The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict: The case of Liberia and West Africa
CDR Working Paper 97.4, June 1997 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning Email your order for a paper copy to
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Contents

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Abstract
The
essence of this paper is to analyse the Liberian crisis not only from
the domestic dimension, but also from a regional perspective. In so
doing, the essay questions the role, not only of contiguous states, but
the extent of regional states' involvement in launching and sustaining
this conflict. This multidimensional approach leads us towards
appreciating not only the internal, but regional dimensions of the
Liberian crisis. Our hope is to contribute to shifting the analyses of
the Liberian conflict beyond the 'spillover', 'diffusion' and
'contagion' perspectives. Rather, we seek to present a systematic
analysis of how internal conflict immerses and influences neighbouring
states by questioning and differentiating between the impact of
internal conflicts on neighbouring states and the strategies taken by
these with respect to such conflicts. To better appreciate the Liberian
crisis and discern between the diverse variety of endeavours undertaken
by neighbouring states, this article will explore the disparate
motivations for neighbouring states' involvement in this crisis.

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List of Abbreviations
ARB African Research Bulletin
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
GSA General Services Agency
ICA International Coffee Agreement
INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU Organization of African Unity
PNDC Provisional National Defence Council
PRC People's Redemption Council
TWP True Whig Party

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1. Introduction
After
the euphoric and popular reaction to the emergence of the military upon
the Liberian political scene, the People's Redemption Council [PRC],
headed by Samuel Kanyon Doe, failed to fulfil initial post-coup d'état
promises of establishing a 'new society' (Givens, 1986:65). Instead of
implementing policies of inclusion, political procedures were initiated
which established patterns of ethnic seclusion (Horowitz, 1993:21 and
25). One result of this restrictive official strategy was the formation
of a broad-based coalition of indigenous Liberians and foreign
insurgents under the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) which
aspired to depose Liberia's Second Republic. Subsequently, an invasion
was launched on 24 December 1989. By April 1990, the NPFL, under the
charismatic leadership of Charles Taylor, effectively controlled more
than 90 per cent of Liberian territory with the exception of the
capital, Monrovia and its environs. While the Liberian state, prior to
the insurgency, was weak in all senses of the term, it is part of the
challenge of this paper to explain the rapidity of state collapse as a
consequence of the operations of these insurgents.
To understand the dynamics of this phenomenon, this paper seeks to
analyse the organization of armed insurgency against the Second
Republic. The analysis revolves around several factors among which are:
(i) the immediate and remote causes of internal conflict; (ii) the
character and composition of coalition forces under the NPFL; (iii) the
role of neighbouring West African states in initial ventures towards
organising, and securing support in terms of finance, training and
equipment; (iv) the campaign in the northeastern county of Nimba,
including the nature of government counter-insurgency strategies; and
(v) the rationales given for the first in a series of factional splits.
The argument is that foreign subversion compounded the insecurity
dilemmas (Job, 1986:17-19; Posen, 1993:103-105) generated by ethnic
rivalry internal to Liberia, and was the immediate cause for the
initial uprising. Appreciating the dynamics of support patterns
extended by individual West African states for the armed struggle,
facilitates an enhanced sensitivity to the rationales used by the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene,
despite its original ambivalence to the engulfing crisis. Such an
analysis also enables us to appreciate the character of later splits,
and to situate in its proper context the escalation of the conflict and
the way it defied solution.

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2. Background
Charles
Taylor's role in shaping the disparate post-1985 opposition forces into
an effective fighting organisation, willing and inclined to actively
combat the Second Republic is not doubted. There is some contention,
though, to the extent to which explicit support from certain ECOWAS
member states was procured, and the processes through which such
patronage was either extended or withdrawn. During his sojourn in West
Africa after his 'escape' from the United States in 1984, Ghana, in
consequence of its own declared 'democratic revolution', (Ninsin,
1987:18-19) granted him residence during the initial phase of
recruitment and planning. Ghanaian support for Charles Taylor has never
been officially confirmed. It is, however, known that Taylor's request
was favourably received by Ghana, and subsequently, an approach was
made to Libya for financial and material assistance and a pipeline for
military hardware and finance was opened (Godwin, 1991:26). Burkina
Faso similarly extended facilities for training, banking, armaments
transfer and a detachment of troops to support Charles Taylor's
uprising. Côte d'Ivoire, an otherwise conservative regional power,
extended patronage in terms of political and diplomatic facilities, and
facilitated the transportation of arms and the encampment of troops
prior to the invasion. A non-regional actor, Libya, in consequence of
its stated desire to get a foothold in West Africa, willingly extended
training, finance and weapons to Charles Taylor (Gershoni, 1993:32).
How do we explain this extensive patronage for a regional uprising?

