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IDF Releases Information Regarding Operation Cast Lead Military Investigations
(April 22, 2009)
On April 22, 2009, the Israel Defense Forces presented the conclustions of multiple investigations into its conduct during the
war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The investigations found that Israel
operated in accordance with international law and was not guilty
committing war crimes during the course of military operations.
IDF Spokesperson
The IDF Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, recently
approved and authorized the publication of the conclusions of five
investigative teams assigned to investigate events related to the
conduct of IDF soldiers during Operation Cast Lead. These
investigations are supplementary investigations and are in addition to
the investigations that take place following all IDF operations.
Additional issues are also undergoing a process of verification or
investigation at various levels within the IDF and the IDF aims to
complete these investigations by June 2009.
The teams were headed by officers of the rank of Colonel and those who
took part in the investigation were not a direct part of the chain of
command in the operations that were in question. The teams were
appointed by Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi.
The five investigative teams dealt with the following five issues:
1.
Claims regarding incidents where UN and international facilities were
fired upon and damaged during Operation Cast Lead. This investigation
was conducted by Col. Itzik Turgeman.
-Regarding
the UNRWA school in Jabaliya, the Fahoura School, the investigation
concluded that the IDF used minimal and proportionate retaliatory fire,
using the most precise weapons available to them. Hamas made this
necessary, as it fired mortar shells at Israeli forces 80 meters from
the school. Additionally, it was concluded that all of the shells
fired by IDF forces landed outside of the school grounds.
According to a Senior IDF Military Official, the United Nations has
also confirmed
this finding. -Regarding damage done
to the UNRWA Headquarters and to a pharmaceutical storage facility in
Tel El-Hawa neighborhood, the IDF concluded that IDF forces came under
fire near these structures and an exchange of fire occurred. The
IDF returned fire only after an IDF armored bulldozer suffered a direct
hit from anti-tank fire. Additionally, no one was injured during
this incident.
-Regarding the alleged attack on a UNRWA vehicle in Tel El Hawa, the
investigation concluded that the vehicle did not bear UN markings, and
it that it contained an Palestinian anti-tank squad.
-In one incident, in which a soldier was found to have fired at a UN
vehicle in breach of the IDF’s rules of engagement, the soldier in
question was court-martialed.
-The IDF did not, at any time, fire with the deliberate intention to
hit a UN vehicle or facility in any of the 13 incidents investigated.
2.
Incidents involving shooting at medical facilities, buildings, vehicles
and crews. This investigation was conducted by Col.Erez Katz.
-The
IDF investigated an incident in which a building containing a
mother-and-child clinic was attacked by the IDF. The
investigation concluded that Hamas used this building as a weapons
storage facility. Despite the fact that the building was not
identifiable as a clinic and contained no relevant markings, the IDF
still warnd the residents of the building prior to the attack. -The
IDF investigation also concluded that all IDF forces were ordered to
take special care in order to protect Palestinian civilians. The
forces took extraordinary care, as obliged by international law and
even acted beyond those obligations. In some incidents, forces even
refrained from attacking ‘medical vehicles’ that were being used by
Hamas.
3. Claims regarding incidents in which many uninvolved civilians were harmed. This investigation was conducted by Col. Tamir Yedai.
-Regarding
the attack in the house of senior Hamas Operative Nazar Ri’an, the IDF
concluded that Ri’an was a legitimate military target due to his
involvement in the execution and planning of terrorists attacks, and
that his house was a legitimate military target due to the fact that it
was used as a weapons storage facility, as proven by investigation and
secondary explosions after the attack. Additionally, it was found
that for unknown reasons, Ri’an’s family stayed in the house, despite
numerous warnings and a length period of time during which they were
able to evacuate. -Regarding an attack on a truck carrying oxygen
tanks, the IDF concluded that intelligence information led forces to
believe that the truck was carrying rockets between a known Hamas
manufacturing facility and known rocket launching site. Later, it
was found that the truck contained oxygen tanks, which were likely to
be used by Hamas for rocket manufacturing. Four Hamas operatives and
four uninvolved civilians were killed in the incident.
-Regarding the Al-Daia family residence in Gaza City, the IDF concluded
that the Al-Daia family did receive a number of warnings, including a
‘knock on the roof’ warning, but the warning phone call was received by
residents of a weapons storage facility, not by the Al-Daia
family. This was a result of a mistake in identifying the
building.
4. The use of weaponry containing phosphorous. This investigation was conducted by Col. Shai Alkalai.
-The
use of weapons containing white phosphorus is standard, legal, and a
tactic employed by other western militaries worldwide, including states
that are signatories of the Third Protocol of the Convention Weapons
(CCW). -The IDF’s use of white phosphorus was in accordance with
Israel’s obligations under international humanitarian law, and more
specifically, the obligations with regard to munitions with incendiary
characteristics.
-The IDF uses white phosphorus as a smoke screen, and uses certain
smoke bombs that contain elements of white phosphorus. These uses are
standard and legal. The use of smoke obscurants proved to be a very
effective means, and in many cases, prevented the need to use explosive
munitions whose impact would have been considerably more dangerous.
