The
Future for UN Peacekeeping
by
Maria Bideke, 2000
UN Photo
Contents
|
1.
Introduction
1.1 Purpose
1.2 Methods used
1.3 Division
2. Background
2.1 Definition of peacekeeping
2.2 History of UN peacekeeping operations during
the Cold War
2.3 Peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War
2.4 The Security Council and its mandates
2.5 The Department of Peacekeeping Operations
2.6 Different peace activities within the UN
2.6.1 Preventive
diplomacy and peacemaking
2.6.2 Peacebuilding
2.6.3
Peaceshaping
2.6.4
Enforcement actions
2.6.5
Conclusion
3.
UN peacekeeping - problems and aspects
3.1 Civil Wars
3.1.1 National
sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention
3.1.2
Neutrality
3.1.3
Geography
3.1.4
Humanitarian aid
3.2 Problems of command and control
3.2.1 Command
3.2.2 Control
3.3 UN peacekeeping and regional organisations
3.4 Problems of national interests and the
United States
3.5 Problems of withdrawal from peacekeeping
operations
4.1 General introduction
4.2 Reforms without amendments of the UN Charter
4.2.1 The structure of the New York Headquarter
4.2.2 The UN organisational structure
4.2.3 The field and specific issues
4.2.4 UN finances and the seeking of additional
revenue sources
4.3 Reforms with amendments of the UN Charter
4.3.1
Reforming the Security Council
5.1 General introduction
5.2 An Agenda for Peace
5.3 The Carlsson–Ramphal Report
5.4 The Millennium Report
6.
Personal views and suggestions
6.1 General introduction
6.2 Reforms already accomplished
6.3 Reforms suggested
6.3.1 Reforms
of the Security Council
6.3.2
Financial reforms
6.3.3 The
creation of a rapid response group
6.3.4
Information capability
Abbreviations
|
C3I – command,
control, communications and intelligence
CIS – Commonwealth
of Independent States
CSCE – Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe
ECOSOC - Economic
and Social Council
ESC – Economic
Security Council
NACC – North
Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO – North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation
P5 – the five
permanent members of the Security Council
SIPRI – Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute
WEU – Western
European Union
UN - United
Nations
UNAMIR -
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNFICYP – United
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIKOM –
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
Back to contents
1. Introduction
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1.1
Purpose
The
purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the importance of UN peacekeeping
operations today and to analyse the future development of these kinds of
operations. Moreover, it will discuss possible improved responses by the UN in
peacekeeping missions in a future of more complex conflict situations, and it
will also deal with the question on whether peacekeeping really is the most
effective way of preserving peace. All of these aspects of UN peacekeeping will
be discussed, although the main purpose will be to evaluate how the UN can
improve its current system of peacekeeping to better suit the new situation in
the world.
The
reason why this subject is especially important today is the new world order
following the end of the Cold War. When the great powers in the Security
Council no longer stopped every possible joint UN action, there was an enormous
increase in resolutions ordering peacekeeping operations. The new situation in
the world also created a need for more complex peace operations acting in
intra-state conflicts. Subsequently, one can say that the end of the Cold War
has caused both quantitative and qualitative changes to UN peacekeeping
activities. The changes have led to an international debate on the subject,
with several requests for an evaluation of the current system of UN
peacekeeping operations with both the successes and the failures taken into
consideration. Suggestions have also been put forward on how to best improve
the UN structure for peace operations, like for example the idea of creating a
rapid response force in order to respond quickly to possible conflicts. It is
this current international debate that makes the subject of the future for UN
peacekeeping so interesting to evaluate.
A
second reason why peacekeeping is of special interest today, is the discussion
of reorganising the UN following the organisation’s 50’s anniversary in 1995.
The main issue in that debate is the survival of the UN in a new world, but
this also includes the issue of future peacekeeping operations.
1.2 Methods
used
There
is no explicit support for peacekeeping operations in the UN Charter, when they
are founded on an imaginary Chapter VI ½, and there is therefore no need for
evaluations of certain articles in this paper. The contents of the following discussion is rather focused on the opinions brought forward in the
international debate, and on the different political wills that they reflect.
Many important persons in the world of international peace and security, such
as the Secretary General Kofi Annan and the head of the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) Bernard Miyet, have ideas about the future of UN peacekeeping
activities, and it is these views and thoughts that create the base for the
following discussion.
1.3
Division
The
thesis will start with a definition of the concept of ”peacekeeping”. Then follows an overview of UN peacekeeping
activities since the foundation of the United Nations in 1945, with the purpose
of putting the current problems/aspects of UN peacekeeping operations in their
historical context. It is first after this initial account of the background
that the actual current aspects of UN peacekeeping operations will be
discussed. These problems and aspects relate both to the fieldwork and to the
structural problems existing in the headquarter of the UN organisation.
Finally, this paper will address the possible reforms of the peacekeeping
operations and the solutions brought forward by different authors in the
international debate, ending with a section of personal evaluations and own
suggestions on how to improve the existing UN structure.
2. Background
|
2.1
Definition of peacekeeping
There
are three particularly important principles for all kinds of peacekeeping
forces: the consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force
except in self-defence. However, after the end of the Cold War and the
increasing number of intra-state conflicts, UN peacekeeping operations have in
some cases been forced to forsake some of these principles in order to coup
with the more complex situations. The tasks of protecting humanitarian
operations in ongoing warfare and protecting civilians in designated safe areas
are examples of situations involving giving up one or more of the
above-mentioned principles.[1]
During
the Cold War the UN peacekeeping approach was focused rather on non-coercive
and facilitative activities than on repellent aggression through armed combat.
The aims of these operations, which are commonly called ”traditional
peacekeeping”, were to promote international stability during a time of
great-power hostilities. The peacekeeping forces had no military objectives and
were required to negotiate rather than to fight. Seven different
characteristics can be said to distinguish traditional peacekeeping[2]:
·
Consent and co-operation of parties
·
International backing
·
UN command and control
·
Multinational composition
·
No use of force
·
Military neutrality
·
Political impartiality
An
almost model example of traditional peacekeeping is the UN peacekeeping force in
Cyprus (UNFICYP), which was sent to Cyprus on recommendation of the Security
Council in 1964 in order to promote a peaceful settlement of the dispute
between the Greek Cypriots and the Turk Cypriots. UNFICYP’s other tasks were to
prevent new violence and to contribute to the restoration of law and order. The
UN peacekeeping force still remains in the area, and it is now guarding the
boarder between the island’s two parts, with the hopes to prevent violence from
escalating.[3]
When
the Cold War ended and the situation in the world changed dramatically, so did
the context in which the UN peacekeeping forces were to operate. The
peacekeeping operations expanded both in numbers, but also in the nature of
their missions. Many of the operations were inserted in the context of
conflicts within nation-states and the tasks they had to perform therefore
expanded. These new kind of more complex peacekeeping operations are often
called ”second generation” peacekeeping, and the peacekeepers in these
operations can be required to undertake tasks like[4]:
·
Policing
·
Military
·
Observation, organisation and conduct of
elections
·
Information dissemination
·
Human rights monitoring and enforcement
·
Rehabilitation
·
Repatriation
·
Administration
Moreover,
there is also a growing ”grey zone” in the space between traditional
peacekeeping and enforcement action (all-out war fighting). Many conflicts
require responses, which are neither traditional peacekeeping nor peace
enforcement, and the tendency lately in these cases has been to slide from
peacekeeping to enforcement and then back again. The confusion this causes has
led to disastrous consequences in the cases of Somalia, Liberia and the former
Yugoslavia, when it has placed peacekeepers in untenable positions in various
ways. Peacekeepers are lightly armed and they therefore lack the capacity of
armed response, which makes military response difficult. There is also another
problem arising if the peacekeepers do engage in military confrontation. The
subsequent consequence of such an action is that the peacekeeping operation may
loose its credibility of being impartial.[5]
There is today an ongoing debate of how to solve the problems concerning peace
operations in the ”grey zone”. One view taken is that when neither traditional
peacekeeping, nor massive enforcement actions are what a conflict requires,
there should be some sort of third mechanism within the UN to cope with the
situation. As Sir Brian Urquhart, a UN expert, advocates, this mechanism could
involve a UN rapid response force. This and other possible solutions to the
current problems of UN peacekeeping operations will be further discussed later
on in this essay.[6]
It
is also important to note that the idea of peacekeeping is nowhere to be found
in the UN Charter. Instead the practice has developed in the spirit of Chapter
VI of the Charter (Pacific Settlements of Disputes), and it is also argued
sometimes that peacekeeping operations can be seen as an application of article
40 (about provisional measures) in Chapter VII (Actions with Respect to Threats
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression)[7].