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3. The Character of the Coalition Force - The Liberian Factor
There
is some controversy as to when the NPFL was formed and who its original
leaders were (Barret, 1994:1342). One school of thought locates the
formation of the movement under the former Army Chief of Staff, Thomas
Quiwonkpa in early 1985 (Ellis, 1995:180), and stresses that the few
escapees among the motley group of dissidents who invaded Liberia in
November 1985 formed the original clique around which the broader-based
opposition movement, NPFL, coalesced. Yet another school of thought
locates the formation wholly under Charles Taylor, as the primus motor
in modelling the exiled Liberian opposition organisations into the
required structure and transforming it into an efficient fighting
force. Irrespective of which of the two schools of thought is correct,
it can be asserted that the patronage system, at least, played a
prominent role in the initial appointment of Charles Taylor as the
Director General of the General Service Agency (GSA). There is an
element of association, therefore, between Quiwonkpa's loss of power in
1983 and the subsequent repression and retrenchment of those associated
or related to him (Ankomah, 1992:12). This led to Charles Taylor's
eventual escape to the United States amid official accusations of
embezzlement, a charge which was rescinded at the height of the civil
war (Weller, 1994:56-57).
The nature of Samuel Doe's military interregnum and the Second Republic
lead most Liberian political opponents into exile. Liberian politics is
characterized by co-optation, clientelism and patronage systems which
exploited the overlapping factors of family, colour, and wealth. Though
this manipulative and discriminatory state strategy, it was
anticipated, would be terminated with the emergence of the military on
the Liberian political scene, it was rather embellished and entrenched,
increasing disparities in political power, privilege and economic
access. To this was added a particularly selective and manipulative
method in which ethnicity was exploited in Liberian politics between
1980-1989 to advance political ambitions and economic goals. Ethnic
consciousness and affiliation became associated with status, power, and
access to wealth. In the ensuing milieu engendered by the 'politics of
tribe' (Howard, 1995/6:28), specific ethnic groups became more
persecuted than others. In a situation where loyalty to the state had
been weakened not only by language and religion, but through
preferential development schemes which left large rural areas untouched
by modernization schemes, state incapacity to design a national image
that was not simply that of the Krahn minority, compounded the new
ethnopolitics practised by the Second Republic, and further eroded
allegiance to the state.
Within this setting, the Gio and Mano groups of Nimba county were
particularly singled out for persecution because of the perception that
the 'most vigorous opposition (to the government) will come from Nimba
county' (West Africa March 1983). In designing strategies
towards curtailing escalating opposition, both the military regime and
Second Republic exploited the underlying ethnic disparities and
antagonisms which were found in Liberian society. These contributed to
creating a mind-set among Liberian policy makers which led to the
interpretation of all opposition as Nimba-originated. Thus, at the
height of ethnic repressions which followed the failed coup d'état of
November 1985, Gio and Manos became the targeted group as the coup
d'état was perceived as having originated from and led by Nimbaians. As
a consequence of subsequent government counter-insurgency measures,
members of these two groups fled to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. A later
surge of mixed groups escaped to Sierra Leone where they settled
largely within existing communities along the borders. Ethnic targeting
identified the peoples of Nimba as 'troublemakers who do not hesitate
to organize themselves' (West Africa 22 March, 1983). Thus by
the time Charles Taylor arrived in Côte d'Ivoire, there was a core of
Liberian volunteers inclined to support the idea of a campaign against
the Second Republic.

