than any other Sudanese leader. Almahdi was also the first head of state who allowed the important Ministry of Finance and Economy to be headed by some from the Western and the Central Region. These were Ibrahim Mansour and Omer Bashir from the Western Region and Omer Nur Aldayim from the Central Region.

Albashir's Government of National Salvation, 1989 to date:

Almahdi was overthrown in a bloodless coupe, 1989 and a new government under took office under the name "Revolution/Government of National Salvation". As the West has been instrumental in the formation of the ideology which inspired Albashir to take over, the Westerners were rewarded without challenging the domination of the North. This was reflected in the constitution of the Military Command Council which controlled Sudan for Albashir's early years (see Table 9):

Table 9
Revolutionary Command Council, June 1989

Region	Positions	%
Eastern	0	0%
Northern	10	66.7%
Central	0	0%
Southern	2	13.3%
Western	3	20%

When the power was settled in favour of the new government, the domination of the Northern Region was restored in line with previous political traditions. The new government operated under the slogans: Civilizational Project, Islamization of life, equality and justice and the principle of citizenship. Unfortunately, these slogans soon gave way to unchallenged hegemony of the Northern Region. The evidence for that can be seen in the cumulative high office positions which continued until the last cabinet reshuffle 1999. A total of 202 personnel are computed in Table 10.

Table 10

Constitutional/ Ministerial Positions, July 1989-December 1999.

Region	Positions	%
Eastern	6	3%
Northern	120	59.4%
Central	18	8.9%
Southern	30	14.9%
Western	28	13.8%

As Table 10 shows, representation of the Northern Region reached 59.4% for a population that constituted 12.2% only. As such, the destiny of the remaining 87.8% of the population was subordinate to the will of the 12.2% who came from the Northern region. The Northern Region itself was not (still is not) a homogeneous entity. In fact, the North contained many groups that were subject to same level injustice and marginalization like the Manaseer and Mahas. The first claimed Arab descent while the latter were of Nubian origin. In fact the entire Northern Region was dominated by only three ethnic groups which also dominated the whole country. These were the Shaygia, the Jaalyeen and the Danagla.

Table 10 also indicates that the National Salvation government had come to wreck what it had formed before during its first Military Command Council. In so doing, the government demonstrated its inability to deviate from established patterns of injustice, despite the slogans which it raised during its inception. Even in situations when the government appointed some personnel from other regions, it opted for those migrants from the Northern Region. Appointing those of Northern origin resident in other region was a blatant attempt to deceive people and give the illusion of some air of regional representation.

In December 1999, and following power struggle between Albashir and his ideologue Turabi, the government rushed in a number of Presidential Decrees. Changes contained in these Decrees showed little attempt to avoid tribalism and regionalism as promised in earlier slogans. This was (still is) evident from the choice of new recruits to high offices ranging from the Republican Palace to ministers and State governors. To dispel any accusation of bias in our analysis, we present below a list of their new appointees indicating their portfolios and

regions. We will start with the Republican Palace (see Table 11)

Table 11
Staff of the Republican Palace (December 1999)

No.	Name	Position	Region
1	F. Marshall Omer A. Albashir	President	Northern
1	Ali Osman M. Taha	First Deputy President	Northern
3	George Kangoor Arop	Deputy President	Southern
4	Dr. Riak Mashar	Assistant President	Southern
5	Dr. Ibrahim Ahmed Omer	Assistant President	Northern
6	Lt General Bakri Hasan Salih	Minister for presidency Of the Republic	Northern
7	Dr. Ahmed Ali Imam	Presidential Advisor	Northern
8	Dr. Nafayi Ali Nafayi	Peace Affairs	Northern
9	Dr. Altayib Mohamed Kheir	Security Affairs	Northern
10	Dr. Suaad Alfatih	Women and Children	Northern
11	Abdel Basit Sabdarat	Legal Politics	Northern
12	Salah Mohamed Salih	Water Resources	Northern

Following defection of Riak Mashar to SPLM, the Palace remained with 11 members one of them from South Renk (Southern Region) while the rest originated north of Aljaile (town north of Khartoum). Those 11 were left to rule a country that extended from Geneina to Port Sudan and from Nimuli to Halfa. One wonders how those people could have imagined the rest of the country and how many of them had seen a third of it, let alone its entirety.

Where was the justice promised by the government in the field of division of power and where was the transparency often reiterated by official media? What was the role of this immense army of advisors? Had these appointments any purpose other than appeasing relatives and fellow members of ethnic groups? What are the jobs that they could and which could not be accomplished by Ministers of the Federal Government (as distinct from State governments)?

Below are names of the Ministers of the Federal government for Post-Turabi Period (12/1999 onwards; see Table 12)

Table 12
Federal Ministers

Name	Region
F. Marshall Omer Ahmed Albashir	Northern
Ali Osman Taha	Northern

George Kangoor Arobe	Southern
Dr. Riak Mashar	Southern
Ibrahim Ahmed Omer	Northern
Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismael	Northern
Lt. general Abdel Rahman Siralkhatim	Northern
Dr. Mohamed Kheir Alzibair	Northern
Dr. Awad Ahmed Aljaz	Northern
Dr. Zibair Bashir Taha	Northern
Dr. Abdalla Hasan Ahmed	Northern
Dr. Qutbi Almahdi	Northern
Abdel Basit Sabdarat	Northern
Dr. Abdalla Mohamed Seed Ahmed	Northern
Ali Ganmar Osman Yasin	Northern
Kamal Ali Ahmed	Northern
Badria Sulaiman	Northern
Abdel Haleem Almuaafi	Central
Abul Gasim Mohamed Ibrahim	Central
Dr. Ghazi Salah Aldin Atabani	Central
Ahmed Ibrahim Altahir	Western
Lt. General Tigani Adam Tahir	Western
F. .Marshall Ibrahim Sulaiman	Western
Mekki Ali Bilal	Western
Dr. Alhaj Adam Yousif	Western
Mohamed Tahir Bilal	Eastern
Dr. Lam Akol	Southern
Alison Manafi Magaya	Southern
Joseph Malwal	Southern

Reading the Table above, the regional representation of the Federal Government is summarised below.

