[allAfrica.com] [celtel.com] Testimony by Howard F. Jeter, Executive Vice President Goodworks International, LLC at the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommitte on Africa: 'Confronting War Crimes in Africa' United States Congress (Washington, DC) DOCUMENT June 25, 2004 Posted to the web June 25, 2004 By Howard F. Jeter Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members of the Sub-Committee, I am honored to appear before you today. My name is Howard F. Jeter, and I am the immediate past American Ambassador to Nigeria. I completed that challenging assignment in July 2003. I retired from the career Foreign Service in November 2003 after 27 years with the State Department. I retired with the rank of Career Minister. I was the incumbent American Ambassador to Nigeria during the events leading up to the offer of asylum in Nigeria to Charles Taylor of Liberia. I had several discussions with Nigerian government officials on this issue, including with President Olusegun Obasanjo. As I understand it, the reason that I was asked to appear before this Sub-Committee today was to offer my recollections and insights on how and why the decision to offer asylum to Taylor was made. My observations are partly based on diplomatic discussions that I had in Nigeria as the representative of the United States, but I understand from Sub-Committee staff that the Administration has no objection to my appearing before this Sub- Committee. Let me begin by noting that Charles Taylor was not the first former Head of State given asylum in Nigeria. The former Heads of State of Somalia, Chad, and Niger also were given asylum there. Foday Sankoh, the now deceased founder and leader of the RUF in Sierra Leone, was forcibly detained in Nigeria for nearly a year in the hope that this would lead to a quick and conclusive end to that country's civil war. Political faction leaders from Liberia, including the NPFL's Prince Johnson and ULIMO's Rooselvelt Johnson also were taken in by Nigeria to avoid further bloodshed in that unhappy country. I know first-hand that Rooselvelt Johnson and three of his cohorts were specifically given asylum in Nigeria at the request of the United States. In all of these cases, Nigerian acted on humanitarian grounds. Its goal was to end conflict and save lives by removing personalities whose continued presence in their respective countries would intensify conflict and lead to greater death and destruction. Charles Taylor was no exception. I vividly remember meeting with President Obasanjo during the height of the crisis in Monrovia, when commentators were predicting thousands and perhaps even tens of thousands of civilian casualties. The President was blaming himself for not having acted sooner. His actions, he said, could have saved lives. One could see the pain and anguish in his face as CNN predicted the impending disaster. When I returned to Washington in August, 2003, I was stunned to learn that some members of the U.S. Senate were planning to sanction Nigeria for taking in Charles Taylor. I was incredulous. Instead of sanctioning Nigeria, I thought we should have been praising Obasanjo for his political courage. There was no political up-side for President Obasanjo for what he had done, and he knew it. He was criticized at home by his people, by the media and even by some in the military, who felt that Nigeria had expended too much blood and treasure in Liberia without even a "thank you" to show for it. They particularly remembered that Charles Taylor's NPFL had targeted and killed Nigerian soldiers and civilians during the civil war in that country. Obasanjo knew this too but he wanted to save Liberia from further agony and a possible bloodbath in Monrovia if Taylor, now trapped, chose to stay and fight. Obasanjo did not take the decision on Charles Taylor lightly or alone. He consulted broadly and often with all key players in and outside the region. Nigeria's decision to offer Taylor political asylum followed consultations with the Chairman of ECOWAS President Kufor of Ghana, and with other members of the Economic Community of West African States. He also consulted with the Chairman of the African Union, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Secretary General Kofi Annan at the United Nations, and with the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Mohammed Chambas. President Obasanjo held intense discussions with the Heads of State of Liberia's immediate neighbors, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. Mr. Chairman, the decision to offer asylum to Charles Taylor was not a unilateral decision; it was a collective decision made by the leaders of Africa, within the West African sub-region and beyond. Moreover, Mr. Chairman, President Obasanjo acted with our full knowledge and concurrence. From the very beginning of discussion on this issue, President Obasanjo made it clear that he would only act under two conditions: first, that he not be criticized for giving asylum to Taylor; and second, that no action would be taken to abduct Taylor from Nigeria if and when he arrived. Before he made his final decision, the President called me and the British High Commissioner to his office to inform our respective governments that he had completed his consultations and planned to offer asylum to Mr. Taylor. He said he would not move forward, however, if the American or British governments objected. He said he needed a response quickly and asked that we convey his intention to our respective governments. We did so, but Washington never responded through officials channels to President Obasanjo's query. Instead what followed was a succession of phone calls from Washington telling the Embassy to urge President Obasanjo to move forward on getting Taylor out. We wanted Taylor out of Liberia and we wanted him out quickly, was the refrain I heard many times. This message was echoed by State Department and National Security Council officials who accompanied President Bush to Abuja during his State Visit to Nigeria in mid-July. Even President Bush at that time publicly was saying that the U.S. would not consider sending military forces to Liberia as long as Charles Taylor remained in the country. The President called for his immediate departure. I can only presume that President Obasanjo felt that America was fully supportive of what he was doing and that by taking Taylor out of Liberia, he was also responding to the wishes of the United States. There could be no other conclusion. A litany of Charles Taylor's crimes are too numerous to mention here; suffice it to say that Taylor destroyed his own country and could have destroyed the sub-region if left unchecked. Granting political asylum to Taylor was a difficult decision, not only for Nigeria but for all of Africa. However, I am not certain what other options were left. Taylor could have remained and confronted the LURD, but it is almost certain that Monrovia would have been destroyed and thousands of innocent people would have been caught in the cross- fire. Thousands more would have died from hunger and disease. Alternatively, Taylor could have returned to the bush, but the war in Liberia would still be going on. The decision to grant political asylum to Taylor prevented a humanitarian disaster and saved thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of lives. The 14-year civil war in Liberia was ended and the dreaded spill-over into neighboring countries was prevented. Liberia now has a chance and a future, and I am certain that the issue of justice for Charles Taylor will not go away.   =============================================================================  Copyright © 2004 United States Congress. All rights reserved. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com). =============================================================================