Sunday, March 5, 2006



ARTICLES of INTEREST
Page 1: Special Report - Depleted Uranium
Page 2: What is Depleted Uranium?
Page 3: Depleted Uranium - The Human Cost
Page 4: The DOD - Report of Lies
Page 5: WISE Depleted Uranium Project
Page 6: Military Use of Depleted Uranium
Page 7: Uranium Toxicity

Citizen Alert
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Commission
NWFZ - Links
Crosswynd - Out There Television
Saving America - NOW!
Truth in Pictures


       This section of the internet is dedicated to the subject of Depleted Uranium. Even though it is only a minor offering here, it is, however, an indepth view of what is not only killing people, but, it is killing the planet.
       We, as Native Americans and Human-beings, have a duty and a responsibility to insure that those who are in positions of power, whether it be government, military, corporation, medical and educational do not use their positions to mislead and lie to the world at large about the truths and facts on this deadly subject.
       The Western Shoshone Nation of Newe Sogobia which is surrounded by the State of Nevada has at least four (4) Depleted Uranium storage facilities on their lands and at least one known on the Paiute Reservation at Pyramid Lake. This is of great concern considering that they have never been informed by the Department of Interior, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Bureau of Land Management or any other department that these sites were being placed on their lands.
       This being the case, how many other places within the United States, aside from Native American lands have they secretly been storing these materials...right out in the open? Military grade nuclear waste, such as this, cannot be buried for at least 50 years. Why? It's too hot - literally.
Most, if not all, of this Depleted Uranium is designated for places like Yucca Mountain, Nevada. (Native American Lands). In order for it to get there it must travel across the country by road and rail. In other words, it must travel through everyones neighborhood.
       You will learn herein and through associated links that there are great and numerous problems with the moving and storage of these materials. If this is how these materials are handled and these are the problems with it then how are we to trust the safe passage of Spent Nuclear Waste? We can't.
       Perhaps, once you've read and learned the details of this situation you may become aware that we must all unify our energies and efforts to put hard pressure on those who play active rolls in these matters and accept nothing short of demanding a total cease and desist orders on these projects with no compromises.
       What are we going to do about it? Unification. This is a world issue. It is about the survival of humans everywhere. It crosses all borders, all governments, all religions and all political arguments...it is about the survival of our entire planet.
       This is not about another environmental group attacking the already heated arguments in regards to destroying the planet for the sake of advancing civilization and its greedy addiction to manufacturing a lot of stuff people don't really need and finding areas to dump the waste from it - and yet, it is an environmental group known as human-beings trying to save their entire planet from such afore mindsets.
       Ask yourself, is it really worth it to destroy the entire planet just so one nation, one political concept, one religion, one corporation, one military can have total control over all the others? It's not logical, not practical, it's inhuman and in the long-run...we all die and no one wins. End of subject.
- Editor


These images are just a mere peek at what is being stored around our nation.


(Coming to a neighborhood near you!)



(A Breech? Look at all that lovely rust.)



(Notice the discoloration on these cylinders? Also notice the power lines directly above the yard.)

      Approximately 704,000 metric tons of depleted UF6 is stored in about 57,600 steel cylinders that hold 9 - 12 metric tons of depleted UF6. The cylinders are stored in large outdoor areas called "cylinder yards."
A program of regular surveillance and maintenance activities assures the safety of continued cylinder storage.
(This is not true. The numbers are much higher and the program of regular surveillance and maintenance activities assures their safety is nothing short of a joke.)

Transportation of Depleted Uranium Materials in Support of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Program
Issues associated with transport of depleted UF6 cylinders and conversion products.

Conversion Plan Transportation Requirements
The DOE has prepared two Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) for the proposal to build and operate depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF6) conversion facilities at its Portsmouth and Paducah gaseous diffusion plant sites, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The proposed action calls for transporting the cylinder at ETTP to Portsmouth for conversion. The transportation of depleted UF6 cylinders and of the depleted uranium conversion products following conversion was addressed in the EISs.

Shipment of Radioactive Materials
Under the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has regulatory responsibility for safety in transportation of all hazardous materials, including radioactive material. DOT developed a single a set of safety standards that assured that properly prepared shipments of hazardous materials would be acceptable for transport by all modes (rail, highway, air, and water). These standards are set forth primarily in DOT's Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) located in 49 CFR Parts 100 - 178.

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also has responsibility for safety in the transport of radioactive materials. Due to the overlap in statutory authorities of the NRC and DOT, the two agencies have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with regard to regulation of the transport of radioactive material. Consistent with the MOU, the NRC has promulgated, in 10 CFR Part 71, shipping requirements for radioactive materials.

The primary regulatory approach used by DOT and NRC for ensuring safety during transportation of radioactive materials is by specifying standards for the proper packaging of such materials. Packaging for transporting radioactive materials must be designed, constructed, and maintained to ensure that they will contain and shield their contents during normal transportation. The type of packaging used is determined by the radioactive hazard associated with the packaged material. The hazard is determined by the characteristics of the specific radioactive material and its physical form (e.g., solid, liquid, or gas). The regulations also specify many requirements for labeling, marking, training, and administrative controls.

The shipment of radioactive materials may take place by truck, rail, or barge. Federal regulations do not place route restrictions on the movement of depleted UF6 cylinders or depleted uranium on United States highways or railroads.

It should be noted that the nuclear properties of depleted uranium are such that the occurrence of a nuclear criticality (i.e., a nuclear chain reaction) is not a concern, regardless of the amount of depleted uranium present. However, criticality is a concern for the handling, packaging, and shipping of enriched uranium. For enriched uranium, criticality control is accomplished by employing, individually or collectively, specific limits on uranium-235 enrichment, mass, volume, geometry, moderation, and spacing for each type of package. The amount of uranium that may be contained in an individual package and the total number of packages that may be transported together are determined by the nuclear properties of the enriched uranium.

