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THE ROLE OF EU BATTLEGROUPS IN EUROPEAN DEFENCE

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This European Security Review aims at assessing the successes and shortcomings of one of the most politically successful achievements of the EU in terms of security and defence, which, paradoxically, has shined in its incapacity and unwillingness to deploy timely rapid response forces when opportunities have arisen. The paper focuses on the problems that the European Union's Battlegroups (EU BGs) face in terms of decision-making and command fragmentation, lack of capabilities and political will, and lack of leadership. These practical, operational and political challenges need to be tackled in the immediate future if EU BGs are to overcome the threat of becoming irrelevant. The current context of economic and financial crisis could potentially, in a logic of cost-reduction, bring some changes necessary for the BGs. BGs need to overcome the challenges of fragmentation and interoperability and need to appear as a single homogeneous capable and efficient force if they are to play a significant role for European defence. Only then are they likely to execute challenging missions and achieve their second goal of becoming a European rapid reaction force within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) toolkit.

The European Union's inability to guarantee security in its own backyard in the wake of the Balkans conflicts has been a major driver for the development of the "European Security and Defence Policy" (ESDP, now CSDP). The necessity to respond to the Union's deficiencies in terms of ambition and capacity as a crisis management and security actor became, indeed, all the more conspicuous in the late 1990s. Conceptually laid down in the Conclusions of the 1999 Council Summit in Helsinki which referred to the necessity of "smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness",[1] and encouraged by the successfully improvised Artemis experience of June 2003,[2] the EU Battlegroups took concrete shape at the Franco-British Summit of le Touquet, in France. Considered as a "European priority" by the Headline Goal 2010, the Battlegroup concept was adopted by the EU Military Committee (EUMC) in June 2004, and initial pledges for the development of EU BGs were made at the November 2004 Military Capability Commitment Conference.

The Concept of Battlegroup

A European Battlegroup "is the minimum effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations".[3] Composed of 3 infantry battalion-sized forces, complemented by combat support elements and combat service support, it is a type of small response force aimed at increasing the Union's capability to defuse escalating crises. The

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[1] European Council Presidency Conclusions, Annex IV, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999

[2] Operation *Artemis* (June 2003) is the first autonomous EU operation. It was rapidly deployed following a request by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and successfully stabilized the situation and brought security in parts of the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

[3] EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, «EU Battlegroups», EU BG 02, November 2006

generic composition of EU BGs is about 1,500 to 2,500 troops, and they can be sustained at 6,000 km away from Brussels for 30 to 120 days. The structure of the battlegroups is not fixed, and they can be tailored depending on the specific requirement of a mission via attaching maritime, air, logistical or other special enablers such as Special Forces. The contributing states set themselves the goal of deploying on the ground within 10 days of an EU decision to launch an operation. Either formed by a single EU Member State or by a so-called "framework state" with the support of contributing countries, it is commonly agreed that EU Battlegroups aim to achieve two goals: firstly, to enable rapid independent European military response to crises, and secondly, to act as catalysts for the transformation of member states' armed forces and to increase cooperation and interoperability of European national armies. Indeed, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) affirms that there is a need "to transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and to enable them to address the new threats".[4]

Having originated after the prompt deployment of operation Artemis in June 2003, the EU BGs were initially meant to deploy upon formal UN request, generally as a "bridging" or "initial entry force". However, their scope has quickly been extended to autonomous rapid response operations and stand-alone operations to solve limited-size crises. The Battlegroup Concept stipulates that the units should be able to carry out the entire range of operations listed in the Petersberg tasks, and as complemented with those identified in the 2003 ESS (reviewed in 2008), ranging from humanitarian aid and peace enforcement operations to crisis management, assistance to security sector reform and post-conflict stabilization.[5] Since BGs reached initial operational capability (IOC) in January 2005, a minimum of one BG has constantly been on standby for 6 months. The objective of the Battlegroups after reaching their full operational capability (FOC) was to enable the EU to undertake two concurrent single BG-sized rapid response operations, launched almost simultaneously.

