Date: Thu, 07 Dec 2000 02:23:45 -0500
From: Carsten Heinrigs
To: iac-discussion@egroups.com
Subject: [iac-disc.] Unconditional end of sanctions



I'm happy that we finally come to discuss the serious differences among us.

I want to mention a principle thought in the beginning. The tradition of
anti-imperialist thought and practice always had a strong interventionist
notion. With the end of the Cold War we experience the rule of a small
group of countries and institutions/organizations, which totally dominate
public opinion. It is a situation, in which positions and thoughts which
might have been right during the previous period in history mean something
different nowadays. For example, today 'intervening to prevent human rights
violations' simply means to justify the interventions and aggressions of
the Great Powers to secure or extend their control in their 'areas of 
responsibility'.


But to respond more concrete to the issue of splitting the sanctions
in 'economic' and 'military'. I agree with Bob Allen that the sanctions
regime must be seen in its totality and that the term 'economic sanctions'
is highly misleading and wrong. But the email of Ramsey Kysia made me
feel that there might be common ground from which to further discuss.

We should not discuss 'military sanctions' as if it not something
concrete. Generally speaking, there are two kinds of weapons control
regimes- voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary weapons control agreements
mostly result from a situation of a certain balance of military power
among the participants. Another important factor is that none of the
parties expects to gain a serious advantage be continuing the armament.
Often there is also a close relation to technological stagnation in
certain weapons categories.

An involuntary weapons control regime is of a totally different kind. It
is normally the dictate of the victorious Allies after capitulation or
based on an agreement of all the major powers to stop trading certain
weapons or isolating certain countries.

Anyway, the major point of a weapons control regime is credibility. In
the case of an agreement the very fact of the successful negotiations
provide some initial trust, which can be supported by certain measures
of regular consultations, exchange of information or inspection teams.

An involuntary weapons control regime cannot build on trust of any kind.
The oppressed country will try everything to overcome the restrictions.
Indeed, is was a major and extremely important success of Iraq to prove
that even the toughest regime ever practiced could not finally ensure
that Iraq doesn't continue the targeted weapons programs.

In the case of an involuntary weapons control regime the credibility
depends totally on the design of the regulations applied and the weakness
of the targeted country. In the concrete case of Iraq the control of its
income and imports is the main source of credibility. To a certain extend
this control can be substituted by rigid and intense weapons inspections
in Iraq.

But no way to maintain a credible weapons control and allow Iraq to regain
its sovereignty or even control over its income.

Another important issue is the right of Iraq to rebuild its military forces
to meet the needs of self-defense. The country is facing potential threats
both from Israel and Iran. A certain balance of military power is a
necessary precondition for any lasting peace and cooperations in that
region. And there can be no peace without a strong Iraq. But a regional
balance of power is not in the interest of the U.S.

And my last point for now is about the question if the U.S. and NATO would
have attacked Iraq and Yugoslavia and if the outcome would be that disastrous
for them if these countries could have seriously retaliated.

A critical mass of medium or long range ballistic missiles equipped with any
of ABC warheads could indeed provide a certain level of deterrence against
the aggressions and attacks of hegemonial powers with far superior military
forces. This is especially so given the ineffectiveness of anti ballistic
missile (ABM) defense. It will take a long time and plenty of resources
to substantially increase the accuracy of ABM systems. The example of
North Korea seem to indicate that the U.S. shows much more precaution
and a relation to the successful launch of medium range ballistic missiles
cannot be fully denied.

carst

-- 
"Nobody can help us but us."
Martin Luther King Jr.