However, the most common view is that peacekeeping operations are to be seen as
an imaginary Chapter VI ½, somewhere in between the pacific settlement of
disputes in Chapter VI and the more forceful actions to preserve international
peace in Chapter VII. The question about the legality of peacekeeping
operations has a strong connection to the issue of the scope of the Security
Council’s mandate. This issue, however, will be discussed more exhaustive later
on in this paper.
2.2 History of UN peacekeeping
operations during the Cold War
The
United Nations was created in the aftermath of World War II and the aim was to
”save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (words of the Charter).
It was assumed that future conflicts were likely to be caused by aggression of
one state against another, and the UN charter therefore gave the Security
Council the mandate to ”take measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security” (article 51). However, the system that was to prevent inter-state
aggressions did not function as intended during the Cold War. The first reason
for this was the unwillingness by the permanent members of the Council to agree
on joint actions. In most conflicts during this time, one or both of the
superpowers had interest and any joint UN action was then inevitably stopped by
the permanent members veto power in the Security Council. Only on one occasion
during the Cold War did the member states join in action against aggression
under the flag of the UN, and this was in the case of Korea in 1950. That
operation was in reality an action by the United States and its allies, and it
was the Soviet Union’s boycott of the Security Council at the time that made
the action possible.
The
second reason for the UN system’s ineffectiveness during the Cold War, was the
fact that many of the conflicts occurring after the end of World War II were
not inter-state conflicts, but intra-state ones. These new kinds of conflicts
were based on ethnic and social divisions that cut across state boundaries,
rather than on the aggression between two states. The Charter allows actions
taken in response to breaches of the international
peace, but it does not legitimise interference in purely domestic conflicts.[8]
It
is in this context of the Cold War and the rivalry between the super powers
that the peace-and-security agenda of the United Nations has developed. During
the time from its first peacekeeping mission in 1948 in Palestine, to the
multidimensional peacekeeping operation in Namibia in 1989, the UN has
undertaken fifteen ”traditional” peacekeeping operations and of those were most
consent-based operations concerning conflicts between states. The peacekeeping
missions monitored and supervised truces, withdrawals, cease-fires and buffer
zones and they worked under the three principles of cooperation, impartiality
and non-use of force except for in self-defence. The forces often helped to
prevent more bloodshed, but they could not resolve the underlying substance of
the conflicts. As a conclusion, one can therefore say that the UN contribution
to world peace during the Cold War did not turn out to be like was hoped in
1945.[9]
2.3
Peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War
In
the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the world underwent a significant change
with the end of the Cold War. This arouse widespread hopes that the Security
Council would now be able to co-operate in joint actions to restore and
maintain international peace. The first sign of this kind of co-operation was
Resolution 598[10],
in which all the five permanent members of the Council agreed to try to stop
the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq.[11]
The
Kuwait crisis in August 1990 constituted a second phase in this new time era,
when the Security Council for the first time took enforcement action under
Chapter VII of the Charter to deal with the aggression by one member state
against another. The Council first imposed stringent economic sanctions on
Iraq, and then proceeded to authorise military action by member states.[12] However, this action was not an
action taken by the Council itself, as envisaged in the Charter, but was
instead an ad hoc coalition of member states under U.S. command. It was the
fact that the Soviet Union supported the action and that China refrained from
using its veto power that enabled it.[13]
In
the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis, there were uprisings against the regime of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq. These were suppressed with extreme brutality, which caused
a stream of Iraqi refugees to the neighbouring countries. This domestic crisis
in Iraq constitutes a third phase in the development of UN peace operations
after the end of the Cold War. The Security Council described the Iraqi
government’s oppression as a ”threat to international peace and security”,
which implicitly brings the Iraqi intra-state crisis within the scope of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[14]
However, the decision by the Council to include a domestic crisis into the
scope of Chapter VII was not undisputed at the time, and there is still no
international consensus as to the legality of this kind of action. Some
non-governmental groups in the third world and also some northern elite states
hoped that this action by the UN in a domestic crisis would constitute the
beginning of a new world order, where international actions could be used in
cases of civil wars with human rights violation within state boundaries.
However, succeeding UN interventions in civil war have turned out to be far
less successful than the Iraqi one, for example the missions in Somalia and
Rwanda. When, and if, international interventions in sovereign states’ domestic
crises should be tolerated will be discussed in a special chapter later on.[15]
2.4
The Security Council and its mandate
The
Security Council is the UN organ that holds the chief responsibility for
maintaining international peace and security, and it is the authorising body
for peacekeeping operations. In Chapter V of the UN Charter the composition,
functions and procedures of the Council are laid down. Article 24.1 in this
Chapter gives the Security Council the “primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security” and the members are agreeing
that “in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council
acts on their behalf”. The more specific powers of the Council are laid down in
Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII [16] and of those can Chapter VII be said
to be the most important, when it allows the Council to “determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression”. The same Chapter also urge the Security Council to take action to
“maintain or restore international peace and security” (article 39), including
if necessary “action by air, sea or land forces” (article 42). Member states
retain, however, their “inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence” in the event of an armed attack
“until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security” (article 51).
During
the Cold War the system of the Security Council looking after peace and
security in the world did not work as intended. One reason for this was the
impossibility of the permanent members of the Council to agree on joint action.
Another was that many of the conflicts after 1945 were not interstate
conflicts, but instead conflicts based on ethnic, social and ideological
divisions that cut across state boundaries. In those cases it was difficult to
determine who was the aggressor and who was the victim, and if the conflict was
raging within only one member-state’s borders, it was also usually considered
to be outside the Security Council’s terms of reference according to article
2.7 of the Charter. This article lays down that “nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state.” It continues,
however, by stating that ”this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII”, but that addition has been interpreted
not to legitimise interference in purely domestic crisis, but rather referring
to measures taken in response to breaches of the international peace. [17]
2.5 The Department of Peacekeeping
Operations
The
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is the section within the UN
secretariat, which manages, plans and directs the peacekeeping field operations
established by the Security Council and the General Assembly. In recent years,
the increasing number of peacekeeping operations has forced the DPKO to upgrade
its structure in order to meet the new demands. A first change was made in
April 1993, when a situation centre, operating around the clock, was
established in New York. Military officers loaned by member states largely
staff this centre, and its role is to enable communications between the new
complex peacekeeping operations around the world and the New York headquarter.
In late 1993, another unit was created, the Policy and Analysis Unit, with the
aim to provide in-depth research of subjects concerning the DPKO. In this
research they are helped by the analysis of previous peacekeeping operations
created by the Lessons Learned Unit.[18]
Moreover,
two new offices in the overall structure of the DPKO have been formed: the
Office of Operations and the Office of Planning and Support. The Office of
Operations is in charge of the day-to-day direction of peacekeeping operations
and other field missions. The Office of Planning and Support, on the other
hand, is responsible for all technical matters related to the planning and
support of peacekeeping operations, and also for civilian police, demining and
training activities.
An
important part of the Office of Planning and Support is the Mission Planning
Service, which works to design integrated civilian and military plans for the
complex, multidimensional peacekeeping operations. This unit is closely
connected to the system of national standby forces, which was developed in
1993. The standby arrangements consist of interested member states that are
willing to maintain an agreed state of readiness as a possible contribution to
UN peacekeeping operations. These standby forces remain in their home country
until their government decides that they should be deployed in a peacekeeping
operation. As to date, 88 member-states have confirmed their willingness to
participate in the standby arrangement, and most of them have also provided
detailed lists of the specific capabilities they wish to contribute with.[19]
To
sum up, the increasing number of peacekeeping operations and the new complexity
of these operations have put a greater demand on the DPKO. As mentioned above,
there has been a gradually updating of the departments structure in recent years,
but there are still improvements that can be accomplished in order to further
strengthening the department’s capacity. Suggestions of such reforms will be
discussed later on in this paper in connection with other reform issues.