-According to a Senior IDF Military Official, the IDF stopped using
white phosphorus on January 7, 2009, despite its legality and tactical
benefits, in response to the outrage in the media regarding its use.
5.
Damage to infrastructure and the destruction of buildings by ground
forces. This investigation was conducted by Col. Adam Zusman.
-According
to a Senior IDF Military Official, the decision to destroy a structure
was made my officers of the rank of Brigade Commander and above.
-The investigation determined that no uninvolved civilians were harmed
during the demolition of infrastructure and buildings by IDF forces.
-In many cases, the preparations (including the planting of explosives
or weaponry) made by Hamas and other terrorist organizations—including
booby-traps aimed at harming IDF forces-- were responsible for
the significant damage caused to the structures.
-The investigations did not identify any instances of intentional harm
done to civilian infrastructure, nor did it find any incidents in which
structures were damaged as means of punishment or without operational
justification.
Regarding
the conclusions drawn from these investigations, a Senior IDF Military
Official said, “The bottom line is that the IDF conducted itself in an
appropriate manner wuth within the limits of international law.
We kept a high professional and moral standard; all of this, against an
enemy that was shooting at our civilian population and using the
Palestinian population as human shields.” A Senior IDF Military
Official also stated that the investigations shed light on a very small
number of mistakes and incidents that indicated inappropriate conduct.
These unfortunate incidents were unavoidable and occur in all combat
situations in which militaries are forced to fight in urban centers
were civilians are used as human shields.
The
process of examination involved a series of operational investigations
that are both standard protocol for IDF investigative activities, and
are employed by other western militaries. In accordance with
accepted IDF protocol for professional investigations, the
investigators operated independently and were provided with access to
all relevant materials and the freedom to question any of the relevant
personnel. It should be noted that each soldier whose testimony was
requested was required to cooperate with the investigation, and the
investigators received full cooperation.
Additionally, a Senior IDF Military Official made clear that in order
to complete these investigations, Palestinian sources were consulted as
necessary and as possible, citing that the IDF has a cooperative
relationship with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of the
Interior.
The government of Israel ordered the IDF to embark on Operation Cast
Lead as part of its duty to protect its citizens following eight years
of rocket fire on Israeli communities in southern Israel. This fire was
heightened during the three years following Disengagement, when Israel
withdrew from Gaza, and during the two months prior to Operation Cast
Lead. During this time, hundreds of thousands of Israeli
children, women and men were terrorized by endless attacks executed by
Hamas and other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.
Thousands of rockets and mortars were fired at schools, kindergartens
and residential neighborhoods. Israel was left with no choice other
than to act against these continuous acts of terrorism that killed and
injured many, not only physically but mentally and emotionally as well.
It was impossible for Israeli civilians in these areas to live normal
lives.
The
fighting in Gaza took place in a complex battlefield against an enemy
who chose, as a conscious part of its doctrine, to locate itself in the
midst of the civilian population. The enemy booby trapped civilian
houses with explosives, fired from schools attended by its own children
and used their own people as human shields, while abusing the IDF’s
legal and ethical commitment to avoid injuring uninvolved civilians. In
order to ensure compliance with the IDF's obligations under
international law, the IDF invested an enormous effort and huge
resources to keep civilians in the Gaza Strip from harm. The IDF
dropped more than 2,250,000 leaflets during the operation, used
Palestinian media outlets, made personal telephone warnings to more
than 165,000 Gaza residents, and carried out a special warning shot
procedure in order to ensure that Palestinian civilians were able to
avoid harm. Additionally, the IDF made extensive use of accurate
munitions, wherever and whenever possible, to minimize harm to
civilians. Also, during the operation, the IDF authorized humanitarian
convoys to enter Gaza and employed a humanitarian recess for several
hours a day. According to a Senior IDF Military Official, Hamas used
these pauses in combat to rearm, in addition to stealing the
humanitarian aid meant for Palestinian civilians.
The approach used by Hamas turned Gaza’s urban areas into a battle
field and intentionally made use of uninvolved civilians, civilian
buildings, and sensitive humanitarian facilities (i.e. hospitals,
religious and educational institutions, and facilities associated with
the UN and other international organizations).
Finally,
regarding the number of Palestinian fatalities during Operation Cast
Lead, a Senior IDF Military Official stated that there were 1,166
fatalities during the operations; 709 of these fatalities were Hamas
and Islamic Jihad operatives, whose names are currently known by the
IDF. 162 of the fatalities were men between the ages of 16 and
45, whose connection to Hamas is unclear. 295 of the fatalities
were Palestinian civilians.
The investigation
process was lengthy due to the extent of the fighting, the complex and
thorough work of the investigators, the time required to gather
information from the various units involved in the operation, and
comprehensive cross-checking. With regard to some of the investigations
presented here, some specific additional issues are still being
checked, and additional allegations are now being investigated.
In
accordance with usual practice, a summary of each investigation will
also be presented to the Military Advocate General, who is entitled to
decide whether additional checks need to be done or if there is a basis
for opening another type of investigation. His decision is entirely
independent and he is subject only to the law.
Due to their significance, the conclusions of the investigations and
the opinion of the Military advocate will be presented for review to
the Attorney General.
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