

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 5 October 2005 from the Chairman of the  
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution  
751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the  
Security Council**

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, and in accordance with paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 1587 (2005), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia (see enclosure).

In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if this letter, together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

*(Signed)* Lauro L. **Baja**, Jr.  
Chairman  
Security Council Committee established pursuant to  
resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia

**Enclosure**

**Letter dated 22 August 2005 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)**

We have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia in accordance with paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 1587 (2005).

*(Signed)* Bruno **Schiemsky**  
Coordinator  
Monitoring Group on Somalia

*(Signed)* Melvin E. **Holt, Jr.**

*(Signed)* Harjit S. **Kelley**

*(Signed)* Joel **Salek**

## Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1587 (2005)

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**Abbreviations**

BAM	Bakaraaha Arms Market
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
JVA	Juba Valley Alliance
MFV	Motor fishing vessel
MV	Merchant vessel
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OLF	Ogaden Liberation Front
ONLF	Oromo National Liberation Front
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
TNG	Transitional National Government
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

## *Summary*

During the current mandate period, arms embargo violations took a sustained and dramatic upswing, even when compared with violations of the previous period, which were also continual and numerous. Those involved in committing the violations included both members of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and members of the opposition in Mogadishu, as well as certain States in the region, whose more visible involvement in the affairs of Somalia in terms of providing arms to the side of their choice allegedly reflects their own strategic and vital interests.

The dramatic upswing in the flow of arms into Somalia is a manifestation of the highly aggravated political tensions between TFG and the opposition. This has correspondingly given rise to the increasing militarization of both sides, which has resulted in a severely elevated threat of widespread violence in central and southern Somalia.

Members of the opposition who committed arms embargo violations during the current mandate period — some of them dissident members of TFG — are the same individuals who have been identified in past reports of the Monitoring Group as warlords who have demonstrated through their actions and activities that they do not want to see a Government established in Somalia that would infringe or overturn their personal political and economic vested interests. A number of these same individuals have well-established and entrenched local administrations that are a reflection of their vested interests.

The Monitoring Group has obtained a better understanding of the structure and organization of some important local administrations and, as a result, has a better appreciation of the sources of the revenue that accrues to those in charge. In particular, the Monitoring Group has identified certain key revenue generators in the area of marine fisheries and the export of huge commercial quantities of charcoal by cargo ships that provide the bulk of known earned revenue to certain powerful local administrations; reliance on shipping and the fishing industry is necessary to complete the financial circuit. The Monitoring Group firmly believes that revenues thus obtained are used by those in charge to help maintain their militias and for purchasing arms.

Accordingly, the Monitoring Group recommends in the present report that the Security Council consider enhancing and strengthening the existing arms embargo by adopting an integrated arms embargo for the purpose of reducing the financial capacity of individuals in charge of local administrations to buy arms in violation of the arms embargo.

In paragraph 3 (d) of its resolution 1587 (2005), the Security Council requested the Monitoring Group to continue refining and updating information on the draft list of individuals and entities who violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with resolution 733 (1992), inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for the purpose of possible future measures by the Council, and to present such information to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) as and when the Committee deems appropriate. The Monitoring Group continues to refine and update the draft list.

## I. Introduction

### A. Mandate

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 1587 (2005) of 15 March 2005, the Security Council conferred the following mandate on the Monitoring Group on Somalia:

(a) To continue investigating the implementation of the arms embargo by Member States and violations, inter alia, through field-based investigations in Somalia, where possible, and, as appropriate, in other States, in particular those in the region;

(b) To assess actions taken by Somali authorities, as well as Member States, in particular those in the region, to fully implement the arms embargo;

(c) To make specific recommendations based on detailed information in relevant areas of expertise related to violations and measures to give effect to and strengthen the implementation of the arms embargo in its various aspects;

(d) To continue refining and updating information on the draft list of individuals and entities who violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with resolution 733 (1992), inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for the purpose of possible future measures by the Council, and to present such information to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) as and when the Committee deems appropriate;

(e) To continue making recommendations based on its investigations, on the previous reports of the Panel of Experts (S/2003/223 and S/2003/1035) appointed pursuant to resolutions 1425 (2002) and 1474 (2003) and on the previous reports of the Monitoring Group (S/2004/604 and S/2005/153);

(f) To work closely with the Committee on specific recommendations for additional measures to improve overall compliance with the arms embargo;

(g) To assist in identifying areas where the capacities of States in the region can be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo;

(h) To provide to the Council, through the Committee, a midterm briefing within 90 days from its establishment;

(i) To submit to the Council through the Committee, no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate, a final report covering all the tasks set out above, which the Committee will subsequently consider and convey to the Council prior to the expiration of its mandate.

2. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following experts: Bruno Schiemy (Belgium), arms expert and coordinator; Melvin Holt, Jr. (United States of America), arms expert; Harjit Kelley (Kenya), maritime expert; and Joel Salek (Colombia), finance expert.

3. The Monitoring Group travelled to areas of concern in Kenya and to the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, France and the United States of America.

4. Throughout the period of its mandate, the Monitoring Group kept the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) informed of its activities by submitting progress reports every two weeks through the United

Nations Secretariat and by providing a midterm briefing at United Nations Headquarters in New York in July 2005.

5. The Monitoring Group received much-appreciated support and assistance from the United Nations Secretariat and other United Nations agencies, in New York, Europe and the region.

## **B. Methodology**

6. The Monitoring Group interviewed government officials in the region, including members of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and, where relevant, representatives of diplomatic missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. The Monitoring Group also contacted numerous key knowledgeable individuals from Somali civil society, including members of the opposition.

7. The two reports of the Panel of Experts (S/2003/223 and S/2003/1035) and the two previous reports of the Monitoring Group (S/2004/604 and S/2005/153) were also taken into consideration during the investigations. The evidentiary standards and verification process that were developed during the two previous mandates of the Monitoring Group, which were clearly outlined in the Group's first and second reports, were also used during the current mandate.

## **II. Known arms embargo violations during the mandate period**

8. During the current mandate period, unyielding pressure towards a military solution between TFG and opposition forces has taken pre-eminence over a political solution. The opposition includes businessmen, warlords, organizations such as Al Itihad Al Islaami and dissident ministers of TFG. The demand for arms by both sides increased dramatically over the previous mandate period, ending 15 March 2005, and continued unabated as at the writing of the present report, 22 August 2005. The Monitoring Group received many reports concerning arms flows into Somalia, most of which it believed had a foundation in fact. However, due to time and other constraints, it was able to investigate only a portion of the information received. But the Monitoring Group determined with a reasonable degree of certainty that arms were supplied directly to either TFG or the opposition by Ethiopia, Yemen and another State in the region. In addition, the opposition was supplied with arms by criminal groups or arms-trading networks through the medium of the Bakaraaha Arms Market (BAM) at Irtogte in Mogadishu.

### **A. Bakaraaha Arms Market, arms-trading networks and the opposition**

9. The flow of arms into and through BAM is a good barometer of arms flows into and around Somalia, since the Monitoring Group believes that arms coming into Somalia via seaports, airports and roads are, to a significant degree, channelled to BAM. Based on the totality of available information — past reports of the Panel of Experts and the Monitoring Group and the work of the current Monitoring Group — the Monitoring Group believes that a very significant quantity of the arms available for sale at BAM come from Yemen.

10. The numbers of recorded transactions in recent months at BAM are as follows: March, 13; April, 25; May, 37; June, 40; July, 32; and August, 18 (1-14 August only). This constitutes a 378 per cent increase in the number of transactions, or arms embargo violations, from the previous reporting period, October to December 2004. Opposition elements in Mogadishu and their allies in central and southern Somalia have been the primary recipients of arms from BAM, while incidental purchases have been made by TFG members (see annex I for transaction details). In spite of the above-indicated increases in the number of transactions, the Monitoring Group believes that the overall potential supply of arms to BAM has been negatively affected by two factors.

11. Firstly, arms available at BAM, during the early part of the mandate period, were affected by the surveillance activities of the foreign naval task forces operating in the Gulf of Aden. Around mid-April, sales of arms from Yemen at BAM were reported by sources to be negatively affected by foreign naval task forces operations being conducted along the northern Somali coastline. Accordingly, the arms-trading networks were forced to exercise greater care in the movement of arms shipments from Yemen to Somalia across the Gulf of Aden. It has also been reported to the Monitoring Group that some of the criminal groups using dhows to transport weapons from Yemen to Somalia reacted, for example, by dividing a single shipment of arms into smaller quantities and loading them on different dhows for transport across the Gulf of Aden to Puntland. The dhows then landed at different locations along the coast of Puntland and used land transport to bring the separate shipments back together into a single large consignment at Bossaso, Puntland. The purpose of this practice was to reduce potential losses of arms to the naval task force operations. The Monitoring Group believes that the overall effect of this reaction on the part of the criminal groups to the increased threat of being apprehended by the naval task forces has been to slow the flow of arms and thereby contribute to a reduction in their overall availability at BAM.

12. Based on cooperation extended to the Monitoring Group by the Government of Yemen, stemming from meetings between the two parties in August 2005 at Sana'a, the Monitoring Group offers the following example of an illegal arms-trading network that operated between Yemen and Somalia and its apprehension by foreign naval task forces operating in the Gulf of Yemen and Yemeni authorities:

“On the evening of Friday, 7 May 2004, the vessel (*za`imah*) ‘Al-Nasr’ (No. 1184) was intercepted at a distance of 70 miles from the Yemeni coast by a United States vessel belonging to the coalition forces. [Seven crew members were on board.]

“In addition, the following ordnance was found:

- “–536 AK-47 rifles;
- 7 modified rifles;
- 2 medium-calibre 14.5 mm machine guns, plus 84 rounds of ammunition;
- 12,000 rounds of 30-mm ammunition;
- 1,239 AK-74 rifle ammunition cases;
- 34,770 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition;

- A set of rifle belts and cleaning boxes;
- A radio communications set;
- A hand-held GPS unit;
- Documents and passports.

“The arms and ammunition had been placed in sacks, of which there were 30 to 40. The weapons were impounded by the weapons officer of the United States vessel and subsequently handed over to the Yemeni authorities. The case was turned over to the Hadramawt Public Prosecutor’s Office on 25 August 2004, along with the 12 persons detained.

(...)

“The seven crew members of the vessel ... were also turned over. The members of the network have confessed to smuggling two earlier shipments prior to the one seized.

“It is also apparent from the seizure report that other persons connected with smuggling remain fugitives from justice. The security authorities are continuing their efforts to capture them. [They include Abdullah Yusuf Farih, a Somali national who receives weapons in Somalia, and Ali Al-Dharafi, who supplies and sells weapons to the band.]

“A. The modestly resourced Coastguard Department has partially achieved its intended goal of securing Yemeni ports, in addition to carrying out patrol activities. It has consequently been able to seize quantities of drugs and reduce illegal infiltration into the Republic of Yemen by displaced persons from the Horn of Africa. It has also seized quantities of drugs and weapons in cooperation with the naval forces and the coalition forces present in the region.

“B. Owing to their low income, it is difficult for fishermen to satisfy their essential everyday needs. In contrast, fishermen engaged in smuggling goods, weapons, drugs and human beings, inter alia, reap alluring profits, and it is this that induces them to perpetrate such acts in violation of the law.

“The situation in Somalia has led people to turn to illicit trade of this kind. Moreover, the presence of a large number of Somali refugees in our country facilitates the passage of such shipments without the knowledge of the competent authorities.”<sup>1</sup>

13. With regard to the second factor affecting arms supplies to BAM, the Monitoring Group believes that Abdullahi Yusuf, TFG President and former President of Puntland, is very well aware of BAM arms-supply channels and the fact that members of the opposition were the principal beneficiaries of arms sales at BAM. The Monitoring Group learned that, accordingly, about the beginning July 2005, President Yusuf took two decisions that ultimately affected the overall availability of arms for sale at BAM: (a) he blocked the use of the port of Bossaso for dhows delivering arms destined for BAM and attempted to block all roads that the arms traders use in Puntland to convey the arms to Mogadishu, and (b) he further made a deal with arms dealers based in Puntland from his clan — Darod — not to supply arms to BAM, providing the reason that the arms would ultimately go to the opposition in Mogadishu, which is preparing to use the arms to fight fellow clan members — Darod militias — from Puntland. The Monitoring Group believes

that the effect of this action is a noticeable downturn in arms shipments reaching BAM and of sales to key opposition members buying there.

14. It must be recalled from the two previous Monitoring Group reports that the network of arms traders relies heavily on the port of Bossaso and the road infrastructure of Puntland to effectively move supplies of arms to BAM. It must also be recalled from past reports that the larger arms dealers at BAM have storage facilities. Therefore, any actions intended to affect the availability of arms at BAM, such as the ones taken by President Yusuf, would necessarily have a delayed impact on overall availability at any given time, depending on demand and stocks available.

15. The Monitoring Group noted that as a result of the actions described above the number of transactions in July — 32 — was 20 per cent less than in June.

16. However, demand remained high due to the ongoing military preparations of the opposition. Also as a result of high demand and decreased availability, prices for specific weapons increased by as much as 85 per cent. The Monitoring Group notes with interest how BAM has been affected by the measures taken by President Yusuf and believes that this has positive implications for the future control of the arms-trading activities at BAM by an established Government in Somalia.