Shipment of Depleted UF6 Cylinders
UF6 has been transported safely for more than 40 years. Specific requirements exist for the shipment of UF6 cylinders. Among other things, UF6 cylinders must be designed, fabricated, inspected, tested, and marked in accordance with the version of American National Standard N14.1, "Uranium Hexafluoride - Packaging for Transport" that was in effect at the time the cylinder was manufactured. Although a detailed discussion of depleted UF6 transportation regulations is not included here, three requirements are particularly important relative to depleted UF6 cylinder shipments: (1) cylinders must be filled to less than 62% of the certified volumetric capacity (the fill-limit was reduced to 62% from 64% around 1987); (2) the pressure within cylinders must be less than 14.8 psia; and (3) cylinders must be free of cracks, excessive distortion, bent or broken valves or plugs, and broken or torn stiffening rings or skirts, and must not have shell thicknesses that have decreased below a specified minimum value. Cylinders not meeting these requirements are often referred to as substandard or noncompliant.

Although the exact number is not yet known, preliminary reports suggest that many of the cylinders at ETTP will not meet the DOT transportation requirements. Three options exist for shipping these noncompliant cylinders:

· The UF6 contents could be transferred from noncompliant cylinders into new or compliant cylinders.

· An exemption could be obtained from the DOT, allowing the UF6 cylinder to be transported either "as is" or following repairs. The primary finding that DOT must make to justify granting an application for an exemption is that the proposed alternative will achieve a level of safety that either: (1) is at least equal to the level of safety required by the otherwise applicable regulation; or, (2) if the otherwise applicable regulations do not establish a required level of safety, is consistent with the public interest and will adequately protect against the risks to life and property inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce.

· Noncompliant cylinders could be shipped in an "overpack." In this case, the shipper would have to obtain an exemption from DOT allowing the existing cylinder, regardless of its condition, to be transported if it is placed into a metal overpack. The metal overpack would have to be specially designed. Furthermore, DOT would have to determine that, if the overpack is fabricated, inspected, and marked according to its design, the resulting packaging (including the cylinder and the overpack) would have a level of safety at least equal to the level of safety required for a new UF6 cylinder.

Shipment of Depleted Uranium Conversion Products
The depleted uranium conversion product will be shipped as low specific activity, group I, (LSA-I) material. All LSA materials have a characteristic of presenting limited radiation hazard, because of their relatively low concentration of radioactivity.

Evaluation of Transportation Risks
The EISs for the conversion project include a detailed evaluation of the risks associated with the transportation of the depleted uranium materials. This assessment includes the risks to both workers and members of the public during normal transportation conditions and hypothetical accidents.

Depleted UF6 Storage Safety
Continued cylinder storage is safe if the current surveillance and maintenance activities are continued.

(...and if not?...)

Potential Hazards of Cylinder Storage
The advanced age of some of the steel cylinders in which the depleted UF6 is contained, and the way in which the cylinders were stored (sometimes too close together to permit inspection, and sometimes in direct contact with the ground, due to settlement of cylinders, leading to enhanced cylinder corrosion) have created a potential environmental and safety hazard. While depleted UF6 does not present as significant a radiological hazard as other radioactive materials, it is a potential chemical hazard if not properly managed.

(Nice of them to at least admit this much.)

Concerns Raised about Depleted UF6 Storage at Portsmouth
In October 1992, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) issued a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Notice of Violation to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The Notice of Violation stated that the OEPA had determined depleted UF6 to be a solid waste, and that the Department had violated Ohio laws and regulations by not evaluating whether such waste was hazardous. The Department differed with this assessment, and in February 1998, reached an agreement with OEPA, which defers RCRA characterization of depleted UF6 stored at the Portsmouth Plant until 2008, as long as the Department complies with a Depleted UF6 Management Plan as agreed to by OEPA and makes good faith efforts to evaluate potential use or reuse of the depleted UF6.

Concerns Raised about Depleted UF6 Storage at ETTP
The State of Tennessee raised nearly identical RCRA issues in 1997 regarding depleted UF6 stored at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) near Oak Ridge. A negotiated settlement resulted in a consent order issued by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation on February 8, 1999. Among other things, the order requires conversion of all depleted UF6 stored at the ETTP, or removal of the storage cylinders from the State by December 31, 2009.

(How do they plan to convert these materials and where are they going to move them too? - Yucca Mountain, Nevada?)

The PEIS and Cylinder Management Program
Following the OEPA Notice of Violation in 1992, the Department took the initiative to re-evaluate its long-term strategy for managing the DUF6 inventory. In 1994, work began on the Program-matic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride <../../../guide/peis/index.cfm> (DOE/EIS-0269, April 1999).

In 1995, the Department also began an aggressive program to better manage the aging depleted UF6 cylinders. In part, this program responded to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 95?1, Safety of Cylinders Containing Depleted Uranium, which DOE fully accepted. Included were more rigorous and frequent inspections, painting and refurbishing of cylinders, and construction of concrete-pad cylinder yards. The results of the analysis in the PEIS indicated that continued cylinder storage is safe if the current surveillance and maintenance activities are continued. The Cylinder Management program's implementation has been successful, and as a result, on December 16, 1999, the DNFSB closed out Recommendation 95-1.

Depleted UF6 Cylinder Leakage
A small number of cylinders have leaked over the last 40 years; leaking cylinders are repaired, and material that leaks onto the ground is removed.

(Where do they remove these materials too? What about the personnel that handles this material? Do they remove them too?)

