Map of southern Sudan, reproduced from the National Democratic Alliance

Throughout history, there are defining moments that signify the beginning of an era and the end of a previous one. Wars, revolutions, technological breakthroughs and uneven growth rates between different societies were usually thought of as harbingers of transformation and change in world politics. However, peace agreements are another source of change. The peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), signed on July 20th in Machakos, Kenya, following five weeks of marathon talks, resembles a landmark transformation in both domestic Sudanese and regional politics.¹ 

The agreement, which was brokered by the Horn of Africa’s Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with the active involvement of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway, signifies an end to the 19 year-old civil war between the northern government and rebels in the south which left more than 2 million people dead and another 4 million homeless.² 

Under the terms of the protocol, southern Sudan will be granted a six-year period of administrative autonomy and will not be subjected to the Islamic law applied in the north. During the interim period, Sudan will have two armies, the north under the leadership of the Khartoum government, and the south under the leadership of SPLA leader, John Garang. Also, the south will have the right to establish separate administrative, security, and banking systems, and can pass laws that suit the norms and traditions of the south.³ 

A more controversial issue, however, is the provision that at the end of the six years, animists, Christians and minority Muslims in the south, will vote in a referendum on whether they wish to be part of Sudan or secede.⁴ The clause reads as follows: 

At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an international monitored referendum, organized jointly by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.⁵ 

Currently, talks are under way between the government and rebels to discuss issues related to the relationship between religion and state, self-determination, cease-fire arrangements, and distribution of wealth. Despite optimism that the agreement can actually bring peace to a war-torn Sudan, it masks a plethora of complex strategic and geopolitical dilemmas. In this context, national security will be understood as a multidimensional concept that not only involves military/territorial threats, but issues of resource distribution, water rights, and historical ethnic/cultural tensions. The case of Sudan is a perfect example of the internal fragility of the Third World state, the interconnectedness and overlapping between internal and international politics, and vulnerability to regional and international powers.⁶ 

The Historical Legacy of Conflict 

Sudan’s beleaguered President Bashir

The population of Sudan is almost 70% Muslim, mostly located in the north. The remaining 30% of the population is either animist (25%) or Christian (5%), and are mostly in the south.⁷ The population of southern Sudan is about 7 million, 65% of whom are animist, 18% Muslim, and 17% Christian. There are almost 12 languages with 250 different dialects, but Arabic remains the official and most widely spoken language.⁸ 

Despite the fact that Sudan gained its independence in 1956, the roots of the north-south divide were planted long before by the British colonialists. The territory of southern Sudan was demarcated at the end of 1913 after a series of agreements between Britain, France and Belgium, where the 10°N parallel was considered the line of demarcation between north and south.⁹ 

More importantly, Britain insisted on treating the south as an entirely distinct area from the north. The Closed Districts Order of 1922 banned non-southern Sudanese from traveling to or living in the South unless they obtained a special permit. In addition, “Britain removed northerners who had served in the southern administration, forbade Arab-style clothes in the south, and taught English instead of Arabic in the newly established schools. They also encouraged Catholic and Protestant missionaries to open schools and churches, whereas they banned Muslim schools, mosques, and preachers.”¹⁰ 

Hence, suspicion between the north and south was already well established when the country gained independence in 1956. Trends favored separation, as southern politicians feared that when the country gained its independence, it would be dominated by the wealthier and more politically sophisticated northerners. In fact, just one month before independence, the southern members of parliament refused to endorse the independence proclamation unless the south was granted federal status. The government then declared some commitment towards establishing a federal system, but that was never implemented. 

Essentially, Sudan has been at war with itself since independence. However, there was a period of peace between 1973 and 1982 due to the Addis Ababa Accords, which were signed by the government, headed by Numairi, and Anya Nya rebels, lead by Colonel Joseph Lagu. The accords provided the south with a regional government, responsible for its own public order and internal security, and local administration over social, economic, and cultural matters. The south was also given its own assembly and Higher Executive Council (HEC). The accord was embodied in the Regional Self Government Act, which was incorporated into the constitution. It stated that all citizens would be granted equal rights and any discrimination on the basis of religion, race, language, or gender, was to be prohibited.¹¹

However, the agreement was short-lived. By the early 1980s, Numairi made moves that indicated his willingness to strictly control the country’s political life. Political parties resisted his grip on power, and worsening economic conditions lead people to riot in the streets. This forced Numairi to align himself with religious-oriented groups in Sudan as support for Islamic oriented groups increased, and to abrogate the rights he had given the south. In 1983, after being elected (unopposed) as president for a third time, he re-divided the south into separate regions and decreed Islamic law for the entire nation. This lead to a return to civil strife in the south, as southerners felt those recent measures violated the essence of the Addis Ababa Accords.

The Politics of Oil & Water

Despite its seemingly historical, sectarian and religious nature, the conflict in Sudan has many economic, territorial and resource-based sources. Moreover, it is not a purely domestic issue, but rather involves both regional and international actors. In particular, the politics of oil and water are increasingly important, as they are both vital resources for both warring parties, as well as regional and international actors. 