Table 13

Regional Representation of the Federal Government, 1999.

Region	No of Positions	%
Eastern Region	1	3.3%
Northern Region	18	60.1%
Central Region	2	6.6%
Southern	4	13.3%
Western Region	5	16.7%

Chapter 4

Examples of Imbalance of Division of Wealth:

Division of wealth in any society is an important barometer of the legitimacy of its political system. A political system that thwarts its laws to preside over an unfair distribution of wealth is bound to witness rapid erosion of its legitimacy. Modern Sudan is a case in point here. We have carefully monitored the division of wealth in this country over a long time and have come to conclusions that are neither assuring, nor comfortable to confront. We have handed our leadership to those with whom we have fought together for our common national objectives. We have paid our allegiance and put our trust behind the appealing slogans which they raised and continued to do so until the present time. We have finally come to the conclusion that as we demand restoration of our rights, we are demanding the impossible. We are like a person who tries to straighten a shadow without thinking about the crookedness of the object that casts it in the first place.

During his reign 1958-1964, General Aboud extended the railway line to Nyala, opened two technical schools in Geneina and Nyala and two secondary schools in Alobeid and Port Sudan. Having done that, he then proceeded to redirect the rest of Sudan's wealth for the development of Central and Northern Sudan. Agricultural schemes of Khasm Algirba and New Halfa were given special attention, having been reserved for those who were displaced by the construction of Oswan dam. Population of New Halfa were compensated for losing their original homeland and for the mistakes that were committed by previous rulers. However, had they not been indigenous to the Northern Region, they would not have been compensated.

Since independence, Sudan has known several development plans. Among them we mention Ten Years Strategic Development Plan, Five Years Development Plan and Three Years Development Plan. Billions of dollars have been spent on these Plans, forming our present foreign debts and a burden on current and future generations. Most of these Plans have been located in the central and northern Sudan and we are yet to see a return that benefits all those who are responsible for its costs. Many of the schemes which emerged within these developmental plans have remained a drain on the national economy at the expense of all but the Central and the Northern Regions. A critical look at government budget allocations in recent years shows the perils of such development investment and the special place northern Sudan occupies in the hearts of Sudan's ruling elite. Not a single state in non-northern Sudan exceeded 36% of its already budgeted allocations. The Northern States were different. Actual disbursement shows that they never dropped below 60% of their planned budget allocations. Apparently, there is a story behind that. The Ministry of Economy and Finance has always been dominated by the Northern Region. Top positions like Minister, the Deputy Minister, Secretary Generals and chief administrators usually come from the Northern. Even the positions of drivers are also reserved for school drop outs from then north. The rest of the country has to contend with jobs in the Ministry as cleaners, tea makers, guards, etc. In such an environment, it is not surprising that non-northern States find it impossible to receive their allocated budgets while the Northern States have their facilitators at every venue inside the

Ministry. This is very clear when you look at how universities and higher institutes have been performing. In particular, that is evident from the growth of Universities of Kasala and Kadugli (Eastern and Western Region respectively) with their peer Universities of Shandi and Atbara (Northern Region). The first category experienced difficulties while the last prospered even when the economy was facing major difficulties. Universities of the north benefited from substantial donations from public companies which were headed by officials from the Northern Region. Their donations were in fact borne by the same tax payers who come from the whole of the Sudan.

For our purpose here, we will focus on the major characteristics of the Three Years Programme which was ratified by the Government of National Salvation for the years 1999 to 2002.

4.1. The Agricultural Sector.

The irrigated sector, as distinct from rain-fed sector of agriculture is an important component of the Sudanese economy. It has been developed with dual aims in mind. Firstly, to boost the export sector through increase in cash products like cotton, peanuts, sesame seeds, etc. Secondly, to augment food production as a strategic sector, thus increasing production of millet, maize, rice, lentils, etc. This sector has been fortunate in attracting substantial fund both from national resources as well as borrowed capital from abroad. Substantial expenditure in this sector also goes for infrastructure like dams, roads, bridges, etc. Despite substantial investment in this sector, its revenue to the nation is minuscule compared to rain-fed agriculture. The latter has remained a back bone of the export sector contributing peanuts, sesame, gum Arabic, hibiscus and animals. The high cost and low return aspect of the irrigated sector led to its continuous subsidization by the rain-fed sector. We note here that the irrigated sector dominates in Central and Northern Sudan while rain-fed agriculture features mainly in other parts the nation.

Lack of investment in areas of rain-fed agriculture has been a major cause of migration to cities including the capital Khartoum. The North has however been protected against population depletion. Production of wheat has been moved from central Sudan to the north. Movement of wheat to the north has led to the emergence of new dams like Kajabar, Hamadab and Marawi and God knows what other dams follow. Palm trees that were displaced by these dams have been compensated for and many of them have been transported for transplantation in Khartoum. Compare this level of care with the impact of similar dams and irrigated schemes in the East like Algash, Tokar and Sitait. Displacement in these areas still remains unaided to this day. This is despite the fact that the east is among the least underdeveloped parts of the country. Its population suffer disease, hunger, illiteracy and drought.