Chemical Reactions During Leakage
If a cylinder leak (breach) occurs and the depleted UF6 is exposed to water vapor in the air, uranyl fluoride (UO2F2) and hydrogen fluoride (HF) are formed. The uranyl fluoride is a solid that plugs the leak, limiting further escape of depleted UF6. Release of the hydrogen fluoride gas to the atmosphere is also slowed by the plug formation.

(They know this because it has happened more than once...in this country...in your neighborhood.)

Historical Information about Leaks
Ten depleted UF6 cylinders have been breached (mainly from cylinder wall cracks) over the past 40 years: most of the breaches were due to corrosion around dents caused by mishandling, with the others due to corrosion around welding defects or from external corrosion alone. After the breaches were discovered, the material that leaked onto the ground was removed, and the cylinders were repaired or the UF6 was transferred to new cylinders. The cylinder yard workers and the environment around the cylinder yards are constantly monitored for potential radiation and chemical exposures and appropriate actions are taken if higher-than-expected readings are obtained from monitoring equipment.

(Again, they admit there is problems and will be more as this has been going on for over 40 years. They want to transport this stuff throughout our country, through your neighborhood on its way to some place like Yucca Mountain.)

Leak Repair Procedures
When a valve leak is detected, the valve is replaced. When cylinder wall corrosion or leakage is detected, the cylinder is repaired with a patch, followed by a welded steel repair.

MAIN NOTE:
Where is the leaked material moved to and how is it handled and contained? (No mention of this.)


Cylinder Surveillance and Maintenance
DOE has a Cylinder Management program in place to inspect and maintain depleted UF6 cylinders, and to improve their storage conditions.

Background
Since 1990, DOE has conducted a program of cylinder inspections, recoatings, and relocations to assure that depleted UF6 is safely stored pending its ultimate disposition. The program has so far been largely focused on the ongoing surveillance and maintenance of the cylinders containing depleted UF6.

In 1995, the Department began an aggressive program to better manage the aging depleted UF6 cylinders. In part, this program responded to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 95-1, Safety of Cylinders Containing Depleted Uranium, which DOE fully accepted. Included were more rigorous and frequent inspections, painting and refurbishing of cylinders, and construction of concrete-pad cylinder yards. The results of the analysis in the PEIS indicated that continued cylinder storage is safe if the current surveillance and maintenance activities are continued. The Cylinder Management program's implementation has been successful, and as a result, on December 16, 1999, the DNFSB closed out Recommendation 95-1.

Surveillance and Maintenance Program Duration
It will take decades to convert the depleted UF6 in the inventory to a more stable chemical form. As a result, the Department intends to continue surveillance and maintenance of the depleted UF6 cylinders currently in storage.

Surveillance and Maintenance Program Activities
The day to day management of the depleted UF6 cylinders includes actions designed to cost effectively improve their storage conditions, such as:

· Performing regular inspections and general maintenance of cylinders and storage yards;

· Restacking and respacing the cylinders to improve drainage and to allow for more thorough inspections;

· Repainting ends of skirted cylinders and repainting cylinder bodies as needed to arrest corrosion; and

· Constructing new concrete cylinder storage yards and reconditioning existing yards from gravel to concrete to improve storage conditions.

The above information is compiled from: Argonne National Laboratory - January 2006

About Argonne
Argonne National Laboratory administers this web site for The U.S. DOE Office of Environmental Management.

Responsibilities
The Depleted UF6 Management Program Information Network web site is administered by the Environmental Assessment Division of Argonne National Laboratory for the United States Department of Energy (DOE) , Office of Environmental Management (EM) . EM is responsible for preparation of the Depleted UF6 Conversion Facility EISs. Argonne is assisting EM in preparation of the EISs.

About the Office of Environmental Management (EM)
In 1989, the Department of Energy created the Office of Environmental Management (EM) to mitigate the risks and hazards posed by the legacy of nuclear weapons production and research. Although the nation continues to maintain an arsenal of nuclear weapons, as well as some production capability, the United States has embarked on new missions. The most ambitious and far ranging of these missions is dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War. Like most industrial and manufacturing operations, the nuclear complex has generated waste, pollution, and contamination. However, many problems posed by its operations are unique. They include unprecedented amounts of contaminated waste, water, and soil, and a vast number of contaminated structures that will remain radioactive for thousands of years.

About Argonne National Laboratory
Argonne National Laboratory is one of the U.S. Department of Energy's largest research centers. It is also the nation's first national laboratory, chartered in 1946. Today, the laboratory has more than 4,000 employees, including about 1,400 scientists and engineers, of whom about 700 hold doctorate degrees.

The Environmental Assessment Division of Argonne National Laboratory conducts applied research, assessment, and technology development in the following areas: risk and waste management; natural resource systems and integrated assessments; restoration, compliance, and pollution prevention; and environmental policy analysis and planning. Most of these efforts support federal agencies that have responsibilities for energy development and use, natural resource management, or national defense.

For More Information:
Contact the Depleted UF6 Webmaster:
Robert Sullivan
Environmental Assessment Division
Argonne National Laboratory
Argonne, IL 60439
(630)252-6182

duf6webmaster@anl.gov



In January 2001, news media in many parts of the world carried reports that postulated links between NATO's use of Depleted Uranium ammunition in Kosovo and Bosnia with allegedly higher incidences of leukemia, other cancers, and other negative health effects said to be occuring among NATO troops who had served in those areas and among local civilian populations.

Although a very large body of existing scientific and medical research clearly established that such a link between Depleted Uranium ammunition and the reported illnesses was extremely unlikely, NATO Secretary General George Robertson immediately established an Ad Hoc Committee on Depleted Uranium to serve as a clearing house for information to be shared among interested nations.

To date, the scientific and medical research continues to disprove any link between Depleted Uranium and the reported negative health effects. Furthermore, the present evidence strongly suggests that NATO troops serving in the Balkans are not suffering negative health effects different from those suffered by their colleagues who have not served in the Balkans. Nevertheless, NATO is not complacent about this matter, and will continue to share information about this issue.

