Dusan T. Batakovic
Historian, Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade
The inter-ethnic tensions and political crisis in the southern province of Serbia - the autonomous province of Kosovo & Metohija - have a long and turbulent historical background. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century it was part of the Serbian medieval kingdom, the Serbian empire and the Serbian Despotate. From mid-fifteenth to early twentieth century, these regions were parts of the Ottoman Empire. From 1912, until today - with the exception of the Second World War occupation - Kosovo and Metohija were integral parts of the Kingdom of Serbia, later on the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and still today in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as in all the above mentioned states, was and is an integral part of Serbia. Neither Kosovo nor Metohija was a distinctive territorial unit until 1945. In Ottoman times as well as in the twentieth century, these regions were part of larger administrative units. The present internal border and political status of the province of Kosovo and Metohia were arbitrarily established by the communist dictator Josip Broz Tito in 1945.(1)
Within the communist Yugoslavia, the centuries-old Serbo-Albanian conflict was only one aspect of the complex concept for resolving the national question which was carried out in phases and in the name of "brotherhood and unity" by J. B. Tito. The communist dictator of Yugoslavia was a Croat, brought up in the Habsburg environment of constant fear of "the Greater Serbian threat" as well as the ideological pattern of Lenin's teaching that the nationalism of big nations is more dangerous than the nationalism of smaller ones. For these reasons, Tito was consistent in stifling any hint of "Serbian hegemony" which, according to the communists, was personified in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The first two decades of bureaucratic centralism (1945-1966) were a necessary phase for the communist authorities to consolidate power. During that period Tito relied on Serbian cadres with whom he emerged victorious from the civil war. The decentralization (from 1966 to 1974), based on the plans of his two closest associates - Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene, and Vladimir Bakaric, a Croat - which aimed at strengthening the competencies of the federal units, notably by the Constitution of 1974, finally led to the renewal of inter-ethnic tensions.
With the introduction of national-communism, a model shaped by Edvard Kardelj, the power of federal jurisdiction came to reside in the ruling oligarchies of the republics. Thus the Party nomenklatura became sovereign each in its own republic, where each came to represent the majority nationality. As the only republic with provinces, Serbia was the exception, since, under the Constitution, the provinces could use their veto power against inner Serbia. National-communism, through the 1974 Constitution, introduced majority rule for the leading nation in each of six republic and two provinces of the federation, with the result that there continued to be - to a greater or lesser extent - discrimination against nations or national minorities residing in each republic or province.
Josip Broz - Tito skillfully manipulated the growing nationalism in order to prevent an ideological thaw of the hard-line dictatorship and to preserve his undisputed authority. In the last phase of his rule, marked by the Constitution of 1974, he became, like Brezhnev in the USSR, the obstacle to any semi-liberal evolution of the system. As Tito's only legacy there remained the common ideologically oriented army, and the bulky party-bureaucratic apparatus, now divided along republican and provincial borders - borders which, although officially administrative, increasingly resembled the borders of self-sufficient, covertly rival national sates, linked together on the inside by the authority of the charismatic leader, and from the outside by the danger of a potential Soviet invasion.
In such a context, Kosovo and Metohia had an important role: at first it was an autonomous region (1946), then an autonomous province within Serbia (1963) and finally an autonomous province (1974) only formally linked with Serbia, with competencies that were hardly different from those of the republics (the only thing it lacked was the Leninist principle concerning the right to self-determination). Kosovo and Metohia owes the change of its status within the federation not to the freely expressed will of the people of Serbia (of which it had been an integral part since 1912), but exclusively to the concepts designed by a narrow circle of communist leaders around Tito to resolve the national question within the whole federation.
During the period of centralism when Albania was part of the Soviet bloc, openly hostile towards Yugoslavia (1945-1961), Tito relied on the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia who represented the guarantee of the preservation of Yugoslavia's integrity in that region. After the reconciliation with Moscow (1955) and the gradual normalization of relations with Albania (1971), Tito favored the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in a way which, after the 1968 and 1971 Constitutional amendments, they understood not only as a possibility for national emancipation but also as a long-awaited opportunity to take historic revenge against the Serbs who had deprived Albanian feudal leaders of privileges enjoyed under the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to the modern democratic state of equal citizens, the ideological and national model for Kosovo and Metohia's ethnic Albanians was the Stalinist-type ethno-nationalism of Enver Hoxha, imbued with century-old intolerance towards the Serbs. The erasing of the name of Metohija, as an exclusively Serbian-Orthodox term, from the name of the autonomous province in 1968 symbolically indicated the direction to be taken by the ethnic Albanian communist nomenklatura in Kosovo in their national policy.