17. The foregoing notwithstanding, arms transactions remained numerous, as indicated in the statistical increase over transactions documented in the previous mandate period. The arms were crucially important for opposition plans to protect itself against TFG forces. The opposition used arms purchased at BAM to fight TFG in the battle for control of the strategically important town of Baidoa (Bay region). Both the leadership of the opposition in Mogadishu and Habsade, the member of the opposition in charge of Baidoa, purchased arms from BAM in apparent anticipation of the fight for Baidoa. It is significant to note that on 22 May 2005, approximately one week before the second battle of Baidoa, a very large arms shipment arrived from Yemen, via the arms-trading networks, at BAM. The shipment consisted of 500 AK-47 assault rifles, 100 PKM machine guns, 120 RPG-2 rocket launchers, 3 Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns, 15 DShK anti-aircraft guns, 12 Dhuunshilke one-barrel anti-aircraft guns, 20 120mm mortars, 6 B-10s and a variety of ammunition. The buyers included the following: Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, who on 23 May 2005 bought 28 AK-47s, 3 120mm mortars, 2 Dhuunshilkes, 2 B-10s, 11 RPG-2s and a variety of ammunition; Muse Suudi, who on 25 May 2005 bought 50 AK-47s, magazines for AK-47s, ammunition boxes, empty belt feeders for PKMs, belts for militiamen and a variety of ammunition; Qanyare, who on 25 May 2005 bought 50 AK-47s, 4 PKMs, ammunition for small arms, mortars and Zu-23s, magazines for AK-47s and empty belt feeders for PKMs; Atto, who on 25 May 2005 bought 4 120mm mortars and 120 shells for them; and, Habsade who on 26 May 2005 bought 50 AK-47s and a variety of ammunition, through Indohaadde's representative at BAM (see annex I).

18. Similarly, learning of TFG plans for a possible move to Jowhar, the opposition also purchased arms from BAM and moved some militias to positions around Jowhar. The militias involved in encircling Jowhar included that of Muse Suudi, who moved his militia to a position about five kilometres south-west of the city. Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde moved militia members from Baledogle airfield to positions north-east of Jowhar. Bashir Rage and Abukar Omar Adaan sent 13 of their most militarily capable technicals to positions located 20 kilometres south-east of Jowhar. The Monitoring Group noted that during this time, the opposition had

purchased a number of anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition from BAM. The buyers included the following: Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, who on 22 April 2005 bought 1 DShK anti-aircraft gun and ammunition for a Zu-23 anti-aircraft gun and on 25 April 2005 bought DShK Zu-23 ammunition; Mohamed Qanyare, who bought 2 DShKs on 16 April 2005; and Bashir Rage, who bought 1 Zu-23 and ammunition on 23 April 2005 and 2 DShKs on 15 May 2005.

19. Although members of the opposition were the principal buyers of arms from BAM during the mandate period, the Monitoring Group also learned that sub-clans engaged with one another in ongoing resource-related hostilities — over livestock and land, for example — also made purchases at BAM. For example, in the fight in the Beletweyne area (Hiraan region) between the Gaaljeel and the Jaleele sub-clans over livestock, the Gaaljeel bought 50 AK-47 assault rifles, 11 RPG-7s, 2 80mm mortars and a variety of ammunition from BAM on 4 June 2005. Three days later, the Jaleele bought 25 AK-47 assault rifles, 2 anti-aircraft guns, 6 PKM machine guns, 4 RPG-2s and ammunition. Other examples of purchases by sub-clans are included in annex I. The Monitoring Group notes that BAM is profit-driven and sells to anyone who has the required amount of money, regardless of the intended use or its impact, including destabilizing the country.

## **B. Direct State support for the opposition and the Transitional Federal Government**

### **Yemen**

20. The Monitoring Group has determined during the current mandate period that arms flows from Yemen to Somalia came not only from criminal groups (to BAM for purchase by the opposition) but also from the Government of Yemen directly to TFG. Using military aircraft (Antonov 26) to transport arms shipments from Aden, Yemen, to Bossaso, Puntland, in direct State support for TFG and President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the Yemeni Air Force delivered arms on eight occasions between 2 and 10 July 2005. Details of specific flights are included in annex III. The Yemeni authorities also provided the following response to Monitoring Group inquiries concerning their support for TFG.

“The unstable conditions in Somalia are a direct threat to the security and stability of the Republic of Yemen, as they lead both to insecurity and to large-scale migration of Somalis to Yemen, which has considerable adverse consequences.

“Over the last decade the Yemeni Government has therefore followed a clear policy aimed at restoring stability in Somalia, ending the civil war there and supporting the central Government.

“Since the election of the present Government, Yemen has been pursuing this approach with a view to supporting the legitimate Government of the country. In so doing, Yemen has received full backing from the international community, including the European Union, the African Union and the United States of America.

“Accordingly, the Yemeni Government, in response to a direct personal request from the new Somali President, provided the requested aid with a view

to strengthening the capacities of the legitimate Government. The aid, which was transported to Bossaso airport on a number of flights, comprised:

- 15,000 uniforms for the Somali police;
- Food supplies for 5,000 people;
- 5,000 personal weapons.

“The framework within which this aid was provided can be stated as follows:

- “1. The aid was supplied to and at the request of the legitimate elected Government, which has received international endorsement;
- “2. Its aim was to enhance the capabilities of the police force and to strengthen security so that the President can move to Mogadishu, the capital, to perform his official duties. This cannot happen unless the armed bands are disarmed in favour of the legitimate Government;
- “3. The task of disarming those bands and consolidating the grip of the legitimate authority is a sine qua non for combating terrorist hotbeds in Somalia. It is consistent with the policies embraced by States all over the world in the fight against terrorism and will ensure that no new Taliban emerges in Somalia.

“Reinforcing security and stability in Somalia and strengthening the legitimate Government represent a desideratum both for Yemen and for the international community. Yemen has accordingly taken on this task, notwithstanding the economic burden it entails, with a view to bringing an end to the deteriorated conditions in Somalia. It trusts that the international community will appreciate and duly compensate it for those efforts.”<sup>1</sup>

21. During a conversation with the Monitoring Group arms experts, a well-placed source with intimate knowledge of the affairs of TFG confirmed that President Yusuf and the Chief of Staff, General Naji, had negotiated a deal with the Government of Yemen for the delivery of large numbers of arms and a variety of ammunition, including the following: AK-47 and G3 assault rifles; RPG-7 and RPG-2 rocket launchers; 75mm and B-10 anti-tank weapons; 37mm, 14.5mm and 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns; mines and hand grenades; shoulder-fired Strella missiles; and 3 or 4 helicopters with missiles for the express purpose of fighting the Mogadishu dissidents. Also included in the deal were other items of military equipment, such as fatigues. Other Monitoring Group sources confirmed the relevant flights and the arms deliveries.

22. Some of the goods listed above were received and unloaded on 5 August by TFG forces located in Waajid, Bakool region, about halfway between Hudur and Baidoa. The weapons — small arms and ammunition — blankets and fatigues were delivered in three N3 lorries and came from Puntland via Ethiopia to Waajid. The Minister of Agriculture, Hassan Mohamed Nuur (Shatiguduud) and the Minister of Justice, Sheik Mohamed Noor (Madobe), among others, shared the arms shipment. About 400 TFG militia members were expected to arrive in Waajid from Mustahil, Ethiopia, receive the supplies and, at an unspecified date, attack opposition forces in Baidoa.

**Ethiopia**

23. The Monitoring Group learned that arms shipments were sent from the Government of Ethiopia directly to TFG militia forces in Western Somalia. Upon enquiry by the Monitoring Group, however, the Government of Ethiopia denied providing arms shipments to TFG and sent a formal reply to that effect (see annex VI). The following are examples of information obtained by the Monitoring Group concerning military support in the form of arms and military training supplied to the TFG forces by the Ethiopian Government.

24. In preparation for the second battle for control of Baidoa, the TFG forces of Sheik Madobe (Minister of Justice), Shatiguduud (Minister of Agriculture) and others were supplied with a steady flow of arms from Ethiopia. The following chronology of events is indicative of Ethiopian arms support to TFG.

25. On 29 April 2005, a meeting took place in Ethiopia between Ethiopian military officials and TFG officials, including the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Planning, Mohamed Dheere, local administration leader in charge of Jowhar, Abdikarim Farah Laqanyo, local administration leader in charge of Beledweyne and the Chief of Staff, General Naji, and others.

26. Following that meeting and on 3 May 2005, N3 lorries entered Ethiopia from the Bakool region of Somalia to pick up shipments of arms. On 5 May 2005, the same lorries, transporting arms and foodstuffs, returned to Somalia via the border town of Yeed, Bakool region. On 7 May 2005 the lorries containing the arms arrived at Hudur, the capital city of the Bakool region, and temporarily stored the arms at the Hudur police station.

27. On Sunday, 8 May, Sheik Hassan Madobe and Shatiguduud took possession of the arms shipments. The arms consisted of AK-47 assault rifles, RPGs, a variety of ammunition and explosives. The intended recipients were the militias of Madobe, Shatiguduud and other TFG forces in Somalia.

28. On Monday, 9 May, the arms were distributed in Hudur among the TFG militias. On Monday evening the militias moved to positions near Waajid, about 90 kilometres north of Baidoa.

29. On Tuesday, 10 May, the same militias moved to positions about 45 kilometres north of Baidoa, near Goofgaduud. Also, between 7 and 10 May, the TFG Minister of Planning, Abdirizak Osman Hassan, received a shipment of arms supplied by Ethiopia at Luuq, located north of Baidoa in the Gedo region.

30. On 30 May 2005, TFG militia forces of Shatiguduud and Madobe attacked militia forces of the opposition at Baidoa, under the command of Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade. Habsade's forces defeated the TFG forces and caused them to retreat from the immediate area of Baidoa.

31. Following the battle, the Monitoring Group obtained photographs of Ethiopian-supplied ammunition boxes made of wood and physical samples of thick plastic Ethiopian-supplied ammunition pouches; the boxes and the pouches were captured by Habsade's forces. The following information is printed on the surface of one of the pouches: "200 cartridges 7.62x54, Lot. No.: 13/2000". Similar information is also printed on the other pouches. The ammunition boxes contained 14.5mm armour-piercing ammunition for heavy machine guns; in the Somali

context, this is the type of heavy machine gun that is typically mounted on technicals.

32. Ethiopia also supplied arms to Mohamed Dheere, the warlord in charge of Jowhar (Middle Shabelle) and a TFG ally. Mohamed Dheere had welcomed the publicly expressed intention of TFG to locate the new Government at Jowhar. The Monitoring Group was informed that Mohamed Dheere was supplied with arms from Ethiopia to assist TFG in its possible relocation to Jowhar. For example, during the first two weeks of May 2005, five lorries containing an arms shipment from Ethiopia and destined for Mohamed Dheere travelled to Jowhar via Hudur and Tayeeglow; two technicals escorted the arms shipment.

33. The Monitoring Group learned that Hudur was set up by TFG as a militia staging area, supply centre and depot for arms supplied by Ethiopia. For example, in June Mohamed Dheere also received a shipment of arms from Ethiopia, via Hudur. On 17 June 2005, two N3 trailers left Jowhar and travelled to Hudur, arriving on 18 June. One of the N3s continued on to Ethiopia to pick up a shipment of arms. Ammunition from Sheik Madobe's Ethiopian-supplied arms stocks was loaded onto the remaining N3, which departed Hudur on the night of 20 June 2005, escorted by two technicals belonging to Sheik Madobe. The convoy travelled to Eel Garas (Bakool region, east of Hudur), where technicals belonging to Mohamed Dheere took over security escort services for the N3. The convoy arrived in Jowhar on 21 June 2005.

34. It is important to note that the Monitoring Group has been repeatedly informed by numerous sources that as a matter of general practice, Ethiopia has typically and historically provided small arms — assault rifles, RPGs, etc. — and ammunition to warlords and allies in Somalia. It has also been reported to the Monitoring Group that the warlords have on occasion also sold or bartered the Ethiopian-supplied weapons at BAM in exchange for more powerful armaments, such as anti-aircraft guns. The flow of weapons from Ethiopia to warlords and then to BAM helps to explain another source of small arms and ammunition available at BAM. This activity has been noted in previous reports of the Monitoring Group.

35. The Monitoring Group has also learned that the Ethiopian military conducted military training for TFG militias from the Puntland, Bakool and Hiraan regions. The training occurred in at least two locations, the Ethiopia-Somalia border town of Fer Fer (Hiraan region, north of Beledweyne) and Waajid (Bakool region).

#### **Another State in the region**

36. The Monitoring Group has been informed that another State in the region provided support to the opposition and the Oromo National Liberation Front (ONLF) in the form of arms. That State provided arms to opposition allies including Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde (Governor of Lower Shabelle), Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys (an Al Itihad leader) and others for the purpose of countering support provided to TFG by Ethiopia.

37. Credible sources alleged that from approximately the beginning of February to the end of the second week of May 2005, that State supplied arms on approximately eight different occasions to Hassan Dahir Aweys and elements of ONLF that at the time were located in the Dhusamareeb area of the Galgaduud region. The arms were

transported on aircraft that flew from the State in question to an airfield located in the Dhusamareeb area.

38. Hassan Dahir Aweys had travelled to that central Somalia location to establish sharia courts and to provide military training to his militia (Al Itihad) or set up military training programmes. While there he also met with representatives of the Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF) and ONLF. Some were militia leaders who arrived in Dhusamareeb by aircraft from the State in question in April 2005. Also, during the last week of April and the end of the second week of May 2005, approximately three flights transporting 270 trained and equipped ONLF militia arrived in Dhusamareeb from that State. Most of the shipments of arms provided during the first part of the period mentioned above were given to Hassan Dahir Aweys, with the smaller portion going to ONLF.