Review
Depleted uranium: an overview of its properties and health effects S. Shawky1 1Department of Community Medicine and Primary Health Care, College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.


Volume 8, No. 2&3 , March 2002.

SUMMARY
There has been much debate about the use of depleted uranium in the Gulf War and its health effects on United States and European war veterans. However, studies on the impact of this radioactive substance on the residents of the surrounding Gulf region are far from adequate. Depleted uranium intro-duces large quantities of radioactive material that is hazardous to biological organisms, continues to decay for millennia and is able to travel tens of kilometres in air. If depleted uranium were used in the Gulf War, its impact on the health of people in the area would have been considerable. This review of depleted uranium — its origin, properties, uses and effects on the human environment and health — aims to trigger further research on this subject.


Introduction
Many debates about the use of depleted uranium in the Gulf War have been held in industrialized countries. Some claim that depleted uranium was used extensively in place of tungsten for ordnance by the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) forces [1,2]. It has been suggested that at least 320 tons of depleted uranium were used during the war and much of that was converted at high temperatures into an aerosol of minute insoluble particles of uranium oxide [1]. The fact that depleted uranium was detected in the urine of Gulf War veterans seven to eight years after the war is substantial evidence of long-term internal contamination and tissue storage of this substance [1,3,4].

For some years after the Gulf War, many US and European veterans deployed in the region during the war complained of vague incapacitating symptoms that have been termed ‘Gulf War syndrome’ [5,6]. The US Department of Defense treated this illness as ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’ and advised military doctors to treat it with muscle relaxants and sleeping pills while ordering a mental illness assessment [1]. Arguments about the issue have continued for years, some authors describing it as a myth invented by the media [7], others documenting the symptoms reported by the veterans. These symptoms were multiple, consisting mainly of chronic fatigue, headache, muscle and joint pain, sleep disturbances, bladder dysfunction, sweating disturbances, skin manifestations, menstrual disorders, as well as neurological, psychological, respiratory, gastrointestinal and cardiac symptoms [5,6,8]. Over time, the focus shifted to more serious health risks and a number of dangerous conditions became linked to depleted uranium exposure. These included cancers of different types, renal diseases, as well as congenital anomalies and perinatal deaths among the neonates of veterans [3,9–14]. These health concerns triggered an explosion of interest in the subject as the affected veterans started to campaign for more information about the relationship between their illnesses and exposure to depleted uranium. If the Gulf War veterans who were temporarily stationed in the region were indeed victims of depleted uranium, what could have been the impact of this substance on the health of the residents of the region and surrounding countries?

Most studies from Iraq have concentrated on the impact of the United Nations’ sanctions against Iraq on nutritional deficiencies and on children’s health. A few studies in the Gulf countries have noted an increased incidence of abortion and perinatal and infant mortality since the Gulf War [15–17], but no adequate in-depth research has been performed on the link between the war and serious health conditions. Many issues concerning the effect of depleted uranium on the health of the residents of the war countries and the surrounding regions remain unexplored.

This review of depleted uranium—its origin, properties, uses and impact on the human environment and health—aims to trigger further research on the subject. Internet and MEDLINE searches were performed to extract information on depleted uranium and its health effects. Information was mainly taken from published research on depleted uranium in general and from the Gulf War in particular.


Origin of depleted uranium [1,18,19]
Natural uranium is the heaviest naturally occurring element on earth. It is widely distributed in the earth’s crust but is concentrated in certain rock formations. Natural uranium has both radioactive and fissive properties and is known to be the deadliest metal on earth. Radioactivity is caused by unstable atoms exploding microscopically to form a series of new substances called ‘decay products’, emitting energy in the form of alpha and beta particles and gamma rays. The fission process requires highly sophisticated technology to bombard uranium atoms with neutrons, splitting them into two or three pieces and releasing a high degree of energy and more neutrons with great force. This splits more atoms and starts a chain reaction, producing substances called ‘fission products’. Radioactivity and fissionability are two completely different processes and release different products. Radioactivity is not triggered and so cannot be controlled, whereas fission can be started, stopped, slowed or speeded. It is fission that allows uranium to be used in nuclear electricity generation and in nuclear weapons. Natural uranium occurs in soil at about 1 to 3 parts per million whereas in uranium ore it is about 1000 times more concentrated, reaching about 0.05% to 0.20% of the total weight. Natural uranium is a blend of uranium-235 (U-235) and uranium-238 (U-238). The U-235 is the fissionable part and can be used directly but it is rare and constitutes only 1% of natural uranium. Thus at a uranium enrichment plant, the concentration of U-235 is increased by discarding some U-238. This cast-off uranium, which is almost 100% uranium (mainly U-238), is called depleted uranium.


Radioactive decay products of depleted uranium [1,18,20]
Depleted uranium is thus a nuclear waste by-product of uranium enrichment and has the same properties as metallic natural uranium. As the concentration of uranium in depleted uranium is much higher than in its natural state, depleted uranium is more radioactive than natural uranium. Figure 1 shows the radioactive decay products of depleted uranium, their half-lives and the type of energy emitted (alpha or beta particles or gamma rays). It can be seen that radium is one of the decay products of U-238. Radium disintegrates into radon gas that in turn decays into the extremely dangerous ‘radon daughters’ or ‘radon progeny’, of which there are about half a dozen radioactive materials including polonium, the most toxic of all radon daughters. Finally, this progression ends with lead, which is a stable highly toxic substance. Figure 2 shows the radioactive decay products of the radon progeny. The very long half-life of U-238 means that depleted uranium remains radioactive for billions of years and over these periods will continue to produce radioactive decay products. Thus, depleted uranium becomes more radioactive over the centuries and millennia because the decay products accumulate.