2.6
Different peace activities within the UN
There
are several different ways in which the UN currently works to create
international peace and security. The way of categorising these activities
differ between different persons in the world of international peace and
security, but in an attempt to generalise they can be divided into: preventive
diplomacy and peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peaceshaping and
enforcement actions. It is important to realise the differences between these
types of actions in order to fully understand the problems and aspects relating
to UN peacekeeping operations. Therefore, a brief outline of the differences
and challenges of the various UN peace operations will follow, before the
specific issues of peacekeeping are addressed.
2.6.1 Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking
There
is consensus in the international community as to the importance of preventive
diplomacy, because once a conflict has escalated the difficulty of resolving
the conflict increases immensely. It is both more efficient and more
cost-effective to prevent potential crises before they explode into armed
conflict, than to have to undertake major politico-military efforts after the
conflict has broken out. Preventive diplomacy can consist of early warning
systems to warn the international community of possible threats to the
environment, nuclear risks and abuses of human rights. However, preventive
diplomacy can also involve quiet diplomacy, preventive deployment and other
policies and tools to resolve conflicts at an early stage of their evolution.[20]
In
close connection to preventive diplomacy, is the concept of peacemaking. The
major difference between these two activities, is that peacemaking is applied after a dispute has turned into an armed
conflict. In peacemaking the main purpose is to bring hostile parties to an
agreement by peaceful means, mostly through getting the parties of the conflict
to use alternative tools of conflict management as set out in article 33 of the
UN Charter. In this article the parties of the conflict are asked to seek a
solution by ”negotiation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlements, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice”.[21] Finally, the concept of peacemaking
can also include the Secretary General’s ”good offices” (bona officia) acting as third party in a conflict, or even UN
interventions without the parties consent but with the direction of the
Security Council.[22]
When
discussing peacemaking, it is also important to make the distinction between
peacemaking and peacekeeping. The difference is that when peacemaking seeks
conflict settlement and resolution, peacekeeping operations often have more
modest aims. Peacekeeping can include reaching a cease-fire or bringing the parties
to the negotiation table, but it does not necessarily mean the settling of the
underlying conflict. However, although peacemaking and peacekeeping are
distinct and have different purposes, they are nevertheless often inseparable
activities. Peacekeeping activities on the ground create the necessary
conditions for succeeding peacemaking. Sometimes, as in the case of Cambodia,
peacekeeping operations can even incorporate elements of peacemaking.[23]
2.6.2 Peacebuilding
Another
international response to conflicts is that of peacebuilding, and here the
emphasis is put on post-conflict intervention. Peacebuilding operations focus
on economic development and institution building, demilitarisation, improved
police and judicial systems, electoral reforms and the monitoring of human
rights, with the aim to prevent the recurrence of hostilities.[24] There are two kinds of peacebuilding
situations, and they give raise to different problems. The first situation is
when a UN peacekeeping force is already present in the conflict area to
supervise an agreed settlement, and the second situation consists of a conflict
where no peacekeeping force has been deployed. The first situation is easier to
manage, when the UN already has an entree into the conflict. The parties have
accepted the role of the UN as peacekeeper and peacemaker, which facilitates
the efforts to build peace. This is especially the case when the preceding
peacekeeping forces have already begun to launch various peacebuilding
activities, such as the reintegration of former combatants into civilian
activities. In the second situation, when the UN does not have a peacekeeping
or peacemaking mandate, there is the question of who should identify the need
for peacebuilding activities and report them to the governments in the conflict
states. The former Secretary General suggests in his Supplement to an Agenda
for Peace, that this responsibility falls upon the UN Headquarter. With all the
information available to it, he argues, the Headquarter should be able to see
early warning signals and then take appropriate action. [25]
2.6.3 Peaceshaping
The
term ”peace shaping” is a new way of
defining a UN peace strategy, and the Nordic countries first launched this
expression in a document in 1991 [26].
This document is often called ”the Skagen Document” after the town where it was
negotiated, and it sets up twelve points of how to shape the UN peace operations to be more efficient. Peace shaping
is really a combination of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building, and
the aim is to create an extensive strategy for peace.[27]
2.6.4 Enforcement actions
Peace
enforcement operations are authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII
of the Charter, and they give the force commanders permission to use force
beyond the situations of self-defence and defence of the mission. The purpose
of Chapter VII is that enforcement actions shall act against threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, but the problems at present
to deploy, direct, command and control such operations make them rather rare[28].
When defining the concept of peace enforcement, it is also important to
evaluate its close connection to peacekeeping. The difference between these two
kinds of actions, is that peacekeepers, as opposed to peace enforces, are
”instruments of diplomacy, not war”. Peacekeeping missions need the consent of
both parties and should act peacefully, while enforcement actions are presumed
to be resisted by at least one of the parties and are mandated to use force.
Lately peacekeeping operations have been mixed with peace enforcement in
several cases, which has caused confusion as to the objectives of the
operations. To avoid this confusion and the problems that causes, many voices
in the international debate of peace and security have advocated that the sharp
distinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations should be preserved.
In a workshop in Stockholm held jointly by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, for example, there were requests that ”mixed operations” should be
avoided, and with ”mixed operations” then meaning a mixture of peacekeeping and
peace enforcement. Most of the members of this workshop also stressed the
difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement and the importance to
uphold the basic principles of peacekeeping: consent of the parties,
impartiality of the peacekeepers and the non-use of force except for in
self-defence. If, for example, the use of force in a peacekeeping operation is
used other than in self-defence, this may compromise the neutrality of the
peacekeepers and risk the consent of the parties. [29]
2.6.5 Conclusion
After
discussing the different UN peace activities and evaluating the varying
problems relating to each of these activities, there is also a need to look at
the connection between them all. Together the UN peace activities can be
regarded as a system, which provides a comprehensive range of responses to any
given conflict. One kind of peace operation often facilitates the succeeding
kind of peace activity in the conflict area, and sometimes the varying peace
forces can even perform tasks usually undertaken by a different kind of UN
peace operation. Many of the considerations that have to be regarded are also
the same in the different kinds of UN peace operations: the nature of the
response to the conflict has to be recognised, the cost involved have to be
accepted and the objectives of the action have to be clear. However, although
the different UN peace activities show similarities and together create a
system, there is important that the distinction between them remain sharp so
that there will be no confusion as to the scope and mandate of UN peace
operation forces.
3.
UN peacekeeping – problems and aspects
|
“the constant struggle to close the
gap between aspiration and performance…makes the difference between
civilisation and chaos”
-
Dag Hammarskjöld
3.1
Peacekeeping in civil wars
When
the Charter of the United Nations was written in 1945, it was founded on the
principle of national sovereignty. Today, however, most conflicts in the world
are mainly domestic, which subsequently raises the question of when the UN or
another international body committed to maintaining the territorial integrity
of its member-states, are allowed to intervene in civil wars. The international
organisation has to decide when to support the “legitimate” government against
the attempts to succession, and when to oppose it, which subsequently puts the
UN neutrality in question. Moreover, civil war interventions also concern other
difficult areas, such as problems relating to geography and humanitarian aid.
All of these above mentioned issues will be discussed separately below in
connection to the issue of peacekeeping.[30]
3.1.1 National sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention
The
questions of national sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention are
perhaps the most obvious problems relating to UN interventions in domestic
crises. Although these questions primarily concern enforcement actions, it is
nevertheless important to also mention them when discussing UN peacekeeping
operations. That is because the difficult issue of interference in states’ domestic
affairs affect all UN peace operations.
Article
2.7 of the UN Charter clearly support the principle of non-intervention in
domestic affairs of other countries, and the reason for including this article
at the 1945 San Francisco Conference was obviously that sovereign states should
remain sovereign. However, although the Security Council lacks the authority to
decide on interventions in civil wars under article 2.7, they may decide that a
domestic crisis constitutes a “threat to the peace” in terms of article 39 of
the Charter. If that is the case, the Security Council is free to order
intervention by the UN or authorise intervention by member-states. This right
for the Security Council to order intervention in civil wars under article 39,
however, is not undisputed.[31]
3.1.2 Neutrality
One
of the fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping is to maintain the neutrality,
because neutral troops are more likely to be accepted by the parties involved
in a conflict. In civil war, however, it can be rather difficult for UN
peacekeepers to remain impartial, when they often have to make the choice of
supporting or opposing the government.