4.2. Rain-fed Agricultural Sector

Two broad sub-sectors can be identified here; these are the traditional rain-fed sector and the mechanised rain-fed sector. This sector plays important role in food production. Its

programme of work is intended to include investment in agricultural services, pest control, provision of seeds and agricultural extension in general. A number of schemes were established within this sector with the aim of developing deprived areas and rehabilitating drought stricken savannah belt. Rather than augment this sector, the government ordered liquidation of a number of them. These schemes are:

1. Nuba Mountain Agricultural Corporation
2. Blue Nile Agricultural Corporation
3. White Nile Agricultural Corporation
4. Agricultural Machinery Corporation
5. South Kordofan Agricultural Corporation
6. Mechanised Agriculture Corporation]
7. Jebel Mara Rural Development Scheme
8. Western Savannah Corporation

Note that none of these schemes were in the north and that these schemes were liquidated and not sold or privatised. We add that these schemes were developmental and their contribution was not confined to economic gains. As such we are bound to conclude that scrapping of these schemes indicates that development work is a preserve of north Sudan. Others have to contend without it. None of those in power who are calling for equality and development in the county had noticed the plain fact: that since Independence, Darfur has not secured a single developmental scheme which could finance a single Local Administrative Area for three months. Moreover, most agricultural schemes in central Sudan are headed by personnel from the north or otherwise those whose origin is in the north. Examples here include the Gezira Scheme, Rahad Scheme and the Blue Nile Scheme.

In addition to liquidation of public amenities, the government also resorted to aggressive privation that benefited certain circles. Below is a list of privatised public properties:

1. Abu Naama Jute Factory
2. Sata Company
3. Blue Nile Cardboard Factory
4. Port Sudan cotton Spinning Factory
5. Rabak Ginnery
6. Sudan Mining Corporation
7. Red Sea Hotel
8. Kosti Guest House
9. Sudan Cotton Company
10. White Nile Tannery
11. Ria Sweets Factory
12. Kirrikab Factory for Sweets
13. Khartoum Tannery
14. Kuku Company for Milk
15. Sudan Hotel
16. Atbara Guest House

17. Sudan Trade Bank

Some of these companies were sold to certain institutions and for logical reasons. For example, there was nothing wrong in selling Sudan Hotel to the National Fund for Social Insurance. Other sales were however of dubious nature. Abu Naama Jute Factory was sold for Ls 800m, a sum that was well below its commercial value at the time, considering land, assets and machineries included in the sale. We were less surprised when we realised that the buyer was none other than Hashim Haju . Other sales also followed the same pattern. In sharp contrast to Hashim Haju, the Sudanese businessman Mohamed Jar Alnabi who is from the Western Region had to struggle exceptionally hard to survive with the regime. His effort to establish an oil refinery, a strategic acquisition at the time did not endear him to the system. Had it not been for his resilience, he would have been driven into exile like the Ex-Governor of Darfur, Ibrahim Draig.

Sadly, the above shows how the country is run and how the public coffer is manipulated to serve certain individuals and certain areas. Barriers are also erected to prevent leaders from other parts of the Sudan to succeed. A good example is the endemic problem of drinking water in Alobeid city. It was the governor Ibrahim Alsanusi who decided to confront this problem and had tirelessly worked for a final solution. As an indigenous to the area, he was not allowed to reap the result of his work. At the last moment, he was replaced by one of those who deserve to succeed, a governor from the Northern Region.

We all remember the case of Alshafay Ahmed Mohamed who worked together with his predecessor Hasan Mohamedain to establish the National Council. Both of them are from the west and hence had to give way to a northerner to preside over the established Council.

Dr. Ali Alhaj is another example of the manner in which leaders are penalised for not originating in the north. He was the dynamic figure in the peace negotiations as well as establishment of the Federal Government System. In each of these successes, he was removed to allow other to crown his success. Despite continuous character assassination, Dr. Alhaj remained national in his work and did not give way to racist, regional or nepotistic temptations.

4.3. Agricultural Services

Sudan has great agricultural potentials that are yet to be adequately explored and properly exploited. So far, expenditure on agricultural and horticultural extension has been confined to the irrigated sector. For the farmers in the west, east and southern Sudan, agricultural extension is a riddle for which they do not qualify. Other agricultural services directed at small farmers have also been available only to farmers in northern Sudan. Using the Emergency Law which has been enacted recently, even the meagre resources available to the Western Region have been further eroded. Its only pest control plane has been removed on the account that pests did not pose real threat to agriculture in Sudan. Definition of what

constitute pests and grass-hoppers as provided by the Agricultural Pest Control Office in Darfur was not convincing enough for the bureaucrats in Khartoum. The result is that the Office lost the plane and its running cost and kept the grass-hoppers and other pests.

4.4. Natural Resources:

Environmental protection and reversal of desertification have been among the salient stated strategies of natural resource policies in the Sudan. Policies have been drafted with the aim of arresting desertification, protecting and promoting forests, locating new sources of cooking fuel and other similar measures. However, actions on the ground followed a different trend. Jebel Mara forests, rich savannah grass in western Darfur, Blue Nile natural endowment and the gum Arabic belt are all directed to serve the overseers of the Federal government and their affiliates in the north.

