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Iraqi Sectarianism: Inherited, Irreversible?
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Sectarian
strife in Iraq is getting out of control. (Reuters)
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Khaled
Mamdouh, IOL Staff Writer
CAIRO,
February 27, 2006 - The most feared
outcome of the uncalculated, illegal and unethical US adventure in Iraq
is almost a reality now. Sectarian strife in Iraq is making headlines
around the world, with calls for restraint by all parties — both
inside and outside the war-torn country –seemingly falling on deaf
ears. What brought about that dreadful outcome? Is it too late to
prevent a full-scale civil war? What could be the best way forward?
While
a report on the issue Monday, February 27, by the International Crisis
Group (ICG) gives answers for these questions, it might have ignored
some decisive factors.
"If
Iraq falls apart, historians may seek to identify years from now what
was the decisive moment. The ratification of the constitution in October
2005, a sectarian document that both marginalized and alienated the
Sunni Arab community?
"The
flawed January 2005 elections that handed victory to a Shiite-Kurdish
alliance, which drafted the constitution and established a government
that countered outrages against Shiites with indiscriminate attacks
against Sunnis? Establishment of the Interim Governing Council in July
2003, a body that in its composition prized communal identities over
national-political platforms?
"Or,
even earlier, in the nature of the ousted regime and its consistent and
brutal suppression of political stirrings in the Shiite and Kurdish
communities that it saw as threatening its survival? Most likely it is a
combination of all four, as this report argues."
Sunni
Saddam?
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Mosques
need protection, since when?! (Reuters)
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The
ICG's assessment of the situation, at least in part, ignores many other
factors that, if grasped, may help reach "the best way
forward."
Claiming
that the nature of the ousted regime itself and its "consistent and
brutal suppression of political stirrings in the Shiite and Kurdish
communities" were possible decisive causes for the current flare-up
of sectarian strife in Iraq, in effect ignores the very "true
nature of that regime."
Saddam
Hussein, often referred to be some Western media as "Sunni,"
was no more than a despot and a dictator whose practices and actions
were a reflection of this nature and nothing more.
To
say that Saddam Hussein oppressed Shiites and Kurds and favored Sunnis,
on the backdrop of himself being a Sunni, is not only a distortion of
facts, but also an outright lie.
Saddam's
regime officials and inner circle did reflect the Iraqi mosaic,
including Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and Christians. But to say the choice
rested on sectarian lines would also be an "ignorant"
judgment.
Speaker
of Iraq's National Assembly (Parliament) Saadoun Hammady and Minister of
Trade Mohamed Mehdi Saleh were Shiites, while the famous Foreign
Minister Tareq Aziz was Christian.
Does
this mean that Saddam was trying to please certain sects? Does it mean
choice of his henchmen depended on their religious or ethnic
affiliations? It is a fact that dictators tend to pick their aides in
terms of "approval and getting along" with whatever a dictator
sees right.
Outside
Factors
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Rice
called the sectarian clashes "a blow".
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In
the majority of Iraq's provinces, where Shiites and Sunnis live side by
side, it is normal for one family to have Shiite and Sunni members.
In
Baghdad, Dyala, Basra, Babel and other provinces across Iraq, it is hard
to see clear lines across sectarian divisions socially, with marriages
bringing a Shiite bride and a Sunni groom together or the other way
around.
This
social mosaic has always been there. It is true tensions might have been
there as well. But to what extent? What made these develop so
dangerously as to cause huge casualties and threaten an open civil war
now?
There
have to be other "exterior factors." US officials themselves
actually highlight these factors.
James
Jeffrey, the State Department coordinator on Iraq, pointed the finger at
Al-Qaeda for the latest violence.
US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke of "outsiders"
stoking tensions — usually a code word for Iran and Syria.
The
ICG's report highlighted three US-related developments as other
potential decisive factors behind the outbreak of sectarian violence.
But
no one seems to be looking deeper or may be coming outright to blame
Washington's invasion and occupation, its favoring of Shiites and Kurds
at the expense of the Sunnis, and its short-sighted handling of the
Iraqi quagmire for the whole bloody situation.
A
few months after the invasion, reports coming from Washington
highlighted the lack of a US plan to handle the country it had just
occupied, along with a serious misunderstanding of the "Iraqi
case" in general. We still remember how the widely spread notion in
2003 was that Iraqis would meet US soldiers with "roses"!
US
Policies
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Khalilzad
was the first US official to foresee how close sectarianism in
Iraq was to a "civil war".
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The
same situation seems to be repeated now with the sectarian jinni out of
its bottle. While it is hard to accuse the Americans of fueling
sectarian strife in Iraq now, it is safe to say the US short-sightedness
and lack of "a clear vision or exit strategy" have all been
major factors in matters reaching that risky cliffhanger.
US
ambassador to Baghdad Zalmay Khalilzad was amongst the first US
officials to foresee the fast-approaching sectarian sandstorm when he
hinted "a possible cutoff of US security aid if the coming Iraqi
government included sectarian ministers."
But
typical of US moves in Iraq, the realization might have come too late
already. The US occupation forces themselves, in their actions to curb
the armed resistance, have long been accused of singling out Sunni
neighborhoods for massive operations that saw major violations of human
rights. Sunni mosques have also been the scene of such operations. While
the US and their allies of the Iraqi government argue that most anti-US
operations in Sunni areas of the country are to confront resistance
fighters only, two massive revolts by a major Shiite faction widely
dispute these claims.
Revolts
against US occupation by Al-Sadr's followers were dealt with in a way
different from the handling of other resistance factions, to say the
least. There were no massive operations in Shiite areas, or at least
nothing that made the headlines. Even Mehdi Army Militia are still there
and operative despite being declared illegal under current laws. Mehdi
Militia themselves played a big role in attacking Sunnis last week
following the bombing of the golden dome in Samarra.
Rice
called the sectarian clashes "a blow" and said Iraqis were
going through "an extremely hard and extremely delicate
moment." Yes, but the Americans are also facing the consequences of
that "blow."
ICG
recommendations to Washington focused on what it could do to get their
Shiite-Kurd allies to include the Sunnis in a "national unity
government," "encouraging meaningful amendments to the
constitution to produce an inclusive document that protects the
fundamental interests of all principal communities and assisting in
building up security forces that are not only adequately trained and
equipped, but also inclusive and non-sectarian."
But
in short, the United States has played a big role in fueling the
sectarian strife in Iraq, whether wittingly or unwittingly.
Consequently, it has to play a more positive role in curbing that
devastating plague before it is too late.
An
exit strategy, with a clear schedule for gradually withdrawing its
occupation forces might be a good first step in this direction.
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