A series of successive administrative, judicial, police and physical pressures against the Kosovo and Metohija Serbs resulted in their quiet but steady and forced migration to inner Serbia, a process which many knew about, but which very few dared publicly mention. Over the years, due to this silent ethnic cleansing tolerated or even encouraged by the federal communist leadership, the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohia was reduced by almost a half, from 23.6 percent in 1948 to 13.2 percent in 1981, the relatively high birth rate during Tito's rule notwithstanding. The Montenegrin population in Kosovo and Metohia fell from 3.9 percent in 1948 to 1.7 percent in 1981. (2)
As the process of moving out proceeded, the land of the expelled Serbs was given to emigrants from Albania. From the end of the Second World War until Tito's death in 1980, the number of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia tripled, resulting in a 164 percent population increase in the period of 1948 to 1981. Among them there were also a large number of immigrants, a number that has still not been definitely determined. The gradual settlement of Albanian refugees from Albania in Kosovo and Metohia, during the first years after the Second World War, aimed to ease the expected annexation of Albania to the Yugoslav federation. The second wave of settlement of refugees was organized from the late 1960s to late 1980s by the local nomenklatura of ethnic Albanians in order to improve Albanian ethnic domination of regions with a strong Serbian population. The uncontrolled growth of the ethnic Albanian population gave additional social stimuli to numerous young people, increasingly and openly educated on the basis of national mythology and brought up to hate Yugoslavia. The economic frustration of the young and predominantly agrarian population of ethnic Albanians was thereby largely diverted into the huge propaganda campaign of national dissatisfaction. Thus, the official theory of Enver Hoxha that the Albanians were the direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians was used as a "proof" of the ethnic Albanians' historical right to Kosovo and Metohija. The Serbs, who arrived there many centuries after the Illyrians (only in the 6th century), were stigmatized in popular opinion as the unlawful intruders into genuine "Albanian lands". (3)
The unanimous demands by the Albanian minority to create a republic of Kosovo (with the right to self-determination, including secession), set out in 1981, only a year after Tito's death, disrupted the sensitive balance of forces in the federal leadership of communist Yugoslavia. The attempt to hush up the Albanian question in Kosovo and Metohia by means of a party purge and with outside efforts (actions by the federal military and police forces) and to minimize the problem of the discrimination against the Serbs and their forced displacement, resulted in growing frustration among Serbs all over Yugoslavia in the years that followed. (4) Serbs gradually, but in an increasingly large numbers, started realizing that the Titoist communist order, contrary to the interwar period, was based on the national inequality of Serbs in Yugoslavia.
The attempts by Serbian communists to resolve the question of Serbia's competencies over the provinces in agreement with the other republican leaderships, for the purpose of protecting the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia more efficiently, were rejected by all the other republics with unhidden antagonism. All attempts from 1977 to 1987 to put an end to the discrimination against the non-Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohia failed. The intransigence of the national-communist nomenklatura in the federal leadership created dangerous tensions that were hard to control: the Kosovo Serbs started broadly self-organizing. (5)
The Serbs' growing national frustration was skillfully exploited, after a party coup in 1987, by Slobodan Milosevic, the new leader of the Serbian communists: instead of forums he used populist methods, taking over from the Serbian Orthodox Church and the non-communist intelligentsia the role of the protector of national interests. Thus, the protection of the endangered rights of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia became a mean of political manipulation. Milosevic's intention to renew the weary communist party on the basis of newly discovered national ideals came at a moment when an irreversible process of communism's demise by means of nationalism was launched in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. Milosevic's communist approach to the national question began to compromise overall Serbian interests in Yugoslavia. At that moment, for most of the Serbs, preoccupied by the question of Kosovo, the interests of the nation were more important than the democratic changes taking place in the East, especially since Milosevic had created the semblance of a freedom of the media where former political and ideological taboos were now freely discussed. Democracy in Serbia was belated only because of the unresolved national question.