4.5. Anima Resources:

As a desert plain, the Northern Region has no significance in the field of animal export. Nonetheless, amid international concern about animal disease, the north was declared – internationally- by the government as an area free of animal diseases. Soon after that, centres of animal exports in the west were moved to the north together with appropriate infrastructural rehabilitation to facilitate that. Officials who contested that were either subjected to threats or enticement to buy into the new policy of the day. Custom tax centres were also moved to the north. Despite difficulties, truck drivers involved in animal export had no choice but to clear their departing products in Dongula in the north. Financial services also had to follow suit. The Branch of Sudan Bank in Alashir in the west had to give way to a Bank Branch in Dongula despite the fact that Alafshir is a capital of animal producing Region, while Dongula is a capital with no land to support animal wealth and a population that is half of that of Alfashir.

4.6. Industrial Sector:

Rural industry and industrial villages have been among the fundamentals of development in India and China. The pattern of development is different in the Sudan. Rural areas are emptied of their labour force in favour of bloated cities where the meagre industrial development is concentrated. In these industrial centres, power is firmly placed under the grip of northern elite who in turn continue depleting other Regions of their wealth. This is despite the fact that substantial natural wealth like iron, petrol, gas, gold, etc. is found in these non-Northern Regions. As long as we continue along this road, it will be a long time before we can see a single industrial scheme outside Central and Northern Sudan. It is in these Regions that we find military industry, currency coinage, Bank Notes Printing Houses, electricity, sugar industries, etc.

4.7. Water and Energy:

It is hard to write about expansion in oil drilling and development in the Sudan without a deep feeling of embarrassment. The Ministry of Energy is now, more or less, a homestead of extended families belonging to one ethnic group from the north. This group and its

commercial companies have monopolized all the high paying posts in the venture down to that of drivers. The local people who supposedly own the oil land are to be content with digging trenches and laying the oil pipelines.

Water development is currently reserved for the eve-expanding capital Khartoum. The rest of the country is left out dying of thirst as well as of diseases like malaria, **kalazar**, **bilharsiasis**, and other water borne diseases.

4.8. Transport and Communication:

Current state strategies in the field of transport and communication state the following objectives:

- a) Integration and improvement of transport and communication services through continuous maintenance of existing national roads and constructions of new national networks which are geared towards economic development.
- b) Orientation of new investment towards schemes and projects that have clear objectives, leading to increased production.
- c) Encouragement of the private sector to invest in transport and communication through sales of public amenities or joint ownership with the state.
- d) Making full use of available opportunities, resources and potentials to that effect.

Despite the obvious importance of transport and communication and their centrality to any developmental plans, they have been relegated to marginal ministries that have no power in the allocation of national budgets. As such, the Department of Transport and Communication has remained subordinate to other ministries like Economic and Finance which operate under different and often contradictory agenda.

While the principle of integrated transport network is agreeable, the term itself has remained either ill defined or simply meaningless. It is not at all clear whether the policy of integration is meant to feature at the level of the nation, the State or a combination of both.

The strategy refers “correctly” to projects and schemes that have clear objectives without being specific as to the delineation of these objectives. Lack of clarity in these issues leaves options open for individual ministers to tune national budgets to their regional and ethnic interests. For example, the Saudi Islamic Bank earmarked fund for the Western Road (Alobeid- Alfashir). That fund was later redirected by the Ex-Minister of Finance Dr. Abdel Wahab Osman to the Wheat Project in the north. This project came as a policy of indigenising production of wheat in northern Sudan, a project poorly compete with national economic gains of the Western Road. This is despite the fact that previous economic feasibility studies had been in favour of the Alobeid – Alfashir Road and equally the Southern Kordofan Nuba Circular Road..

4.9. Education and other Developmental Services:

Tremendous disparities obtain with regard to educational services. While certain areas have seen progressive increase in the number of children who have progressed to secondary schools, pupils in the marginalized areas have been grounded at the primary level. In the State of Western Darfur, primary schools remained closed for two years for lack of books and staff pay. In fact, books rotted in their stores due to lack of funds. There were more than one a half million people in the State of Western Darfur. Only 4,211 children were able to sit for the final Primary School Examination. This number is less than the number of primary school leavers in a single Local Administrative Area in the Northern Region. The comparison becomes somewhat bizarre when we realise one Local Administrative Area in the Darfur has population that is equal to that of the entire Northern Region.

At a different level, marginalized Regions also suffer at the hand of the State Support Fund. This is a national fund expected to fund State developmental projects. As decreed, no State is to access the fund without sound feasibility studies. While this principle makes sense, it is here that northern control reigns supreme. Poorer states are deprived of costs of feasibility studies and hence credible competition for funding. The result is obvious. The National State Support Fund channels its entire budget to funding projects other than those in the Western, Southern and Eastern Regions.

National Financial Institutions:

Stat financial sector is one of those sectors that have remained off limit for Regions other than the Northern Region. For example since the establishment of the Bank of Sudan in 1956 and to this day, not a single manger of this Bank came from the Eastern, Western or Southern Region. Those mangers who came from the Central Region were in fact members of ethnic groups that originate in the Northern Region. The case of the management of the Bank of Sudan can equally be said for other major Sudanese banks like Khartoum Bank, Sudan Agricultural Bank and the Industrial Development Bank. Appointment of managers for newly created banks and other recent public financial institutions in the country also followed same patterns.

a- Chamber of Zakat (Islamic Tax):

Although this institution is essentially religious, it too could not escape the process of northern ethnification, i.e. bringing it under the control of the Shaygia, the Jaalyeen and the Danagla. Recent power struggle between the Secretary General and the Manger General of the Chamber of Zakat can be seen within the same process.

b- Sudan Development Corporation:

No Manager General of this institution ever came out of the three ethnic groups (Shaygia, Jaaliyeen and Danagla).

c. Islamic Trust.