39. The Monitoring Group also received credible information that the same State provided another member of the opposition, Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, with arms by transporting them to two locations in Middle Shabelle — by aircraft to Baledogle Airport, near Mogadishu, and by ship to the port of Marka. Both shipments arrived between 25 March and 10 April 2005. Included among the types of arms in the shipments were anti-aircraft guns and mines.

40. The Monitoring Group noted above that Sheik Indohaadde and other opposition leaders from Mogadishu had provided arms to Habsade, opposition leader in charge of Baidoa, for potential use against TFG forces in the fight for control of that city on 30 May 2005. Subsequent to the battle, the Monitoring Group obtained two metal ammunition containers and photographs of other ammunition containers that were alleged by Monitoring Group sources to have been provided by the State in question.

41. The Monitoring Group has further learned that an opposition leader and TFG dissident from Mogadishu travelled to that State during the middle of the mandate period to make arrangements with authorities there to obtain arms shipments. The State allegedly promised to give arms only to the opposition and in quantities that equalled what TFG President Yusuf received from other countries.

42. The Monitoring Group did not mention the State of the region by name because at the time of the writing of the present report it had not completed its investigation. However, the Monitoring Group remained convinced that the information was of sufficient quality and credibility to merit its inclusion in the report, but without naming the State. The Monitoring Group also believed that including the information describing the activities of the State in Somalia is important for a balanced understanding of the overall picture presented in the present report. As a final note, the Monitoring Group has been made aware of historical information previously given to the Security Council by the Panel of Experts relating to a very similar pattern of activity conducted by the same State in its involvement in the affairs of Somalia.

### **III. Analysis of trends and patterns of arms embargo violations**

#### **A. A pattern of State support**

43. The dramatic increase in the number of arms embargo violations during the current reporting period over that of the previous mandate period is in direct correlation to the increasingly hostile tensions between TFG and the opposition. The arms embargo violations originate from two basic sources: illegal arms-trading networks channelling arms to BAM from outside Somalia and direct State contributions to TFG or the opposition.

44. The current trend of high-visibility direct support by States of the region, as noted by the Monitoring Group in the present report, is not new to Somalia. In its report to the Security Council dated 25 March 2003 (S/2003/223), the Panel of Experts dealt at length with direct State support in the form of arms shipments to different factions or opposing sides in Somalia. The Monitoring Group notes that State support for factions in Somalia during that reporting period became more visible and more aggressive during the existence of the Transitional National Government (TNG), from 2000 to August 2003, and its opponent, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). Much of the State support during that period was directed to either TNG or SRRC.

45. The Monitoring Group notes a clear parallel in direct State support for TNG versus SRRC at that time and the current TFG versus the opposition. Direct State support for both TFG and the opposition during the current reporting period is also highly visible and aggressive. It also involves virtually the same States of the region acting in support of their perceived interests. It is also interesting to note that when TNG disappeared and its opponent, SRRC, correspondingly diminished in importance, the highly visible and aggressive direct support for key Somali factions subsided. Currently, as TFG has arrived in the Somali context and an opposition has also taken a strong position against it, direct State support again plays a key role in the exacerbation of the Somali situation and arms embargo violations. This proxy struggle in Somalia by States of the region, each one vying to promote its own strategic interests, is partly responsible for the failure of TNG and, clearly, partly responsible for the current predicament of TFG.

#### **B. Status of the Transitional Federal Government and the opposition: military build-up**

46. Since the last mandate ended, in mid-March 2005, the relationship between TFG and the opposition has seriously worsened, making the likelihood of a severe military confrontation between the two highly likely. As indicated by the increase in arms embargo violations and the high-profile and aggressive involvement of States of the region in support of one side or the other, the level of tension between the two sides has risen sharply. Both sides are actively preparing for this probable confrontation. Well-informed Somalis and others who have intimate knowledge of developments on both sides say, regarding the likelihood of a military confrontation, that it is not a question of if, but when.

47. In addition to the dramatic increase in arms flows into Somalia, both sides are also very actively distributing arms and ammunition to their militias, outfitting

militiamen with individual combat gear, obtaining and storing foodstuffs, medicines, fuel and other necessities for engaging in sustained combat, organizing themselves into military-style structures, stepping up recruitment and training of militias and devising strategies and plans to militarily defeat the other side.

48. In addition to the sustained and heavy arms build-up, and the other actions noted above taken by each side to prepare for violent confrontation with the other, the fighting between TFG and the opposition over control of Baidoa demonstrates the serious intent of each side to pursue a military solution to their differences.

49. On the basis of the preparations outlined above, the Monitoring Group also noted an example of the new level of organization and sophistication demonstrated by the opposition during the fights with TFG for control of Baidoa. There were two significant battles for the control of Baidoa. Opposition forces — of Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade — took control of Baidoa on or about 26 or 27 March by routing the militias of President Yusuf and Sheik Madobe. Habsade played a central role on behalf of the opposition in blocking initial TFG moves to relocate there. The battle for control of Baidoa suggested that opposition elements coordinated their efforts to overcome TFG forces. Habsade received financial and military support from Atto, Muse Sudi, Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde and others. On the same day that Habsade took control of Baidoa, Indohaadde sent militia members and three lorries containing arms and diesel fuel to Habsade at Baidoa. In spite of the increased supplies of arms, Habsade remained concerned about the amount of ammunition he had and questioned whether he had sufficient ammunition to fight the TFG forces, which were supplied by Ethiopia. As a result, Colonel Barre Aden Shire Hirale (Kismaayo warlord and (dissident) Minister of Reconstruction and Resettlement in TFG) sent his militia to support Habsade and located it at Baadheerre, south-west of Baidoa. At the same time, Indohaadde sent reinforcements to Baledogle Airport, south-east of Baidoa.

50. Both militia contingents included technicals. On Saturday, 14 May, Habsade received a shipment of arms, transported in a lorry, for Muse Suudi, Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Osman Hassan Ali Atto and Abdirashid Ilqeyte (a businessman) from Mogadishu. Following the second battle for control of Baidoa, Habsade again received logistical support from his allies in Mogadishu.

### **C. Geographic expansion through military action**

51. The Monitoring Group has been informed, and believes, that the foregoing plans for military action are not solely defensive, but also offensive, with each side having the ultimate objective of trying to absolutely defeat the other and be the primary power of influence, if not control, in central and southern Somalia. However, at the time of the preparation of the present report, the situation was a standoff, accompanied by a lot of harsh rhetoric, with a commensurate rise in tensions.

52. Somaliland and Puntland aside, central and southern Somalia is the area that is primarily affected by the military build-up and represents the principal geographic operational area of TFG and the opposition.

53. As a result of the standoff, a line in the sand has been drawn between the opposing sides. The area generally encompassing central and southern Somalia has

been split into two parts, approximately described as follows: the area that is most heavily influenced by TFG is along the border with Ethiopia and includes portions of the Gedo, Bakool and Hiraaan regions; the area that is most heavily influenced by the opposition includes portions of the Lower and Middle Juba, Bay, Lower and Middle Shabelle, Mogadishu and Galgaduud regions. The virtual line in the sand extends diagonally from south-west to north-east, effectively splitting central and southern Somalia into two parts.

54. With the exception of the small TFG enclave of influence that has, at the time of writing, been established in Mohamed Dheere's area of Jowhar, Middle Shabelle, both sides have developed military-style strategies and plans to extend their respective areas of influence, each desiring to push the line in the sand to a position more in their favour. Accordingly, the Monitoring Group has learned that TFG President Yusuf and General Ahmed Naji, Chief of Staff, have devised a military plan to attack the opposition. They have targeted various geographic locations for military operations, planning to wrest them from the opposition. These locations include Baidoa, Marka and Mogadishu. To carry out their plan, they intend to unite various militias under their control and equip and train them in Fer Fer (Ethiopia) and Waajid (Bakool region). They expect to have a total force of about 20,000.

55. The opposition does not intend to yield to the control of President Yusuf and has also been making military preparations to counter the TFG plans. Like TFG, the opposition has been organizing along military lines with a command and control structure, combining militias and equipping and training them. It has established military training camps in the greater Mogadishu area, including at Laanta Buuro and Hiilweyne, and has sent arms obtained at BAM to these camps. The training at these locations has been proceeding for several months. The Monitoring Group has also been informed that the opposition may have established additional training programmes in the Dhusamareeb area, Galgaduud region, and Dinsoor area, Bay region. Al Itihad leader, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde are believed by the Monitoring Group to have organized the latter two training programmes.

#### **D. Business as usual and fighting to maintain vested interests**

56. The establishment of a viable Government in Somalia continues to be the greatest threat to and fear of those people (members of the different TFG institutions, warlords, businessmen, traders, religious fundamentalists and others) that have through years of operating in a lawless territory carved out their own kingdoms, replete with personal political power and ambitions, military-style muscle in the form of their own militias and, probably most importantly, the ongoing accumulation of personal wealth. A Somali Government would considerably alter this landscape of personal kingdoms. This threat to vested interests remains the impetus behind the increasing threat of serious violent confrontation between TFG and the opposition, which is in reality an alliance of convenience to preserve vested interests.

57. The self-interest of those opposed to the establishment of a bona fide Government has been a constant, and the Monitoring Group has in its previous reports laid bare this central problem in Somalia. The problem abides, and the most

conspicuous theme in the present report is the continuing trend of escalating potential violence in a pattern of protection of entrenched vested interests.

58. The pattern of resolving political differences and protecting interests through the use of weapons continues and is sustained by the ongoing and rapidly rising acquisition of arms from sources outside of Somalia in violation of the arms embargo. The people who are today involved in arms embargo violations and who constitute the greatest obstacles to peace and stability in Somalia continue to be the same ones who have been involved in arms embargo violations since the Monitoring Group began its work early in 2004, with few exceptions.

## **IV. Financial and maritime activities for revenue generation**

### **A. Local administrations and revenue**

59. Taxes are the key source of revenue that allows Governments to promote development and investment and to provide public services and infrastructure. In Somalia, almost immediately after the collapse of the central Government, different factions, clans and groups claimed authority over certain areas and created local administrations. There are ongoing struggles for the control of municipal and local taxes, public assets, economic and natural resources and the revenue they generate. For the purpose of the present report, a local administration can be defined as an area that may comprise a region, a city or a district where an individual or a group has de facto governmental and administrative control.

60. With regard to the organization and structure of the local administration, a single individual may have overall control of one of those areas or a group of them as shareholders of the revenue generated. In the first instance, the individual is the administrative head of the area, has the monopoly of force and exercises power through deputies that report details to him on a daily basis. Deputies supervise a staff of revenue collectors, who collect taxes and fees from public facilities such as airports and seaports and private businesses.

61. In the second instance, when a group of individuals exercises administrative control over a certain area, they share administrative responsibility and revenues. An example can be used to illustrate this point. Mogadishu has been divided into areas of control operated by individuals on a daily basis, but to the ultimate benefit of the group. While an individual may be in charge of supervising the collection of taxes for the use of an airstrip and ports, another will be in charge of providing security for the facilities. Revenue collected is pooled and shared by the group. The amounts obtained by either form of local administration can be considerable, in many cases worth millions of United States dollars. Portions of the revenue are used for the procurement of arms and ammunition.

62. Examples of individual and group administrations benefiting from tax revenue generated from public assets and private business are shown in annex IV. The three case studies below describe specific local administrations.

## **B. Local administration of the Lower Juba region and the city of Kismaayo**

63. Kismaayo is the fifth-largest city in Somalia, situated in the Lower Juba region, in the southern part of the country. The population is estimated at 88,000. Many of its residents have lived in camps for internally displaced persons since 1992. The main sources of income for the local population are farming, household chores, stevedoring at the seaport, work at the airport, firewood collection and charcoal-burning.

64. Colonel Barre Hirale, head of the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), is the primary beneficiary of the revenue generated in the Lower Juba region, including the city of Kismaayo. Income is derived from business taxes and duties imposed at the airport and seaport of Kismaayo, which make up the majority of the total earnings.

65. Colonel Hirale exercises overall control over the local administration. He has an organization of subordinates that assist him in carrying out administrative activities in both the city of Kismaayo and the remainder of the Lower Juba region. To administer the region, Colonel Hirale appointed a Chairman, a District Commissioner and a Mayor of Kismaayo. To ensure control of his administration, he relies on a sizeable militia, a military commander and a deputy to assist him. Both civilian and military organizations have their headquarters in Kismaayo, with representatives spread throughout the region. He uses revenue generated through his local administration to purchase arms for his militia.

66. Due to the primary importance of the Kismaayo airport and seaport for revenue generation, Colonel Hirale has, as of the writing of the present report, undertaken to revamp the physical infrastructure of the facilities of both ports and is reorganizing the administration and making staff improvements. A system of local officers is in charge of collecting revenue at both the seaport and airport. They wear uniforms, use official stationery and have recently established auditing systems. The airport is controlled by a supervisor who has a staff of about 11 customs and revenue officers, 5 immigration officers and other personnel. The customs house at the airport has been revamped, and a permanent staff of officers has been on duty since May 2005.

67. The seaport has a supervisor, seven customs and revenue officers, three or four immigration officers and three dock captains. Although these officers are under the administrative structure of the city of Kismaayo, the airport and seaport supervisors report the amount of revenue collected on a daily basis directly to Colonel Barre Hirale.

### **Kismaayo seaport**

68. A deep-water port on the Indian Ocean, Kismaayo has large docks situated on a peninsula outside the town. Income is generated from taxes on imports, exports and berthing at the seaport. The Monitoring Group has learned that revenue collected from January to April 2005 is as shown in table 1.