The ethnic Albanians were already organized as a homogenous political movement. They held to their radical stands demanding neither political freedom nor human rights, but exclusively collective rights: "the Republic of Kosovo" within the Yugoslav federation. Ethnic Albanians responded to reassertion of Serbian authority with a relentless series of strikes and demonstrations: they were aware that the abolition of the autonomy based on the 1974 Constitution of communist Yugoslavia, meant, in fact, the abolition of certain elements of statehood, and put restrictions on uncontrolled Albanian political domination. But by organizing mass demonstrations, they only strengthened Milosevic's positions. The polarization within the republican leaderships in regard to the Kosovo and Metohia issue became public. The support of the communist leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia to the ethnic Albanian demands definitely cemented Milosevic's charisma. The final results of open rivalry between Serbia and other republics were the following: a majority vote by the National Assembly of Serbia to limit Kosovo and Metohia's autonomy, huge unrest among the ethnic Albanians, and severe police repression in Kosovo and Metohia. On March 26, 1989, the semi-republican status of the two Serbian provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, was reduced to the more usual competencies of autonomous regions. The 1989 amendments to the 1974 Constitution annulled the provinces' right to two separate legislatures, abolished the veto power held by the provincial legislature over the legislature of Serbia, placed the power over international relations in the hands of the republic, and limited the right to debate a measure to a period of six months, after which the matter was to be settled by a referendum. The referendum, boycotted by the ethnic Albanians was held on July 1, 1990. Kosovo remained as an autonomous province, but with territorial autonomy and a Statute which would be enacted with the Serbian parliament. The legislative authority was transferred to the parliament of Serbia and the executive authority to the Government of Serbia. The highest judicial authority resided in the Supreme Court of Serbia. The name Metohija (left out by the Albanian communist nomenklatura in 1968) reappeared in the official name of the autonomous province.
The ethnic Albanians (through the members of the dismissed provincial communist Assembly) responded on July 2, 1990 by proclaiming Kosovo as republic within Yugoslavia and adopted their own Constitution on September 7, 1990 at an assembly held secretly in Kacanik. These acts, followed by the widespread Albanian boycott of all official institutions, were regarded by Serbian authorities as an attempt at secession. The result was firing of those who left their jobs, thereby challenging the state unity of Serbia. The second measure was harsh police retaliation against armed or anarmed street protesters. Since then, the ethnic Albanians, determined to obtain independence from Serbia, have consistently refused to have any contact with official Belgrade or with the local government in Kosovo. They have constantly boycotted Serbian parliamentary elections and accused the regime of "colonial" and "apartheid" policies.
The secessionist movement of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia, derived from the logic of the Titoist order and based on ethnic discrimination and intolerance, led to the homogenization of the Serbs in Yugoslavia, directly producing Milosevic. This, following the domino effect, resulted in the homogenization of the other Yugoslav nations. In a state with such mixed populations, due to the inability of the communist and post-communist leaderships to place democratic principles of organizing a multi-ethnic community above narrow national interests, this homogenization directly led to the tragic civil war.
After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, the Serbo-Albanian conflict lost its important Titoist dimension and once again became Serbia's internal issue, despite the demands to establish the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo through internationalization of the Kosovo issue as part of the search for a global solution of the civil war and the ethnic conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia. If the ethnic Albanians were to give up their refusal to live in Serbia and cast their votes against Milosevic's candidates, the democratic opposition in Serbia could easily take over power, which would open the way to a long-term solution. On the other hand, as long as Milosevic is in power in Serbia, Ibrahim Rugova, the "president" of self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, can still hope for the internationalization of the Kosovo issue.
The two essentially authoritarian regimes, the Serbian one and the shadow regime of Kosovo Albanians, are only nourishing the extremism on both sides.
The geopolitical realities point to the fact that every attempt at achieving the Kosovo Albanians' goals would cause a war of broader Balkan proportions with unforeseeable consequences, because this would mean changing the stable inter-state borders established way back in 1912 and 1913. The right to self-determination, which the ethnic Albanians refer to when rejecting even the very thought of remaining within Serbia, is not envisaged anywhere in Europe for national minorities, no matter how large their percentage may be compared to the country's overall population.
Today, the ethnic Albanians account for approximately 18 percent of the overall population of Serbia. That is approximately the same as the percentage of the Serbs and other non-Albanians in Kosovo.
Mistakes have been made on both sides. The ethnic Albanians attempted to resolve the Kosovo question without the participation of the Kosovo and Metohia Serbs and against interests of Serbia, and the Serbian regime tried to resolve the problem without consulting the ethnic Albanians. The only viable solution appears to be the opening of dialogue and mutual concessions. The first concession of the ethnic Albanians should be the recognition of Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo and Metohia. It is absolutely a conditio sine qua non for further negotiations. The next step would be negotiated concessions concerning the form of Kosovo and Metohia's autonomy.
A return to the old type of political organization set forth by the 1974 Constitution would mean a return to the completely outdated concept of administrative decision-making by simple majority vote - as was the practice under Titoist rule - and would inevitably result in a renewed flare-up of ethnic tensions, but this time on a larger scale. What is urgently needed is the abolition of collective rights - the communist legacy - and their replacement with human and civil rights for all citizen regardless of nationality and religion. Unlike the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina who are ethnically, linguistically, and culturally close to the Croats and Bosnian Muslims, and therefore threatened by silent assimilation, the ethnic Albanians are in no danger of losing their ethnic identity through assimilation since their culture, language and religion differ substantially from those of the Serbs.
