[allAfrica.com] Dokubo: Obasanjo's Tactical Surprise Vanguard (Lagos) NEWS October 7, 2004 Posted to the web October 7, 2004 By Ochereome Nnanna MANY Nigerians woke up on Wednesday, September 29, 2004, to news reports of President Olusegun Obasanjo's meeting at the Presidential Villa, Abuja, with Mr. Asari Dokubo, the self-styled Ijaw rebel leader. This young man, in the past two months, shot himself into national and international limelight as the current foremost warlord leading the Nigeria Delta People's Volunteers Force (NDPVF). First of all, he had led his armed group to flush out the Rivers State Government-sponsored fighters of the Ateke Tom group from Okrika, the present hub of armed activity in the Niger Delta. Not only that, he invaded the water front areas of Port Harcourt to rout the Tom gang, which had held Port Harcourt and many parts of Rivers State in thrall for a long time. Dokubo swiftly rejected the tag of cult leader earlier put on him and pointed out that he was a fighter for the freedom and self determination of the Ijaw people. He reiterated as his mission the actualisation of the Kaiama Declaration launched in December 1997 and promptly followed it up with a threat to declare an all-out war against Nigeria from October 1 unless steps were taken to grant his people full autonomy and power to control the resources of their land. Media reports also had it that he had ordered foreigners and oil company workers who were not Ijaw to leave the Niger Delta, as he could not guarantee their safety when the said full-scale war took effect. Already, the Nigerian armed forces and security apparatuses had swung into action and the media overflowed with reports of intense military activities in the areas of the Niger Delta where the warlord and his armed men were based. The activities of Dokubo and his group were the most important factors that pushed crude oil prices to a new three year high of plus $50 per barrel, a clear evidence that the group was actually making international impact. The price climb was attributable to fears arising from Dokubo's threat to emasculate the petroleum drilling, transportation and sale infrastructure throughout the Niger Delta. As the countdown to the October 1 D-Day drew near, most Nigerians braced up for the worst. Dokubo and his men were already being called "rebels" in the media. The Rivers State Governor, Dr. Peter Odili, and his hirelings were referring to him and his group as "criminals", even though in truth, Dokubo was one of the boys reportedly armed by the government to help it "win" the 2003 general election in the state, where Dr. Peter Odili scored almost 100% of the votes. NIGERIANS knew their incumbent President's overzealous but hackneyed reflexes over matters of "rebellion" against the Nigerian state by separatist groups. His exploits in Odi (Bayelsa State) in 2000 and Zaki-Biam (Benue State) a year later and his declaration of a state of emergency in Plateau State on May 18 2004 put him out as a dog of war, ever eager to prove the superiority of coercion as an omnipotent means of solving uprisings. A day earlier on Tuesday, September 28, the National Council of State had met and mandated him to crush all groups threatening the corporate existence of Nigeria. With this carte blanche, Obasanjo was expected to heave-ho into the Delta with full military force, more so as the international community expected him to act to safeguard the interests and citizens of stakeholders in the petroleum industry within the Niger Delta. THE dialogue between Obasanjo and the security chiefs on the Federal Government side and Dokubo, his rival, Ateke Tom and other parties to the Niger Delta ferment on the other, thus surprised not a few people. Dokubo himself so confessed. The question on the lips of observers was why Obasanjo apparently opted for dialogue. Some were already commenting that the President's resort to dialogue was a special treatment for Dokubo and his group despite the fact that they had taken up arms and were threatening war. However, a close tactical examination of this entire issue would suggest that the Federal Government, especially the President, could merely be using the dialogue offer as a calculated military gambit towards bringing the uprising and threat to book. The President's strategic intention is to eliminate the threat facing the nation's oil wells and infrastructure in the Niger Delta, as this would not only be in the nation's interest but also in the interest of the international community of where he is an enthusiastic and active player. Dokubo and his group and other similar groups are merely being given, perhaps, the last chance to back off from the dangerous path they have chosen and reintegrate themselves within the existing political processes from which they were alienated by the Rivers State Government. That was why emphasis was placed on making peace between him and the Ateke Tom group. The chances are that in the subsequent sittings of the peace meetings, there would be trade-offs, whereby Dokubo and his group will be persuaded to disarm and abandon the rebellion in exchange for political and economic "accommodation". Remember that the cabinet of the Rivers State Government has remained dissolved and opportunities still exist. Governor Peter Odili, being an Obasanjo man and mindful of the special privilege he has enjoyed (remaining on the job when he could have been flushed out through emergency rule) will go along with the terms of settlement. That is as far as the President is likely to go in "making peace" with Dokubo and company. Even so, for having picked up arms and threatened war against Nigeria, Dokubo (and any other person who might do likewise) will henceforth be looked upon by the federal authorities as one who has tugged the tiger by the tail. The tiger usually doesn't like it, and doesn't forget it. As for insisting on the purity of the demand of the Kaiama Declaration, which effectively demands the cession of Ijaw territory and resources to Ijaw people, either within or outside the confines of the Nigerian dispensation, it looks very much like an uphill task to expect Obasanjo to play ball. The chances are he will not. In fact, the dialogue of Abuja held on September 29, 2004, could very well be a diversionary gambit to momentarily slacken the concentration of the insurgents and enable the federal troops to sink their claws deeper in securing the Niger Delta against threats of destabilisation. The fact that even while the dialogue went on the armed forces kept up with their maneouvres illustrates this possibility. It is not likely that President Obasanjo will over night lose his personal ideology of Nigeria and the resources within its territories. Anybody who thinks Obasanjo will preside over the decentralisation of political and economic power of Nigeria to the peripheries is simply daydreaming. Obasanjo has made it repeatedly clear enough that the Biafran secession was stopped by the Federal Government because the government of the former Eastern Region wanted to appropriate the abundant oil resources of Nigeria to itself. The Biafran secession was therefore stopped in the overall interest and well being of Nigeria. He reiterated this much when he visited Bayelsa State after he sent a punitive military expedition to Odi to crush the first Ijaw youths push under his presidency, of which the Dokubo initiative is merely the latest follow-up. OBASANJO is a genuine believer in the central control of political and economic power. He it was who created the 1979 constitution that centralised our federalism, and he is very proud of this legacy. He prizes it as a piece of ingenuity, which was never faulted or discarded by subsequent regimes' series of constitution tinkering. Obasanjo's hands are being strengthened by the emergent position of crude oil as a tool of international relevance now more than ever before. The task of stabilising the Niger Delta for the free flow of oil will be to the benefit of Nigeria and the world. Obasanjo will likely do his level best to remove by whatever means any impediment to the free flow of oil in the interest of Nigeria and the international community. The bottom line, therefore, is as follows: if Dokubo or any other person or group insists on taking over the power over the oil wealth of Nigeria by force, or undermining its safety, Obasanjo will bat no eyelid in re-enacting the Odi experience. But as we always say, muscle without sense never solves problems of this nature. The best solution, therefore, is for both sides to shift grounds. The people of resource-bearing areas of Nigeria will have to live with the fact that these resources are Nigeria's commonwealth. At the same time, Nigeria has to recognise that special needs arise from exploiting these resources in their catchment localities, and the people are entitled reasonable amount of reparations.   =============================================================================   Copyright © 2004 Vanguard. All rights reserved. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com). =============================================================================