[allAfrica.com] [allAfrica.com_Top_Headlines] Museveni's Unwelcome Lullaby in Northern Uganda The Monitor (Kampala) ANALYSIS September 1, 2004 Posted to the web September 1, 2004 By Norbert Mao Kampala Museveni and his political strategists seem to have a new political game plan for Northern Uganda. Despite the bluntly partisan nature of the Presidential trip to the north, the motive is clearly to reinvent President Museveni as a friend of the north and not the warmongering General with a sectarian vendetta against an entire region. Let's take a backward glance at the historical context of Museveni's love-hate relationship with Northern Uganda. In the bushes of Luwero Museveni simplified Uganda's problem to an individual (Obote) and an ethnic group (the Northerners). Sectarian military songs like Sinadola Anyanya attest to this. Former NRA child soldier China Keitetsi's book may have exaggerations but I believe her when she says that NRA political mobilisers presented the people from the north as animals who are heartless and do not even feel pain. Needless to say, this is an effective way to turn innocent people into killers by numbing their conscience. People kill most remorselessly when all pangs of guilt have been removed. Eventually however this approach faces severelimitations. When a guerrilla force that used sectarianism to mobilize has to run a national government then songs that previously stirred their blood in battle suddenly become badges of shame. That is why a few months after NRA's victorious march into Kampala, Sinadola Anyanya was banned. Eventually the NRA turned its guns northwards. The retreating UNLA soldiers fled north and their leadership went to Acholi Inn, which they declared to be State House. Suddenly there was a need to popularize the resistance against the advancing NRA. Word went north that the Bantu (Luloka)- dominated NRA was advancing north like a swarm of locusts wasting everything in its path. Whatever response was to be designed would thus be based of a paralyzing fear of extermination. The UNLA leadership threw open the doors of the armoury and issued a popular call for volunteers to drive back the NRA. People responded in droves. Short training drills were done to prepare youths for deployment against the NRA. Tractors that previously ploughed farmlands were brought to Gulu and mounted with guns. It was time for war. The popular saying then was "lalworo odoki imine" (let the coward retreat to his mother's womb). Fast forward to August 1986. The NRA had demolished the last stand of the UNLA and the hastily recruited civilians. Most UNLA soldiers had either retreated to their villages or crossed into Sudan from where they monitored events. There was no fighting in Gulu. The elders met Museveni and pleaded for peace. Soon however, the NRA command issued a call for former UNLA soldiers to report to the authorities. This call evoked memories of when Idi Amin issued a similar call and ended up butchering thousands of Acholi and Lango youths. Once bitten twice shy. The UNLA leaders used this as a basis for a new call to arms. In addition, some units of the NRA and its allies had committed some atrocities against civilians. What was the UNLA then became the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA) and for the next two years war raged in Acholiland. In 1988 a peace deal was negotiated and the UPDA leadership ceased hostilities. The groups that took up arms post UPDA continued to enjoy diminishing levels of support. I have discussed this first phase of the resistance with President Museveni and he agrees that this was a legitimate resistance by a deposed government. In addition he admits that there was no basis to vie for power other than by force of arms. He now says that since 1995 there is a constitution and therefore there are no legitimate grounds for anyone to resort to force to pursue state power. For those who see the current constitution as partisan and tailor- made to keep Museveni in power, this argument is unsound. Let us now tie the loose ends of the above analysis and see how it relates to Museveni's current political offensive. First, it has to be admitted that Museveni did not invest enough political capital in the north. The NRA crossed Karuma but the NRM did not! People have felt the weight of the jackboots on their backsides, but their minds have not been stimulated by the new ideas that Museveni promised. Secondly, President Museveni's basic political thesis was a blanket characterization of the north as an enemy of the rest of Uganda. Anyone who contests this rather sweeping assertion should look into the 2002 parliamentary Hansard and revisit a speech Museveni gave to Parliament where he said that "the chauvinism of the Acholi had to be destroyed". I admit that like any tribe, the Acholi have their fair share of chauvinists obsessed with an exaggerated sense of ethnic prowess. But to use the chauvinism of a few individuals to stigmatize an entire tribe seems to me evidence that Museveni is driven by sectarian vendetta. This is what other people have referred to as the lack of a political will to end the war in the north. Museveni has always explained his failure to end the war using a series of scapegoats ranging from an unfriendly terrain, Sudan's support for the LRA and collaboration by the civilian population. These scapegoats are now dwindling. Sudan has stopped its support for the LRA. Excuses based on the terrain have become a joke as the terrain obstructs both the UPDF and the LRA. Above all, allegations of mass collaboration have proved to be unjustified. Also, the UPDF now seems more vigilant to protect the population and to pursue the LRA. Museveni's rhetoric is also changing. A few weeks ago he gave a highly conciliatory speech to the Acholi community meeting in Kampala. He apologized for his failure to protect the people and thanked all sections of leaders for their contributions towards peace. But with the LRA capacity dwindling, Museveni needs to set the stage for a new war. This time the war is against political opponents like Mao, Reagan Okumu and Cecilia Ogwal. It is not by accident that in virtually all the rallies he addressed Museveni singled out these political leaders as thorns in his flesh. He also said these people are alive because he is magnanimous enough not to have killed them (yet). Furthermore, there is turbulence on board the Movement ship. Territories that were previously sealed for the Movement will now be hotly contested. Museveni is now at his weakest politically and so demands have increased. Entities like Buganda are now behaving like a bank calling up its loans from a business on the verge of collapse. In this situation, a number of smooth political operators in the north are also seeking to cash in. They now want to present the north as a place from which Museveni may gain some support and thus fill the gap left by the massive defections in the south. These political operators will be amply rewarded. But it is unlikely that they will deliver votes to the Movement because the people are aware that their suffering is precisely because of Museveni's callous policies. Museveni has some supporters in the north but he is not going to get a majority soon. I have seen some of the people at the forefront of the kisanja campaign in Gulu and I can only say I pity Museveni. Indeed only a sense of civility restrains me from revealing the highly selfish motives for them to bedeck themselves with dray banana leaves. The kisanja campaign is thus a lullaby to put the people to sleep and make them forget Museveni's responsibility for their suffering. And our people are desperate. The spectacle in Gulu is what we call Gwoko kot I gang pa lajok. In a rainstorm, a weary traveler may be compelled to seek shelter in the home of a well known night dancer. This is a political challenge for us to present something better so that the night dancer's refuge does not receive anything more than a glance. I would advise President Museveni to work with elected leaders. The so-called opposition are representatives of the people and when the President excludes them he sends a wrong message. As long as he reaches out only to those who agree with him politically, he will come out as fake and selfish. It would be a sign that he is unwilling to engage in a real political debate, and instead wants to be flattered by people who seek to climb the political ladder on his back.   =============================================================================   Copyright © 2004 The Monitor. All rights reserved. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com). =============================================================================