Sudan’s oil resources are estimated to be worth at least $53 billion at current prices.¹² Some estimates put Sudan’s known reserves at 1.2 billion barrels, with another 800 million of recoverable reserves.¹³ 

One of the SPLA’s first armed activities was targeted at the workers of the oil company Chevron, which planned to construct an oil pipeline running from the oil fields of the South to the refineries located in the northern harbor of Port Sudan.¹⁴ The government is also accused of displacing large numbers of local inhabitants to protect foreign companies’ oil operations. All those measures indicate efforts by both opposition and government forces to either control, protect, or destroy the oil production capacity. More specifically:

Oil is a symbol of the Sudanese problem: Sudan’s recent history of decolonization, failed nation-building and its continuing political affairs are reflected in the story of oil. Economic factors, such as oil exploration and extraction, show not only that considerations of the global economy dominate political decision-making but also clearly indicate the underlying sources of conflict in Sudan.¹⁵ 

Also, in light of the change in U.S. foreign policy after September 11th, former “rogue” states, such as Libya and Sudan, are becoming increasingly important for the U.S. in its bid to control the world’s oil reserves. The U.S. is searching for oil-rich states without the potential for massive conflict. Oil-rich Central Asia and the Gulf have been riddled with conflicts for decades, and U.S. voters are not comfortable with the idea of further domestic oil exploitation.¹⁶ 

The U.S. has a stake in the current peace process in Sudan and in reconciliation with Libya. In fact, “Libyan oil production already ranks second to African oil giant Nigeria, and the Sudan when fully explored by oil geologists, could eventually rival oil behemoth Saudi Arabia.”¹⁷ In the words of John Danforth, U.S. special envoy to Sudan, “The success of the peace talks in Kenya will transform Sudan from an area of conflict to a major source of oil.”¹⁸ 

In addition, China and the U.S. are engaged in fierce competition over oil interests in Sudan. In fact, U.S. officials said that China is willing to replace any firm that leaves southern Sudan. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Katsteiner, suggested that “We don’t foresee anything stopping the Chinese from increasing their equity participation in oil, and I think it probably would be problematic if they were the dominant player.”¹⁹ The National Petroleum Corporation (NPC) – which is wholly owned by China – already has a 40% share in oil extraction operations in Sudan.²⁰ 

In addition, Egypt has extensive interests in Sudan. The Egyptian response to the Machakos agreement was very tepid, and many in Cairo voiced concerns that the protocols laid the foundation for an independent southern Sudan – an outcome that would stand in stark contrast to Egypt’s national interests in a unified Sudan under Khartoum’s control. Egyptian officials felt that the Machakos agreement bypassed the Egyptian-Libyan Initiative (August 1999), and failed to recognize the national interests of Egypt:

Any Egyptian government, regardless of its ideological inclinations, has to safeguard two things: national unity, and the unhindered supply of Nile water… Any regional or international development that interferes, however remotely, with either of these two imperatives inevitably raises alarm in Cairo.²¹ 

SPLA’s Dr. John Garang

In fact, the Nile remains the single most important facet of Egyptian geopolitics, as without the river, Egypt would cease to exist. As early as the 1970s, Egyptian Air Force bombers and reconnaissance aircraft routinely patrolled Sudanese skies, and Egypt intervened militarily several times in the 1980s against Libyan attempts to destabilize Sudan.²² 

There is also the possibility of extensive Israeli activities in the Horn of Africa, another source of alarm for Egypt. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that there is intelligence and military cooperation between Israel and both Kenya and Eritrea to curb the forces of so-called “Islamic fundamentalism” emanating from the Sudanese government.²³ Hence, the Machakos agreement raises the possibility of an independent southern Sudan, with close U.S., and possibly, Israeli ties.

Conclusions

As much as the Machakos agreement seems at surface to be an important step towards ending the longest civil war in Africa, one must note that the conflict involves a great deal of complex geostrategic relationships, concerning a multitude of actors with many irreconcilable interests. Hence, the whole issue must be put in its proper historical and geostrategic framework, since it remains to be seen whether the agreement will be a positive step towards reconciliation or a new opening for further conflict and struggle. Either way, what is certain is that the agreement will have major domestic, regional, and international repercussions.

1-  For an in-depth study of theories of change see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981); Barry Schutz and Robert Slater, Revolution and Political Change in the Third World (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (Connecticut: Fontana Press, 1986).

2- Meron Tesfa Michael, “ Sudan : Peace in Peril,” World Press Review Online August 7th, 2002

3-  Hassan Abu Taleb, “African Cloaks, Foreign Daggers,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online August 8th, 2002 .

4- Nevine Khalil, “Concerned Support for Sudan Deal,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online August 8th, 2002 .

5-  “Machakos Protocol,” United States Institute of Peace Library: Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Sudan July 30th, 2002 .

6-  For a theoretical view on Third World conflict and national security, see Bahgat Korany et al., The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1993)

7- “ Sudan : Reference Document” World Press Review Online     

8- Hisham Al-Hadidi, “ Southern Sudan …Where To?” Al-Ahram Daily August 4th, 2002 : 12 (in Arabic).

9-  Ibid.

10-  Ann Mosely Lesch, “The Republic of Sudan,” in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa (Florida University Press: Miami, 1992): 362.

11-  Ibid., 369-370.

12-  Meron Tesfa Michael, “ Sudan : Peace in Peril.”

13- Franz Schurmann, “‘Rogue’ No More – US Eyes Oil in Libya , Sudan ,” Pacific News June 18th, 2002 .

14-  “Sudan: Oil in Sudan – Deteriorating Human Rights,” Amnesty International May 3rd, 2000 .

15- Ibid.

16- Franz Schurmann, “‘Rogue’ No More – US Eyes Oil in Libya , Sudan ,” Pacific News June 18th, 2002 .

17-  Ibid.

18-  Hisham Al-Hadidi, “ Southern Sudan …Where To?”

19-  “ China Eyes Greater Oil Stake in Sudan ,” World Tribune June 11th, 2002 .

20- “Sudan: Oil in Sudan – Deteriorating Human Rights,” Amnesty International.

21- Hassan Abu Taleb, “African Cloaks, Foreign Daggers,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online August 8th, 2002 .

22- Rick Francona, “The Nile River – The Politics of Water,” Suite 101 August 28th, 2001 .

23-  Israel Shahak, Open Secrets: Israeli Nuclear and Foreign Policies (London: Pluto Press, 1997): 68-71.

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