Table 1  
**Revenue from Kismaayo seaport, January-April 2005**

(United States dollars)

	<i>Import tax<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Export tax<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Berth tax</i>	<i>Total</i>
January	23 522.00	234 881.00	32 200.00	290 603.00
February	95 479.00	233 055.00	44 900.00	373 434.00
March	35 909.50	253 648.00	32 900.00	322 457.50
April	146 720.00	235 049.00	29 800.00	411 569.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>301 630.50</b>	<b>956 633.00</b>	<b>139 800.00</b>	<b>1 398 063.50</b>

<sup>a</sup> Imports consist primarily of sugar, rice, flour and other miscellaneous goods.

<sup>b</sup> Exports consist primarily of charcoal and scrap metal.

69. Charcoal accounts for 99.7 per cent of the export taxes collected at Kismaayo seaport, while scrap metal accounts for the remaining 0.3 per cent. On average, 18 vessels berth at Kismaayo seaport per month. Of those, only two or three are cargo ships, while the rest are dhows. Most of the ships and dhows come to Kismaayo from the United Arab Emirates, while the varied destinations of the ships and dhows include India, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

### **Kismaayo Airport**

70. Kismaayo Airport, formerly an international airport under the regime of Siad Barre, is located 10 kilometres north-east of the city. Colonel Barre Hirale's immigration and customs officers collect fees from passengers and from traders dealing in khat. Most of the revenue collected is from the import of khat.

Table 2  
**Revenue from Kismaayo Airport**

(United States dollars)

<i>Description</i>	<i>Item amount</i>	<i>Estimated monthly revenue</i>
Passenger entry/exit tax (not applicable for Somalis)	20.00	2 passengers x 30 days = 1 200.00
Landing tax (per aircraft)	200.00	2 flights x 30 days = 12 000.00
Khat import tax (25-kilogram bag)	12.50	120 bags x 30 days = 45 000.00
<b>Total</b>		<b>58 200.00</b>

71. According to reports, two flights carrying 60 bags of khat each land at Kismaayo airport per day. However, the figures may vary due to changes in the frequency of flights, weather conditions and other variables.

### **C. Local administration of Middle Shabelle and the city of Jowhar**

72. Jowhar is located 90 kilometres north of Mogadishu and has an estimated population of about 100,000. It is the capital city of the Middle Shabelle region. Mohamed Dheere is the self-declared Governor of Middle Shabelle and “Chairman” of the city of Jowhar and exercises authoritarian control of his local administration.

73. The city of Jowhar has a well-organized system of revenue collection. The administration of Jowhar consists of a chairman (Mohamed Dheere), a vice-chairman, a secretary and a council of elders. This structure has been established and exists as a formality in order to comply with the requests from leaders of local clans. However, it is de facto superseded by Dheere’s authoritarian leadership style. Additionally, Dheere relies on his militia to ensure control of his local administration. Large portions of the revenue are reportedly used to maintain his militia, including for the purchase of arms and ammunition.

#### **Revenue from businesses and entry taxes**

74. To gather local revenue in the city of Jowhar, Mohamed Dheere has appointed a Mayor and local staff, including revenue officers. Their main function is to collect taxes from the municipality. To facilitate the task, they use vehicles to make daily rounds according to a timetable: Monday, north; Tuesday, south; Wednesday, east; and Thursday, west.

75. Taxes are collected from a variety of businesses conducting activities including telecommunications, money remittances, livestock marketing (goats and sheep) and farming (products such as mangoes, oranges and cooking oil). Revenue officers report the result of their activities daily to the Mayor, who in turn has to inform Dheere directly of the results.

76. Jowhar is located on the primary north-south highway in Somalia and, as a result, is a mandatory transit point for traffic in south-central Somalia. Jowhar receives vehicle traffic from Mogadishu and other important eastern locations and from inland locations to the north and west. For example, it receives most of the commodities coming from the inland city of Beletweyne (Hiraan region). Information indicates that there is a large slaughterhouse in Beletweyne that has cold storage facilities with capacity for storing up to 2,000 lamb carcasses to be exported from Somalia. The carcasses are transported from Beletweyne to Mogadishu via Jowhar, where tax is paid at the entry point of the Jowhar local administration.

77. Reports indicate that the city has at least four entry points, each with four or five individuals in charge of collecting an entry tax at every point. All passenger vehicles and lorries carrying goods must pay a tax.

### **D. Local administration of Lower Shabelle**

78. Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde is in charge of the local administration of Lower Shabelle; he assumes the role of governor. Indohaadde’s headquarters and state house are located at Buulamarer, situated on a large, active banana farm north-west of Marka.

79. The geographical area under his control includes the seaports of Marka and Baraawe — he has his own fishing fleet — and an airport at Marka. The local administration also includes prime agricultural lands — including numerous “drug farms” on lands that were taken from the local farmers.

80. In order to exercise control over his geographical area, Indohaadde has his own militia, made up of men from his clan, and other militias from the same clan group, Hawiye. Indohaadde also has a large number of personal bodyguards, individuals who are most trusted from his own clan.

#### **Tax revenue**

81. Revenue for Indohaadde’s arms purchases comes from traders, businessmen, the Marka and Baraawe seaports, the airports, checkpoints, farms, NGOs, the fishing fleet and other sources. Indohaadde’s representatives collect taxes on a weekly basis. Every month, from the moneys collected, he pays militia members, his “inner circle” (advisers and closest associates) and the elders of the clan and makes purchases of arms. After those payments are made, the remainder, which is approximately equivalent to \$50,000, reverts to Indohaadde himself.

82. Indohaadde collects revenue from NGOs that want to operate in the area under his control; they must obtain Indohaadde’s permission and must pay him a sum of money to conduct their activities. He receives at least 15 per cent of any NGO benefits that are offered to the local population. The fees paid by an NGO for the buildings they use are split between the owner and Indohaadde. He has a say in the question of which Somalis work for NGOs — members of his own clan — and gets part of an employee’s salary. He also has a network of people that monitor the activities of NGOs to ensure their compliance with his financial interests. If an NGO does not comply with his requirements, he forces it to leave his area.

83. Indohaadde also owns drug farms in the area under his control, including at Janaale, Shalambood, Qoryooley, Buulamarer and Kurtun Waarey; the exact number of farms is unknown, but Monitoring Group sources estimated that as many as 10 may be spread throughout his area. He is alleged to be dealing in marijuana (probably in the form of hashish).

84. Indohaadde’s drug farms are a sophisticated operation involving irrigation systems, fertilizers and herbicides. The workers on the farms are experienced in the drug-growing business and receive a good salary to maintain the high quality of the drugs. The drugs undergo a drying process and are packaged and concealed to avoid attracting attention. The product is graded: poorer-quality product is sent to Mogadishu and neighbouring countries for local consumption, while the higher-quality product is put into trucks and transported to airstrips or the Marka seaport for further transport to the international market.

85. There are about six harvests per year. Indohaadde is expanding his drug-farming operation, by increasing either the number of farms or production per farm. He allegedly receives a total of approximately \$100,000 per harvest for all of the farms. Indohaadde has a “special representative” who handles drug-farm operations on his behalf and uses his militia to guard his drug farms.

## **E. Maritime activities and revenue: charcoal, fisheries and piracy**

86. The Somali coastline is 3,333 sea miles in length, with an exclusive economic zone that extends 200 miles offshore. Somalia continues to be without an effective central Government to control and administer its coastal waters. As a result, Somali coastal waters are under the control of a number of different local administrations or self-appointed militias, led by a faction leader.

87. This patchwork control of the Somali maritime environment has created or promoted three significant income generators for local administrations: (a) the export from Somalia of, among other commodities, large commercial quantities of charcoal, (b) unrestrained foreign access to Somali marine resources and fisheries by foreign fishing vessels and (c) widespread piracy.

### **Charcoal**

88. There are no regularly scheduled shipping services to Somalia, but individual ships from anywhere in the region, or the world, carry cargo to or from any of the more significant Somali seaports — Kismaayo, El Ma'an, Marka, El Adde (Mogadishu), Berbera and Bossaso. The Monitoring Group has learned that each of these ports is controlled by a local administration, as defined above in the present report, that demands the payment of royalties by importers and exporters of goods and the payment of protection money while a vessel is in Somali coastal waters. Arrangements for the protection of a vessel are made by a vessel owner or operator through the services of an agent who works on behalf of a local administration. At the port of departure an advance payment is made to the agent, who then arranges for a clearance for the vessel at the port of arrival. This fee also guarantees a vessel's protection while in Somali waters. Dhows and general cargo ships that use the above-mentioned ports are subject to the payment of these fees. Large cargo ships using the ports typically transport livestock, scrap metal or charcoal.

89. The charcoal trade has been mentioned in past reports of the Monitoring Group and the Panel of Experts as a considerable source of revenue for factions engaged in arms embargo violations. Its relevancy is particularly important in the south-central regions of Somalia. Major markets for charcoal originating in Somalia are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen, where businesses do a lucrative trade in the commodity. It is also a means to obtain United States dollars through the foreign-exchange process.

90. Ports in Somalia where charcoal is known to be exported are Kismaayo (the largest quantity), El Ma'an, located 30 kilometres north of Mogadishu, and El Adde, the local seaport of Mogadishu.

Table 3  
**Gross revenue from charcoal exports through Kismaayo, El Ma'an and El Adde seaports from January to April 2005**

		<i>January</i>	<i>February</i>	<i>March</i>	<i>April</i>	<i>Total</i>	
Kismaayo seaport	Quantity (metric tons)	8 485.1	5 972.6	4 698	10 128	29 283.7	
	Average price (United States dollars)	200	200	200	200	200	
	<b>Revenue (United States dollars)</b>	<b>1 697 020</b>	<b>1 194 520</b>	<b>939 600</b>	<b>2 025 600</b>	<b>5 856 740</b>	
					<i>March</i>	<i>June</i>	<i>Total</i>
El Ma'an seaport	Quantity (metric tons)			1 025	9 513	10 538	
	Average price (United States dollars)			200	200	200	
	<b>Revenue (United States dollars)</b>			<b>205 000</b>	<b>1 902 600</b>	<b>2 107 600</b>	
					<i>March</i>	<i>Total</i>	
El Adde seaport	Quantity (metric tons)			1 025		1 025	
	Average price (United States dollars)			200		200	
	<b>Revenue (United States dollars)</b>			<b>205 000</b>		<b>205 000</b>	

91. Even though the charcoal trade is linked to the livelihood of some workers in the areas of production, the overwhelming majority of the profits generated in Somalia will remain in the hands of those in charge of the local administrations, not the people that produce charcoal, who are very poorly paid for their labour. The following are the different stages involved in the process:

- (a) Production: cutting, burning and bagging (Somalia);
- (b) Collection: gathering product, loading onto lorries and delivering to seaports (Somalia);
- (c) Trading: shipping costs, sales price negotiation, terms of sales (Somalia);
- (d) Importation: wholesale and retail businesses (foreign country).

92. The price associated with each stage of production and collection is estimated at \$0.30 per 25-kilogram bag. At the trading stage, (c) above, at the port of loading, the actual price is at \$1.50 per 25-kilogram bag (including transport fees from the collection point to the port). The final sales price is \$5 per 25-kilogram bag or \$200 per metric ton (at the port of Kismaayo). The wholesale price at the importation stage, (d) above, is not known by the Monitoring Group. However, the retail price (price to the consumer) at stage (d) of the same 25-kilogram bag is \$15 to \$20.

93. The Monitoring Group has learned that those in charge of the local administration in Somalia are in charge of the stages of production, collection and trading, and as a result will receive the great majority of the profits generated; any collateral benefits accruing to the local population are negligible. A portion of the profits will be used to buy arms and reinforce the security apparatus of the militias of the local administration. As an example, in May 2005 it was reported that Colonel Barre Hirale contributed funds and logistical military support to Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade in his fight with TFG forces for control of Baidoa.

### **Fisheries**

94. Foreign fishing vessels have open access to Somali coastal waters. The commercial fishing industry is driven principally by foreign interests. Local Somali administrations, or faction leaders conclude licensing arrangements with foreign countries, companies or individual fishing vessels. Somalia coastal waters offer significant potential for exploitation of marine resources, which include very rich fishing grounds. Seasonal variations are considerable, November and March being the peak times for fish harvesting.

95. Previous studies conducted by various countries and international agencies have estimated an annual catch of 300,000 tons of fish and 10,000 tons of crustaceans. The varieties landed are tuna, bonito, mackerel, squid, shark, lobster and shrimp. There is especially high demand in foreign markets for tuna, shark, lobster and shrimp.

96. Estimates indicate that before the collapse of the Siad Barre Government in 1991, fisheries were one of the largest generators of revenue, estimated at \$20 million per year. Today the exact amounts received by the numerous local administrations from foreign operators for marine fisheries production, generally, or the issuance of marine fishing licenses, in particular, are difficult to establish. However, according to a study completed by the Marine Resources Assessment Group, Ltd., London, entitled, *Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries, Synthesis Report*, published in June 2005, about \$90 million is the estimated annual value of illegal and pirate fishing in the exclusive economic zones of the case-study countries for 2003 and 2004.

97. The following case study is indicative of the type of fishing activity carried out in Somali coastal waters by some foreign fishing operations in concert with a local administration (port of El Ma'an). The motor fishing vessel *Alpha Serengeti* is based at Mombasa, Kenya. In November 2004, the owners selected a crew and advised crew members that they would be fishing in Kenyan waters off the coastal cities of Lamu and Malindi. The vessel left the port of Mombasa on 25 November and had sailed for about 18 hours when the crew was informed by the vessel's captain that they were actually destined for Somalia. The captain told the crew that they would be fishing in areas declared to be a "war zone". The crew members were then compelled to sign contracts, drawn up by a Mombasa business, that included the stipulation that they agreed to work in a war-zone country — Somalia.