Figure 1 = Radioactive decay products of depleted uranium, their half lives (shown in brackets) and type of energy emitted:



Figure 2 = Radioactive decay products of the radon progeny, their half lives (shown in brackets) and type of energy emitted: alpha or beta particles or gamma rays:



Uses of depleted uranium [1,19,20]
Depleted uranium has several military and peacetime uses. In military settings it can be used to breed plutonium, a powerful nuclear explosive; to double the explosive power of a hydrogen bomb; to coat conventional bullets and shells to improve their armour-piercing capabilities; and to provide armour-plating to tanks and other vehicles. The peacetime uses include: counterweights in aeroplanes; shields against radiation in medical radiotherapy units; and transport of radioactive isotopes.


Environmental pollution with depleted uranium [1,20,21]
Depleted uranium ignites at high temperatures, producing uranium oxide particles (UO2 and UO3) that are insoluble in water. The particles resist gravity and are able to travel tens of kilometres in air. Once on the ground, they can be resuspended and continue travelling when the soil or sand is disturbed by motion or wind. They contaminate the soil, ground water and river systems. Radioactive materials can also be carried long distances in the bodies of animals, fish, birds and insects. Thus, depleted uranium seeps into water, food and air and introduces into the human environment very large quantities of long-lasting radioactive materials, all of which are hazardous to biological organisms.


Human exposure to depleted uranium [18–20]
Human exposure to depleted uranium can be external or internal. External exposure occurs through proximity to depleted uranium metal or through contact with dust or shrapnel following an explosion or impact. Internal exposure occurs by ingestion of food and water contaminated with depleted uranium, as well as inhalation of depleted uranium that has been deposited in the environment or resuspended in the atmosphere by wind or other disturbances. In the military environment, humans can be exposed to radiation through wounds, if these are caused by the impact of depleted uranium projectiles or armour.


Health hazards of depleted uranium [1,17–20]
Depleted uranium and its decay products are extremely dangerous and remain radioactive even inside the human body. During the radioactive decay, tiny electrically charged alpha and beta particles and gamma rays are emitted that travel very fast. Some radioactive materials are alpha emitters and others are beta emitters. An alpha particle is made up of two protons and two neutrons whereas a beta particle is made up of a single electron. The gamma rays are not material particles but a form of pure energy travelling at the speed of light. Gamma rays penetrate very fast through the soft tissues. Beta particles have less penetrating power, travelling less than two centimetres in soft tissue. Alpha particles are the weakest, travelling just a few microns in soft tissue (equivalent to a few cell diameters). Thus, outside the body, alpha emitters are the least harmful because alpha particles are hardly able to penetrate the outer layer of the epidermis. Beta particles are able to penetrate the outer layers of the skin and reach the basal layer, giving a localized dose to the skin when contact is high. Gamma emitters are the most dangerous as gamma radiation can penetrate into internal organs, depending on the energy of the gamma radiation. However, although alpha particles cannot penetrate the epidermis, they are extremely hazardous when taken into the body. Alpha particles that are emitted within the body deposit energy more densely than either beta particles or gamma radiation and are consequently more destructive.


Cycle of depleted uranium inside the human body [10,18,21]
Internal contamination with depleted uranium occurs through inhalation or ingestion of depleted uranium particles. Once inhaled, very small insoluble particles of uranium oxide (2.5 mm or less in diameter) can reside in the lungs for years, slowly passing through the lung tissue into the blood. As a result of coughing and other involuntary mechanisms by which the body keeps large particles out of the lungs, the larger particles pass through the gastrointestinal tract. Around 0.2% of insoluble depleted uranium and 2.0% of the soluble depleted uranium taken in food and water are absorbed by the gut. Over 95% of the depleted uranium entering the body is not absorbed but is eliminated via the faeces. Of the depleted uranium that is absorbed into the blood, approximately 67% will be filtered by the kidneys and be excreted in the urine within 24 hours, increasing to 90% within a few days. The unexcreted depleted uranium is distributed around the body and stored in bones, kidneys, liver and other tissues.


Health effects of depleted uranium [17–26]
The human body has no way of protecting itself from depleted uranium in water, food or air. External exposure to depleted uranium leads to radiological toxicity, while the effects of internal contamination with depleted uranium are complex, caused by both chemical and radiological mechanisms. The detailed mechanism of radiation toxicity is a subject of continuing research. However, it is thought that one of the ways in which the deposited energy may damage cells is by causing changes in deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a biologically important molecule that controls all aspects of structure and function and which is mainly found in cell nuclei. Two types of health effects have been demonstrated: deterministic and stochastic. The deterministic effects depend on the dose of radiation. Massive exposure can lead to death within a few days or weeks. Lower doses cause burns, erythema, loss of hair or other effects on the skin. The primary stochastic effect associated with radiation exposure is cancer. Radiation causes direct damage to cell DNA. The damaged cells that die, as long as they are not too many, are not a real problem, but the damaged cells that survive may reproduce in an abnormal and uncontrolled fashion, becoming cancer cells. As the cancer spreads, it destroys the healthy tissue and unless treated it eventually kills the host. Cancers of all kinds can result from internal radiation exposure, depending on the organ affected. In the case of inhalation of insoluble depleted uranium particles, the upper aerodigestive tract and the lungs are the first target organs, in which case tissue damage and an increased probability of cancers is these areas would be expected. The bone is one of the main places where depleted uranium is stored, leading to uncontrolled production of white blood cells to the detriment of other cells, ultimately leading to leukaemia. It takes many years for a cancer caused by contaminated air, food or water to grow, so the effect is not apparent immediately. Exposure to radiation can also affect the reproductive system, causing infertility or damage to the father’s sperm or mother’s egg. Genetic damage is possible, leading to spontaneous abortion, premature death or congenital anomalies. Some forms of genetic damage are not seen in the first or second generations but only later after several generations have passed. Another danger of exposure to low-dose radiation is biological damage in the form of monocyte depletion, leading to iron deficiency anaemia and a depressed cellular immune system. Radiation also deforms red blood cells, inhibiting their passage into the tiny capillaries and depriving the muscles and brain of adequate oxygen and nutrients. This can lead to impairment of many organs especially the kidneys, liver, lungs and cardiovascular and haematopoietic systems. Radiation can cause disorders of protein and carbohydrate metabolism, leading to symptoms ranging from severe headache to brain dysfunction. Mental retardation owing to brain damage of the fetus has also been described as a result of radiation exposure in the womb during the critical period when the child’s brain is being formed. The chemical toxicity of depleted uranium results from its interaction with the biochemical processes of the human body. Chemically, depleted uranium damages kidney function in humans. The proximal tubules are the main site of potential damage. The types of damage that have been observed are nodular changes to the surface of the kidney, lesions to the tubular epithelium and increased levels of glucose and protein in the urine.