Especially groups in a conflict who are disadvantaged by the status quo tend to regard peacekeeping
forces as inherently biased. There is therefore the risk in civil wars that
such groups will act to disrupt the operation and perhaps even attack UN
peacekeeping personnel.[32]
3.1.3 Geography
Peacekeeping
forces in all conflicts face potential problems in regard to the geography in
the area. Generally, the larger area of deployment, the more difficult it will
be for the peacekeeping troops to achieve their mission, when violations will
be more difficult to detect. On the other hand, a too small area may also cause
difficulties, as it may then be impossible to properly separate the combatants.
In civil wars, these problems concerning the geography are especially
difficult. One difficulty lies in that the combatants in an intra-state
conflict are from the same state and are often not wearing military uniforms,
which makes it hard for the peacekeepers to identify them. Another is that it
might be problems with separating the different sides, when they usually occupy
the same geographic area. Overall, one can say that peacekeeping forces in
civil wars face more problems relating to the geography of the conflict area
than traditional peacekeeping operations in inter-state conflicts do. They have
greater difficulties in separating combatants and monitoring cease-fire
violations and they also are more vulnerable themselves to attack.[33]
3.1.4 Humanitarian aid
There
may be particular problems regarding UN distribution of humanitarian aid in
civil conflicts, which is often distributed with the help of UN
peacekeepers. Normally, such aid is
regarded to be neutral, but in civil wars parties in the conflict may think
otherwise. First, there are groups opposing the government, which often seek to
prevent supplies and assistance to reach the people. Their aim is to create
chaos in the country, in order to make the government more vulnerable for a
take-over. A second group, which might also be opposed to the humanitarian
distribution of food and medicines to the people, is the status quo group. Their reason is that they may want to punish
groups that live in areas controlled by the rebels. Another reason for the
government to resent humanitarian aid is that they regard it as a violation of
the states sovereignty.[34]
3.2
Problems of Command and Control
One
of the issues debated in relation to UN peacekeeping operations is the question
of command and control in these missions. Command
refers, in NATO terminology, to
“the authority vested in the individual of armed forces for the direction,
co-ordination and control of the military forces” [35]. Control,
on the other hand , refers to that authority exercised by a commander over part
of the activities of subordinate organisations or other organisations not
normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for
implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be
transferred or delegated.[36]
Somewhat
more simplified, command is “who is in charge of the military”, while control
is “how the military know what their own people are doing and how they tell
them what to do”.
Sometimes
the issue of command and control is referred to as C3I: command, control,
communications and intelligence. The cause to the problem of C3I arrangements
is often the discrepancy that exists between the political authority and their
military means. Many peacekeeping operations are shaped with prevailing
politically rather than military means, and military considerations such as
those concerning command and control, are subsequently secondary to political
priorities.
Lately
the problem of command and control in UN peacekeeping operations has been
particularly heated during the operations in Somalia and Bosnia. In Somalia it
was the co-ordination between the UN and the U.S. that was questioned, when it
in Bosnia was rather a discussion of who should have the authority to order air
strikes. These both operations show that peacekeeping operations are becoming
increasingly complex and even dangerous, which makes it important to evaluate
the problems associated with C3I.[37]
3.2.1 Command
Different
actors in a peacekeeping operation, such as NATO, the United States, the UK and
Russia, usually have different answers to the question of who is in command of
the military. They also have varying ways of regarding the particular key issue
related to the question of command in UN peacekeeping operations: Who should be in charge of the C3I of the
operation? Many of the command questions are dependent upon the answers to this
key issue, and it is therefore interesting to evaluate how the different actors
in peacekeeping operations regard it.
Nato’s
opinion is that if NATO forces are committed to a peacekeeping operation, they
should remain under NATO control only. However, NATO does not oppose that its
member-states may choose to subordinate certain units of their armed forces to,
for example the UN, as long as the forces engaged within NATO action remain
under NATO control only. The United States regard the degree of U.S. control in
proportion to the importance of U.S. participation. They might agree to
participate in an operation controlled by the UN, but U.S. troops will still
remain wholly under U.S. authority. In the UK they have a somewhat different
attitude to the question, when they have been willing to put British soldiers
under UN command in peacekeeping operations, as for example in Bosnia. This
willingness to subordinate British troops to the UN, however, is dependent upon
the risk of uncontrolled escalation of violence in the operation. If such risk
is foreseen, the UK is likely to withdraw its forces unilaterally. Russia too,
is prepared to subordinate forces to UN peacekeeping operations, as long as it
is not a question of operation under the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) or within Russia.
As
has been shown, there are many different views and preferred opinions among
states regarding the issue of command in UN peacekeeping operations. The key
operational command concepts for NATO, U.S., UK and Russia varies, and these
varieties are good illustration of the complexity and the problems affecting many
of the UN peacekeeping operations today.[38]
Table 1: Differing operational
concepts of command in peacekeeping operations [39]
Actor
Attitude to C3I
NATO NATO only
USA U.S. only
Russia UN or Russia (within CIS)
UK Operational subordination to UN
possible
3.2.2 Control
Control
in peacekeeping operations depends upon means, such as firepower, intelligence,
planning, communications, logistics, mobility, etc. The United Nations does not
have any means of its own, and it therefore has to rely on means belonging to
individual nations and military alliances. There lies a danger in accepting
this help, however, when the UN then becomes susceptible to political pressure.
The most obvious lack of means in the UN is the lack of firepower. There is,
however, no possibility for the UN organisation to create an army of its own,
which subsequently makes it dependent upon the military means of external
entities. In addition to the lack of arms, the UN is also short of an
independent intelligence service. It has even been claimed that the shortage of
intelligence capability is actually more important than the lack of arms.[40] This is because firepower is only
needed in certain circumstances, but intelligence is crucial for all stages of
a peacekeeping operation. It helps the peacekeepers to assess the situation,
note what the warring parties are doing and to provide essential background
information for negotiations.
Today
the UN is completely dependent upon NATO for most of its information, and it is
in this context interesting to keep in mind that NATO relies to a great extent
on the intelligence capabilities of the U.S. One can then ask how much of the
UN requirements of impartiality, transparency and independence from any single
country that are left. [41]
3.3
UN Peacekeeping and regional organisations
The
importance of regional organisations in UN peacekeeping has been debated since
the very drafting of the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. At
that time the opinions varied, and there were doubts as to whether regional
organisations should be regarded as a complement to the UN in peace and security
issues or as opponents. The division in opinions of the importance of regional
organisations in UN peacekeeping operations is still of current interest, and
there are several arguments both for and against their involvement. The
arguments against their contribution
include the regional organisations’ alleged lack of necessary resources and
experience, and also the problems for these organisations to overcome
intra-regional political differences. Regional organisations’ frequent failures
in former peace operations are also often mentioned in this context. Arguments for an involvement, on the other hand,
are that regional peacekeeping operations might receive greater local support
than an intervention by an “outsider”, like the UN. Regional organisations may also
be better in providing early-warning, fact-finding and information-gathering
than the UN mechanism, and they are also often more familiar with the conflict
situation. [42]
The
end of the Cold War created a need for a decentralisation of the peace and security
functions of the UN, which contributed to a more positive outlook on regional
organisations’ involvement in peacekeeping. The increasing number of UN
peacekeeping operations in resent years, with the resource constraints this has
imposed on the UN organisation, has also created a greater demand for
delegation of UN peace operations to regional organisation. A particularly
striking example of regional peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era, is the
operation in Liberia in 1990 at a time when the UN was preoccupied with the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The regional organisation ECOWAS (Economic Community
of West African States) then acted as peacekeeper in the conflict and managed
to create a cease-fire and establish a temporary government. However, ECOWAS was
not able to pacify the whole country, but the mission can nevertheless be
regarded as successful. This operation may also have been a turning point for
African regional peace missions in general, when it opened up a possibility of
intra-state peace operations in Africa, which had not existed before.[43]
In
the beginning of the 1990s in Europe the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was authorised to call upon the military
resources of other European regional groups, such as NATO, the Westen European
Union (WEU) and the EU for regional peacekeeping operations. However, CSCE’s
mandate was more limited than the UN’s, because even if it could provide
institutional legitimacy and monitoring, it did not have an independent
peacekeeping capability.[44] Therefore, the primary responsibility
of supporting the UN peacekeeping operations in the Balkans fell upon NATO,
which is the regional organisation with the most developed capacity and
resources for peacekeeping. NATO has declared its support for peacekeeping
operations undertaken by the Security Council[45], but they have also stated a
willingness to “support on a case by case basis in accordance with their own
procedures, peacekeeping activities under [CSCE] responsibility”. The North
Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) has recognised the importance of NATO in
peacekeeping operations and created an Ad Hoc Group on Co-operation in
Peacekeeping. This Ad Hoc Group is
meant to be a place for discussion of issues relating to peacekeeping and for
practical measures for co-operation in peacekeeping operations. In 1995 the CSCE
transformed into the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and in 1999 the OSCE introduced a new concept for the organisation's
peacekeeping in the Istanbul Charter for European Security. According to
the Charter the OSCE could either "decide to play a role in peacekeeping,
including a leading role, when participating States judge it to be the most
effective and appropriate organisation" or it could "decide to
provide the mandate covering peacekeeping by others and seek the support of
participating States as well as other organisations to provide resources and
expertise".
