[allAfrica.com] [US-Africa_Business_Summit_Registration] 'Secrets' behind US, UK Anti-Terror War in Kenya The Nation (Nairobi) COLUMN June 22, 2003 Posted to the web June 23, 2003 By Charles Onyango-Obbo Nairobi The United States has spent $3.1 million (Sh210 million) on anti-terrorist training in Kenya since 1998. However, together with Britain, their travel advisories to their nationals not to visit Kenya because of the threat of terrorist attacks are, in the opinion of many economists, undermining the new Narc government's project of economic renewal. The US and UK have made statements strongly backing the reforms by the Kibaki government. Local critics, however, argue that the warnings about the security of Western targets are seriously weakening the Government's ability to fight terrorism by denying it resources. The British government suspended British Airways flights to Kenya, and is steadfast they will not be resumed until the Narc administration takes key measures to deal with the threat. The Americans even offered voluntary repatriation of their embassy staff just over a month ago, and are causing considerable irritation with frequent mission closures, particularly to those seeking visas. The Americans and the British insist that they are doing all this for Kenya's good, even as Kenyan ministers and businesses in the travel sector that are verging on collapse, say the measures are bleeding the economy and tourism. The governments of Kenya, the US and the UK have not publicly given sufficient specific information about the extent of the terrorist threat and what is being done to deal with the problem. While the Americans and the British have said there are Al-Qaeda terrorist cells in Kenya and demanded that the Kenya government arrest and prosecute Kenyan accomplices, they have said little about how their posture in Kenya ties into their global campaign against terrorism. Until most of the facts in this counter-terrorism are known, there will continue to be angry reactions in Kenya about constant American and British travel warnings, and the feeling that the country is being "unfairly targeted" will grow. It would be naive to imagine that the Americans and the British don't understand the knock-on effect the warnings are having on Kenyan tourism, for example. Thus, the pertinent question is: Have they factored it into their present actions? One of the bright spots in the whole scenario is that some information is beginning to emerge about the web of the anti-terrorism politics in which the American, the British and the Kenyan governments are caught. And they are beginning to give pointers to the issues involved. Some of the best information available in one place can be gleaned from the recent issue of Strategic Survey 2002/3, published by the Institute for Strategic Studies. The annual survey is an analysis and assessment of security issues around the world, and offers important insights into worldwide strategic developments. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, and the US- led war that toppled Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the institute is one of the very few Western think-tanks which are occasionally informative without being narrowly ideological. For that reason, the latest survey deserves to be read with more attention. It is significant that, after a long period, the Africa section in this year's survey has a part focusing on Kenya. In fact, the country occupies the greatest amount of space in the section . A detailed review of the reflections on Kenya is quite revealing, both in what it says and the conclusions it makes. The survey notes: "In recent years, Kenya has developed an elaborate network of ties and has arguably the most complex relationship with the US of any African country." It says that the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi in August 1998, in which more than 200 Kenyans and 12 Americans died, established a bond between the two governments against terrorism. This has endured in spite of the disputes over compensation for Kenyan victims of the attack. The relationship, reinforced by the Bush administration's war on terrorism, was strengthened further following the November 28 attack on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel near Mombasa, in which 13 Kenyans and three Israelis died. The US believed that supporters of al-Ittihad al-Islami, which it identifies as "a Somali terrorist organisation with links to al-Qaeda", have infiltrated some of the refugee camps in North-Eastern province, and made their way to Mombasa and Eastleigh, the Nairobi quarters of Somalis. The survey reports also that in Coast province, "they may well have gained support among the thousands of unemployed youths, hit by the decline of the tourism industry". This is ironical because the US and the British advisories are only spreading further gloom in the industry, the hardest hit of which are establishments at the Coast with a large Muslim population. This way, they would be playing into the hands of so-called religious hardliners because increasing numbers of youths are thought to have turned into radical Islam in the 1990 as tourism declined. While in both the 1998 bombing and the attack on the Israeli hotel some Kenyans were implicated, a point which outgoing ambassador Johnnie Carson will not tire of repeating, the feeling seems to be that Islam is not a big factor. The survey notes that most of Kenya's Muslims are "religiously moderate". It reports that terrorist sleeper cells exist in Kenya, and that, indeed, the two al-Qaeda Nairobi and Mombasa-based cells involved in the the 1998 bombings were "never completely rolled up. The reason for this is the weakness of Kenya's "counter-terrorism institutions". Secondly apart from porous borders and the influx of weapons from troubled areas in the