98. On 30 November the vessel docked at the port of El Ma'an, north of Mogadishu. The crew was not allowed to go ashore. During the next couple of days local Somalis brought on board a gun, which was mounted on the upper deck of the *Alpha Serengeti*. An analysis of a photograph of the gun suggested that it was a modified version of the 20mm Single Mark 4 anti-aircraft gun that was used

extensively during the Second World War. The vessel left the port on 2 December and fished the coastal waters between Mogadishu and Kismaayo. They caught and processed crustaceans and a variety of fish. During this fishing trip the Somali merchant vessel *Soul Sea* replenished the *Alpha Serengeti* with supplies. The *Soul Sea* is also armed, with a much bigger gun, and often accompanied the *Alpha Serengeti* as an “armed escort”. There were other “friendly” vessels fishing in the same area. On 16 January, the *Alpha Serengeti* opened fire on two unidentified fishing vessels that apparently had intruded into its fishing zone. The other vessels responded with small-arms fire. There were no hits on either side, and the other vessels left the area at high speed.

99. The fish caught were processed and packed in boxes labelled “produce of Kenya” and were alleged to be illegally destined for the international market. This allegation is based on the fact that foreign inspectors have carried out inspections of the *Alpha Serengeti*. The Monitoring Group learned that during these inspections the owners provide all the necessary safety and hygiene gear to satisfy the stringent conditions laid down by the importers, but all this is withdrawn as soon as the inspection is over. The Monitoring Group also learned that the *Alpha Serengeti* was approved by the European Union (EU) as a freezer vessel, as per European Commission decision 2004/39/EC of 14 January 2004 (approval No. 13/WB/KEN). An individual by the name of Abdullahi Ali Mohammed facilitated the fishing arrangements described above (with the local Somali administration), using a front company operating out of Dubai under the name Coral Coast Trading. The Monitoring Group has brought the facts of this case study to the attention of the EU office in Kenya.

### **Piracy**

100. Somalia’s coastal and offshore waters are dangerous for the innocent passage of fishing vessels, traditional boats, yachts and commercial vessel traffic. Piracy off the coast of Somalia is causing a great deal of concern to the shipping world. Somali waters now have a fearsome reputation and have been classified as some of the world’s most dangerous by both the International Maritime Bureau and International Maritime Organization. The main motive behind acts of piracy in Somali waters appears to be an attempt by local administrations or individual warlords and militias to obtain large sums of money through ransom demands.

101. The pirates off the coast of Somalia are trained fighters, often dressed in military fatigues, using speedboats equipped with satellite phones and Global Positioning System equipment. They are typically armed with automatic weapons, anti-tank rocket launchers (shoulder-fired) and various types of grenades.

102. The hijacking of the merchant vessel *Semlow* is an example of an act of piracy that occurred during the mandate period. The *Semlow*, a Kenyan cargo ship, on charter to the World Food Programme to carry tsunami relief supplies to Somalia, was hijacked off the Somali coast on 26 June 2005. The ship had set sail from Mombasa on 23 June and was headed for Bossaso, Puntland. The captain, aware of the dangers of piracy in Somali waters, set a course that was at least 40 miles from the Somalia shoreline and well out of sight of land. Early on the morning of 26 June, however, two speedboats appeared from nowhere and seized the ship and crew, after menacing them with rifle fire.

103. As of the writing of the present report, the *Semlow*, along with its crew, remains captive. A ransom demand of \$500,000 has been made by those responsible for the hijacking.

104. Another example of a pirated ship is that of the merchant vessel *Feisty Gas*, a liquefied petroleum gas tanker. On 10 April 2005, Somali pirates seized the ship and crew. The pirates then guided the ship close to the Somali coastline and anchored it within sight of land. The owner of the ship, a company based in Hong Kong, started negotiations with the hijackers. The Hong Kong company subsequently wired money to a local shipping company through a bank in Mombasa, Kenya, and sent one of its representatives to Mombasa on 18 April. The Hong Kong agent met the representative of the hijackers at various locations in Mombasa and paid the ransom of \$315,000 in the following instalments: on 20 April, \$150,000; on 22 April, \$150,000; and on 25 April, \$15,000.

105. From January through July 2005, incidents of piracy in Somali coastal waters have been fairly common and are listed in annex V. That list is not complete. The actual extent of piracy is very difficult to gauge; there may have been other cases that have gone unreported, since many shipping companies do not report incidents of piracy for fear of raising their insurance premiums and prompting protracted, time-consuming investigations. The same is true of ransoms paid. Ship owners and companies do not want to divulge any information regarding the amount of money paid for the release of ships and crews.

## V. Capacity-building

106. Capacity-building can be defined<sup>2</sup> as efforts aimed at developing human skills or societal infrastructures within a community or organization needed to reduce the level of risk.<sup>3</sup> In extended understanding, capacity-building also includes the development of institutional, financial, political and other resources, such as technology at different levels and sectors of society. The Monitoring Group notes, however, that the lack of an established central Government in Somalia and the current elevated threat of widespread hostilities has severely retarded, if not put on hold for the time being, serious countrywide capacity-building efforts.

107. Nevertheless, plans do exist to proceed with capacity-building in Somalia at the appropriate time — in the financial sector, for example, as follows.

108. The Financial Sector Development Project is one of the most significant plans, with an estimated duration of two years, from 2004 to 2006. Its main focus is on strengthening the Somali remittance sector to increase its compliance with international financial regulations and laying the groundwork for the entry of a formal commercial banking sector.

109. Additional projects include support for the establishment of the office of the comptroller general of Somalia, the creation of a central bank and the development of the revenue-generation initiative. With regard to financial services, the Monitoring Group has learned that some projects have been accomplished, or are currently ongoing, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office in Somalia, the European Commission and the World Bank.

## **VI. Coordination with neighbouring States and other organizations**

### **A. Neighbouring States**

#### **Yemen**

110. On the invitation of the Government of Yemen, arms experts travelled to Yemen during the second week of August. Meetings were conducted with the Deputy Minister for Europe, the Americas and International Organizations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Interior. Discussions centred on three topics: (a) the seizure by Yemeni authorities of a contraband arms shipment that was being transported by a dhow across the Gulf of Aden and destined for Somalia, and arms smuggling networks, in general, (b) the Government's strategies and plans for dealing with illegal arms and (c) round-trip flights by Government military aircraft from Yemen to Somalia during July 2005. The Yemeni authorities were very cooperative during the discussions, providing information that was most helpful to the work of the Monitoring Group. Subsequent to the meetings, the Yemeni authorities provided the Monitoring Group with a formal reply, dated 15 August 2005, to the questions that were discussed during the visit. Their replies on topics (a) and (c) above have already been incorporated elsewhere in the present report. Their response on topic (b) — the Government's strategies and plans for dealing with illegal arms (i.e., paragraph 3 (b) of the mandate: to assess actions taken by Somali authorities, as well as other Member States, in particular those in the region, to implement fully the arms embargo;) — is as follows:

“There is no body that sponsors arms-smuggling from Yemen to Somalia, inasmuch as it is an offence punishable by law. Moreover, since, for the reasons previously stated, citizens have various light and medium weapons in their possession and the Ministry of the Interior is the authority responsible for maintaining public security, order, tranquillity and morality and for protecting lives, honour and property, that Ministry has sought to curb the illicit arms-trafficking and smuggling through various means, as follows:

#### **“I. In the legal sphere**

“A bill amending the Arms Act has been tabled and is currently before the House of Representatives. Through this bill, the Government is seeking to limit domestic arms trade and prevent the transfer of arms to third States.

#### **“II. In the maritime sphere**

“Using available resources, the Coastguard Department is engaged in securing the Yemeni coasts by conducting marine patrols to check for any possible breaches occurring by sea. It has endeavoured to expand its activity by preparing a Department work plan for the years 2006-2007, with United States assistance and expertise. The aim is to develop the work of the Department to include the security aspects necessary for securing part of the coastal strip in accordance with the Department's phased plan, as part of Yemen's counter-terrorism efforts. This requires considerable material resources, which we are seeking to obtain through support from friendly States, primarily the United States of America, inasmuch as Yemen is a partner

in combating terrorism. An English-language copy of the Department plan is annexed hereto.

### **“III. On land**

“The first phase of the plan to collect medium and heavy weapons and ban their possession has been implemented through the following:

“(a) The purchase, from citizens, of dangerous weapons, including should-fired missiles and medium and light machine guns, to which end a total of 10 billion Yemeni riyals has been spent. This affects the budget earmarked for development, inasmuch it represents an additional burden on the State budget;

“(b) Assistance from the United States of America in the purchase from citizens of certain dangerous weapons, including shoulder-fired missiles, as well as the collection and destruction of a number of weapons under the supervision of United States experts to ensure their lawful disposal;

“(c) The preparation of the second phase of the weapons-collection plan, which comprises the following four stages:

“(i) Preparing for the weapons-collection process by gathering information on persons in possession of weapons and determining the right time to implement the plan;

“(ii) Establishing implementation programmes for the plan through:

“– Determination of the weapons to be taken in and the appropriate amount of compensation for each;

“– Elaboration of information programmes that explain the importance of surrendering weapons, considered as something uncivilized and a primary factor in the perpetration of most crimes;

“– Issuance of a proclamation by the Ministry of the Interior calling on citizens to cooperate and participate in the implementation of the weapons-collection plan, setting a schedule for implementation and stating that immediately upon the expiration of the time limit set for the voluntary surrender of weapons against the compensation fixed by the competent committee, the Government will begin to carry out search and investigation procedures for weapons and persons in possession of weapons and to apply the laws in force;

“(iii) Commencing implementation in the field through tightened security measures at entry/exit points and in coastal areas and other places where arms-smuggling offences are likely to be committed;

“(iv) Upon the expiry of the deadline, carrying out procedures for information-gathering on weapons and procedures for confiscation conducted in coordination with the judicial authorities.

“Inasmuch as all these aspects represent additional burdens that will affect development efforts, it is essential to seek support for the implementation of this phase. It is hoped that support will be forthcoming from friendly nations, primarily the United States of America, inasmuch as the measures in question form part of Yemen’s counter-terrorism efforts.”<sup>1</sup>

111. Furthermore, during discussions in Sana’a, the Minister of Interior provided the Monitoring Group with a document that includes additional measures involving the enhanced capacity of the Yemeni Coast Guard to more effectively combat the arms-trading networks operating between Yemen and Somalia.

#### **Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti**

112. In accordance with paragraph 3 (b) of the mandate, the Monitoring Group also sought information from Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti regarding actions that they have taken to comply with and implement the arms embargo. Accordingly, the Monitoring Group sent letters to those countries soliciting their response by 30 September 2005.

#### **Somalia**

113. The coordinator of the Monitoring Group attempted on three occasions to meet TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi, but Gedi’s office failed to respond with arrangements for a meeting. However, the Monitoring Group did meet with Hussein Aideed, the Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, to discuss his concern about lifting the arms embargo. The Minister stressed that, in order for the Somali people to survive and the peace process to be given a chance, the arms embargo not only had to be upheld, it needed to be strengthened. The Monitoring Group also met with members of the opposition, who made it clear that the final goal was the removal of President Yusuf and to control the TFG institutions.

### **B. Other organizations**

114. The Monitoring Group has had contacts and exchanged views with the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) and the Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004). Members of the Monitoring Group also met on several occasions with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, François Lonseny Fall, during which they exchanged views and information.

115. The Monitoring Group also conducted meetings with representatives of the UNDP and FAO offices in Somalia, who expressed their desire to cooperate with the Monitoring Group in developing proposals for interdicting illegal, uncontrolled and unregulated fishing in the Somali exclusive economic zone and preventing the export of charcoal. They also acknowledged that it was essential that such proposals be considered for possible additional measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the arms embargo.

## **VII. Conclusions and recommendations**

### **A. Conclusions**

116. The current mandate period has been marked by a dramatic rise in the numbers of arms embargo violations, which have involved 10 Ministers and the President of TFG. This rise in the number of violations corresponds to an ongoing militarization of central and southern Somalia. Both TFG and the opposition are making military-style preparations, with the apparent intent of engaging each other in violent hostilities. The political process has apparently taken a back seat to these military preparations.

117. The Bakaraaha Arms Market in Mogadishu has continued throughout the current mandate period to play a major role as an intermediary for channelling arms to members of the opposition and others in violation of the arms embargo. It is an important factor in the continued destabilization of Somalia. Another new and important element contributing to the continued instability of Somalia during the mandate period has been the direct arms support by States in the region for either TFG or the opposition. Their support has also exacerbated the level of tension between the two sides, leading to increased militarization and the threat of widespread violence in central and southern Somalia.

118. Due to the high level of tension between TFG and the opposition, and the resulting greatly increased arms flows into Somalia, the Monitoring Group proposes that the Security Council consider a new approach to deal with arms embargo violations. The Monitoring Group has devised an approach that is designed to enhance the effectiveness of the arms embargo. The new concept is best described as an integrated arms embargo. It incorporates financial and maritime aspects and is intended to reduce the funds available to local Somali administrations run by dissident TFG Ministers — former warlords — who use the money to buy arms. The integrated arms embargo concept is detailed below.

### **B. Recommendations: an integrated arms embargo approach**

119. Considering the totality of the information contained in the previous reports of the Panel of Experts and the Monitoring Group, as well as the present report, and the current chaotic situation in Somalia, the Monitoring Group proposes that the Security Council consider adopting and implementing the concept of an integrated arms embargo. The Monitoring Group believes that an integrated arms embargo is needed at this time in view of the uncontrolled and dramatic rise in arms flows into Somalia and in the number of corresponding arms embargo violations.