Conclusion
If depleted uranium were indeed used in the Gulf War, it will certainly have constituted an enormous health hazard not only to the US and European veterans deployed in the region during the war but also to the residents of the war countries and surrounding areas. The extent of the region affected has not been determined and the long-term dangers remain unidentified.

(Update – January 2006: Regions of affected areas since 1988 are – Bosnia, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, parts of Syria and those areas where DU is stored before and after use.)

Many issues concerning this subject need to be resolved through extensive public health action and intense epidemiological research.


References
1. Bertell R. Gulf War veterans and depleted uranium. Paper prepared for the Hague Peace Conference 11–15 May 1999.

2. Mathews J. Radioactive bullets raise cancer fears. Journal of the National Cancer Institute, 1993, 85(13):1029–30.

3. McDiarmid MA et al. Health effects of depleted uranium on exposed Gulf War veterans. Environmental research, 2000, 82(2):168–80.

4. Hooper FJ et al. Elevated urine uranium excretion by soldiers with retained uranium shrapnel. Health physics, 1999, 77(5):512–9.

5. Beers MH, Berkow R, Burs M, eds. The Merck manual, 17th ed. Rathway, New Jersey, Merck & Co, 1999:2480.

6. Jamal GA. Gulf War syndrome: a model for the complexity of biological and environmental interaction with human health. Adverse drug reactions and toxicological reviews, 1998, 17(1):1–17.

7. Nicolson GL, Nicolson NL. The eight myths of Operation ‘Desert Storm’ and Gulf War syndrome. Medicine, conflict, and survival, 1997, 13(2):140–6.

8. Steele L. Prevalence and patterns of Gulf War illness in Kansas veterans: association of symptoms with characteristics of person, place, and time of military service. American journal of epidemiology, 2000, 152(10):992–1002.

9. Knoke JD, Gray GC, Garland FC. Testicular cancer and Persian Gulf War service. Epidemiology, 1998, 9(6):648–53.

10. Durakovic A. Medical effects of internal contamination with uranium. Croatian medical journal, 1999, 40(1):49–66.

11. Doyle P, Roman E, Maconochie N. Birth defects among children of Gulf War Veterans. New England journal of medicine, 1997, 337(16):1175–6.

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A Process for Reducing the Licensing Burden for
New Products Containing Depleted Uranium
Citation

ANL/EAD/TM/03-01
Authors
Ranek, Nancy L.; Kamboj, Sunita; Hartmann, Heidi M.; Avci, Halil I.
Document Type
TM
Publication Year
2003

(New Products containing Depleted Uranium? Like what - bumpers on our cars; window and door frames in our houses; lunch-boxes for our kids?)

Avoiding Destructive Remediation at DOE Sites

Whicker, F.W.; MacDonell, Margaret M.; Hinton, T.G.; Pinder, III, J.E.; Habegger, Loren J.

Development of an Analytical Methodology for Sarin (GB) and Soman (GD) in Various Military-Related Wastes

O'Neill, Hugh J.; Brubaker, Kenneth L.; Schneider, John F.; Sytsma, Louis F.; Kimmell, Todd A.

Discrete Charm of Cooperative Federalism: Environmental Citizen Suits in the Balance, The

Puder, Markus

Environmental Policy and Regulatory Constraints to Natural Gas Production

Elcock, Deborah

Final Environmental Impact Statement for Construction of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth, Ohio, Site

Life-Cycle Evaluation of Alternative Configurations for Shipping Low-Level Radioactive Waste to the Nevada Test Site

Daling, P.M.; Biwer, Bruce M.; Siebach, Peter R.; Ross, Steven B.

Measurement Uncertainties and Minimum Detectable Concentrations for the In Situ Nal Gamma Spectroscopy Systems Used at Fernald

Davis, Michael J. (EA)

Modeling the Suitability of Potential Wetland Mitigation Sites with a Geographic Information System

Van Lonkhuyzen, Robert A.; LaGory, Kirk E.; Kuiper, James A.

Process for Reducing the Licensing Burden for New Products Containing Depleted Uranium, A

Ranek, Nancy L.; Kamboj, Sunita; Hartmann, Heidi M.; Avci, Halil I.

Voluntary Cleanup of the Ames Chemical Disposal Site
Taboas, Anibal L.; Freeman, Richard; Peterson, John M.