The costs and responsibility of planning, setting up, training, certifying, putting together and making the Battlegroups available to the EU lies with the troop-contributing nations, and primarily, with the framework nation. The standard practices associated with military CSDP operations apply. The "common costs" related to the operational headquarters, local administration, transportation within the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) area, and lodging infrastructures are administered through the "Athena" mechanism. "Individual costs" (transport of troops from individual countries to the area of operations), as well as other costs linked to stand-up preparations and placing the EU BG on standby the responsibility of contributing states according to the principle of "costs lie where they fall".[6] However, given the fact that costs jointly covered through Athena make up just 10% of the total maintenance and operational costs of an EU BG, the bulk of the burden is provided by contributing nations, and especially by the framework nation, both in terms of cost-sharing and risk-sharing in case an operation is undertaken.[7] Consequently, many EU Member States have been prevented from taking the lead as framework nations, or even from playing a larger role in a BG formation.

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[4] Gustav Lindstrom, «Enter the EU Battlegroups», *Chaillot paper 97* (Feb. 2007), pp. 63-64
[5] «EU Battlegroups», http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/eu_battlegroups_/eu_battlegroups_en.pdf, p. 2
[6] Gustav Lindstrom, *Ibid*., pp. 25-26
[7] The Nordic BG is assumed to have cost Sweden more than 1.2 billion Swedish Krona (€130 million) during the first term of 2008, without having been used.

Despite the initial political success of the BG Concept, Member States' commitment to BGs seems to be currently experiencing a downturn. Indeed, five years after FOC was reached, not a single Battlegroup has ever been deployed, while an increasing number of slots remain despairingly blank on the roster (c.f. Annex I). The longer EU BGs are not deployed, the more pressing the question of their existence, viability and employability become.

The challenges of EU Battlegroups

Beyond the political statement that contribution to the BGs represents, the actual record of achievements of BG is rather disappointing. Indeed, the concept in itself and its application within the EU suffer from a significant number of structural and agency flaws that subsume challenges at the practical, operational and political levels. They encompass fragmentation, lack of capabilities and political will, and lack of leadership. These issues reflect difficulties inherent to any efforts made to further European integration in the fields of security and defence. Moreover, the BGs' relationship with similar formations such as the NATO Response Force (NRF) has to be taken into account, given the potential mutual practical and operational "blockage" that could be triggered if overlaps in terms of force rotations, personnel and headquarters committed to both forces are not solved.

Practical/operational achievements and challenges

With regards to their first goal, the setting up of Battlegroups has indeed somehow boosted national armed forces' transformation and cooperation; the results are, however, variable. When looking at the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG), EU BGs have not only been a driving force for the restructuring of Swedish armed forces from their traditional static territory-focused forces to flexible mission-based forces, but they have also triggered the creation of comprehensive inter-parliamentary cooperation among the states of the formation.[8] However, given the small section of forces concerned by these changes and given the short period of their operational readiness (6 months), these successes are rather limited; in most cases, EU BGs have not generated structural changes of national structures and capabilities as initially aimed. Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, note that at the national level, the most significant progresses have been restricted to the areas of political decision-making, military planning, logistics, and command procedures.[9] Although advances have been made to overcome equipment and skills gaps (notably through outsourcing and pooling and sharing initiatives), the upgrading of equipment is rather minor; fundamental military hardware deficits in areas such as airlift capacity and battlefield surveillance persist.

The relative flexibility of BGs certification plays the role of a double edge sword in a context of limited shared understanding of the required overarching standards: on the one hand side, it allows for easier force generation, greater operational and structural adaptation of the "force packages" to the requirements of specific operations and enables contributors to rely on standards that they are familiar with. On the other hand, it can affect interoperability within and across force packages, and results in considerable differences among different EU BGs, both in their level of capabilities and readiness. The lack of training at the EU level can only further reinforce the impact of the lack of harmonized standards, which in return, has considerable importance for potential cooperation and interoperability. These

[8] http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/Organisation/Nordic-Battlegroup/The-Battlegroup-concept/

[9] Claudia Major & Christian Mölling, «EU Battlegroups : What contribution to European Defence», *SWP Research Paper (June 2011)*, pp. 14-25

aforementioned challenges can result in "credibility gaps" that would affect the entire EU BG not only in terms of mutual trust, but also in terms of overall credibility and actual military effectiveness. The cooperation and interoperability of EU armed forces that the EU BGs aim at achieving is, thus, limited, while the military effectiveness of the BG concept but also of different BG formations cannot be assessed in the absence of concrete operational experience.