120. The Monitoring Group defines the concept of the integrated arms embargo as a process that involves the following aspects:

(a) Reaffirming and sustaining the arms embargo on Somalia, in accordance with Security Council resolution 733 (1992), paragraph 5;

(b) Implementing a trade embargo on the export of charcoal originating in Somalia;

(c) Implementing a ban on foreign vessels fishing in Somali waters and a trade embargo on the export of fish taken in Somali waters.

121. The purpose of the approach outlined above is to enhance the overall effectiveness of the enforcement of the arms embargo on Somalia by reducing the funds available for those local administrations, warlords and others that have been engaged in the purchase of arms in violation of the embargo. The desired effect is to stem the unrestrained flow of arms into Somalia by key arms embargo violators — those who have the gained financial capacity by accruing revenue, in part from exports of Somali charcoal and the issuance of fishing rights to foreign businesses for fishing in the exclusive economic zone in Somalia.

122. The proposal will depend on cooperation among States in the international community to ban and impose embargoes on illegal and unregulated activities not controlled by a Government, since it relates to trade with businesses in foreign countries. Further, the proposal can be implemented and enforced by an agreement among States in the international community until a Government in Somalia is properly in place.

123. The proposal is not intended to seriously affect or impose restrictions on individuals in Somali civil society who are engaged in traditional, domestic and day-to-day subsistence activities for the purpose of local consumption. The Monitoring Group recognizes that the proposal will not have an impact on State-sponsored arms donations to Somalia.

#### *Notes*

<sup>1</sup> Translation from the original Arabic version provided by the Government of Yemen (see annex II).

<sup>2</sup> International Strategy for Disaster Reduction definition.

<sup>3</sup> Risk: the probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction definition).

## Annex I

**Arms purchases and sales at the Bakaraaha Arms Market  
investigated during the mandate period**

Individual conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market	Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction	Role (supplier/purchaser/seller)
<b>Mohamed Qanyare Afrah</b> , businessman and Minister for National Security in TFG	Ammunition for Zu-23 and mortar shells <b>16.03.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through his representatives Abdi Jilaoow and Ali Yusuf
	10 PKM <b>09.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	2 DShK, and a variety of ammunition for belted machine guns and anti-aircraft guns such as the Zu-23-2 and Zu-23-4 <b>16.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	Ammunition for mortar and 100 shells for the B-10 <b>06.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through his representatives Abdi Jilaoow and Ali Yusuf
	20 AK-47, ammunition for the Zu-23, ammunition for mortars and small arms and feeder belts for machine guns <b>09.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	50 AK-47, 10 PKM and a variety of ammunition <b>11.05.2005</b>	Purchased together with Atto and Muse Suudi for Habsade
	40 AK-47 and ammunition for Zu-23 and mortars <b>17.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	50 AK-47, 4 PKM, ammunition for small arms, mortar and Zu- 23, magazines for AK-47 and empty belt feeders for PKM <b>25.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
A variety of ammunition including 120mm shells <b>04.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms	

	A variety of ammunition <b>08.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	A variety of ammunition <b>11.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	3 PKM <b>16.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	70 AK-47, 10 RPG-2, 4 mortars, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition <b>02.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	A variety of ammunition <b>03.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	Ammunition for mortars, Zu-23, DShK, B-10 and ZP-39 <b>09.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	30 AK-47, 7 PKM and 100 RPG-7 grenades <b>10.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through his representatives Abdi Jilaoow and Ali Yusuf
	1 B-10 and a variety of ammunition <b>20.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	Ammunition for small and big arms <b>06.08.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	Ammunition for small and big arms <b>08.08.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Tuni clan representative</b>	4 PKM, 2 RPG-7 and ammunition <b>09.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms. They are fighting the Sheekhaal sub-clan over agricultural land in the Kismaayo area
	8 PKM <b>02.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Col Umar "Fiasco"</b>	2 DShK <b>10.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Bashir Rage</b> Businessman	100 120mm mortar shells <b>09.03.2005</b>	Purchased the arms together with Abdikadir Beebe

	<p>1 ZP-39 <b>10.04.2005</b></p> <p>1 Zu-23 and ammunition <b>23.04.2005</b></p> <p>Ammunition worth \$50,000 <b>28.04.2005</b></p> <p>Ammunition <b>07.05.2005</b></p> <p>2 DShK and ammunition for the Zu-23 and mortars <b>15.05.2005</b></p> <p>80 PKM, ammunition for small arms <b>12.06.2005</b></p>	<p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Purchased the arms together with Abukar Omar Adaan and Deylaaf</p> <p>Purchased the arms together with Muse Suudi. They used their representative Yusuf Garbood</p> <p>Purchased the arms through his representative Yusuf Garbood</p> <p>This shipment arrived by plane at Isaley airport, near El Ma'an. Purpose: sell at BAM</p>
<b>Jaamal Aadan Dheere</b>	<p>1 B-10, 1 Dhuunshilke one-barrel anti-aircraft gun and 4 RPG-7 <b>11.04.2005</b></p>	<p>Purchased the arms</p>
<b>Marihaan clan representative</b>	<p>1 Dhuunshilke <b>11.04.2005</b></p> <p>Many AK-47 <b>21.06.2005</b></p>	<p>Purchased the arms. Fighting the Garre sub-clan about cattle theft. Around El Wa'aq area</p> <p>Purchased the arms</p>
<b>Saleeban clan representative</b>	<p>2 DShK, 2 B-10, 8 PKM and a variety of ammunition <b>06.03.2005</b></p> <p>50 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition <b>14.03.2005</b></p> <p>1 Zu-23 and ammunition <b>12.04.2005</b></p>	<p>Purchased the arms. Fighting the Sa'ad sub-clan in central Somalia (Galgaduud/Mudug) concerning killing of elders</p> <p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Purchased the arms</p>
<b>Abdikarim Farah Laqanyo, "President" of "Midland"</b>	<p>Variety of ammunition <b>12.04.2005</b></p> <p>1 Dhuunshilke and 1 DShK <b>02.05.2005</b></p>	<p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Purchased the arms by selling at BAM (small) arms received from Ethiopia</p>

<p><b>Muse Suudi Yalahow,</b> Minister of Commerce in TFG</p>	<p>1 DShK and a variety of ammunition, mostly for the Zu-23 <b>13.04.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms
	<p>100 120mm shells <b>22.04.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms
	<p>Ammunition <b>07.05.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms together with Bashir Rage. They used their representative Yusuf Garbood
	<p>45 AK-47, a variety of ammunition, ammunition pouches and belts and feeder belts for machine guns <b>08.05.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms. Destination “reserve force” outside Mogadishu
	<p>Ammunition, battle clothing and load-bearing equipment <b>09.05.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms
	<p>50 AK-47, 10 PKM and a variety of ammunition <b>11.05.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms together with Qanyare and Atto for Habsade
	<p>A variety of ammunition but mainly 120mm mortar shells <b>17.05.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms
	<p>50 AK-47, magazines for AK-47, ammunition boxes, empty belt feeders for the PKM, belts for militiamen and a variety of ammunition <b>25.05.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms for the “reserve force” located at Laanta Buuro (Mogadishu)
	<p>A variety of ammunition <b>08.06.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms
	<p>2 80mm mortars and a variety of ammunition <b>03.07.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms
<p>1 ZP-39 <b>11.07.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms	
<p>A variety of ammunition including for Zu-23, DShK, ZP-39, mortars, B-10 and RPG-7 <b>03.08.2005</b></p>	Purchased the arms	

<p><b>Omar Muhammad Mohamud “Finish”</b>, Minister for Religion and Endowments in TFG. Controls the Mogadishu seaport</p>	<p>1 B-10 <b>13.04.2005</b></p> <p>1 DShK and a variety of ammunition <b>05.06.2005</b></p> <p>Ammunition <b>11.06.2005</b></p> <p>1 DShK and 1 Dhuunshilke <b>18.06.2005</b></p> <p>1 DShK and ammunition <b>06.07.2005</b></p>	<p>Purchased the arms through a representative of Qanyare</p> <p>Purchased the arms. He also ordered at the same time arms that were not available at the market</p> <p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Purchased the arms through his representative Ismaan Umar</p> <p>Purchased the arms</p>
<p><b>Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade</b>, MP, in control of Baidoa</p>	<p>2 B-10, 15 PKM and ammunition <b>12.03.2005</b></p> <p>1 ZP-39 <b>14.04.2005</b></p> <p>70 AK-47, 7 PKM, 2 DShK, ammunition for Zu-23, B-10, mortar shells and ammunition for small arms <b>26.04.2005</b></p> <p>45 AK-47, 10 RPG-2, 9 PKM and a variety of ammunition <b>21.05.2005</b></p> <p>50 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition <b>26.05.2005</b></p> <p>Large quantity of ammunition <b>30.05.2005</b></p> <p>A variety of ammunition <b>14.06.2005</b></p> <p>40 AK-47, 5 PKM and a variety of ammunition <b>01.08.2005</b></p> <p>15 AK-47, 6 PKM and 8 RPG-7 <b>14.08.2005</b></p>	<p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Purchased the arms through the representative of Indohaadde</p> <p>Arms bought at the BAM were supplied to Habsade by unknown purchasers. Note: possibly from opposition allies. Middleman was Indohaadde’s representative</p> <p>Purchased by Habsade via Mohamed Hassan (representative of Indohaadde)</p> <p>Purchased by Habsade via Mohamed Hassan (representative of Indohaadde)</p> <p>Received from Indohaadde via his representative Mohamed Hassan</p> <p>Bought by Indohaadde for Habsade</p> <p>Purchased by Habsade via Mohamed Hassan (representative of Indohaadde)</p> <p>Purchased by Habsade via Mohamed Hassan (representative of Indohaadde)</p>

<b>Barre Aden Shire “Hirale”</b> , Minister for Reconstruction and Resettlement in TFG, in charge of Kismaayo port	9 PKM and ammunition for the ZP-39, Zu-23, B-10 and small weapons <b>14.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	2 DShK and ammunition for Zu- 23 and ZP-39 <b>16.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through his representative Usman Umar
	1 ZP-39 <b>18.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Abukar Omar Adaan</b> , Businessman	2 B-10 and a variety of ammunition for heavy weapons (anti-aircraft and anti-tank) <b>16.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	Ammunition worth \$50,000 <b>28.04.2005</b>	Purchased together with Bashir Rage and Deylaaf
<b>BAM traders</b>	8 DShK, 100 AK-47, 50 PKM and ammunition, mostly mortar shells <b>08.03.2005</b>	Imported arms to BAM
	240 pistols, 35 AK-47, 90 PKM and a variety of ammunition including mortar shells <b>15.03.2005</b>	From Yemen (arms-trading network) via Bossaso
	180 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition, especially for the Zu-23 <b>19.04.2005</b>	Imported arms to BAM
	An arms shipment worth \$75,000 <b>06.05.2005</b>	This shipment from Bossaso via Galkayo was ambushed at Bulo Burto by members of the Gaaljeel clan
	600 AK-47, 50 PKM, 80 RPG-2 and a variety of ammunition <b>15.05.2005</b>	This shipment from Yemen (arms-trading network), transported via Bossaso and Galkayo and Beletweyne, took one month to arrive at Irtogte due to controls on the route, especially between Yemen and Somalia
	160 AK-47, 20 PKM, 16 RPG-2 and a variety of ammunition <b>18.05.2005</b>	Supplied by traders from Irtogte to the arms market at Qoryooley (south-west of Marka)

	<p>500 AK-47, 100 PKM, 120 RPG-2, 3 Zu-23, 15 DShK, 12 Dhuunshilke, 20 120mm mortars, 6 B-10 and a variety of ammunition <b>22.05.2005</b></p> <p>110 AK-47 <b>28.05.2005</b></p> <p>250 AK-47, 8 PKM, 2 Zu-23, 10 B-10, 50 RPG-2 and a variety of ammunition <b>04.07.2005</b></p> <p>A number of pistols, RPG-2, PKM and a variety of ammunition <b>12.07.2005</b></p> <p>A shipment consisting of Zu-23-2 and 4, ZP-39, DShK, B-10, RPG-7 and small arms <b>20.07.2005</b></p> <p>A shipment consisting of pistols and AK-47 <b>23.07.2005</b></p> <p>180 AK-47, 70 PKM and ammunition for small arms <b>03.08.2005</b></p> <p>100 AK-47 and 40 PKM <b>06.08.2005</b></p> <p>A shipment of AK-47 and RPG-7 <b>06.08.2005</b></p> <p>380 AK-47 and ammunition <b>13.08.2005</b></p>	<p>One of the biggest ever arrivals of arms at the market. Route: via Bossaso, Galkayo and Beletweyne. Transaction for several traders but principal is Yusuf Garbood. See also purchases immediately afterwards by opposition</p> <p>This shipment for traders at Irtogte was ambushed in Beletweyne</p> <p>Arms imported to BAM by a group of traders</p> <p>Arms imported to BAM by a group of traders such as Said Kuulow, Qorshel and Abdi Said</p> <p>Arrived via a port on the east coast since President Yusuf blocked Bossaso for BAM traders</p> <p>Imported to BAM</p> <p>Imported to BAM via new route: Galkayo and Beletweyne</p> <p>Imported to BAM</p> <p>Imported to BAM</p> <p>Imported to BAM via Galkayo</p>
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<b>Garre clan representative</b>	24 AK-47, 16 PKM <b>20.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms. The clan fights the Marihaan sub-clan over theft of cattle. El Wa'aq area
	Many AK-47 <b>21.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	Some AK-47 <b>24.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	60 AK-47 and 15 PKM <b>30.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	22 AK-47, 8 PKM, 10 RPG-7 and ammunition for small arms <b>02.08.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Owner of the company "Dun Iyo Irbad"</b>	1 Zu-23 <b>21.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms for his sub-clan (Saleeban), which is fighting the Sa'ad sub-clan
<b>Sheik Adaan Dheere</b>	20 AK-47, 7 RPG <b>21.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Said Indoohaadde</b> , warlord/businessman and governor in southern Somalia, associated with Al Itihaad Al-Islaami	2 Zu-23 and a variety of ammunition <b>27.02.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	1 DShK and ammunition <b>13.03.2005</b>	Purchases the arms through his representative Mohamed Hassan
	2 mortars and ammunition <b>17.03.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through his representative Mohamed Hassan
	1 Dhuunshilke, 12 RPG-2 and ammunition for Zu-23, B-10 and small arms <b>22.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	80 pistols and a variety of ammunition for Zu-23, DShK, PKM, RPG-7, RPG-2 and small arms, and load-bearing equipment <b>25.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
60 AK-47, 12 RPG-7, 4 120mm mortars, 1 DShK, 2 B-10 and a variety of ammunition <b>07.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through his representative Mohamed Hassan	

