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File: 961031_950825_0116pgv_00p.txtAssessment of Current Health Threats and Capabilities (U) Filename:0116pgv.00p Iraq: Assessment of Current Health Threats and Capabilities (U) A. Key Judgments Restoration of Iraq's public health services and shortages of major medical materiel apparently are being emphatically exploited by Saddam Hussein in an effort to keep public opinion firmly against the U.S. and its Coalition allies and to keep blame away from the Iraqi government [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. Both issues remain dominant international concerns. Disease incidence above prewar levels is more attributable to the regime's inequitable post-war restoration of public health services rather than the effects of the war and [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. Current countrywide infectious disease incidence in Iraq is higher than it was before the Gulf War, but not at the catastrophic levels that some groups predicted. The Iraqi regime will continue to exploit this situation for its own political purposes. Iraq's medical supply shortages are the result of the central government's stockpiling and exploiting of domestic and international relief medical resources. Compared with pre-war capabilities, hospital services have been significantly reduced, with comprehensive medical care available only to the political elite, the very wealthy, and the military. Iraq may be storing nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) materials in or around hospitals in an attempt to conceal [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]them from special observer teams [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) If true, the storage of these materials poses a serious health threat to hospitalized patients and medical staff. B. Public Health [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] restoration of water sewerage, and electricity services appears to be limited to select regions. while the water is dirty in appearance, water quality reportedly has improved in Baghdad. However, conditions have not improved correspondingly in Al Basrah or other Shiite- dominated southern cities and in northern Xurdish regions. Nationwide restoration of water potability has been slowed by 1) the destruction of Iraqi's chlorine production capability and 2) the financial cost of rebuilding damaged petrochemical plants and the interim requirement of importing chlorine products from - abroad. Water purification systems and portable generators provided through humanitarian assistance have served, at best, as stop-gap measures. Iraq's Ministry of Health (MON) continues to provide public health communiques instructing inhabitants to boil water, fully cook food, and store food and water in clean containers. The MON appears to be regaining administrative control of the nation's health care system, but restoration of nationwide public health programs apparently is not being addressed. Resumption of pubIic health programs (such as disease surveillance, vector, control, and immunization programs; food and food handler inspections; bacteriological testing of potable water sources; and local level primary health services and education) is completely dependent on the Iraqi government. Until these programs are fully reinstated, most Iraqi citizens will remain vulnerable to otherwise preventable diseases. Refugee medical care remains a specific concern of international humanitarian agencies as an estimated 300,000 Iraqi refugees remain in Iran and another 24,000 in[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(5) ] A number of these refugees are attempting to return to northern Iraq before cold weather returns to the region. Current reports describe an influx of 10,000 refugees a week returning from Iran. However, destruction of villages and current violence in Kurdish areas may prevent a significant number from reaching their homes, leaving them without shelter and prone to cold and other exposure-related injuries and illnesses. Moreover, warehouses containing tents, clothing, and heating supplies provided[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(5) ] for this contingency are located in the area of current fighting. Workers at these warehouses have reportedly fled, leaving those goods unprotected from looters on both sides of the conflict. Additional humanitarian assistance for the refugees is not likely to be forthcoming from the Iraqi government, although the plight of the refugees continues to be exploited by Baghdad.- C. Infectious Disease Incidence Current countrywide infectious disease incidence in Iraq is higher than it was before the Gulf War, but is not at the catastrophic levels that some groups predicted. Disease incidence above pre-war levels is more attributable to ttie regime's inequitable post-war restoration of public health- services rather than the effects of the war and UN-imposed sanctions. Recent intelligence reports from reliable sources have indicated that life in Baghdad essentially has returned to normal, with no signs of poverty or food shortages. In contrast, increased infant and child mortality rates, evidence of child malnourishment, and poor sanitary conditions continue to plague vulnerable groups outside of Baghdad, particularly in southern Iraq. The current disease situation in Iraq is difficult to assess, - because the regime did not report adequate prewar disease surveillance data, and current disease reporting appears -politically biased. Because prewar disease surveillance data are not available for comparison, it is unclear what amount of - current disease incidence reported through the Iraqi government reflects normal incidence levels. Recent Iraqi reports linking increased disease morbidity and mortality (particularly cholera, typhoid fever, hepatitis A, giardiasis, amoebic dysentery, bruceilosis, and echinococcosis) to vaccine and medicine shortages created by the international embargo are particularly misleading. These diseases are fundamentally prevented through basic sanitation and hygiene, not public vaccinations or curative medicine. Therefore, much of the current reporting is regarded to be an attempt to gain international sympathy. In addition, morbidity and mortality forecasts publicly provided by international and private medical organizations frequently have been based on incomplete information. Baghdad has restricted the access of foreign observers, limiting the quantity and quality of collected data. Many of the early post-war - estimates assumed that health and living conditions would not improve, which led to significant overestimates of projected morbidity and mortality rates. Because of the restoration of essential services and international relief efforts[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] recently reduced its estimates of Iraqi children at-risk from 170,000 children to between 50,000 and 80,000 children. Infectious disease incidence in areas where services are -restored is likely to stabilize in a range that is somewhat above pre-crisis levels, with discriminated groups (particularly Xurds and Shiites) sustaining substantially higher disease incidence. With the advent of winter, acute respiratory infections, preventable childhood diseases (measles, diphtheria, and pertussis)1 and meningococcal meningitis are expected to increase significantly in populations receiving inadequate public health services. The Iraqi regime will continue to exploit the hardships of discriminated groups for its own domestic and international political purposes. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] F. storage of NBC Materials in Hospitals Current reporting alleges that the Iraqi military is storing nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) materials in or around hospitals in an effort to conceal them [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] The health threat to patients and medical staff is borne out by Iraq's historical lack of regard concerning safe handling and storage of NBC material. Reports of accidental chemical agent exposure among Iraqi military personnel date back to the Iraq/Iran War. More recently,[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] medical reports found at the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE; 33-49-56N O43-48-13E, also known as the Samarra Chemical Warfare Research, Production, and Storage Facility) estimate an annual chemical exposure accident rate at that facility approaching 30 percent. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] a lack of appropriate detection equipment at Iraqi chemical production facilities, -indicating that Iraq would have a significantly limited capability to detect a chemical contamination occurring during the storage of chemical agents on or near hospital grounds. Moreover, most civilian Iraqi physicians lack the capability to diagnose signs and symptoms of chemical agent exposure. Suspect medical facilities believed to be housing NBC material include the Saddam Hussein Medical City and the Al Rashid Hospital, both located in Baghdad (33-21N O44-25E), the Saddam Hussein General Hospital in Kirkuk (35-28N O44-23E), the Mosul Hospital (36-21-28N O43-O7-OOE), and the Dagalah Hospital (36-O9N O44-23E)[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] chemical warfare agents stored in the King Hussein Medical Center in Amman, Jordan (31-57N O3$-56E). G. Summary [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
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