Disarmament in Liberia: Lessons From Sierra Leone

Concord Times (Freetown)
NEWS
December 8, 2003
Posted to the web December 8, 2003

By Joe Lamin
Freetown
On December 7, Liberians began a most decisive phase of the peace process
namely the disarmament of the fighting forces. Liberian government forces once
loyal to former President Charles started to turn in their weapons. The
development has breathed some fresh air into the overall peace process in that
country. The doubting Thomases may now hold their breath. But getting to this
stage has not been without hitches and proceeding from where it is now is not
going to be a smooth ride.
The difficulty often associated with getting guns off the hands of fighters who
have used them as instrument of power and livelihood cannot be easy. It takes a
whole deal of patience and suave diplomacy.
Patience, diplomacy and firm leadership were each tested in Liberia recently
when some of the warring factions raked up new demands as preconditions to
handing in weapons. Suddenly, leaders of these factions were united in a common
goal: the demand for more jobs. They wanted plump government appointments
otherwise they were going to stall the disarmament process.
This demand, illegitimate as it was, is only reflective of the bigger
underlying problems as was seen in Sierra Leone. These problems hinge on what
becomes of life after disarmament and the extent to which promises of
demobilization and reintegration into mainstream society can be fulfilled when
the guns are no longer there.
It was therefore no surprise that the Liberian factions appeared to throw
spanners in the works.
In Sierra Leone, the same restiveness played up, and on numerous occasions it
appeared the whole process was going to collapse. Even when the peace process
slumped as was the case when hundreds of peacekeepers were abducted by rebels
loyal to late Foday Sankoh, the process was resuscitated thereafter. The reason
the peace process did not die were simply the overwhelming belief of the people
that there was no alternative to peace and the determination of the UN Mission
and all other stakeholders to go through the distance. The people's belief in
peace as against war transformed into a desperation and this desperation was so
palpable that it created a bandwagon effect on everyone including the fighters.
Anyone who tried therefore to stall the process stood the risk of being tagged
an enemy of progress.
The first lesson from Sierra Leone would therefore be that Liberians must throw
themselves and everything they have into the process. At the moment, this
appears to be the case. For a people who have seen the worst horrors of war far
longer than Sierra Leoneans saw; a people who can now look at neighbouring
Sierra Leone and see evidence of the fruits of peace, there is really no
choice. So, divisions among the people over the ultimate goal of the peace
process should not be an issue. Rather, we should expect an overwhelming
support. That is why when leaders of the factions demanded more jobs, the
reaction of the people was spontaneous in referring to these factions as only
interested in their selfish interest.
Following closely the people's support must be the nature of leadership of
those who supervise the whole process. This is crucial. The supervisors of the
peace process must not just say they are neutral, such neutrality must be on
display all the time.
This is where the combination of General Daniel Ismael Opande who was Force
Commander for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone and the Head of the
Mission Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji must be commended.
Adeniji's suave diplomacy was ably complemented by Gen. Opande's
professionalism.
Gen. Opande took over from Gen. V. J. Jetley, the Indian General under whose
tenure as Force Commander the Mission suffered debilitating setbacks. Gen.
Jetley was promptly removed and replaced by Gen. Opande.
Opande's first job was therefore to re-organise the peacekeeping force, restore
its confidence, boost its morale, grab back the confidence of Sierra Leoneans
and set an agenda for a forward match. The dexterity with which Opande carried
out his tasks indicated quite correctly how effective leadership could make a
difference.
The good news is that Opande is now also the Force Commander in Liberia.
What we have seen so far in Liberia is a near replication of what transpired in
Sierra Leone. For example the tripartite meetings (meetings of reps of various
warring factions and stakeholders including the leadership of the United
Nations Mission) are now also being held in Liberia. There can be no doubt that
these meetings will form the nucleus of resolution of the numerous conflicts
that will arise in the course of the peace process.
In Liberia at the moment, all the factions, at least by words of mouth, have
shown a remarkable willingness to disarm. The government forces have taken the
lead. In Sierra Leone, government had control over the Kamajors , seen also as
a faction , and disarming the Kamajors was considered as not going to pose any
major problem. The real job in Sierra Leone was getting the RUF to hand over
weapons. In Liberia, it will be getting the LURD and the MODEL groups to turn
in weapons. And if Charles Taylor still has any modicum of control over his ex
fighters, then we should expect some problems from the government fighters
irrespective of this initial enthusiasm. What Opande did in Sierra Leone was to
get the RUF commanders under his firm grip by stamping his authority in a
polite but firm manner. The RUF commanders saw in Opande a highly competent
military officer with the resources to moderate their excesses if the need were
to arise. Opande is therefore expected to do the same in Liberia.
A final lesson from Sierra Leone is the way and manner the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programme is carried out. This programme must
be well funded with adequate mechanism in place to absorb the expected
restiveness of disarming fighters. Promises made must be fulfilled and on time.
No one is expecting any hiccup in Liberia on the scale of the abduction of
hundreds of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and the rescue mission that was
mounted. Once this level of confrontation is avoided, with Opande's experience
being useful and with SRSG Jacques Klein putting all other measures in place,
one can only hope for a smoother disarmament process in Liberia.

   

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