	55 AK-47, 10 PKM, 16 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition <b>18.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	28 AK-47, 3 120mm mortars, 2 Dhuunshilke, 2 B-10, 11 RPG-2 and a variety of ammunition <b>23.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through his representative Mohamed Hassan
	Large quantity of ammunition <b>30.05.2005</b>	Purchased the ammunition at Irtogte through his representative for Habsade
	1 Zu-23 <b>31.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	2 Dhuunshilke, 2 PKM, 1 RPG-2 and ammunition <b>05.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through his representative Mohamed Hassan
	A variety of ammunition <b>14.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms for Habsade
	4 PKM, 6 RPG-2 and a variety of ammunition <b>02.08.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	1 Zu-23 <b>09.08.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Biyomaal clan representative</b>	4 PKM and 2 Dhuunshilke <b>23.04.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Mohamed Deylaaf, businessman</b>	Ammunition worth \$50,000 <b>28.04.2005</b>	Purchased through his company "Shirkadda Banaadir" together with Bashir Rage and Omar Adaan
	5 PKM and 1 Zu-23 <b>25.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	1 Zu-23 <b>06.07.2005</b>	Purchased through his company "Shirkadda Banaadir"
	2 DShK and ammunition for small arms <b>21.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	1 DShK, 1 Sekawe (anti-aircraft gun) and 2 B-10 <b>24.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Aadan Saronsoor, ally of Habsade</b>	2 DShK <b>28.02.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through Salaad Ilka Weyne

	<p>60 AK-47, 2 PKM, 10 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition <b>07.03.2005</b></p> <p>20 AK-47, 6 PKM, 1 DShK and some ammunition <b>03.05.2005</b> 2 DShK <b>09.06.2005</b></p>	<p>Purchased the arms</p> <p>Purchased the arms through the representative of Indohaadde, Mohamed Hassan Purchased the arms through the representative of Indohaadde, Mohamed Hassan</p>
<b>Sharia courts</b>	<p>24 PKM and 10 120mm mortars <b>02.03.2005</b></p> <p>10 RPG-2, 5 RPG-7, 5 PKM <b>14.03.2005</b></p> <p>14 PKM, 6 RPG-7, 4 80mm mortars and ammunition for anti-aircraft gun <b>10.05.2005</b></p> <p>24 AK-47, 8 PKM, 2 DShK and ammunition for small arms <b>19.05.2005</b></p> <p>70 AK-47, 8 PKM and ammunition for small arms, RPG-7, DShK and Zu-23 <b>21.05.2005</b></p> <p>14 AK-47, 4 PKM, 8 RPG-2 and ammunition for small arms, DShK and RPG-7 <b>04.06.2005</b></p> <p>16 AK-47 and some ammunition <b>07.06.2005</b></p> <p>1 DShK <b>14.06.2005</b></p> <p>20 AK-47, 1 DShK and ammunition <b>03.07.2005</b></p> <p>12 RPG-2, 1 DShK and a variety of ammunition <b>02.08.2005</b></p>	<p>Purchased the arms from Yemen (arms-trading network) via traders at BAM</p> <p>Sharia court, south Mogadishu, purchased the arms</p> <p>Sharia court at Ifka Halane purchased the arms</p> <p>Sharia court at Ifka Halane and Shirkole (Circola) (Mogadishu area) purchased the arms</p> <p>Sharia court at Ifka Halane and Shirkole (Circola) (Mogadishu area) purchased the arms</p> <p>Sharia court at Ifka Halane purchased the arms.</p> <p>Sharia court at Shirkole (Circola) purchased the arms</p> <p>Sharia court at Warshadda (Mogadishu area) purchased the arms.</p> <p>Sharia court at Ifka Halane purchased the arms</p> <p>Sharia court at Ifka Halane purchased the arms</p>

	24 AK-47, 4 PKM and a variety of ammunition <b>10.08.2005</b>	Sharia court at Ifka Halane purchased the arms
<b>Reymataan clan representative</b>	2 mortars, 2 RPG-7 and 1 Dhuunshilke <b>03.03.2005</b>	Purchased the arms. The clan fights the Waesley sub-clan around the El Ma'an area
<b>Botan Ise Alin "Haaraan Kunaar"</b> , Minister for Rehabilitation and Training of Militias in TFG	1 DShK and some ammunition <b>02.05.2005</b>  1 B-10, 2 mortars and some ammunition <b>05.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms  Purchased the arms
<b>Sheekhaal clan representative</b>	50 AK-47, 8 PKM, 4 RPG-7, 50 hand grenades and a variety of small arms <b>05.05.2005</b>	Purchased the arms. The clan fights the Tuni clan over agricultural land around Kismaayo area
<b>Osman Hassan Ali "Atto"</b> , Minister for Public Works and Housing in TFG	Ammunition and load-bearing equipment <b>09.05.2005</b>  50 AK-47, 10 PKM and a variety of ammunition <b>11.05.2005</b>  4 120mm mortars and 120 shells for the 120mm mortar <b>25.05.2005</b>  40 AK-47, 10 RPG-2 and ammunition <b>09.07.2005</b>  6 120mm mortars and a variety of ammunition <b>18.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms  Purchased the arms together with Qanyare and Muse Suudi for Habsade  Purchased the arms  Purchased the arms  Purchased the arms
<b>Mahamud Hassan Ali Gaabow "Adde"</b> , Governor of Banaadir region	4 PKM and ammunition <b>28.05.2005</b>  22 AK-47, 4 PKM, 4 RPG-2, 1 DShK and a variety of small arms ammunition <b>18.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms  Bought through his representative Mohamed Jimaale, who is also a broker at Irtogte
<b>Ibrahim Umar Sebrye "Shaalwey"</b> , former mayor of Mogadishu	4 PKM and ammunition <b>29.05.2005</b>  14 AK-47, 2 PKM and ammunition <b>16.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through a broker, Usman Yusuf  Purchased the arms

	25 AK-47, 4 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition <b>13.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	20 AK-47, 7 PKM and ammunition for small arms <b>13.08.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Gaaljeel clan representative</b>	50 AK-47, 11 RPG-7, 2 80mm mortars and a variety of ammunition <b>04.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms. The clan fights the Jaleele clan (Beletweyne area) over livestock
<b>Jaleele clan representative</b>	25 AK-47, 2 Dhuunshilke, 6 PKM, 4 RPG-2 and ammunition <b>07.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms. The clan fights the Gaaljeel clan (Beletweyne area) over livestock
	22 AK-47, 1 DShK and ammunition for small arms <b>13.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	Small arms and ammunition <b>21.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Abdikadir Beebe</b> , coordinator of militia stationed in Mogadishu	Ammunition, including for the ZP-39, Zu-23, 80mm shells and 120mm shells <b>07.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	1 B-10, 1 DShK and ammunition <b>13.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	20 AK-47, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition <b>05.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Mohamed Dheere</b> , in control of Jowhar	1 Zu-23 and 2 B-10 <b>08.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through a representative who brought the arms to Jowhar. Purpose: to be able to protect members of the Government when they come to Jowhar
	1 Zu-23 <b>25.07.2005</b>	Bartered small arms and mines received from Ethiopia against the Zu-23
<b>Mohamed Jama Furuh</b> , Deputy Minister for Welfare for Disabled and Orphans in TFG, controls Mogadishu seaport	1 Dhuunshilke and 1 120mm mortar <b>14.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	1 Sekawe anti-aircraft gun <b>19.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms

<b>Abdi Qeybdiid</b> , former police chief, Banaadir region, controls checkpoints between Afgooye and Mogadishu	5 PKM, 1 B-10 and ammunition <b>20.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through his representative Abdi Iley
	40 AK-47 and some ammunition <b>12.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	18 AK-47, 4 RPG-7 and 2 mortars <b>01.08.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Abdi Wiif</b> , businessman, has dhows with anti-aircraft guns that protect traders in the sea	Some PKM, 2 DShK, 2 B-10 and a variety of ammunition <b>22.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms through his representative Ali Yusuf
<b>Aden Hashi Ayro</b> , leader "Jihadi"	2 PKM, 1 Dhuunshilke and a variety of ammunition <b>23.06.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	12 PKM and 5 RPG-2 <b>03.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Abdirashid Ilqeyte</b> , businessman	1 DShK and ammunition <b>11.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
	18 AK-47 and 6 PKM <b>03.08.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys</b> , leader Al Itihad al-Islaami	30 AK-47, 8 PKM and 10 RPG-7 <b>13.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Rahaweyn clan representative</b>	50 AK-47, 4 PKM and 12 RPG-7 <b>25.07.2005</b>	Purchased the arms
<b>Abdi Waal</b> , freelance militia leader	12 AK-47 and 2 PKM <b>06.08.2005</b>	Purchased the arms

## **Annex II**

### **Response of the Government of Yemen to the Monitoring Group**

15 August 2005

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Yemen to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Coordinator of the Monitoring Group on Somalia of the Security Council and has the honour to enclose herewith the answers of the Government of the Republic of Yemen with regard to the questions raised by its members (see attachments).

**Attachment I****Aircraft operations from Yemen to Bossaso**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Flight number</i>	<i>Plane</i>			
02/07/05	YAF 708	AN 26	OYAA	ETA	1007
02/07/05	YAF 708	AN 26	DEP HCMF	1304	FOR OYAA
04/07/05	YAF 1177	AN 26	OYAA/HCMF	ETA	0637
04/07/05	YAF 1178	AN 26	HCMF/OYAA	ATD	1029
06/07/05	YAF 1177	AN 26	OYAA/HCMF	ETA	0734
06/07/05	YAF 1178	AN 26	HCMF/OYSN	ATD	1023
10/07/05	YAF 616	AN 26	OYAA/HCMF	ETA	0815
10/07/05	YAF 616	AN 26	HCMF/OYAA	ATD	—
01/07/05	YAF 707	AN 26	OYAA/HCMF	ETA	1015
01/07/05	YAF 707	AN 26	HCMF/OYAA	ATD	1311
03/07/05	—	NIL			
03/07/05	—	NIL			
05/07/05	YAF 1177	AN 26	OYAA/HCMF	ETA	0812
05/07/05	YAF 1177	AN 26	HCMF/OYAA	ATD	1046
07/07/05	YAF 1177		OYAA/HCMF	ETA	0913
07/07/05	YAF 1177		HCMF/OYAA	ATD	1140
09/07/05	YAF 1177		OYAA/HCMF	ETA	0824
09/07/05	YAF 1177		HCMF/OYAA	ATD	1005

## Attachment II

[Original: Arabic]

### **Efforts by the Yemeni Government to stabilize the situation in Somalia**

The unstable conditions in Somalia are a direct threat to the security and stability of the Republic of Yemen, as they lead both to insecurity and to large-scale migration of Somalis to Yemen, which has considerable adverse consequences.

Over the last decade the Yemeni Government has therefore followed a clear policy aimed at restoring stability in Somalia, ending the civil war there and supporting the central Government.

Since the election of the present Government, Yemen has been pursuing this approach with a view to supporting the legitimate Government of the country. In so doing, Yemen has received full backing from the international community, including the European Union, the African Union and the United States of America.

Accordingly, the Yemeni Government, in response to a direct personal request from the new Somali President, provided the requested aid with a view to strengthening the capacities of the legitimate Government. The aid, which was transported to Bossaso airport on a number of flights, comprised:

- 15,000 uniforms for the Somali police;
- Food supplies for 5,000 people;
- 5,000 personal weapons.

The framework within which this aid was provided can be stated as follows:

1. The aid was supplied to and at the request of the legitimate elected Government, which has received international endorsement;
2. Its aim was to enhance the capabilities of the police force and to strengthen security so that the President can move to Mogadishu, the capital, to perform his official duties. This cannot happen unless the armed bands are disarmed in favour of the legitimate Government;
3. The task of disarming those bands and consolidating the grip of the legitimate authority is a sine qua non for combating terrorist hotbeds in Somalia. It is consistent with the policies embraced by States all over the world in the fight against terrorism and will ensure that no new Taliban emerges in Somalia.

Reinforcing security and stability in Somalia and strengthening the legitimate Government represent a desideratum both for Yemen and for the international community. Yemen has accordingly taken on this task, notwithstanding the economic burden it entails, with a view to bringing an end to the deteriorated conditions in Somalia. It trusts that the international community will appreciate and duly compensate it for those efforts.