In
other parts of the world, there is also an interest in peacekeeping amongst
regional groups. In the Middle East, for example, the Arab League has
established a committee to examine the possibility of establishing a
peacekeeping force within the League. In Eastern Europe too, there has been
efforts taken toward regional peacekeeping. The CIS member-states have in 1992
signed an agreement entitled “Groups of Military Observers and Collective
Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS”, which authorised peacekeeping operations to
provide assistance in conflicts within the region.[46]
To
sum up, there is a growing interest for regional organisations in peacekeeping
operations today, but there are still several difficult challenges that remain.
The lack of necessary military means and
the possible lack of impartiality in intra-state conflicts are only two
examples of obstacles that need to be overcome before regional organisations
can develop a collective military structure for peacekeeping operations.
However, given the increasing number of intra-state conflicts today, the main
impediment for regional peacekeeping is the inability of the organisations to
control internal conflicts.
3.4
Problems of national interests and the United States
In
close connection to the above-mentioned issue of regional organisations in
peacekeeping operations, is the question of the involvement of the United
States in these operations. After the end of the Cold War, the United States
was the only superpower left on the international scene. This made the United
States the dominated country in the Security Council, and subsequently also the
country with the highest influence over peace and security issues. Therefore,
even if the UN has the authority to order peace operations, the United States
is now the single country with the most power and equipment to perform these
operations. The third world has expressed their unease over that the
U.S.-dominated Security Council is being used as an instrument of Western
interests. An illustrating example of this is the statement by Huntington in
his book The Clash of Civilizations, where
he argues that:
The West in effect is using
international institutions, military power and
economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western
interests and promote Western political and economic values.[47]
Chandra
Muzaffar, a former Amnesty International prisoner of conscience, also stresses
that the UN has gone from being an impartial monitor of human rights to
becoming “nothing more than the instrument of the U.S. and other Western
powers.” [48]
However,
although the United States is the most obvious example of one single state
exercising its national interests within the framework of the United Nations, there
is also an overall growing tendency of UN-authorised military actions by major
powers where UN peacekeeping takes over first in the conclusion of the
operation. Recent examples are the French intervention in Rwanda, the U.S.
interventions in Somalia and Haiti and the Russian intervention in Georgia,
which are all actions where national interests are engaged. In connection to
this development of national interests in peacekeeping operations, there are
several different kinds of dangers to consider. One is the possibility that the
world’s major powers in the future will only take military action or support UN
peace operations when their own national interests are involved, leaving the UN
without means for other peace actions. Another danger lies in that the
countries of the third world might eventually withdraw their support from the
UN, if they think the organisation continues to be a mere reflection of Western
interests. [49]
3.5
Problems of withdrawal from peacekeeping operations
Sometimes
United Nations peacekeeping troops are forced to withdraw from a conflict
without having achieved its objectives, and such withdrawals can be necessary
in three different cases. First, there is the circumstance when the UN lacks
financial resources to sustain the operation. This may be the case in long
lasting operations, with their high costs for the long-term presence. A second
circumstance when peacekeeping withdrawals take place, is when one or several
of the troop contributing countries decide to withdraw. The contribution of
troops to UN peacekeeping operations are purely voluntary, and the member
states can therefore make this decision at any time and for any political
reason. This happened, for example, in Somalia, when the United States decided
to withdraw its troops after an incident in which several U.S. servicemen were
killed. Finally, withdrawal can also take place when no political will for
peacekeeping exist among the various factions in a conflict. These kinds of
withdrawals, however, are often dangerous, when it often involves a struggle
between the parties in the conflict for control of the strategic positions
previously occupied by the United Nations. Therefore, additional UN troops are
often required in these cases to protect the withdrawals. [50]
However,
as the former Secretary General Boutros Ghali stresses, it is important not to
regard a withdrawal of peacekeeping troops from a continuing war as a failure.
Instead it should be seen as an act, which recognises that the UN cannot impose
peace solutions in the absence of political will. After the withdrawal of the
peacekeeping forces, the UN can continue to work for peace in the conflict by
maintaining diplomatic and humanitarian presence in the country. It can also,
as was the case in Angola, send new troops to the conflict if the parties
demonstrate a renewed political will for peacekeeping. [51]
4. Reforms
|
“To stand still when the world moves
forward is to slide helplessly backward”
-
Kofi
Annan
4.1 General introduction
Since
the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic increase in United Nation
peace and security activities, along with the development of new, more complex
peace operations. This has strained the organisation’s capacity and caused a
debate on how to reform and improve the United Nation organisation in the
twenty-first century in order to cope with these new challenges. The
restructuring of the New York headquarter, the reformation of the Security
Council and the building of new institutional capacities are only a few of the
reform proposals that has been suggested in order to make UN peace activities
better suited for the new world order. Some of these reforms require amendments
of the UN Charter and some can be accomplished without such changes. The
following presentation will make a distinction between these two kinds of
reforms, and begin with the suggestions that can be accomplished without any
alterations to the Charter.
4.2
Reforms without amendments of the UN Charter
4.2.1 The structure of the New York Headquarter
In
the current debate of UN peacekeeping operations, suggestions have been put
forward on how to restructure the DPKO in order to further strengthening the
UN capacity for peacekeeping
operations. Secretary General Kofi Annan, for example, stresses the importance
of military expertise in the department, and suggests that a general staff in
the Military Adviser’s Office of DPKO should be created. Such a military
expertise would have a greater capacity to translate mandates into achievable
concepts of operations and to support the field in military matters. The
Secretary General also emphasises the importance of ready access to mobile,
well-trained forces. He regards the current standby arrangements as a step in the
right direction and believes that these arrangements might be further enhanced
by some of the “rapid deployment” initiatives that are being discussed.[52]
Another
voice in the debate of reforming the UN organisational capacity, is Mats R.
Berdal’s. He believes that the DPKO should be encouraged to further improve its
ability to engage in mission support, force generation and planning, but he
does not believe that the department should become an “operational headquarter”
in the strict military sense. The assignment to direct peacekeeping forces in
the field on a day-to-day basis should instead be delegated to the Special
Representatives and Force Commanders in the field. One reason for this
delegation is, according to Berdal, the practical difficulty for the DPKO to
direct nearly twenty separate operations at the same time. Another reason is
the reluctance of many governments to give the New York Headquarter
responsibilities of “mission command” opposed to “mission support”. [53] In sum, on the one hand Berdal stresses
the need for management functions within the Secretariat to be more
centralised, but on the other he also advocates decentralisation and greater
delegation of operational, financial and administrative responsibilities to the
field.[54]
4.2.2 The UN organisational structure
The
United Nation does not posses an army and does not have any military equipment
of its own, and the organisation therefore has to rely on its member-states for
peacekeeping operations. However, the contributions to peacekeeping operations
are voluntarily and governments are often reluctant to commit national
contingents to violent situations that are of no concern to their national
security. Today there is a system of stand-by arrangements, where member-states
can choose to have troops available in the own country for coming peacekeeping
operations. However, these arrangements provide no guarantee that the national
troops will be provided for a specific operation, which the situation in Rwanda
was an obvious example of. When the violence escalated there in May 1994, the
Security Council decided to expand the United Nation’s Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR). However, none of the then 19 governments, that at that time
had undertaken to have troops on stand-by, agreed to contribute. Subsequently,
the UN today has no army of its own to use in peacekeeping operations, nor does
it have any guarantees that member-states will contribute with troops in all
situations.[55]
Another
problem lies in the fact that even if member-states agree to contribute with
troops, their training and equipment are often inadequate for the task ahead of
them. The peacekeepers also meet for the first time with commanders, staff and
other contingents in the middle of an emergency, which subsequently leads to
that they need a considerable amount of time to adjust to each other. It is
important to note, however, that in the middle of conflicts there is often
little or no time to spare for this purpose.