Throughout the life of Albashir's government, this institution has never been led by any manger from outside the Northern Region.

d. Integration Fund.

This fund was originally established for noble reasons. However, when it was placed under directorship of someone from a region other than the favourite one, hell broke loose. All obstacles were placed in front of the non-northern director in order to ensure his failure. This went on despite the impressive profile of the Director who succeeded in attracting Libyan firms for Red Sea fishing, provided badly needed school uniforms, and created employment for substantial number of people. Despite appeals of many prominent people, the Fund was liquidated and the Fund was replaced by Sineen Corporation under the same directorship. When Sineen proved its success like its predecessor under the same previous manager of Integration Fund, opposition was revived. A new manager from the right Region was put in charge. His school drop-out relative now works there and is paid in Dollars, not in Sudanese Dinars, in a UN sponsored project.

Control of the Northern Region over public finance also features in other institutions including the following:

- Application of Sharia (Islamic Law) Fund
- Philanthropic Corporation for Support of Armed Forces
- Martyr's Organisation
- Call for Jihad
- Bir (Charity) International
- Martyr Zibair Charity Organisation
- Marine Lines
- Philanthropic Insurance Fund

National Insurance Fund:

This Fund was originally headed by Major General Mahir Sulaiman who is not from the Northern Region. His success attracted attention of his relevant Federal State Minister who was not pleased by what he saw. Confrontation followed and the Fund was subsequently restored to the control of the Northern Region.

When we raise issues of injustice, corruption and mismanagement, we get accused of racism. Others are free to abuse their position and enrich themselves at the expense of the tax payers in the open. Let us give one exam known to many in the country. A General Director of a well known public company was moved to head another public company. He requested payment of \$17,000 as travel expenses for himself and his family against his new company. He also demanded payment of the same expenses from the previous company insisting payment be made outside the state. He also applied for two years house rent in cash, 7 million Sudanese pounds for furniture, in addition to his salary of 10 million pounds a month. All was paid to him to the last penny. Now, this explains why higher jobs have to be reserved only for those from the Northern Region and that there is little or nothing left for other Regions.

Committee for Division of Resources:

The discovery of petrol and resumption of its export introduced a new type of wealth into the nation. This new wealth was territory bound and could not be simply relocated to the Northern

Region. Something had to be done to ensure flow of wealth to the North and there was no dearth of genius thinking in our leadership. It was easy. A Presidential Decree was to take care of it. Here is the Decree in full:

“Decree No 334, Year 1999: Creation of a National Committee, for drafting proposal for division of national wealth between Federal Government and State governments.

Following examination of the recommendations of the Minister for Federal Relations and the decision of the Council of Ministers No. 839, Year 1998 regarding constitution of a National Committee for division of national resources between the Federal Government and state governments, and in accordance with Constitutional Articles 113, 114, and 115, The President decrees the following: Establishment of a National Committee for the purpose of drafting proposals for division of national wealth between the Federal and State Governments. The committee consists of the following:

Table 14

National Committee for Division of National Wealth:

No	Name	Position	Region <added by authors>
1	Abdel RahimMohamed Hamdi	Chair	Northern
2	Dr. Taj Alsir Mahjoub	Secretary And Member	Northern
3	Dr.Taj Alsir Mustafa	Member	Northern
4	M. General Abul Qasim M. Ibrahim	Member	Northern
5	Dr. Khalid Sir Alkhitim	Member	Northern
6	Farah Hasan	Member	Northern
7	Dr. Ahmed Majzoub Ahmed	Member	Northern
8	Abdel Wahab Ahmed Hamza	Member	Northern
9	Dr. Jumaa Kindi Komi	Member	Western
10	Dr. Swar Aldahab Ahmed Iesa	Member	Northern
11	Jamie Leemy	Member	Southern
12	Dr. Ali Abdalla Ali	Member	Northern
13	Dr. Awad Alseed Alkarsabi	Member	Northern
14	Moses Mashar	Member	Southern
15	Ahmed Ibrahim Turuk	Member	Eastern
16	Dr. Izzaldin Ibrahim Altigani	Member	Northern
17	Dr. Mohamed Kheir Alzibair	Member	Northern
18	Gindeel Ibrahim	Member	Northern
19	Fareed Omer Medani	Member	Northern
20	Badr Aldin Taha	Member	Central
21	Sheikh Beesh Kore	Member	Southern
22	Omer Taha Abu Samra	Member	Northern

23	Dr. Bidoor Abu Affan	Member	Northern
24	Tariq Mubarak	Member	Northern
25	Hasan Jiha Ali	Member <end of Decree>”	Northern

Table 15**Summary of Table 14, Division of National Wealth**

Region	Seats	%
Eastern	1	4%
Northern	19	76%
Central	1	4%
Southern	3	12%
Western	1	4%

The hegemony of the Northern Region over all other Regions is obvious (Table 15). Such a powerful position enables the committee to become yet another tool for furthering interests of the Northern Region.

Future Visions:

The injustice and mal-division of power and wealth in the Sudan have eroded the sense belonging to a unified society where all could aspire to share benefits as well duties and responsibilities. The situation in which citizens compromise their personal interests in return for peaceful co-existence with others in their society is what early philosophers called “social contract”. Inability of our leaders to respects this simple fact has undermined the very fabric of our Sudanese society. Ensuing problems includes the following:

I. Internal Immigration:

Emigration is not natural and is rarely built into the culture of most Sudanese societies. Most rural Sudanese prefer to remain in their homes surrounded by their familial human and non-human surroundings. However, rural people are also thinking individuals who have to evaluate their options and ensure reasonable future prospects for themselves and their future generations. The current pattern of development in country consists of continuous transfer of surplus from rural areas to cities and from marginalized Regions to the Northern Region. Not surprisingly, rural villages, particularly in marginalized Regions are emptied of their human resources. Young people in particular vacate these rural centres in their desperate attempt to flee poverty, illiteracy and ill health. At he same tame, shanty towns continue growing forming belts of poverty around every city in the country. This has serious implications at both ends.