region, even in restricted areas like airports, "security is inadequate". The problem then is in a poor capacity, not radical religion. After the Mombasa attack, the US contributed $750,000 to improve airport security. But despite this and earlier expenditures, intelligence reports suggest that Yemeni terrorists sneaked into Mombasa to prepare a possible attack on German Air Force personnel who operate surveillance flights over southern Somalia. Many Kenyans are wondering why their country is coming under pressure to deal with terrorism in ways no other African country is. Kenya, the survey says, has the largest port facilities in the western Indian Ocean, north of Durban. As the US prepared last year to go to war in the Persian Gulf, the then President Daniel arap Moi confirmed its right to use the Mombasa port as a supply and recreational base, and to airlift men and materiel to the Gulf through the Nanyuki military airbase. If the country didn't have these facilities and old strategic links with the US, Washington would certainly be less concerned about the terrorist threats it was facing. In that sense Kenya's blessing is also its curse. Just how key Kenya is to America's regional security calculations was again apparent last September, when the US annual National Security Review designated it as "one of the US's four key partners in Africa, along with South Africa, Nigeria and Ethiopia". This role, according to the survey, goes beyond the single issue of counter- terrorism. For more than a decade, Operation Lifeline Sudan has been a vital conduit of humanitarian relief to southern Sudan from its base in Turkana District. Kenya also provides a haven to thousands of Somali refugees. In his last year in office, Mr Moi played an important role in efforts to end the civil war in Sudan, building on the peace initiatives of former US Senator John Danforth. This initiative led to the Machakos protocol on the issue of self-determination for southern Sudan. Last October, Mr Moi launched another initiative to bring peace to Somalia. However, his representative, former Cabinet minister Elijah Mwangale, "demonstrated little understanding of the suspicions and regional rivalries of the Somali groups, and seemed too willing to overrun unilateral decisions that had been painstakingly negotiated," reports Strategic Survey. Somali delegates and members of the secretariat became disillusioned with Mr Mwangale and expressed the view that the only way to salvage the conference was for the then Narc presidential candidate, Mr Mwai Kibaki, to win the elections and appoint a new intermediary. Mr Kibaki won and appointed Mr Bethuel Kiplagat on January 10. Mr Kiplagat quickly restored credibility to the process and was able to get the Somali groups to some broad agreements. Somalia presented a security threat to Western interests in East Africa because, in the chaos that reigns there, it is impossible to have a government that would crack down on terrorists and prevent infiltration into Kenya. However, the survey acknowledges that "on the foreign front Moi had been a reasonably solid leader." It continues: "Accordingly there will be pressure from external actors for Kibaki to maintain Kenya's profile as a central player in regional security matters. Since the US continues to regard Kenya as one of the four "anchor states" in sub-Saharan Africa, and has heightened concerns over the penetration by Al- Qaeda, how does one make sense of its present position? One possible conclusion is that the "weakening of the country's couter-terrorism" institutions happened because of the decay and politicisation of the security apparatus during the Kanu rule. Action needs to be taken now while the reform momentum is high. This would explain the timing of the pressure on the Government to deal with terrorism. Raising the scare level and hiking the price of inactivity on terrorism is likely to create a lot more local acceptance for the actions necessary to deal with the threat. The alarm bells the US is ringing in Kenya over terrorism would be equally important in winning domestic support for anti-terrorism security assistance to be funnelled to Kenya. In January, US military officials announced the formation of a joint task force with Kenya and five other Horn of Africa countries, backed by a 900-strong military contingent (including Special Forces) stationed in Djibouti, to disrupt terrorist operations in the region. According to Strategic Survey, US actions in Kenya "mean Washington will have a standing, if secondary, interest in strengthening Kenyan institutions and in 'inoculating' its Muslim population against radicalisation through longer-term development programmes". Any visible improvement in Kenyan governance, it argues, could spur Washington to use its influence in international financial institutions to have aid to Kenya resumed. It is possible then that the aid taps could be opened largely based on how the Government performs politically, and the sticking economic points such as liberalisation and privatisation could well be glossed over. The US and the UK can also choose to present these benefits if they are offered before a major backlash happens inside Kenya partly as compensation for the losses sectors like tourism are suffering today, and even more important, as the model of "stabilisation" interventions in poor countries that are threatened by terrorism. The real intentions might, of course, be different from those presented here. But if there is any sense in the line the two countries are taking, the above scenarios are the most logical.   =============================================================================   Copyright © 2003 The Nation. All rights reserved. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com). =============================================================================