A last fundamental issue with regard to EU BGs' operational capacity relates to the adequation between the tasks that they have been set up for (i.e. extended Petersberg tasks & ESS), and their limited size, capabilities and sustainability. As warned by the EU Council Secretariat Factsheet on BGs, BGs can reach their "full potential in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, *bearing in mind their limited size*".[10] As it has very widely been argued, "Battlegroups are not suited for stand-alone or prolonged deployment in high-intensity operations".[11] There is indeed a significant capabilities-expectations gap, which practically renders EU BGs unlikely to handle stand-alone combat operations on the medium- to hard-end of military utility, especially given that no strategic reserve force for the EU BGs has been set up. Better suited for rapid pre-emptive operations limited both in space and time, EU BGs are probably more adapted to operate within a clearly delimited military and political framework and in a low to medium-intensity context, where "normal" forces cannot be mobilised and deployed because of the urgency looming on normal force generation procedures.

Political decision-making process and the question of deployment

The problems arising from the fragmentation of the planning and decision-making structures and capacities are two-fold and inter-related; they comprise both the national and European political rustles within the planning and decision-making processes and structures themselves, as well as the tight timeline assigned for rapid-response deployment. Indeed, a rather large number of actors and decisional levels are involved in the strategic and military planning and decision-making processes preceding a force deployment (c.f. Annex II). National *caveats*, legal requirements or lengthy procedures play an important role. With this regard, some progress has been reached by member states to facilitate and shorten procedures (c.f. inter-parliamentary cooperation of the NBG). However, planning, decision-making and command coordination between the EU and national levels remain clearly insufficient,[12] thereby hindering the EU BGs' potential ability to react in due time and form. Adequate synchronization of lengthy national decision-making processes with strained European decision-making processes constitutes a primary challenge in a context where central planning and command capacities at the political-strategic level, in Brussels, are only limited. However, the recent first-ever activation of the EU Operations Centre (Ops Centre, established on 1 January 2007) "to improve coordination and strengthen civil-military synergies between the three CSDP actions in the Horn of Africa"[13/14], on 23 March 2012, may potentially impact the issue of European fragmentation of the planning and command structure. The efficiency and outcomes of this first utilisation of the Ops Centre is likely to pave (or block) the way towards the provision of suitable EU Operational Headquarters.

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[10] EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, «EU Battlegroups», EU BG 02, November 2006
[11] Claudia Major & Christian Mölling, *Ibid.*, p. 19
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 6
[13] Factsheet – "The activation of the EU Operations Centre", http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1634515/factsheet_opscentre_22_may_12.pdf
[14] The EU is currently conducting a military operation (EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA) and a military mission (EU Training Mission Somalia – EUTM Somalia). The planning of the civilian mission (EUCAP NESTOR) is in its final stage and the mission we be launched over the summer 2012.

EU BGs have so far not been validated in practice. Notwithstanding the rather widespread "lack of opportunities" discourse among EU officials and member states, the fact is that the deployment of Battlegroups has been considered quite often since their setting up; in the cases of DR Congo and Lebanon in 2006, of Eastern DR Congo and Chad in 2008, of Haiti in 2010, and of Libya in 2011. It has even recently been suggested by Political and Security Committee (PSC) ambassadors, that BGs could potentially be used to bring military support to EUFOR Althea. If opportunities arise and if there is general consent and support for the concept of BGs, why has deployment never occurred? Firstly, cost considerations heavily affect individual member states' decisions on deployment. If on a conceptual basis Member states agree on the deployment of a BG, their reluctance to deploy *their own* Battlegroup is quite significant. This first argument reflects of course a fundamental flaw related to the cost and burden-sharing calculations of the BG concept. Secondly, if opportunities have indeed arisen, it remains unclear if the required concrete conditions laid down for the potential development of an EU BG are met. Thus, it can be argued that there is a lack of consensus on the types of tasks that BGs should take on. Furthermore, the assessment of a crisis and of the necessity to use formations on standby is a matter of strategic culture and of political discretion, but it also relates to a third factor; unanimous agreement between Member States on the role of the EU on the international stage, on its strategic goals and more fundamentally, on the use of military force, that constitute never-ending barriers to the concretisation of the EU as a significant international actor. The Union has proved its availability and willingness to engage militarily by using other instruments at its disposal than EU BG to respond to a number of recent crises (RD Congo 2006, Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008/09); but it has simultaneously highlighted how BGs shortfalls overburden their employability, probably sentencing them to remaining on the sidelines for the foreseeable future.

