Date: Sat, 05 Aug 2000 23:16:15 -0400
From: Carsten Heinrigs
To: iac-discussion@egroups.com
Subject: Re: [iac-disc.] Anti-Sanctions Movement: Which way forward?
Comments: In-reply-to iacenter@iacenter.org
   message dated "Fri, 04 Aug 2000 17:13:13 -0400."



I want to thank the International Action Center for their clear 
position against any de-linking of 'economic' and 'military' 
sanctions.
As i understand it, the argumentation behind the de-linking 
strategy is purely opportunistic and reformistic: because it is 
impossible to persuade the American public to support a full 
rehabilitation of Iraq, we concentrate on that part of the UN 
sanctions regime, which seems most vulnerable.

I support the view argued in the articles of Sara Flounders 
'De-Linking Sanctions: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing' that the 
de-linking is not only shortsighted, but dangerous.
The 'oil for food' deal provides a good example for the dangers 
of the de-linking strategy. Propagated as a program to ease the 
deadly effects of the anti-Iraq sanctions it mainly provided 
the framework to continue and even escalate the war.

Let's be more concrete. An end to 'economic sanctions' means 
what? An immediate end to any trade restrictions and control? 
The freeing of all Iraqi assets hold by foreign countries? Or a 
least a kind of 'in case for the defendant', means, 'if there 
is a possible civil use' any import is allowed? And what to say 
about the foreign debt and reparation claims against Iraq? How 
to make sure, that an end of 'economic sanctions' translates 
into a substantial increase of revenues of the Iraqi government?

The danger and most possible outcome is, that a change in the 
sanctions regime will be designed to increase the flow of 
resources (both money and oil) from Iraq.

The de-linking is also dangerous from another point of view. 
The propaganda campaigns related to the bombing of Iraq and 
Yugoslavia stressed the term 'military targets'. But at least 
since World War II it is clear, that the traditional division 
into military and civil parts of society was history. The whole 
society and industrial potential contribute to the military 
strength of a country. Indeed, most factories can be used to 
participate in the production of weapons. Especially suspect 
are chemical factories, you only have to mention the word 
C-weapon to legitimize its destruction. A university can do 
military research, a hospital can treat soldiers ... In 
reality, there are only very few purely military installations 
in a modern society, and moreover, most of those are irrelevant 
against the strategy of deep strikes with missiles and high 
altitude bombing applied by the Allied Forces.

The term 'weapons of mass destruction' is carefully chosen to 
manipulate public opinion and prevent any serious debate about 
the monopoly of a few countries in certain weapon categories. 
While the term makes sense in the case of classical nuclear 
weapons (A) like those thrown on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is 
misleading in the case of biological and chemical weapons (BC) 
or missiles. The main means of mass extermination today are 
hunger and deseases. The destruction of Iraqi infrastructure 
and production facilities combined with sanctions proved to be 
a extremely effective strategy of mass extermination. And 
concerning 'real' weapons, the Rwandan murderers proved, that 
primitive weapons are sufficient to kill hundreds of thousands 
of people.

It is true, that Iraq had developed a C-capability. Iraq 
possessed some hundred tons of chemical weapons agent at the 
beginning of the 1990s. And used it in its war with Iran. Iraq 
countered Iranian advantages in numbers with technological 
superiority. The C-weapons were part of a mid-range battlefield 
strategy. If weather and wind conditions were favorable, the 
Iraqi army would use C-weapons to attack Iranian positions. 
Protected Iraqi corps, which were staffed and trained to fight 
in the C clouds would then rapidly move forward against the 
fleeing Iranian troops. But the most published use of C-weapons 
is that of Halabja in Northern Iraq. Not because it is a 
typical example, but it serves the propaganda goals best. The 
context of that attack is carefully avoided and references to 
concrete studies are rare.

Making things worse, parts of the international peace movement 
(NGOs) support the weapons control regime against Iraq as a 
model case to prevent the proliferation of ABC-weapons and 
medium or long range ballistic missiles. Together with the UNO 
they provide a level of credibility, which is a key for the 
successful propaganda campaign.

The propaganda technique we face is a mix of accusations and 
selected fragments of reality to spread irrational fears and 
totally emotionalize a certain issue. Once successful, no 
objective analysis can touch the affected people any more.

carst