To
sum up, the difficulties facing UN peacekeeping today is first that there is no
guarantee that member states will provide the necessary troops and equipment
for peacekeeping operations. The second problem lies in that even when the
member states do contribute with peacekeeping forces, these troops are often not
trained together and they often lack the necessary equipment. Finally, there is
the importance of reacting quickly to conflicts, which is another aspect of
peacekeeping that needs improvement. Many different solutions to these problems
currently facing UN peacekeepers have been suggested, and they all include
changes of the organisational structure of the UN. Ideas often proposed are the
creation of an UN rapid reaction force or the further development of the
current system of national stand-by forces. These and other possible reforms of
the UN structure for peacekeeping operations will now be discussed in more
detail.
The
prevailing opinion in the current debate on UN peacekeeping is that rapid
deployment of peacekeeping troops is essential for the success of the
operation. There have been various
suggestions on how to accomplish such rapid responses to conflicts, and one of
these includes the creation of national rapid response units in member-states.
These units might be composed of volunteers and they should be ready for
immediate service for the UN whenever a crisis occurs. They would also train
together with similar units from other countries on a periodically basis. The
responses from governments for this kind of arrangement, however, have been very
negative. The governments are reluctant to provide troops in violent conflicts
and then especially to provide them immediately in the dangerous outset of a
conflict. Therefore, even if such national rapid response units would be
created, there would be no certainty that these units would be made available
by the governments when they were needed.[56]
Another
suggestion is to create a rapid response group within the UN organisation itself. This is not a new idea. Tryggve
Lie proposed something similar during the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948, but
what is new is the new need for such a rapid response group. Brian Urquhart
advocates the establishment of this kind of small, highly trained rapid
response group within the UN, but he also emphasises that this group should not
take the place of a traditional peacekeeping force, and certainly not take the
place of enforcement forces under Chapter VII. Instead, such a group should
stay in the conflict area for the shortest possible time, to then be relieved
as soon as possible by normal peacekeeping arrangements. The most important
tasks for this kind of rapid response group are, according to Urquhart:
·
to provide an immediate UN presence in the
conflict area after the Security Council has decided on UN involvement
·
to facilitate a cease-fire
·
to prevent violence from escalating
·
to secure a base, communications, etc. for a
subsequent UN force
·
to provide safe areas
·
to secure essential humanitarian relief
operations
Moreover,
Urquhart stresses that the rules for the use of force for these groups will be
different from the rules for peacekeepers and peace enforces. A rapid response
group will never initiate the use of force, but will be highly trained to
secure themselves and have the ability and equipment to maintain the operation
if they are attacked. [57]
A
little more cautious to the idea of a UN rapid response group, is the Frenchman
FranVois
Heisbourg. Although he believes in the desirability of such a group, he has
questions concerning the military feasibility. Heisbourg believes that a rapid
response group would meet considerable challenges when it has to perform a
combination of both forceless and forceful tasks. Moreover, such a group would
need both administrative, police and military functions, which is a combination
much broader than many national intervention forces.[58] The solutions for UN peacekeeping
today is, according to Heisbourg, to set up a rapid response group of smaller
dimension than Urquhart suggests, that would deal only with traditional
peacekeeping tasks. As for the forceful tasks that go beyond traditional
peacekeeping, such as the creation of safe areas and the seizure of airbases
and communications, Heisbourg believes that the UN will have to continue to
rely on the willingness and the ability of its member-states to provide the
necessary troops and equipment.[59]
Another
voice in the debate concerning the feasibility of a UN rapid response group, is the voice of Ramesh Thakur [60].
He sees both advantages and disadvantages with such a standby UN force. On the
positive side he puts the professional and specialised training, the
organisational efficiency, the rapid reaction time and the financial stability.
The areas of authority, structure, administration, logistics and financing,
however, are difficult issues that he believes need to be addressed before
creating such a standing force. [61]
4.2.3 The field and specific issues
There
has been a dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping field operations
since 1988, and the context of UN peacekeeping has also changed markedly. More
peacekeeping operations are today deployed in areas of intra-state conflict and
civil wars, which involves many armed factions, intense hatred and ready
supplies of weapons and ammunition. This development has made the environments
in which UN peacekeeping forces operate highly dangerous, and it is especially
some areas in the field that have shown to be affected by this new development.
First,
there is the area of logistic and the new challenge to integrate civilian and
military operations in the field. Co-operation between these different parts of
the peacekeeping operation is essential for promoting the unity of purpose
within the mission.
Then
there is the problem of establishing an efficient command and control system in
the field, caused by the growing tendency of national governments to intervene
directly in the chain of command in peacekeeping operations. The formal command
status of the UN Force Commander in the field has lately in several crisis been
more apparent than real, as was the case in both former Yugoslavia and Somalia.
A
third issue, that has to be addressed in this context, is the inadequate
training of many of the participating contingents in UN peacekeeping
operations. It is especially in the three areas of logistics, communications
and engineering that specialised units and personnel are missing, but the lack
of specialised personnel to carry out early movement and control functions also
constitutes a major problem today.
Finally,
there is a tactical lack of mobility to support operations today. This is well
illustrated by the events in Mozambique in 1994, when the contract for eight
MI-8 heavy transport helicopters expired. Although the New York Headquarter
knew about the problem, regulations prevented a rapid solution to the problem,
which almost derailed the entire demobilisation schedule in the country. In
addition, when the UN eventually did hire some new helicopters, these turned
out to be unsuitable for the operation. [62]
All
of these discussed areas need to be addressed and reformed in order to make the
work in the field in UN peacekeeping operations more efficient. Such reforms
may put further stress on the already burdened UN finances, and this makes the
necessary reforms somewhat more difficult to accomplish. That these issues are
being discussed, however, constitutes a first step towards a further
strengthening of the UN field operations.
4.2.4 UN finances and the seeking of additional revenue sources
The
dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations the last years has
put the UN financial resources under severe stress. The present financial
arrangement is based upon national contributions, but the reality today is that
several member states fail to fully and promptly meet their assessed
contributions. One way of solving this financial problem is to try to force the
member-states to fulfil their commitments, but in the meantime it might be of
use to try to find additional revenue sources in order to meet the higher costs
of multidimensional peacekeeping activities.[63]
Suggestions
have been made, that the sectors in the international community who benefit
disproportionately from a stable and peaceful international situation, should
make special contributions to the UN budget for peace activities. First, there are the corporate sectors,
which benefit from the peace in a zone of conflict. They might contribute
especially to the UN in order to maintain the stability in a region or to
restore peace in a conflict. This solution was used in the aftermath of the
Suez crisis in 1956, when the clearing of the channel was partly met through a
surcharge on the normal tolls levied on ships using the waterway.
Second,
there are the international air travel, the activities of transnational
corporations and the area of telecommunications, which are all activities that
benefit in a general way from a peaceful international environment. A wide
variety of proposals of how to put direct fees on these activities have been
suggested. A surcharge on every foreign exchange transaction or a contribution
per international air ticket are only two of the many ideas, but as to today
there has been no practical test of the viability of those proposals.[64]
A
third category, which could also be contributing especially to UN peacekeeping
operations, is the UN peacekeeping recipient countries. These states are the
direct beneficiaries of UN peace activities, and they therefore have much to
gain from a peace settlement. There have already been some ad hoc examples of
this kind of contribution of recipient countries. One example is the
contribution by Cyprus of one-third of the UN operational cost for the
peacekeeping force in the country (UNFICYP). Another is the contribution by
Kuwait of two-third of the cost for the UN military observer mission on its
border to Iraq (UNIKOM). However, so far these arrangements have only been on
an ad hoc basis, and there is no systematic framework for seeking special
contribution from beneficiary countries. [65]
4.3
Reforms with amendments of the UN Charter
4.3.1 Reforming the Security Council
The
Security Council is responsible for maintaining international peace and
security and it is the authorising body for peacekeeping operations. Reforms of
the Security Council is therefore closely connected to the situation for UN
peace activities, which is the reason why possible reforms of the Council will
be discussed now. As today, there is no agreement of the scope or timetable of
such reforms, but there is a strong will in the international community to
change some of the ways in which the Security Council operates today.
