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Oil-for-food Program in Northern Governates The Kurds and the KRG authority in the region of Iraqi Kurdistan were not consulted in the drafting of the original UNSC resolution 986 and the MOU that regulates its implementation. However the UN Security Council must have found in the devastated condition of Iraqi Kurdistan and the great need for rehabilitation of the region- compelling reasons to set the region's share of SCR 986 revenues at 13-15%. Regrettably, a decision by the UN has arbitrarily chosen the lower limit. We believe a fair and sensible review of the various aspects of 986 must take into consideration the totality of reasons, conditions, and rationale that led to the establishment of the program, and the distinction made with regard to UN's own implementation in the three northern governorates as separate from GOI's control in the rest of the country. The amount of 986 revenue targeted for the various phases of the program are not being realized for the full and effective implementation of the requirements of those phases. In the enhanced (Phase IV) program, no more than half of the projected amount has been realized. Phase V is not expected to fair any better. The time and funding necessary for the resettlement of nearly hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people (due to the destruction of some 4,500 villages and to forcible transfer of the population as part of GOI's policy of ethnic cleansing) can hardly be met by the allocations under the existing phases of the program. The financial requirements for the rehabilitation of the electricity sector, which in its present state has serious adverse affects on water and sanitation as well as on essential services in the region, need to go far beyond the presently projected allocations for that sector under UNSC resolution 986 program. It is being argued that resolution of some of the problems in the 986 program require changes in the MOU and decisions by the Security Council. As there is great pressure on the United Nations Office of the Iraq Program to make the 986 implementation program work, there should also be the willingness to make the necessary changes in that system. Consequently, a review of the program should effect changes that will: --allow the UN the capacity to buy local crops from Kurdish farmers and alleviate the apparent disincentive to agriculture resulting from the food distribution program; -- enable WFP to deliver the region's share of flour in the food basket as wheat to be milled in the region's established mills that conform to Iraqi standards; --allow for the transfer of the responsibility for the procurement of medicine, medical supplies and equipment and their distribution to a system or agency different from the existing one. The United Nations direct handling and implementation of the program in the three northern governorates is not only in full agreement with the intent of SCR 986 and the MOU, but it also means that the United Nations, in close consultation with the region's authorities is the source of all decisions and assessments. However, in the face of this there is increasing tendency by the GOI to force decisions from Baghdad with the aim of bringing the program under its direct control. A joint FAO/WFP mission that was to investigate the issue of disincentive to agriculture resulting from the food distribution program has been barred from entering the region. The delivery of some 140 vehicles (pickups, four wheel drives, etc.) ordered by UNICEF and intended for the northern governorates under UNSC resolution 986, has been hampered under the pretext of customs regulations and number plate registration procedures that are being introduced for the first time. An estimated 21 million anti- personnel mines, that on a daily basis threaten civilian lives, have been planted throughout the Kurdish territory. When compared to the resources needed for an effective de-mining operation, present efforts at de-mining under 986 seem truly insignificant. Additionally, Baghdad has not only withheld the appropriate location maps from the relevant UN agencies, but it also continues to raise objections to present efforts at de-mining. Under the provisions of the MOU, Iraq has been entrusted with the procurement of bulk food and medical supplies for the whole of Iraq. Due to the slow pace of distribution of medical supplies (and consequent accumulation of such supplies in GOI warehouses); the slow contracting procedures by Kimadia (the Iraqi state company for drug imports); and WHO's lack of ability or willingness to challenge forced decisions by the GOI, the 986 food and medicine sector suffers continued problems and shortcomings. WHO denies having responsibility for the quality or usability of medicines and medical equipment procured by the GOI. When evidence of quality control is asked for it is not given. The agency does not have much of a presence in the region and those who are in charge claim not to have the necessary control or decision-making authority. Within the 986 health care and medicine sector, some of the medicines procured by the GOI are given to public clinics, pharmacies and other groups in the private sector. Similar private health facilities in are not covered by this arrangement. The result, on top of the exclusion itself, is that medicines are smuggled into the region and sold on the black market. In such a situation it is nearly impossible to hold anyone responsible for the sale or distribution of expired or unsuitable medicine. The program recommended, in January 1998, an increase in the caloric value of the food baskets and the addition of full cream adult milk and weaning cereal. These supplements did not arrive in sufficient quantities to permit distribution. In fact, it was only a year later in January 1999 that stocks were sufficient to permit their distribution in the food basket for the first time. High-protein biscuits for pregnant women and therapeutic milk for malnourished children under five years of age were provided for in the enhanced distribution plan. Considerable delay occurred in the signing of contracts by the Iraqi Ministry of Health pertaining to the provision of these items. It should also be noted that in addition to a less efficient food ration delivery in the north, there are no arrangements for the stockpiling of food items in the northern governorates to which food is transferred on a daily basis. There is little doubt that due to this dependence on GOI's procurement of food items, repeated staff relocations and periodic mounting tensions can and do adversely affect the food distribution program in the north. KRG authorities have had to divert much-needed funds from their own projects to purchase medicine that is supposed to have been supplied by the WHO under the program. Low oil prices and limitations on Iraq's ability to pump oil are often given as reasons for the lower rate of funds made available for the program. Subsequently, as the latest report by the UN Secretary General shows, delays in the submission of and holds placed on applications are also reasons for the inability to utilize funds apportioned to the oil spare parts sector under Phase IV. The supposedly adverse affect of the slow rate of reimbursement from ESC (13%) account to the ESB (53%) account is, when compared to the above reasons, but a small factor in the shortfall of oil revenues for the program's implementation. |