Battlegroups and NATO Response Force

Finally, the relationship between EU and NATO, and especially between EU BGs and NATO Response Force (NRF), is worth being discussed. Both formations having set themselves similar objectives and tasks, and both organisations sharing almost ¾ of their respective member states and already competing over their respective roles in the international security arena, the question of duplication of capabilities is central to the BGs-NRF debate. If there are considerable differences with regard to the size and composition of the packages (NRF is a brigade-sized joint force, comprising roughly 25,000 troops; it has land, maritime and air components and benefits from harmonized standards and certification programmes), the conceptual, operational and membership overlap is highlighted by similar shortfalls faced by both force packages. In particular, there is a need to coordinate force rotations across EU BG and NRF preparation and standby requirements that currently render forces committed to the NRF unable to serve on an EU BG formation for around 2 years.[15] Closer cooperation, transparency and coordination between the EU and NATO is definitely required within a coherent EU-NATO capability group, organizing regular high-level meetings to address overall coherence and complementarity of the forces. Contrary to what was stated in the EEAS's 2011 note on the Development of European Military Capabilities, it is *not only* "for member states concerned to resolve any difficulties concerning compatibility with their commitments to other organisations, in particular in the NATO Response Force (NRF)".[16]

[15] Gustav Lindstrom, p. 49
[16] EEAS, «Development of European Military Capabilities», January 2011, Military Capabilities/8, p. 5

The Battlegroups in 2012: battling for revitalisation

In recent years, different Council Presidencies have attempted to play a leading role in the revitalisation of EU BGs. In the second term of 2009, the Swedish Presidency had ambitiously wanted to tackle the issue of deployment by "increasing the flexibility and usability of the EU Battlegroups",[17] which, however, only had a minor impact on BG employability as it left a number of important issues such as the problem of capabilities shortfalls, and risk and financial burden-sharing off the agenda. Furthermore, political challenges could naturally not be overcome through technical and practical engineering. The Initiative launched by the "Weimar Triangle" (Poland, France, Germany) in April 2011, to create a permanent civil-military planning and command structure for EU operations, gained renewed momentum under the Polish presidency of the EU Council in the second term of 2011. Indeed, the Polish presidency placed the Weimar Triangle Initiatives at the centre of its presidency programme to revitalise CSDP and EU BGs: developing BGs into civil-military crisis response forces, setting-up civil-military planning and command structures at the EU level and enhancing Pooling and Sharing (P&S).[18] The Polish initiative has to be analysed in the light of poor CSDP performance in 2011 (bilateral UK-French military operation outside the EU framework in Libya, German preference for NATO arms embargo etc.), insufficient political leadership in CSDP matters, and the financial crisis.[19] In spite of the presidency's dynamic efforts, little has been achieved. The Council Conclusions on CSDP of December 2011 call for enhanced cooperation on strategic enablers and niche capabilities, enhanced interaction between the BG and the EU level, and further work on the review of the Athena mechanism. With regard to the initiative of setting up permanent, civil-military EU planning and command structures, the document only envisages "the possibilities for Battlegroup interaction with civilian actors". Civil-military integration is, however, necessary for the EU BGs to successfully complete their tasks and to be able to meet the requirements of future operations; analysts note that rapid military response can only reach its full potential when included in a wider comprehensive strategy, addressing the broad range of crises' root causes, from political to social and economic factors.[20] Civilian considerations and instruments shall therefore be introduced into the whole process from preventive steps to the actual planning, deployment and post-withdrawal period of military operations. Finally, as EU BGs are more likely to be used as "bridging" or "initial entry force", the EU should work on further integrating them in the wider picture and in the planning of the follow-on longer-term operation.