Environmental Research Division Publications, 1999-2005





Discounted Casualties
The Human Cost of Depleted Uranium

Fabrication, Assembly, R & D, Test Firing, Storage and
Demilitarization Sites involving DU Ammunition in USA

[Source: US Army Environmental Policy Institute
Technical Report (June 1995) ]


Fabrication and Assembly Sites
1 Aerojet Ordnance Company Chino, California
2 Aerojet Ordnance Tennessee Jonesboro, Tennessee
3 Detroit Army Tank Plant Warren, Michigan
4 Lima Army Tank Plant Lima, Ohio
5 Martin Marrietta Energy Systems
Milan Army Ammunition Plant
Milan, Tennessee
6 Mason and Hanger at Iowa Army Ammunition Plant Middletown, Iowa
7 National Manufacturing Corporation St. Louis, Missouri
8 Starmet Corporation, formerly known as Nuclear Metals, Inc. Concord, Massachusetts
9 Olin Ordnance Corporation Red Lion, Pennsylvania
10 Specific Manufacturing Capability Facility Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Idaho Falls, Idaho
11 Tank Automotive Command Warren, Michigan
12 Twin Cities Army Ammunition Plant,
Alliant Tech Systems
New Brighton, Minnesota
13 White Sands Missile Range Green River, Utah
14 White Sands Missile Range White Sands, New Mexico
R & D and Test Firing Sites
15 Army Research Laboratory APG, Maryland
16 Battelle Pacific Northwest Labs Richland, Washington
17 Energetic Materials Research and Technology Center, formerly known as the Terminal Effects Research and Analysis(TERA) facility Socorro, New Mexico
18 Ethan Allen Firing Range (General Electric) Burlington, Vermont
19 Jefferson Proving Ground Madison, Indiana
20 Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos, New Mexico
21 Manufacturing Sciences Corp. Oak Ridge, Tennessee
22 Nevada Test Site Mercury, Nevada
23 Picatinny Arsenal Dover, New Jersey
24 Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico
25 Tonopah Test Range Tonopah, Nevada
26 US Army Combat Systems Test Activity APG, Maryland
27 Yuma Proving Ground Yuma, Arizona
Storage and Storage/Demilitarization Sites
28 Defense Consolidation Facility Snelling, South Carolina
29 Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant Hawthorne, Nevada
30 Hunter Army Airfield Savanna, Georgia
31 Letterkenny Army Depot Chambersberg, Pennsylvania
32 McAlester Army Ammunition Plant McAlester, Oklahoma
33 Savanna Army Depot Savanna, Illinois
34 Seneca Army Depot Activity Romulus, New York
35 Sierra Army Depot Herlong, California
36 Tooele Army Depot Tooele, Utah
37 US Army Armament Munitions and Chemical Command Rock Island, Illinois
38 Watervliet Arsenal Albany, New York
Processing Sites
39 Carolina Metals Barnwell, South Carolina
40 Sequoyah Fuels Corporation Gore, Oklahoma
Waste Disposal Sites
41 Chem-Nuclear Systems Waste Management Facility Barnwell, South Carolina
42 Envirocare of Utah, Inc. Clive, Utah
43 US Ecology Hanford, Washington
Former DU Use or Storage Sites, and Sites Being Decommissioned
44 Alliant Tech Systems, Inc. Elk river, Minnesota
45 Army Research Laboratory Watertown, Massachusetts
46 Camp Roberts Military Reservation Bradley, California
47 Chamberlain Manufacturing Waterloo, Iowa
48 China Lake Naval Weapons Center Alliant Tech Systems Ridgecrest, California
49 Ford Aerospace and Communications Corp. San Juan Capistrano, California
50 Fort Hood Killeen, Texas
51 Fort Riley Junction City, Kansas
52 Fort Stewart Hinesville, Georgia
53 Lake City Army Ammunition Plant Independence, Missouri
54 National Lead Industries Colonie, New York
Other
55 Nellis Air Force Firing Range
*Not mentioned in the Army Technical Report, but still in use
Nevada



State Comments, Depleted Uranium EA, Nellis Air Force Base

State of Nevada
Review Comments

Draft Environmental Assessment
Resumption of Use of Depleted Uranium Rounds
at Nellis Air Force Range
Target 63-10

Carson City, Nevada  September 15, 1997

September 15, 1997

Colonel Michael F. Fukey
Director, Environmental Management
Department of the Air Force
Headquarters, 99th Air Base Wing
Nellis Air Force Base, NV 89191-7007

RE: SAI # E1997-160: Draft Environmental Assessment of Resumption of Use of Depleted Uranium Rounds at Nellis Air Force Range Target 63-10

Dear Colonel Fukey:

   Thank you for granting the State of Nevada an extension of the comment period for the above referenced Draft Environmental Assessment (EA). We also appreciated the Air Force's prompt response to our request for the supplemental materials incorporated by reference in the Draft EA.

General Comments:
   Our review of the Draft EA and accompanying materials suggest that the environmental effects that could be anticipated from the resumption of air-to-ground firing of depleted uranium (DU) munitions have not been adequately assessed. There are two central reasons for this opinion. First, neither the Draft EA nor its predecessor, the Limited Site Assessment, reflect awareness of the scant scientific and technical information on the use of DU and the large uncertainties that characterizes the issue of using DU munitions in the environment. For example, the Draft EA cites the study involving the Yuma Proving Grounds (YPG), LA-13156-MS, September 1996, but fails to capture the large degree of uncertainty about the impact of DU in the environment.

   The YPG investigation included an extensive and detailed review of the scientific information available and attempted to construct an environmental transport mechanism for DU as a means of evaluating the risks that environmental DU poses to ecosystems and to humans. This proved to be impossible because of insufficient data and an incomplete understanding of DU in the environment. Thus, the conclusions from the YPG study were based on unsubstantiated conjecture. This should be reflected in the Draft EA.