Recomposing the membership, clarifying the role and mandate of the Council,
changing the veto power and strengthening the effectiveness and credibility of
the Council are some examples of the objectives that such reforms could seek to
achieve.
The
first issue that needs addressing is the restructuring of the permanent
membership of the Security Council. The dramatic growth in UN membership and
the emergence of a new power structure in the world are the two developments
that have given raise to this debate. The current five permanent members of the
Council (P5) are not necessarily the world’s main countries today. Germany and
Japan, for example, are two new major powers that are obvious candidates to the
P5. It is important to note that both Germany and Japan are non-nuclear-weapon
states, and their recognition in the Security Council would therefore lead away
from the perception that the possession of nuclear weapons is necessary to
obtain a status of great power. However, the opinions vary as to whether new
permanent members of the Security Council should be recognised and as to
whether they in that case should have the right of veto.[66]
In
close connection to the question of new permanent members and their possible
new status in the Council, is the issue of changing the overall balance in the
composition of the Security Council. There has been suggested that a new
category of “standing” members should be created, where the member-states would
occupy their seats for an extended period of time, but less than permanent.
However, when creating such a new category, the need for both regional and
global considerations would be crucial. The regional representation would be an
answer to the current concerns about “northern” dominance in the Security
Council, and the election to such a “standing” regional seat would demand the
support of other members in that particular region. The election for a global
“standing” seat, on the other hand, would be made from all members of the UN,
and would be designed to recognise significant contributions to the United
Nations in general and its peace-and-security activities in particular. [67]
The
second issue that needs to be clarified is the role and mandate of the Security
Council. According to the UN Charter, the Security Council is entrusted with
the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, and in the past the “threats to international peace and security” was
usually understood to encompass interstate conflicts. Today, however, the
preoccupation is rather with the breakdown of peace and security within
national borders, and this development is forcing the Security Council to adapt
to this new reality in order to remain relevant. Perhaps it is necessary to
include these new kind of intrastate conflicts into the interpretation of what
constitutes a threat to international peace and security. However, such a wide
interpretation without any explicit support in the UN Charter would risk
undermining the legitimacy of the Council. This is a dilemma that stresses the
importance of a broad-based international support for the Security Council’s
decisions, and it might subsequently lead to an amendment of the UN Charter to
include intrastate conflicts in the definition of “threat to international peace and security”. [68]
The
scope of the Security Council also raises the issue of the non-military aspects
to security, and whether these other areas belong to the agenda of the Council.
Economic, social and environmental concerns may all be areas included in the
broader understanding of threats to security that is emerging. At the first
summit meeting on 31 January 1992 the Security Council declared:
The absence of war and military
conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and
security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social,
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.
The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate
bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solutions of these matters.[69]
If
these non-military areas would be regarded as belonging to the security agenda
of the Council, this would have implications for the division of labour between
the Security Council, on the one hand, and other UN organs like the General
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), on the other. [70]
The
third theme of possible reforms of the Security Council is the right and use of
veto power. Today there is a widespread dissatisfaction about the unbounded use
of the existing veto power among the five permanent members of the Security
Council. A change of the current system, however, would lead to a confrontation
with the permanent members, when they are likely to oppose any modification of
the present veto system. In the near future, therefore, it seems unlikely that
there will be formal changes to the veto power. What might be done instead by
those opposing the current system, is to encourage a more occasional use of the
veto and to advocate the veto’s role as a defence mechanism only used in
extreme cases. Another way of accomplish a change of the veto power, is for
member-states to put pressure on the General Assembly to provide a guideline to
narrow the range of issues to which the veto may apply. [71]
The
final theme of possible reforms concerns the effectiveness and credibility of
the Security Council. Today there is a growing dissonance between the
resolutions from the Council and the development on the ground. Political and
public pressure is driving the Security Council, and sometimes this result in
the lack of resources for the implementation of its resolutions. Especially in
situations when a great number of resolutions are adopted, they seem to not
relate well to the actual developments on the ground. This was the case in
former Yugoslavia, where some of the Security Council’s over ninety resolutions
contradicted each other, and others were not accompanied by the necessary means
and resources for implementation. To solve this problem, the Security Council
needs to make sure that the resolutions and measures are credible and have
prospects of implementation.[72]
5. The future
|
5.1
General introduction
In
the previous chapter of this paper, possible reforms of the UN peace activities
were discussed in detail. These reforms are necessary in order to create a more
efficient system of UN peacekeeping, and many of these reforms are likely to
become a reality in the near future. Now, however, the detailed questions will
be left aside. What will be looked upon instead are the more general statements
and reports by the Secretary General Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali and others, in which they give their overall notion of
how the future for the UN will develop. In these reports the writers
concentrate on general goals, and not so much on the immediate worries of UN
peacekeeping. In doing so they produce useful directives for the future
development of the organisation. Tree documents have been of special importance
in the ongoing debate on UN peace activities; the Carlsson-Ramphal Report, An
Agenda for Peace and its Supplement and the Millennium Report, and it is these
three reports that now will be examined.
5.2
An Agenda for Peace
The
former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted his report entitled
“An Agenda for Peace” [73]
in June 1992. This report’s aim was to analyse and make recommendations on ways
to strengthen and make the United Nations peace activities more efficient. The
different UN peace activities were discussed in detail and various ways of
improving these activities were suggested. Three years later, Boutros-Ghali
wrote a supplement to his previous report, but this supplement was not meant to
revise An Agenda for Peace, nor was it meant to be a comprehensive treatise on
the subjects it discussed, Boutros-Ghali stressed. The purpose with the
supplement was rather to highlight certain areas in the debate of UN peace
activities, which had been overlooked in 1992. In the Supplement Boutros-Ghali
discussed the qualitative and quantitative changes in UN peace activities, and
his conclusion was that the UN capacity to deal with the threats to peace and
security needed further strengthening. Boutros-Ghali also emphasised the need
to not only address the immediate causes to a conflict, but also to see to the
root causes. These causes, he stated, are often the absence of economic
opportunities and social inequalities. However, although Boutros-Ghali
addressed many of the problems relating to the peace activities in the UN, he
concluded his report with the optimistic remark that the progress the last
years was more than could have been predicted, and that this positive progress
called for confidence and courage in the future.[74]
5.3
The Carlsson-Ramphal Report
In
the beginning of 1995, the year when the UN turned 50, a report called “Our
Global Neighbourhood” was presented by the Commission on Global Governance in
Stockholm. The Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and the former Secretary
General of the Commonwealth Sir Shridath Ramphal led the work, which was aimed
to form the debate on the future for the UN. The document presented several
suggestions of reforms in the areas of global cooperation, international
security and economic stability.
First
it stressed the importance of global cooperation, not only between governments
and international organisations, but also in the global civil society that is
developing. The document also emphasised the decreasing importance of national
sovereignty and advocated collective sovereignty as an alternative in the
common global areas (such as the space and the seabed).[75]
Second,
the report suggested that global security should include not only states’, but
also peoples’ and the whole world’s security. The non-intervention principle in
the UN Charter should therefore be changed so that the UN could intervene in
domestic crisis, when it of humanitarian reasons would be necessary. Moreover,
the document proposed two reforms for UN peacekeeping operations. One suggested
reform was that for each peacekeeping mission a special advising committee
should be created, including all contributing member-states. Another proposal
was that the rule that none of the permanent members of the Security Council
could contribute to peacekeeping operations, should be abolished. [76]
Finally,
the Carlsson-Ramphal report suggested that an Economic Security Council (ESC)
should be established in order to observe the world economy and promote a
stabile, balanced and durable development.[77]
5.4
The Millennium Report
In
facing the new millennium, the Secretary General Kofi Annan wrote a report
where he addressed the difficulties and challenges that the UN organisation
might meet in the future.[78] The report contained a discussion on
the structural weakness of United Nations peace operations, which the Secretary
General stressed was a problem which could only be solved by the member-states.