Rural areas have been depleted of their human resources, particularly the young, energetic and creative. Cities in turn cannot cope as their resources, employment opportunities and services collapse under pressure of an ever growing populations.

II. Education Loss:

Educational services have so far been concentrated in Khartoum, the Northern Region and certain parts of the Central Region. Within these locales, the cost of education has been beyond the reach of the average citizen. In fact, education has become more and more confined to the rich, including families of high government employees. Much more recently, education has been devolved and placed under State authorities. Many States rose to the challenge and used the then rationed sugar to finance their own State education. That policy did not last for long. The government moved to remove sugar from the list of rationed items and left it to the open market. Obviously, that deprived States of the revenue raised by tax on sugar, thus resulting in the collapse of the educational system in all marginalized States. To this day, not a single leader called for examination of this costly problem with a view to overcoming it. We are bewildered about previous slogans of compulsory education and free education that preceded it and equally free medicine. It is our contention that the Northern Region is deliberate in inflicting illiteracy and ignorance on others as part of its project of hegemony over the Sudan.

III. Spread of Diseases:

The Eastern Region gives a good example of the collapse of the health system in the Sudan and the impotence of those who are in charge in Khartoum. Kasala and Gadharif cities offer health services to patients that are four times their capacity – by national standards. They both depend on internally generated and charity funds in offering their services. National health system and national disease prevention have receded to feature only on National TV programmes. Instead, the government introduced the so-called national health insurance for those who can pay for it. The policy led to mushrooming of health hotels, some rated at five stars and above for the haves and forget about the have-nots.

The entire State of Western Darfur has two medical specialists in the field of obstetrics and gynaecology, one in Geneina and the other in Zalengay. They are to serve a population of 1,650,000 aided by few medical students who visit the area for training and for escaping mandatory Military Service.

Let us give one example to highlight the dearth of health services in Darfur. The city of Geneina got its first x-ray machine in 1978. It lasted for seven or so years. Since the 1980s, patients requiring x-ray had to leave for Nyala or Khartoum for x-ray, a trip of two to six days for those who could not afford air tickets.

Erosion of Peace and Harmony:

Continuous feeling of injustice, favouritism in job allocations, removal of employees from their jobs to leave rooms for designated individuals, etc, have all created a sense of exclusion and lack of belonging. This has led marginalized people either to opt out of the society or to

turn to violence to redress their perceived maltreatment. Loss of faith in authority and leadership is eating fast on the very fabric of the Sudanese society.

Regional Associations:

Continuous marginalisation of certain groups and loss of faith in all those in power have resulted in new ways of campaigning for basic rights. Among others, this has led to mushrooming of ethnic and regional groups acting in desperate attempts to remind leaders of their role regarding distribution of power and wealth in the country, albeit in a peaceful manner. Thus we have the Bija Association, the Nuba Mountain Associations, Darfur Associations, in addition to lobby groups from within the National Parliament.

Alliance

Armed Movements:

Over the years, various regional armed movements appeared in the Sudan in response to injustice perpetrated by successive Khartoum governments. These movements include Anyana I and II, Sudan Liberation Movement, Sudan's People Liberation Force, Ingessana Coalition and Nuba Mountain Freedom Movement. For all of these groups, independence of the country was no more than a replacement of one master by another.

Loss of Credibility:

Loss of credibility is certainly the worst outcome of imbalance of power or wealth in the Sudan. Lack of faith in Khartoum government has been a phenomenon felt in all Regions, with the North being the only exception. Since Independence, the last of Government of Sadiq Almadhi was perhaps the only exception whereby some efforts had been shown in its mild attempt to be somewhat inclusive. Other governments have simply pursued policies of entrenching domination of the north and few areas in the centre over all other Regions. The last government (Albashir's National Salvation) is certainly the worse of them all. It combined politics with ethnicity and Islam to concentrate power and wealth in the North. In this project, regionalism goes hand in hand with racism, and often disguised under an Islamic flag to realise government goals. Not only that Sudan is further dissected into clearly power demarcated Regions, cities too are falling under the same onslaught. They are to be ruled by their inhabitants who originate in the North.

Islamic Rule:

Since its accession to power, this government has been selling itself as a champion of Islam. Its major slogan has been to construct a state built on "Knowledge/Science and Submission to Islam". Such a state is expected to be a model of justice, equality and faith. We hereby offer our understanding of the five major criteria for an Islamic State:

I. Land Development (I'mar Alarad):

As stated in the Koran, man is the successor of God on earth and is entrusted with its development (I'mar). The state or the government is the body which is in charge of this, and is thus obliged to devise and implement and monitor all relevant policies. In so doing, the

state is to guarantee equality of all in front of the laws in the designated land. In accordance with God's Decrees, the state should ensure prevalence of justice, protection of the weak and eradication of oppression and excesses of the powerful. The state is obliged to fight nepotism, favouritism and unfair enrichment of the few at the expense of the many. Only through this can the state claim to be an adequate representative and a true successor to God.