Serbia should therefore offer the broadest possible status of autonomy to Kosovo-Metohia and the European-type of minority rights to ethnic Albanians. Minority rights, such as the right to use one's own language in the local government, the courts, schools and universities, as well as the freedom of religion and full cultural autonomy, would have to conform to international law in every respect. The gradual introduction of a genuine democratic government, through which the majority ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia, and the ethnic Albanian minority within the whole of Serbia, would became part of the Serbian state system, with full participation in parliamentary elections as well as public institutions such as schools and universities, would help reduce existing ethnic tensions since all economic and political matters would be resolved in the parliament of Serbia by the freely elected representatives of all citizens of Serbia.
There are others forms of territorial arrangements that would work better as they are envisaged by the Serbian democratic parties in opposition to Milosevic's regime. These parties consider that instead of ethnic and ideological criteria, it is more important to use economic and geographic criteria, with a heavy emphasis on a new communication system. In the 1970s and 1980s Kosovo and Metohia was unable to meet more than 10 percent of its domestic needs with its own production; whatever else was needed came from the federal or Serbian government. The financial investments in Kosovo by federal agencies in this period exceeded the total amount of funds used for the development of inner Serbia. On the other hand, inner Serbia was obliged by the federal government to invest in Kosovo and Metohia, regardless of its own economic stagnation. This had disastrous consequences for inner Serbia, which was deprived of a stable economic development, and for Kosovo and Metohia itself where the investments were placed in a completely wrong way. Instead of encouraging small business or agriculture, funding was invested in big hotels, stadiums, bureaucratic buildings or large industrial complexes. For all these reasons, reforms are urgently needed to restructure Kosovo and Metohia's basic economic production and whatever infrastructure already exists in the province so as to raise its productive capacities to the level existing in Serbia.
A regionalization of Serbia - as envisaged by the experts from the opposition parties, that is based on economic priorities would reduce the risk of a centralized, authoritarian regime fueling particularistic and secessionist aims. Any linking of minority question with the territorial claims is only a basis for further confrontations. A region such as Kosovo and Metohia with from 1.6 to 1.9 million inhabitants would be able to thrive by means of its own productive capacities without threatening the integrity of the state. This would be desirable in all respects.
Denationalization of state property, and the return of property confiscated during and after the Second World War to its rightful owners, is a basic prerequisite not only for all political solutions, but also for a favorable economic development in the future. Furthermore, regionalization would relieve the provincial administration of some of the enormous costs through the creation of smaller territorial units that would function as effective economic units.
Already culturally and linguistically united, the ethnic Albanians would have better chances for economic prosperity within the smaller regional units. A Regional Assembly for Kosovo and Metohia, as a territory with an ethnically mixed population suffering from rising inter-ethnic tensions, would consist of two chambers. Members of the lower chamber would be elected by direct vote, while each ethnic group would be equally represented in the upper chamber. (6) The Assembly would vote its own Statute by a two third majority of both chambers. The acts adopted by the local parliament would not have the force of law but of decrees, necessarily in accordance with the existing laws of Serbia. An ombudsman (an ethnic Albanian or a Serb) would be necessary to monitor implementation of these decrees.
Within this system - which would be set out only for Kosovo and Metohia not for the rest of Serbia - would be prevent the use of any ethnically-based majority vote, a technique so destructively applied under the communists, while it guaranteeing the protection of all ethnic groups, not only the Serbs and ethnic Albanians, but the Turks, Muslims and Gypsies also. According to this project, the province of Kosovo and Metohia would enjoy rights similar to those envisaged for autonomous communities under the present constitution of Spain, or for regions according to the present constitution of Italy. All those competencies are far broader then those envisaged by the present Constitution of Serbia. The possible changes in legislative competencies of the province can be made only when the present Constitution is changed or amended by the National Assembly of Serbia. This is the most European, entirely democratic and multi-cultural solution, even though it is for the time being completely rejected by the political leadership of ethnic Albanians. But in time it could be accepted by the Kosovo and Metohia Serbs as well as by the opposition parties in Serbia, who are strongly in favor of regionalization. The present low level of political culture in Serbia, including Kosovo and Metohia, makes this global project viable only after the establishment of full parliamentary democracy within Serbia and Montenegro.