   Additionally, the Draft EA should note that the YPG study found DU residues in all components of the environment, that environmental concentrations varied widely, that corroded DU residues are soluble and mobile in water, that wind dispersal during testing is the prevalent means of dispersal of DU particles, and that an unknown degree of risk was posed to human health by DU in the environment. Moreover, there appears to be no insight into the issue of long-term (100 to 1,000 years and longer) environmental threats posed by DU residues. The study concluded by identifying the environmental field and laboratory studies needed to provide a credible assessment of the risks to both ecosystems and humans from environmental DU. This information should also be reflected in the Draft EA.

   The second reason for our conclusion that the Draft EA is inadequate is based on a lack of attention by the Air Force to implementing a comprehensive monitoring program to assess DU airborne emissions and/or transport of DU particulates in surface and groundwater at Target 63-10. The necessity of doing so was one of the most obvious and strong conclusions from the YPG study. Accordingly, an on-site monitoring program for Target 63-10 should be initiated before a responsible assessment can be conducted of the potential for short and long-term effects on humans and ecosystems from transport and corrosion of DU in the environment. Likewise, wind dispersal of dust containing DU generated from air-to-ground firing is a probable transport mechanism of concern1, one that must be considered in developing a monitoring program for the target area.

   While the Air Force has prepared a brief DU management plan for the range in question, this plan has not been publicly reviewed and appears to fall short of achieving a comprehensive monitoring program to document the possible migration of DU from the target area. Elements of the proposed program apparently have not been initiated even though the Air Force wishes to resume the use of DU munitions at Target 63-10.

   As mentioned above, the Draft EA relies on studies conducted at the Yuma Proving Grounds in Arizona to suggest that no impacts would occur from firing DU munitions at Target 63-10. The EA states that "the general results of this evaluation (at Yuma) should be similar to NAFR Range 63 conditions." In addition, the proposed Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Draft EA says that airborne emissions of DU particulates "would settle quickly resulting in minimal air migration." Yet the Draft EA provides no factual evidence, through either on-site monitoring or modeling, to substantiate that dispersal of DU would in fact be minimal and contained to the vicinity of the target area. The document simply states that "air migration of DU particulates is not likely to occur at any great distance due to the extreme density of these particulates and the oxides." The term "great distance" is not quantified. And as mentioned above, an assessment of wind dispersal of dust containing DU that is generated by direct air-to-ground firing has not been performed.

   In a related matter, the Draft EA acknowledged that the nearest population center to the range is Indian Springs, located 12 miles southwest of the target. However, the document fails to mention that a major state institution, the Southern Desert Corrections Center, (with an inmate population of over 1,400 ), is located in the same general vicinity and is likely to be closer to the target than the community of Indian Springs.

   The Draft EA also failed to present, or assess, disposition alternatives for hazardous materials 2 and DU wastes. This is a significant issue given the Air Force's failure to provide specific information on the physical forms and probable locations of the estimated 27,000 kilograms (30 tons) of DU that has already been deposited in the target area and on target vehicles. If the preferred alternative is adopted, this volume of contamination would be expanded by an estimated 2,370 kilograms, or 2.6 tons of DU per year.

   Accordingly, by not assessing the "cradle to grave" management of existing and expected to be generated DU materials and soil contamination, the EA is deficient in scope, in terms of compliance with Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations for defining the "range of actions, alternatives and impacts to be considered" (CFR Parts 1508.25). Moreover, the EA provides little or no information about the management plans, alternatives, and potential hazards concerning disposition of the 200 plus contaminated vehicles that remain in the range holding area; the same can be said for the disposition of thousands of cubic meters of permanently contaminated soil that currently exists [and would be significantly expanded] at Target 63-10.

Recommendations:
   The State's review of the document suggests that the Air Force should not implement the draft Finding Of No Significant Impact for the referenced EA.

   Alternatively, if Target 63-10 is to be used for DU test and training activities, then a detailed Environmental Radiological Monitoring (ERM) program (i.e., risk assessment/DU transport model) should be developed, peer reviewed, and implemented for actual site conditions in the Three Lakes Valley region of the Desert National Wildlife Range. Development of a comprehensive ERM program should proceed any action by the Air Force to resume DU air-to-ground test and training activities at Range 63-10.

   The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review process should also be reinitiated to cover the full scope of issues associated with the management, use, and final disposition of DU munitions. As currently written, the Draft EA is silent on the final disposition of DU contaminated targets and soils. And this is clearly inappropriate, given the volume of legacy waste (i.e., expended military ordnance) that exists today on public lands throughout the west. If the Air Force fails to address final disposition of these wastes in a revised EA, then such an analysis must be presented in the Nellis Range Renewal EIS.

   Finally, the long-term use of DU munitions on the Desert National Wildlife Range appears to be an incompatible activity. To address this issue, the Air Force and the Department of Interior should assess options for land exchanges through appropriate legislative initiatives such as the Nellis Range Renewal process stipulated under P.L. 99-606.

Please contact me if you have any questions about these comments. Sincerely,
 
 

Julie Butler, Coordinator
Nevada State Clearinghouse

JB/jbw
cc:
Richard Urey & Tim Crowley, Governor's Office
Robert R. Loux, NWPO
Lew Dodgion, NDEP
Leo Penne, Washington Office
Michael Wickersham, NDOW
John B. Walker, NWPO
Charles Malone, NWPO
Paul Liebendorfer, NDEP
Karen Beckley, NDEP
Les Monroe, DOE
Ken Voget, USFWS, Las Vegas
Mike Dwyer & Brian Amme, BLM,
Connie Lewis, The Keystone Center
Michele Leslie, The Nature Conservancy
 
 

FOOTNOTES

1  Ebinger, M.K. et. al., "Long Term Fate of Depleted Uranium at Aberdeen and Yuma Proving Grounds, Phase II: Human Health and Ecological Risk Assessment." September 1996, Los Alamos National Laboratory, (see page 115).

2  The EA is silent about the potential historical generations of mixed waste, as well as the potential generation of mixed waste from future activities on the referenced range.
 
 


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