On 1 January 2012, Denmark took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union from Poland. This handover was of primary importance for the EU's Common Defence and Security Policy because of the Danish defence "opt-out" which keeps it away from EU-led military operations and from discussions over the development of military capabilities within the EU. Therefore, the reform dynamic of the recent years is currently slowing down and has shifted away from Council Presidencies' initiatives into the hands of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). As it appears from the May 2012 CMPD report on Battlegroups, the concept still benefits from wide support among CSDP member states. Many, however, mention the lack of political will and, some others, the cost of participation and the lack of

[17] Council of the European Union note, 15336/09

[18] c.f. Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos, « The EU, NATO, and Emerging Security Challenges », *ISIS-Europe European Security Review 54*, pp. 5-6, http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/publications-downloads/esr54-EU-NATOemergingchallenges-May2012%20MH_0.pdf

[19] Claudia Major & Florian Wassenberg, «Warsaw's Ambitious CSDP Agenda», *SWP Comment* (Sept. 2011) pp. 1-3

[20] Claudia Major & Christian Mölling, *Ibid.*, p. 9

critical capabilities, to explain the blanks in the contribution roster. Indeed, the current economic and financial context, heavily weighing on national defence budgets, has created renewed momentum on P&S as a means to step-up spending efficiency and keep, at the EU level, essential capabilities that could not be gathered by member states alone. This is an opportunity to overcome a number of limitations mentioned above by enhancing, expanding and further integrating member states capabilities and sustainability within recurrent/regular BG formations. CMPD, therefore, envisaged to recast BGs contributions on framework nations from 2015 and onwards, on the basis of a regular rotation among themselves, with other member states adding their own contributions to the core roster within a regional and/or partnership approach.

Renewed focus on P&S has also provided impetus for joint procurement initiatives and for entrusting the European Defence Agency (EDA) with more responsibility on EU BG related matters, and especially, in acquiring support packages for formations. The German, Czech and Austrian Defence Ministers recently agreed to launch joint procurement initiatives for the acquisition of basic logistic support means for Battlegroups.[21] In parallel, the Visegrad Defence Ministers[22] engaged in talks on the acquisition of joint radar surveillance technology. The EDA estimated savings through grouped procurement to be up to 20%.[23] The establishment of an Early Warning and Deployment Management System and of a Military Health and Medical Support coordination Unit to tackle financial and capabilities shortfalls was also raised in the CMPD report. Further logistic outsourcing, further use of the EDA and regular recourse to cooperative solutions (framework support contracts for fuel, transport, satellite communication etc.), including P&S, are also clearly recommended.[24] Ironically enough, although the current context of strained defence budgets has produced sustained incentives for member states' investment in the search for new ways to share costs and pool resources associated with EU BGs, it is feared that these very countries, at the same time, may look for ways to avoid the activation of their EU BG during a time of crisis. Such a development would clearly constitute a major blow to the perceived viability of the EU BG concept.

The upcoming Cypriot presidency, the political deadlock in Cyprus-Turkey relations and the lack of a formal Cyprus-NATO dialogue that accompanies it, heavily constrains Cyprus' likelihood to bring about any significant change or initiative on EU BGs and CSDP. Increased cooperation with NATO, which constituted one of the cornerstones of the Polish Presidencies' priorities for CSDP, will most certainly not result in the envisaged (and much-needed) "enhanced Berlin Plus Agreements" over the second term of 2012.