II. Freedom

The second criterion of an Islamic state is freedom as enshrined in the Koran ("Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out Clear from Error" The Cow, Verse 256). The divine order presupposes freedom treating the individual as a thinking citizen capable of making his/her own choice. Only through enabling people to make their choice that we can guarantee true debate and exchange of different views that can lead to effective use of resources and continuous development. Islam teaches us to exchange view in a free environment that is cleared of autocracy and arrogance of rulers; an environment in which the ruler is subordinate to the consensus based on views of ordinary citizens. This was the method used by the Prophet and his immediate Successors. Abu Bakr, the first successor of the Prophet once said: "Support me if I do well and correct me when I make mistakes". His successor Omer also followed the same philosophy. As narrated, a woman opposed one of his decisions and quoted the Koran to support her argument. Omer listened and obliged saying "Omer erred while a woman delivered the right view. All of you are more knowledgeable than Omer". This is why early Islamic states prospered and extended their borders from the Indian to the Atlantic oceans.

Arrogant leaders who refuse to listen to their subjects are ultimately bound to depend on oppressive institutions if they are to preserve their power. In their pursuit of remaining in power, these leaders, hypocritically, preach the word of God and His Prophet amid corruption, injustice and tyranny. They however never recall the words of the Prophet "If Fatima, the daughter of Mohamed is to steal, I will certainly amputate her hands as we do to other thieves". Such a level of justice requires an environment of freedom and in which citizens guide their leaders in the fight against corruption, nepotism and injustice.

III. Justice

The third criterion of an Islamic state is working for justice. Justice is the essence of good leadership. With its presence, a non-Muslim king can guarantee his success in a Muslim community. In its absence, even the most Muslim king is bound to fail. The high place accorded to justice is indicated by its use as one of the Most Beautiful Names of Allah.

Justice that we require in the Sudan is that which includes division of resources in accordance with equality of all citizens as members of the same country. resources are to be divided according to clearly laid down priorities that are transparent and evident to all. Such an approach ensures consensus and evades feeling of deceit. Control over public wealth should be

open to all according to their experience, qualifications and commitment to national interests. It should not be a preserve of a select minority whose members collaborate to protect the corrupt and shield the incompetent. While stories of corruption in many public financial institutions are rampant in the state, response of the government seems to have focused on limited number of Banks. So far all of these Banks and financial institutions seem to have links to Regions other than the Northern Region.

Justice presupposes opening high offices to all qualified citizens. This is not the case in the Sudan. The presidency of the state, for example, has always been monopolized by certain ethnic groups. This has been the case throughout the independent history of the Sudan. The position of the head of the Judicial System has also fallen under the same menace of ethnic domination.

VI. Shura (Consultation)

We introduce shura or consultation as the fourth criteria of Islamic rule. Islam stipulates the use of consultation for all public decision, small and big alike. The shura is a right of all citizens in an Islamic state, and the ruler is clearly instructed to avoid monopoly over decision-making. The following are clearly stated in Islamic jurisprudence:

- a) The ruler is obliged to consult widely prior to taking any major decision. Consultation allows the ruler to examine various views that are not available to a single individual, no matter how wise he or she is. Consultation also allows the ruler to avoid pitfalls of emotional and personal inclinations.
- b) Absence of consultation leads to abuse of power and breeds arrogance. Major decisions are public matters and should not be left to a single individual. The duty of all citizens to contribute to such consultation is so crucial in Islam that it is elevated to the level of Jihad: "The best of Jihad is a word of truth to an unjust ruler". In a modern state, civic societies, organisations, media, etc are all obligated to speak out and contribute to the decision making process.

IV. Adoption of Divine Governance:

Our fifth criteria of an Islamic rule is its conformity with divine laws as enshrined in the Koran, the prophetic traditions and other good sources of Islamic jurisprudence. In this system, submission must be made to God alone and this applies to the ruler and ruled alike. The rule here is nothing but a means towards entrenchment of the rule of God. Islam grants the ruler rights but equally that comes with corresponding responsibilities. So heavy are these responsibilities and that is what led Omer, the second successor of Prophet Mohamed to lament: "I wish the mother of Omer had never given birth to me", or elsewhere: "You are all shepherds and every one of you is responsible for his flock, (i.e. subjects) in front of Allah".

The ruler must constantly remember that he has to defend himself on the Day of Judgement. Those who are related to the ruler should not abuse that relationship. Early Islamic rulers had always seen such relationship as a liability and never an asset. A

relative of a ruler is the first to be called to action and first to be scrutinized for mistakes. Such was the case with Abdullah, the son of Successor Omer who was the first to be investigated and the last to receive his legitimate share in his community.

Harvest of Destruction

We would like to step back and contemplate on our rulers and assess the reasons behind their incessant control over power and their use of every possible means to retain it. Here are our conclusions:

- I. Those who are in charge seem to have succumbed to their inner instinct for power and domination over others. Their thirst for power has gone out of control as they have lost the most important bridle and that is fear of God and the After Death punishment.

Success in monopolising power for so long gave members of this group an illusion that their rise to power is natural and is a direct result of their superior capabilities, tribes and regional origin. Nothing better illustrates this more than their popular saying that they will never hand in the Sudan to anybody except to Jesus and the Messiah at the end the current world (Biblical story about end the world). Despite their deceptive talk about Islam, those people have never learnt the simple Islamic teaching that it is God that gives power to some and takes it from others; that it is God's kingdom that lasts, not hat of His creatures.