In the context of UN peacekeeping, he emphasised the problem of delayed
operations due to the current last minute ad hoc arrangements. The military
standby forces today are unable to react rapidly to crisis, and Annan therefore
suggested new solutions and new organisational systems for UN peacekeeping.[79]
Later on in the report, the Secretary General also advocated that the Security
Council would adapt to the changing times. He urged the member-states to tackle
this challenge, at the same time as he emphasised the importance of the Council
and its unquestioned legitimacy.[80]
Finally, the Secretary General strongly stressed the need for the UN
organisation to continue to serve as a catalyst for collective action and to
continue to be the place where new standards for international conduct are
hammered out. [81]
6.
Personal views and suggestions
|
6.1
General introduction
In
the previous parts of this paper, many various ways of reforming the UN
peacekeeping capacity have been discussed. Some of them have already been
accomplished and others are still on the proposition stage. I will now present
my own personal views on some of these reforms and reform suggestions, which
will also include my personal recommendations on how to improve and how to make
the current UN structure for peacekeeping operations more effective.
6.2
Reforms already accomplished
In
my view, there are several positive changes and reorganisations of the UN
structure that have been accomplished in the last years. The first change that
will be discussed is the creation of a Lesson Learned Unit within the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the New York Headquarter. This
unit was established in order to analyse past experiences and use this
knowledge for future operations. The creation of this unit was important, I
believe, when there is often much to learn from past successes and failures.
Many times it might be easy to look only to the future, and in the process
forget that the experiences of the past are also valuable sources of knowledge.
The Lesson Learned Unit is a good example of how the UN uses the insight from
past missions to improve the organisation and to create a better base for the
future.[82]
Another
already accomplished change within the DPKO is the Situation Centre, which was
established in 1993 and enables timely communication between the Headquarter
and the field operations. Military officers loaned by member states largely
staff this unit, operating around the clock. The improvement in creating this
unit, I believe, lies in the way it provides an always-present military
expertise that can be contacted in emergency situations. This is important,
when the operational staff need rapid response to certain problems in the
field.
6.3
Reforms suggested
6.3.1 Reforms of the Security Council
Numerous
ideas have been suggested on how the Security Council can be improved. Many
voices in the international debate on peace and security today advocates a change
of the current veto system, but the rules for membership of the Council have
also been questioned. A reform of the Security Council, however, is not easy to
accomplish. First there is the problem of the veto powers opposing every change
of the current veto system, and then there are the difficult amendments to the
Charter that such reforms of the Council would demand. What is important to
remember in this context, though, is that the world is changing and that the
United Nations has to change with it. Therefore, even if the current system may
be hard to change, I believe it is essential to find solutions so that the UN
organisation continues to reflect the situation in the world.
6.3.2 Financial reforms
Today
the entire United Nations have problems with financing its activities, and this
is also the situation for UN peacekeeping. In order to solve this problem, it
might be necessary to think of new ways of financing the operations and find
new contributors. One way of accomplishing this is to create a system, in which
those who gain from a stable and peaceful environment help to finance parts of
UN peacekeeping operations. Another way is to collect the national
contributions for peacekeeping from the military budgets in the member-states,
as opposed to from the smaller foreign budgets, which is the case today.
However, this last suggestion require the consent from the governments in the
member-states, which they may not will be willing to give. The best way to
begin the process towards new ways of financing the UN activities, according to
me, is to appoint a working group within the UN to analyse the different
options and evaluate which of these would be possible to carry through in
reality. First when this analysing work is finished, the creation of a new
system for UN financing can begin.
6.3.3 The creation of a rapid response group
With
the increasing number of multidimensional peacekeeping operations and the
growing number of intra-state conflicts, there is a strong need to think in new
ways in order to accomplish the most effective form of UN peacekeeping. The
suggestion made to create a rapid response group within the UN is one way of
renewing the current system. I believe that such a group would have the two
main advantages of being able to respond rapidly in crisis situations and of
being used to work together as a group. Both of these aspects contributes to
saving time in the beginning of conflicts, and time has in many conflicts shown
to be an important factor in preventing further escalation of violence. A quick
response and UN presence in a conflict area could also save the UN from future
costs of deploying other peace activities.
However,
the disadvantage is that the establishment of a rapid response group would also
require a considerable reorganisation of the current system for UN
peacekeeping. Such a change would involve a considerable amount of work and
would put strain on the economic resources of the organisation. The
difficulties in creating a rapid response group have to be weight very
carefully against the advantages.
The
main obstacle to the establishment of a rapid response group today is, as I can
see it, the financial costs of the project. A solution to this problem,
however, may be to use the suggested system of financial contributions by those
who gain from a peaceful environment. In that case, this would be the first
time such contributions would be put into system, and it might be the best way
of solving the financial difficulties in creating a rapid response group. Contributions
by the countries in conflict may be difficult to put in to such a standing
system, however, when those contributions could only be made on ad hoc basis.
The contributions in question are rather the ones made by those that in a
general way gain from the absence of conflicts, such as air travel agencies and
transnational co-operations.
My
suggestion is that experts of international peace and security issues meet and
discuss the future UN system of peacekeeping, as a first step towards the
creation of a new system for UN peacekeeping. After weighing the positive and
negative aspects of a rapid response group against each other, they will
hopefully come to a conclusion of what is the most effective development for
the UN at present.
6.3.4 Information capability
The
flow of information has proven to be of great importance in most peacekeeping
operations. Today, however, the UN lacks an information capability of its own
and has to rely on the information given to it by the intelligence services of
its member-states. It would not be possible today to build an UN intelligence
service equivalent to those in the member-states, but what might be
accomplished, I believe, is the creation of smaller UN information units with
military competence. Such groups would highly facilitate the work in the field
in peace operations, when it would save the time it would otherwise take to
obtain information from other sources.
7. Conclusion
|
The
new world order, following the end of the Cold War, changed the nature of the
conflicts in which UN peacekeeping forces are to operate. The rivalry between
the super powers in the Security Council ceased, which caused a dramatic
increase of resolutions ordering peacekeeping operations and opened for a
discussion on the need to reform the UN system for peacekeeping. The two most
important questions in this debate on possible improvements, are why reforms are needed and how these reforms best can be
accomplished.
One
reason why the UN needs reforming its system of peacekeeping, is the severe
strain on the UN finances that the increasing number of peacekeeping operations
have put on the organisation. Today, there is an urgent need to find additional
revenue sources, in order to strengthening the UN financial capacity.
Contributions from other sources than UN member-states have been discussed, but
so far has no reform of the financial contribution system been made. Another
reason why the new world order requires a change of UN peacekeeping activities,
is the new need for effectiveness that has developed. Many conflicts today are
of intra-state nature, which provide UN peacekeepers with a new variety of
tasks to perform and puts demands on the effectiveness of the current system.
The increased need for rapid response in the outset of the crises today, is yet
another evidence for the necessity of making the UN peacekeeping system more
effective. Finally, there is also important to look on the need for reforms
from a greater perspective. The United Nations is designed to be a reflection
of the world in which it is operating, so when the world is changing so should
the UN. If the organisation does not adjust to the changing environments, it
risks to loose both credibility and
legitimacy in the process.
After
stating why UN reforms are essential
in the new world order, the difficult question of how these reforms can be accomplished still remains. Many various
suggestions have been proposed on how to best improve the UN organisational
capacity, the field work in peacekeeping operations and the Security Council.
Some of these suggestions have already been realised, while others still remain
on the proposition stage. In discussing these reforms, however, it is not
today’s immediate worries that are the most important. Focus should rather be
put on the future and the long-term goals for the UN organisation. If the
future is put on hold while dealing with today’s problems, there is a great
risk of loosing sight of what is essential in a long perspective. Therefore,
the first and most important step towards an improved system of UN
peacekeeping, is the work of analysing and elucidating the organisation’s
long-term goals. Then, after these general outlines for the future are laid
down, the problems of today can be addressed and solved.
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