[21] Decision of March 2012 and project to be launched in the second half of 2012

[22] Mr. Csaba Hende, from Hungary; Mr. Martin Glváč, from the Slovak Republic; and Mr. Alexandr Vondra, from the Czech Republic

[23] «EU/CSDP: EDA ideas for doing more in defence with little investment», *Europe Diplomatie & Défense* 23/03/2012, N°499, p. 5

[24] «EU/CSDP : CMPD suggests group of framework nations should shoulder responsibility for making up battlegroup shortfall», *Europe Diplomatie & Défense*, 24/05/2012, N°517, p. 3

Conclusion

As it has been mentioned, in their inception, EU BGs were meant to achieve two objectives: act as a major engine of transformation of national armed forces on the one hand, and enable independent, timely, rapid and decisive European reaction on the other. When assessing their achievements after five years of FOC, they seem to have brought about some progress with regard to their first objective, while their credibility in undertaking rapid action in the framework of CSDP is rather controversial. In consequence, their added-value has been more significant for individual member states than for the Union as a whole, and for its role as a global actor. The efforts made over the past three years to revise and make EU BGs more employable reveal that Gustav Lindstrom may have been right when he prophetically argued that "the first few years post-FOC will be vital to gauge whether or not the EU BGs will become an active part of the ESDP crisis management toolbox".[25] Unfortunately, the pressure exerted on EU BGs is likely to further hamper future deployment, for the Union and CSDP cannot afford a potential military or political failure related to the never-deployed Battlegroups; however, waiting for the ideal crisis may turn Battlegroups into a "forgotten" instrument of the CSDP toolkit.

[25] Gustav Lindstrom, *Ibid.*, p. 64

Annex I
EU Battlegroups rotation, commitment and composition 2005-2017

Semester		Preferred OHQ
2005		
1st semester	**UK**	
	France	
2nd semester	**Italy**	
	vacant	
2006		
1st semester	**France**, Germany	
	Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal	
2nd semester	**France**, Germany, Belgium	FR
	vacant	
2007		
1st semester	**France**, Belgium	FR
	Germany, Netherlands, Finland	DE
2nd semester	**Italy**, Hungary, Slovenia ("Multinational Land Force" MLF)	IT
	Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania ("HELBROC")	EL
2008		
1st semester	**Sweden**, Finland, Estonia, Norway, Ireland ("Nordic")	SE
	Spain, France, Portugal, Germany	
2nd semester	**Germany**, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain	FR
	UK	UK
2009		
1st semester	**Italy**, Spain, Greece, Portugal ("SILF")	
	Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus ("HELBROC")	EL
2nd semester	**Czech Republic**, Slovakia	
	France, Belgium, Luxembourg	
2010		
1st semester	**Poland**, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia	
	UK, Netherlands	
2nd semester	**Italy**, Romania, + Turkey	IT
	Spain, France, Portugal	FR
2011		
1st semester	**Netherlands**, Germany, Finland, Austria, Lithuania ("Saxon")	DE
	Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Ireland + Norway ("Nordic")	UK
2nd semester	**Greece**, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania ("HELBROC")	EL
	Portugal, Spain, France, Italy ("Eurofor")	FR

	2012		
Detailed commitments	1st semester	**France**, Belgium, Luxembourg	FR
		vacant	
	2nd semester	**Italy**, Slovenia, Hungary ("Multinational Land Force" MLF)	IT
		Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Ireland + Croatia & FYROM	DE
	2013		
	1st semester	**Poland**, Germany, France ("Weimar")	FR
		Vacant	
	2nd semester	**UK**, Sweden*, Lithuania, Latvia	UK
		Vacant	
	2014		
BG-package commitments	1st semester	**Greece**, Bulgaria*, Romania, Cyprus ("HELBROC")	EL
		Vacant	
	2nd semester	**Belgium**, Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain	DE
		Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal	EL
	2015		
	1st semester	**Sweden***, Finland*	
		Vacant	
	2nd semester	**France**, Belgium*	FR
		Vacant	
	2016		
Initial offers	1st semester	**Poland**, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic ("Visegrad")	
		Vacant	
	2nd semester	**UK***	UK
		Vacant	
	2017		
	1st semester	*Vacant*	
		Vacant	
	2nd semester	*Vacant*	
		Vacant	

Source: European Union Military Staff – June 2012

Framework nation

*Participation pending political decision

+ third states

Annex II
Battlegroups' Timeline