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Arusha Talks Collapse, France Increases Operations

The New Times (Kigali)
OPINION
December 7, 2006
Posted to the web December 8, 2006

By Andrew Wallis
Kigali
On 9 January 1993 the two sides at Arusha agreed on the composition of a new
national transitional assembly to run the country until new elections were
held.
In Kigali the news was greeted by CDR ­and government-controlled Hutu extremist
rioters taking to the streets to demonstrate against the 'sell-out' at Arusha.
The violence lasted six days, with around 300 fatalities after murderous thugs
had rampaged through the streets, torturing and killing as they went. The talks
at Arusha collapsed and further negotiations were suspended. The ceasefire that
had accompanied the Arusha talks was broken on 8 February 1993 as the RPF
launched a well-coordinated and well ­organized attack on the northern town of
Ruhengeri. The effect was the usual debacle for the government forces and the
town fell within hours. As predictable as the defeat of Habyarimana's troops
was the immediate arrival of French support as Paris swung into action two new
military operations, Volcano and Chimera - the first to rescue trapped
nationals, the second to shore up the FAR until politicians could reach a
truce.
Operation Volcano began on 10 February with a remit to evacuate 67 foreigners
now trapped inside the RPF-controlled town; 21 of these were French. A
negotiated settlement was reached and the foreign workers were allowed to leave
in three convoys. While this was hap­pening, the French were stepping up their
military strength because it had become obvious to their commanders that,
without it, the FAR would be overwhelmed and the capital, Kigali, overrun.
Colonel Bernard Cussac was informed that reinforcements were being rushed to
the threatened area. On 20 February a second company of paratroopers arrived
from Bangui, followed the next day by a heavy artillery section from
Libreville.
On 28 February the French, under General Dominique Delort, set Operation
Chimera in motion. It encompassed a detachment of special operatives (DAMI) as
well as 20 paratroopers from the first RPIMA. Helicopters continued to be used
for identifying RPF movements, while DAMI set up and managed artillery units,
doing everything except firing the guns.
Such artillery was the difference between the two sides. With heavy mortar
sited and aimed effectively by the French, the RPF attack was halted on 23
February. Human Rights Watch reported, 'according to one French "instructor",
French trainers positioned the heavy artillery to bombard the RPF and then
stood back to let Rwandan soldiers push the button to fire the weapon.'22
Former Rwandan defence minister James Gasana admitted that the FAR were only
allowed to employ artillery given by France after they had received permission
from their foreign allies to use them.
The fact that Paris had flown another 300 troops into Kigali meant that any RPF
assault on the capital would inevitably be against the French and, as such, the
advance stopped about 20 kilometres short of the seat of government. French
intelligence operatives in Rwanda, the DGSE, and Tanzanian intelligence experts
shared this view of the motive behind the RPF's sudden halt.24 According to RPF
Colonel Frank Rusegama, who helped lead the offensive, 'What was important was
not occupying land; it was to establish a buffer zone, and to put pressure on
Habyarimana.' The RPF certainly managed this, as hastily arranged peace talks
were convened at Bujumbura in neighbouring Burundi.
A legionnaire told the BBC in an interview just how involved Noroit had been in
the battle in early 1993 and how near Habyarimana's gov­ernment was to
military defeat. 'The artillery is on the front. There would be an officer, in
this case a French military officer, who would observe all lines of fire, who
would regulate by radio to his under­officer, who would give the orders to the
general soldiers on the ground their direction of fire.' The interviewer asked
him: 'So when you say the French army officer was regulating by radio what was
his actual role?'
'He was commanding the fire.' 'If the Frencn hadn't been there what would have
actually happened do you think?'
The Rwandan army would have been totally incapable of defending the country,
and since they scarcely knew how to use their weapons and they knew very little
about military tactics, the war would have been lost. There would have been a
very small battle and in a day it would have been all over if the French hadn't
been there.
His military and political superiors shared this legionnaire's assess­ment.
