[allAfrica.com] Fragile Unity in Mogadishu The East African Standard (Nairobi) ANALYSIS January 16, 2005 Posted to the web January 17, 2005 By Ken Ramani Nairobi Although elected by the warring factions, President Yusuf is less than the unifying factor needed to resolve the numerous issues that have divided the people. The re-unification of the breakaway region of Somaliland with the greater Somalia appears to have been complicated by last year's election of Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed as transitional president. Colonel Ahmed is portrayed as an archetypal warlord and stooge of Ethiopia incapable of uniting the country and is widely regarded by the self-declared Republic of Somaliland as the president of Puntland, a region that lies within the colonial boundaries inherited by Somaliland. That is the reason why, according to the respected International Crisis Group (ICG), within two weeks of his election in October last year, unusually bloody clashes between Somaliland and Puntland forces in the School region left over 100 people dead. The declaration, in Kenya, of a Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), should have been reason to celebrate considering that for almost fifteen years the country had had no central government and had been torn apart by civil strife. But the ICG in a report titled "Somalia:_Continuation_of_War_by_Other_Means?" says: "In the world of Somali politics, unfortunately, no news is ever purely good news and the progress of the peace process has been largely downhill since then." The transitional parliament congregating in Nairobi elected Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed as interim president. But the report released two weeks ago and dated December 2, says Yusuf immediately "side-stepped" the transitional Charter in order to appoint his preferred candidate as prime minister -veterinarian and civil society activist Ali Mohamed Geedi. In December, the newly appointed prime minister put together a very large Cabinet heavily weighted with Yusuf allies and tarnished by allegations of Ethiopian interference. Several appointees immediately resigned, and those who remained were voted out by parliament in a session that degenerated into fisticuffs, forcing the dissolution of the entire Cabinet. The question is whether Yusuf and his supporters will continue to exploit their new legitimacy to entrench themselves in power or dedicate themselves to building a genuine peace in their country. On balance, developments since Yusuf's taking office have compounded rather than alleviated anxieties about the future of the peace process. The report argues that the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) is a fractious body that has already violated its own Charter at least once; many of its members seem indecorously preoccupied with sitting fees and per diems rather than government business. Although the TFP's vote of no confidence in the first Cabinet in December suggested the awakening of a robust democratic process, those who sponsored the motion included many who had been passed over for the Cabinet and may have been defending parochial interests. The interim president's most controversial move has been his appeal for a 20,000-strong African Union (AU) military force to help enforce his government's authority. The report says that within Somalia, the appeal was widely perceived as a sign that Yusuf was prepared to impose his authority using a foreign force. A number of Somali leaders, including several key Islamists, have since flagged their opposition to the plan, the price of weapons and ammunition in Mogadishu has skyrocketed, and there have been reports of new stock entering the city arms markets. It's also argued that initially supported by Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, Yusuf's request appears to have been deflected by both the AU and the UN Security Council, both of which are eager to avoid a repeat of the disastrous "Black Hawk Down" episode of 1993 in which eighteen American troops were killed and dozens wounded in Mogadishu by militia loyal to the late warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed. The AU has continued planning for a modest monitoring and observer force instead, possibly accompanied by a small "protection force". But even these limited deployments would require prior approval from the transitional parliament and that measurable ceasefire arrangements be in place - both of which are formidable challenges in the current context. The report warns that "if foreign troops are deployed without these preconditions having been met, they will no doubt be drawn into the Somali conflict." It's recalled that Somalia has seen several interim governments come and go since 1991, leaving instability and despondency in their wake. "So far, this one looks no different than its predecessors; responsible leadership is essential if the TFG is not to share their fate and is to metamorphose into a real success story." "Yusuf needs to set the tone, demonstrating that he intends to serve as a caretaker, not rule like Caesar. He must demonstrate that he means to lead not merely a factional coalition, but a durable, broad-based government of national unity that works to earn the respect and trust of the Somali people," advises the report. The report goes on to add that "the prime minister and his Cabinet must roll up their sleeves, trim their expectations of international assistance and come to grips with the formidable transitional responsibilities with which they have been entrusted: promotion of genuine reconciliation; restoration of a secure environment throughout Somalia; elaboration of a federal framework for the state - with or without the inclusion of Somaliland and; laying the ground for free and fair elections." Judicious international engagement will be another critical element. Finding the right balance between incentives and leverage will be tricky: the TFG has received a mandate of sorts to lead the peace process but its internal legitimacy, cohesiveness and purpose remain uncertain. The international community should extend recognition and legitimacy to the interim government in an incremental and progressive way, concomitant with the TFG's demonstration of its own acceptance and authority. ICG warns that donors must also be prepared to support the transition process in strategic ways that improve chances of success. "Assistance should be delivered so as not simply to prop up Yusuf and his factional allies and pave the way for future conflict, but to contribute to a process of broad reconciliation. This involves tying support to performance criteria, and strictly controlling disbursements to ensure that aid is not squandered on patronage or used to destabilise areas. Aid resources should be programmed in an equitable, decentralised manner that takes into account the diverse conditions existing in Somalia and ensures the involvement of local authorities." ICG reveals that the friction between Italy and the UK has complicated decision-making on Somalia within the European Union (EU), while the US has adopted a "slow, measured approach"' that has been interpreted as a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the new leadership. Although the international community has begun to organise its relationship with the TFG within the context of an inclusive coordination mechanism, divergent assessments of the interim government's quality and prospects are likely to characterise engagement in Somalia for the foreseeable future. Fundamentally, the concern is that the TFG amounts to no more than a temporary agreement between Somali leaders to continue their war by other means. The peace process has made no attempt to effect reconciliation inside Somalia, and there has been little or no progress toward resolving the numerous issues that have divided the Somali people. Members of parliament and the TFG have already demonstrated casual regard for the Charter from which they derive their authority. Article 29, which assigns at least 12 per cent of parliamentary representation (33 seats) to women, was instantly violated: only 22 women took seats, while the remainder of that quota was filled by men.   ===============================================================================   Copyright © 2005 The East African Standard. All rights reserved. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media (allAfrica.com). ===============================================================================