- II. In the last ten years or so, corruption has become so widespread that it has acquired semi legal status. Corrupt government officials are often described as being involved in establishing themselves or forming personal wealth. Public office has become a means of acquiring villas, expensive cars or extra wives. Corruption has become indivisible from the state that the judicial powers have to be tuned to protect the inner circle of the favoured ruling elite. Thus sharia (Islamic) laws are interpreted to strike those who encroach on private property and spare those who steal from the public coffer. The result is obvious. Amputation, flogging and extended prison sentences became the punishment of the destitute and dispossessed who are likely to steal a transistor radio, a watch or a camel. The same laws and hence punishment do not apply to those who steal public money no matter how huge are their unlawful gains. The latter group of thieves consists of government officials, mostly among the favoured few. Not surprisingly, poverty of the many grew in tandem with growth of wealth as illustrated by substantial increase in new villas, expensive cars and luxurious life style. This trend is very much facilitated by the unwritten code which enabled a small minority to control almost all key financial positions in the country and at the same time preside over the judicial

system.

III. While enriching themselves, our ruling elite also devised a system where no body else succeed in the economic sphere. The rule is simple: “starve your dog and he will follow you”, forgetting that it is God who provides sustenance and that He can change fortunes overnight. Moreover, the ruling elite also made sure that success in any public office can only be achieved if the occupant is a Northerner. Otherwise all obstacles are erected to guarantee failure of the government official. This pattern has been clear in the following cases:

A) The old colonial dictum: “divide and rule” has been refashioned by our leaders and used in various ways to achieve their objectives. It is combined with other tactics including rewards and punishment, character assassination and embellishment of poppets. Turning ethnic groups against each other has been a dominant feature of this current regime. Examples here are the Hadandwa against the Beni Amir , the Ara’ar against the Bashshareen and the Halanga against the Rashida in the Eastern Region. The Southern Region has also been placed under the same destructive policy. Thus you witness the Dinka against the Nuer, the Nuer against the Shiluk, the Manari against the Zande and so forth. The Western Region also has its share of this divisive policy culminating in conflicts between the Nuba and the Misairiya, the Slamati and the Silahat, the Zaghawa and the Rizaigat and so forth. Much more recently, a broader gulf has been created in Darfur between the so-called Arab alliance on one hand, and the Zurga (black) on the other. The national security offices and media have also been employed to stimulate such conflicts. This has often appeared in the form of false statements attributed to certain groups threatening their neighbours.

B) Character assassination of leaders who raise their voices against injustice has also been a favoured tactic for this government. The case of Colonel Malwal, the southern leader, is known to all in the Sudan. He was removed from the Command Council of the government following false accusations staged-managed by the certain circles within the regime.

When this government came to power, General Bakri Almak rose to become the Governor of the Eastern Region. False accusations similar to those Colonel Malwal received were devised to remove him from office. Only reason we can come up with is that he comes from the wrong Region (Central).

Khartoum State also saw similar dirty plays. Khartoum has always been seen as an extension of the Northern Region. That became clear when

Badr Aldin Yhia who is Khartoumese became State Governor of Khartoum. He was subjected to vicious attack using the might of the government controlled media. Attacks continued until he was finally driven out of office. He was replaced by Dr. Majzoub Alkhalifa who is a Northerner, and even better, famous for his chauvinistic inclination to the Jaalyeen ethnic group.

CONCLUSION

This document which is factual in its data and clear in its representation is compiled under the slogan: “Justice”. Our choice is inspired by the fact that “Justice” is derivative of one of the 99 Names of Allah. Justice and equality are our demand. Remaining within Islamic slogans which this government claim to raise, we indicate that Justice and equality are essential to full realisation of Islamic rule. That can only be realised if we are prepared to speak out for justice. Prophet Mohamed once said: “Support your brother whether he is just or otherwise”. In so saying, he does not mean standing with injustice. Rather, what he meant is that you take your unjust brother by the hand, and direct him to where justice lies. This is our approach to our brothers in the Northern Region.

Sudan was not ideal at its Independence in 1956. Resources were poorly divided among different provinces at the time. By the 1970s some progress was made and gaps between provinces started narrowing. The last two decades have been different. Resources were moved to concentrate in the Northern and Central Regions leading to impoverishment of other Regions. As a result, marginalized Regions became zones of out migration. People had to move in search of food, work and services, all of which concentrated in the Central and Northern Regions.

Destruction of marginalized Regions has become a feature of Sudan, particularly during the reign of current Regime. Much worse are the marginalized Regions that are governed by Governors who do not come from the Northern Regions. The State of Western Darfur and the State of Southern Kordofan provide a good example in this regard. They were both brought to their knees simply because their governors happen to be from within these States. When they were replaced by Governors of the “right northern ethnic groups”, funds were released and the States became somewhat functional. So acute this problem was that a pillar of the government in Khartoum declared Federal funding for western states can only be released following his personal approval, verbal or written. Such policies are bound to lead to alienation and subsequent loss of faith in Sudan as a united country. We hereby appeal to those who are in charge to think hard. We understand that justification has always been made to behave in specific way but the road to move forward is clear. Our northern brothers must be ready to compromise and be fair in dealing with national issues. They must open up government positions to all according to their qualifications, competence and experience. They must stop abusing their positions and halt directing illegitimate resources to their own home areas.

Finally, they must follow the –just- slogans which they raise in their public speeches.

This Regime took over (1989) to augment the project of Sudan as a model of an Islamic state. Muslim countries everywhere are looking at our experience. Its failure is a failure of Islam as much as it a failure of Sudan as a nation. It is time to set things right. We appeal to those who are in charge to unite and commit themselves to justice, protection of individual rights and promotion of the national interest.

Lastly, we would like to promise our readers more detailed information in Part II of this work.

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