Colonel Dominique Delort declared on 16 March that 'any reduction of our help
would entail the quick defeat of the government army if the [RPF] offensive is
renewed.'27
French information officer, William Bunel, told concerned Human Rights Watch
investigators that 'French advisers are prohibited from entering combat areas,
and may only advise Rwandan troops in fixed training centres.' The human rights
group drew its own conclusions. 'Western observers, diplomats and Rwandan
military officers said that French advisers had been observed in tactical
combat situations with Rwandan troops during the 1993 offensive.' The new
French ambassador in Kigali, Jean-Michel Marlaud, replied to this allegation in
language that hardly suggested the opposite was true. 'When you are supposed to
advise, you must advise however it is necessary.' He was also quoted as saying:
'I don't expect the Rwandan army to suppress the RPF by itself.'28
Military hardware accompanied this tactical advisory support. The French
provided anti-tank guns and a complete battery of 105 mm mortars. A letter from
Colonel Deogratias Nsabimana, commander in chief of the FAR, to the Rwandan
minister of defence showed his delight with his Western allies but warned, 'the
French work has been good, but they must be more discreet.'
The number of French troops involved rose significantly with the RPF offensives
in 1992 and early 1993, and by March 1993 had reached an official peak of 688.
Other estimates put the number at nearer 850.30 A French army colonel even
boasted that, by cleverly rotating units and dates, it was possible to almost
double, to 1000 men, the official figure of 600 soldiers.3l On top of this was
an unknown number of 'unofficial' secret service operatives from the DGSE
involved in a shadowy game of protecting and shoring-up Habyarimana. After
their 1991 action at Ruhengeri, 15 French soldiers were recommended for
medals,32 while another document thanked the French for assis­tance that was
'precious in combat'.
Pierre, a 37 year-old lance corporal in the FAR, had first-hand experience of
the French. In 1991-92, I was at Ruhengeri, in the Muhoza camps. The French
(DAMI) were giving us military training in hand-to-hand combat. When they were
training us, they told us that they were teaching us to defend ourselves in
case we had to fight the enemy. We learnt from DAMI over a six-month period in
1992. Afterwards, I was sent to Ruhengeri at Butaro on the Muhabura volcano
since there were attacks from the Inkotanyis [RPF].
There were French there, they had 'support rifles' that they fixed and then let
us handle. It sometimes happened they took part themselves, like when we fought
between Muhabura and Gahinga. They were firing on the Inkotanyis, but the
latter put up a good fight. It was only when the battle became difficult that
the French came to support us with military training. They'd taught us and they
could leave us on the field and watch us get on with it. Allegations were also
rife that some French soldiers were helping to question RPF prisoners, a charge
Paris dismissed. In November 1991 the International Federation for Human Rights
declared that French officers had led 'strong-armed' interrogations of RPF
prisoners.
Eric Gillet, former president of Amnesty International in Belgium, returned
from Rwanda in August 1991. He reported that RPF 'major' Jean-Bosco Nyirigira
had testified that French officers in Kigali prison had interrogated him for
many days. Witness statements by 17 other RPF prisoners reported French
soldiers questioned them.35 Six years later Colonel Cussac said he was the only
'French soldier to have met military prisoners.
Venuste Kayimahe, a middle-aged Tutsi living in Kigali, also had experience of
the French 'interrogators'. His friend, Jean, who worked at the French Cultural
Centre branch near Ruhengeri in 1990, had been arrested after an RPF attack and
accused like many Tutsi of helping the enemy.
A colonel in the Rwandan army tortured him, with a French captain also present.
It took place at the gendarmerie school in Ruhengeri, where the French had
established a place to train new police. Jean was tied up, and during
questioning he was beaten with a large stick when his replies did not please
his captors. He later fled to Belgium. I saw his professional file in Kigali;
it was full of letters between the [French] Cultural Centre and the
prosecutor's office. These French employers, instead of trying to protect this
man who worked for them, instead seemed to take the side of those who
considered him to be an 'enemy' because he was a Tutsi.36
The series continue tomorrow


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