The practical proposals within this framework are the following: to improve the present condition of school system, the ethnic Albanians should be given the right to attend the schools (which they more or less voluntarily left in 1990) in the existing school buildings which are now used only by the Serbs and Muslims and other minorities, like Turks and Gypsies. If they do not accept the curricula in use for the whole of Serbia, they can organize their own curricula, which will not be financed by the Serbia. If it is possible to find a common ground for curricula which will be accepted by Serbia, then it can be partially financed by the state. For the moment, the most important issue is to have all the students attending regular schools. Once a common program of schooling is agreed upon, ethnic Albanian teachers and professors will be paid by the state, like all the others in Serbia. The question of curricula is very sensitive, because Serbia cannot agree to pay for schooling which is, in many aspects, hostile to the state itself. There will be no ideological limitations in the search for a mutually acceptable school curricula.
Second, the health care problem should be solved by the return of Albanian cadres to the existing system of hospitals and acceptance of rules which are generally observed elsewhere in Serbia. Ethnic Albanian patients, although officially rejecting all political connection with Serbia, are unofficially accepting the sovereignty of Serbia by frequently coming for medical care to Belgrade and other cities in inner Serbia, instead of going to Pristina, Pec or Mitrovica. Since they are not paying any taxes to the state funds, this humantarian acceptance of ethnic Albanian patients produces severe costs for Serbia. There is no real possibility of creating separate health-care system that will give to ethnic Albanians some kind of satisfaction concerning the governing of the hospitals or other medical institutions. The services offered by the Serbian hospitals are not presently covered by the social security of ethnic Albanian patients but by the state of Serbia itself.
Some immediate improvements can be made on the level of public infrastructure. While formally rejecting any official ties with the state, ethnic Albanians all used the favorable economic situation and spiralling inflation in Serbia during the last several years to pay off their apartments and became owners of state-owned property at very low prices (as happened elsewhere in Serbia). On other levels as well, useful and commonly accepted state laws could provide the basis for improving inter-ethnic relations. The decrees firing ethnic Albanians could easily be annulled for the practical reasons of needed jobs and specialists for many factories, mines and companies. With their gradual return to their jobs, the question of the management of those companies or factories can be solved by mutual concessions, or, as a better solution, prescribed by the state laws of privatization which will give to employees the right to buy company shares and thus participate in owning and running the companies.
The most problematic issue, but only for the moment, concerns the judiciary and executive bodies. If there is a massive return of ethnic Albanians in all structures of the Kosovo and Metohia economy, the next step will be their participation in the executive bodies of the political system. If the model of two-chamber system for the future Assembly of regionalized Kosovo and Metohia is accepted by both sides, the ethnic Albanians will be proportionally represented in all levels of the political system, including the judiciary and executive body.
Serbia is not as militarily and politically powerful as it was in early 1990's, but it is still strong enough to defend Serbian territory itself if necessary. The Albanian side is overestimating international support, and underestimating the readiness of the Serbs to defend Kosovo and Metohia after the wars lost in Croatia and, partly, in Bosnia, even in moments of important internal turmoil such as the power struggle in late 1996 and early 1997. Due to a constant internal power struggle, in order to remain in power, Milosevic's regime, which in September 1996 signed an educational agreement with Ibrahim Rugova, is not in a position to make more concessions to Kosovo and Metohia ethnic Albanians than could any other, democratically elected government of Serbia. Even a fully democratic government would need stability in Kosovo and Metohia to consolidate the international position of Serbia.
The role of international mediators, from the USA to the EU, needs to be extremely balanced, avoiding any one-sided approach, which has not been the case during the last several years. The ethnic Albanians understood the international mediation only as an opportunity to impose upon the Serbs and Serbia their own projects, ranging from the status of a republic within Yugoslavia, with no political ties with Serbia, to independence under international guarantees. But this would mean an imposed, not a negotiated settlement, which would not be viable in the long term. The role of the international mediators should be to pressure ethnic Albanians to find a common ground with Serbian authorities for a negotiated solution acceptable by both sides. Any solution which would not be found within the present Serbia is completely unacceptable for the Serbian side, not only for the current Milosevic regime but also for the democratic parties in the opposition. Any change in political status of any part of the Serbia can be effected only with the approval of the National Assembly of Serbia. Therefore, all negotiations must accept the fact that FR Yugoslavia is an internationally recognized state, and that Serbia, as a part of that federation, will not under any circumstances abandon its sovereignty on any part of its own territory. This is also the general standpoint of the international community concerning the states that emerged from the former SFR Yugoslavia. Therefore, democracy as the general framework seems as the only way out of the present crisis in the province of Kosovo and Metohia. A step by step approach is, in this respect, more viable then any imposed solution.