### **Response to questions concerning the issue of the smuggling of weapons to Somalia**

#### **Reply to question 1**

##### **The facts**

On the evening of Friday, 7 May 2004, the vessel (*za`imah*) "Al-Nasr" (No. 1184) was intercepted at a distance of 70 miles from the Yemeni coast by a United States vessel belonging to the coalition forces. The following crew members, numbering seven in all, were on board:

1. Abdullah Bakhwar;
2. Fu'ad Muhammad Muwawwadah;
3. Shu`ayb Bashu`ayb;
4. Ridwan Awad Salim;
5. Amr Al-Siba`i;
6. Yasir Faraj Hadhbul;
7. Qawri Muhammad Ahmad Yusif (a Somali national).

In addition, the following ordnance was found:

- 536 AK-47 rifles;
- 7 modified rifles;
- 2 medium-calibre 14.5 mm machine guns, plus 84 rounds of ammunition;
- 12,000 rounds of 30-mm ammunition;
- 1,239 AK-74 rifle ammunition cases;
- 34,770 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition;
- A set of rifle belts and cleaning boxes;
- A radio communications set;
- A hand-held GPS unit;
- Documents and passports.

The arms and ammunition had been placed in sacks, of which there were 30 to 40. The weapons were impounded by the weapons officer of the United States vessel and subsequently handed over to the Yemeni authorities. The case was turned over to the Hadramawt Public Prosecutor's Office on 25 August 2004, along with the 12 persons detained, i.e.:

1	Rushdi Muhammad Salih Ba`abbad	2	Ahmad Salim Salih Ba`abbad
3	Muhammad Sa`id Hadi Al-Aqari	4	Salmin Sa`id Abud Basunbul
5	Sa`id Salmin Basunbul	6	Fayiz Salim Salih Ba`abbad
7	Salih Awad Al-Tamuri	8	Majid Husayn Ali Butal`ah
9	Khalid Salih Ba`abbad	10	Salim Salih Muhammad Ba`abbad
11	Mabkhut Ali Hasan Qabi`i	12	Abdul Qadir Umar Ali Shaykh

The seven crew members of the vessel, whose names have already been mentioned, were also turned over. The members of the network have confessed to smuggling two earlier shipments prior to the one seized.

It is also apparent from the seizure report that other persons connected with smuggling remain fugitives from justice. The security authorities are continuing their efforts to capture them. They are as follows:

1	Abdul Rahman Abd Awad Al-Amiri	18	Abdul Qadir Al-Sumali
2	Abdi Hurqan (a Somali national)	19	Muhammad Sa`id
3	Afnille Ali Jabir (a Somali national)	20	Muhammad Shujja`
4	Abdullah Mubarak (a Somali national)	21	Muhammad Al-Tanzani
5	Zaki Abdul Hasan	22	Ali Zarzuri
6	Sa`d Qimam	23	Abdul Rahman Ali (a Tanzanian national)
7	Abdullah Abdullah (or Abud)	24	Mabkhut (an elderly male of unknown identity)
8	Abdul Rahman Al-Qadri	25	Ahmad (born in Somalia)
9	Abdullah Yusuf Farih (a Somali national who receives weapons in Somalia)	26	Majid Sakini
10	Muhammad Farih Barud (nicknamed the Joker)	27	Ali Balah
11	Al-Mahjari (name unknown)	28	Ali Sarfi
12	Husayn (name unknown)	29	Atabah (name unknown)
13	Salih Ahmad Al-Bahsani	30	Abdullah Husayn
14	Abdul Husayn Al-Hadrami	31	Sabihi (name unknown)
15	Ayan (a Somali national)	32	Bamu`min (born in Somalia)
16	Shawqi Ba`abbad (brother of Rushdi Ba`abbad)	33	Abdul Rahman Tuliji (a Tanzanian national)
17	Abdi Al-Sumali	34	Ali Al-Dharafi (who supplies and sells weapons to the band)

### Reply to question 2

A. The modestly resourced Coastguard Department has partially achieved its intended goal of securing Yemeni ports, in addition to carrying out patrol activities. It has consequently been able to seize quantities of drugs and reduce illegal infiltration into the Republic of Yemen by displaced persons from the Horn of Africa. It has also seized quantities of drugs and weapons in cooperation with the naval forces and the coalition forces present in the region.

B. Owing to their low income, it is difficult for fishermen to satisfy their essential everyday needs. In contrast, fishermen engaged in smuggling goods, weapons, drugs and human beings, inter alia, reap alluring profits, and it is this that induces them to perpetrate such acts in violation of the law.

The situation in Somalia has led people to turn to illicit trade of this kind. Moreover, the presence of a large number of Somali refugees in our country facilitates the passage of such shipments without the knowledge of the competent authorities.

### Reply to question 3

There is no body that sponsors arms-smuggling from Yemen to Somalia, inasmuch as it is an offence punishable by law. Moreover, since, for the reasons previously stated, citizens have various light and medium weapons in their possession and the Ministry of the Interior is the authority responsible for maintaining public security, order, tranquillity and morality and for protecting lives, honour and property, that Ministry has sought to curb the illicit arms-trafficking and smuggling through various means, as follows:

## **I. In the legal sphere**

A bill amending the Arms Act has been tabled and is currently before the House of Representatives. Through this bill, the Government is seeking to limit domestic arms trade and prevent the transfer of arms to third States.

## **II. In the maritime sphere**

Using available resources, the Coastguard Department is engaged in securing the Yemeni coasts by conducting marine patrols to check for any possible breaches occurring by sea. It has endeavoured to expand its activity by preparing a Department work plan for the years 2006-2007, with United States assistance and expertise. The aim is to develop the work of the Department to include the security aspects necessary for securing part of the coastal strip in accordance with the Department's phased plan, as part of Yemen's counter-terrorism efforts. This requires considerable material resources, which we are seeking to obtain through support from friendly States, primarily the United States of America, inasmuch as Yemen is a partner in combating terrorism. An English-language copy of the Department plan is annexed hereto.

## **III. On land**

The first phase of the plan to collect medium and heavy weapons and ban their possession has been implemented through the following:

- (a) The purchase, from citizens, of dangerous weapons, including shoulder-fired missiles and medium and light machine guns, to which end a total of 10 billion Yemeni riyals has been spent. This affects the budget earmarked for development, inasmuch it represents an additional burden on the State budget;
- (b) Assistance from the United States of America in the purchase from citizens of certain dangerous weapons, including shoulder-fired missiles, as well as the collection and destruction of a number of weapons under the supervision of United States experts to ensure their lawful disposal;
- (c) The preparation of the second phase of the weapons-collection plan, which comprises the following four stages:
  - (i) Preparing for the weapons-collection process by gathering information on persons in possession of weapons and determining the right time to implement the plan;
  - (ii) Establishing implementation programmes for the plan through:
    - Determination of the weapons to be taken in and the appropriate amount of compensation for each;
    - Elaboration of information programmes that explain the importance of surrendering weapons, considered as something uncivilized and a primary factor in the perpetration of most crimes;
    - Issuance of a proclamation by the Ministry of the Interior calling on citizens to cooperate and participate in the implementation of the weapons-collection plan, setting a schedule for implementation and stating that immediately upon the expiration of the time limit set for the voluntary surrender of weapons against the compensation fixed by the competent committee, the Government will begin to carry out search and investigation procedures for weapons and persons in possession of weapons and to apply the laws in force;
  - (iii) Commencing implementation in the field through tightened security measures at entry/exit points and in coastal areas and other places where arms-smuggling offences are likely to be committed;

- (iv) Upon the expiry of the deadline, carrying out procedures for information-gathering on weapons and procedures for confiscation conducted in coordination with the judicial authorities.

Inasmuch as all these aspects represent additional burdens that will affect development efforts, it is essential to seek support for the implementation of this phase. It is hoped that support will be forthcoming from friendly nations, primarily the United States of America, inasmuch as the measures in question form part of Yemen's counter-terrorism efforts.

**Annex III****Flight details from Yemen to Bossaso (Somalia)**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Flight number</b>	<b>Airplane type</b>	<b>Route</b>	<b>Hours</b>
01.07.2005	YAF 707	AN 26	Aden to Bossaso	ETA 10.15
01.07.2005	YAF 707		Bossaso to Aden	ATD 13.11
02.07.2005	YAF 708	AN 26	Aden to Bossaso	ETA 10.07
02.07.2005	YAF 708		Bossaso to Aden	ATD 13.04
04.07.2005	YAF 1177	AN 26	Aden to Bossaso	ETA 06.37
04.07.2005	YAF 1178		Bossaso to Aden	ATD 10.29
05.07.2005	YAF 1177	AN 26	Aden to Bossaso	ETA 08.12
05.07.2005	YAF 1177		Bossaso to Aden	ATD 10.46
06.07.2005	YAF 1177	AN 26	Aden to Bossaso	ETA 07.34
06.07.2005	YAF 1178		Bossaso to Sana'a	ATD 10.23
07.07.2005	YAF 1177	AN 26	Aden to Bossaso	ETA 09.13
07.07.2005	YAF 1177		Bossaso to Aden	ATD 11.40
09.07.2005	YAF 1177	AN 26	Aden to Bossaso	ETA 08.24
09.07.2005	YAF 1177		Bossaso to Aden	ATD 10.05
10.07.2005	YAF 616	AN 26	Aden to Bossaso	ETA 08.15
10.07.2005	YAF 616		Bossaso to Aden	ATD -

## Annex IV

### Sample sources of revenue

<b>Individuals</b>	<b>“Local administration” area of control</b>	<b>Sources of revenue<sup>a</sup></b>
Muse Suudi “Yalahow”	North Mogadishu, Balcad district	Jezira airport and beach port
Mohamed Qanyare Afrah	Daynile and Bermuda districts of Mogadishu	Daynile airstrip and El Ma’an seaport as shareholder
Bashir Rage	North Mogadishu	Isiley airstrip and El Ma’an seaport as shareholder (head of exports)
Mohamed Omar Habeeb Dheere	City of Jowhar, self-declared “Governor” of Middle Shabelle region	Tax on city businesses and entry taxes
Colonel Barre Hirale	City of Kismaayo, Lower Juba region	Kismaayo airport and Kismaayo seaport, charcoal export
Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Said Indohaadde	Lower Shabelle, self-declared “Governor” of Lower Shabelle region	Revenue from Marka seaport and Baraawe port, taxes on NGOs and drug farms

<sup>a</sup> Airstrip: includes use tax, landing fee and passenger tax. Port: includes import, export and berthing taxes.

## Annex V

**List of vessels attacked by pirates off the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden**

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Vessel</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
1.	8 March 05	Yacht Mahadi	Attempted boarding
2.	8 March 05	Yacht Gandalf	Attempted boarding
3.	11 March 05	Great Luck	Attempted boarding
4.	15 March 05	Honor Pescadores	Attempted boarding
5.	15 March 05	NMT Silvia	Attempted boarding
6.	16 March 05	OR. Sirichainava	Ship and crew held hostage Ship and crew rescued
7.	31 March 05	Trust Dubai	Attempted boarding
8.	10 April 05	MV Timbuck	Boarded by pirates Crew overcame the pirates
9.	20 April 05	MV Feisty Gas	Ship and crew held hostage \$315,000 paid for release
10.	26 June 05	MV Semlow	Taken hostage Demand for \$500,000
11.	16 July 05	MV Hanseduo	Fired upon
12.	16 July 05	MV Parana	Fired upon
13.	17 July 05	RO RO Ship	Fired upon
14.	18 July 05	Container Ship	Fired upon
15.	21 July 05	JOLLY Marrone	Attempted boarding
16.	21 July 05	Bulk Carrier	Fired upon
17.	21 July 05	Cielo di Milano	Fired upon
18.	26 July 05	Cielo di Milano	Second attempted boarding

## Annex VI

### **Response of the Government of Ethiopia to the Monitoring Group**

7 September 2005

Dear Mr. Schiemsky,

I would like to recognize the receipt of your letter dated 29 August 2005, which you sent in your capacity as Coordinator of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1558 (2004) concerning Somalia.

The Permanent Mission has consulted the relevant authorities in Ethiopia. The authorities have confirmed to the Mission that the allegations are fully unfounded and baseless.

Ethiopia, as a direct beneficiary of peace in Somalia, has absolutely no reason to contribute to the country's instability by injecting more arms into an area already turned into an arms bazaar.

Ethiopia's contribution to the peace process in Somalia, for the past 14 years, speaks to Ethiopia's commitment to Somalia's stability.

The Permanent Mission will be very glad to have an opportunity to discuss the issue with you.

*(Signed)* Teruneh **Zenna**  
Ambassador  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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## Annex VII

### **Countries visited and representatives of Governments, organizations and private entities interviewed**

#### **France**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

#### **Kenya**

##### **Government officials**

Kenya Ministry of Defence (Navy)

##### **State representatives**

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Interior of Somalia,  
Hussein M. Aideed

Embassy of France

##### **International organizations**

Special Representative of the Secretary-General Francois Lonseny Fall  
(United Nations Political Office for Somalia)

European Union, Delegation of the European Commission

United Nations Development Programme

Democratic Republic of the Congo Group of Experts (United Nations)

International Committee of the Red Cross

World Food Programme

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator

International Civil Aviation Organization

International Maritime Organization

##### **Others**

Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons

Kenya Ports Authority

Kenya national focal point on illicit small arms and light weapons

Blue Bird Aviation

#### **United Arab Emirates**

Somali Financial Services Association, Dubai

**United States of America**

**State representatives**

Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations

Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern  
Ireland to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

**International organizations**

Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team (United Nations)

**Yemen**

**Government officials**

Minister of Interior

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

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