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4. Domestic Conflicts
It
has been argued that the link between the two major personalities,
Quiwonkpa and Taylor, should be primarily interpreted within the
framework of clientelism and ethnicity. Harold Nelson (1984:31ff.),
argues that, unable to re-establish patronage networks developed under
the True Whig Party [TWP], leading political figures in the PRC who had
ambitions of political leadership 'needed to build an ethnic base'. He
thus attempts to analyse the establishment of the NPFL and its
subsequent disintegration primarily along ethnic lines. Stephen Ellis,
on the other hand, argues that, apart from the persecution of Gios and
Manos by the military regime and Second Republic, other key factors
played an important role in the ensuing struggle between these diverse
groups. One was the degree of traditional rivalry between the Krahn on
the one hand, and the Gio and Mano on the other, as a result of their
earlier competition for land in the rural areas where both groups lived
(1995:178). The nature of policies implemented during the period of
Samuel Doe's stewardship contributed to creating a situation where the
major patterns of social conflict cohered around ethnicity, and
resulted in a situation where the dynamics of power were shaped by
ethnic relations. Therefore, an individual's contacts to the circle of
established political authority was conditional upon his/her ethnic
affiliation. But such mono-causal interpretation of the character of
opposition to the Monrovia government overlooks the widespread
discontent with the regime, and does not have the explanatory potential
to analyse the extent of patronage patterns for the NPFL. Monocausality
also misconstrues an immensely intricate process of economic, social
and political disintegration influencing an entire nation and
compounding an already precarious insecurity dilemma.
Explaining the basis of support for the NPFL, Richards emphasizes that
the NPFL 'sought to establish a mass base by recruiting large numbers
of local youths under the flag of ethnic allegiance'. Richards
also seeks to distinguish between ethnicity as a factor in organizing a
general resistance, and posits that a central ethnic animus for
beginning the conflict, firstly, was the factional rivalry among
clientelist groups in the army and other state organisations, for
example tensions between the Krahn clients of Doe and the Gio and Mano
clients of Quiwonkpa. Fascinating as this argument is, it nevertheless
overlooks recruitment patterns in the Liberian army. Under TWP
direction, a carefully orchestrated strategy of ethnic stereotyping
resulted in military officers being segregated and assigned units to
perform tasks supposedly peculiar to each group. Additionally, a
restructuring exercise undertaken by William Tolbert's administration
also contributed to politicizing and increasing the numbers of specific
ethnic groups within the forces (Liebenow, 1981:131-132). In the
post-TWP PRC era, with its aura of suspicion and fear, it is arguable
whether Quiwonkpa, during his short period of service between April
1980 and November 1983, could have decisively infiltrated enough
clients into the state apparatus. This interpretation also disregards
Joe Wylie's assertions that their organisation was initially 'above
tribalism and partisanship' (West Africa, February, 1986). In
the Liberian case, though differential patterns of economic development
and ethnic stratification occurred in which a dominant minority group
eventually subordinated the majority, ethnicity alone does not have the
explanatory potential for the formation of the NPFL and later coalition
splits. The initial rationale for the organisation and invasion of
Liberia went beyond purely ethnic justifications.
Despite the fact that in the ensuing conflict, ethnicity came to play
an influential role in the escalation of the conflict and splits among
the diverse factions, we argue that the original organization of and
support for the NPFL went beyond the narrow confines of ethnic
interests. Rather, our contention is that the initial dynamics and
subsequent splits and coalition formations, even along supposedly
ethnic lines can be explained in terms of the ruthless ethnic profile
being a symptom of the conflict, rather than the conflict itself. The
rationales for conflict escalation should, therefore, rather be sought
in the struggles among the Liberian elite for political and economic
power. Diverse supportive groups encompassed socio-political forces
cross-cutting the ethnic divide. Among them were students (the youth
factor), the trade unions, women groups, and religious bodies.
Apart from the persecutions suffered by the Mano group between
1980-1989, there were other rationales dating much further back. These
concerned the arrival and resistance by the Mano to Mandingo trader and ülama -priestly-
incursion into their conventional commercial networks resulting in
antipathies between these two groups. Mandingoes distinguished
themselves through their superior literary and trading acumen and were
later specifically supported and encouraged by the True Whig Party to
settle in Liberia, enjoying special privileges that exempted them from
forced tribal labour. They were at the same time not subjected to the
jurisdiction of the local tribal courts' system. Though Mandingoes
emerged as regional peacemakers, committed to muting conflicts between
separate local interests and communities, these characteristics were
not transposed onto their relations with the Mano. Within the emerging
ethnic mosaic of Liberia, Mandingoes were more favoured both by the
Krahn dominated military regime, and the Second Republic in terms of
government contracts and the exploitation of their knowledge of
alternative trading networks for unofficial transactions. Thus, the
Mandingoes were generally seen, at least by the Mano, as their enemies
for supporting and funding a repressive system. Upon the appearance of
Charles Taylor on the scene, the Mano and Gio interpreted NPFL's
campaigns in a much narrower perspective by perceiving the endeavour
towards ousting Samuel Doe as a mode of settling traditional scores
against the incompetent and anachronistic ethnic patronage of the Krahn
and Mandingoes.

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5. Sources of Funding
Another
important initial patronage factor whose role is regularly overlooked
in the analysis of patronage patterns that affect the armed coalition
is the role of Americo-Liberians. In the latter stages of the military
interregnum, the PRC attempted to co-opt sections of influential
Americo-Liberian groups into government, while others preferred to
remain in exile, outside the reach of the PRC and the Second Republic.
Charles Taylor, already well known in the United States as an effective
and persuasive organiser, managed to win extensive support among exiled
Americo-Liberians, who funded the coalition to an estimated tune of $1
million (Hubbard, 1991:27-30). This claim stands in sharp
contradistinction to William Reno (1995:114), who claims that 'Taylor
begun financing his operations with the plunder and sale of machinery
from the abandoned German-operated Bong Iron Ore Company'. John
Chipman's (1993:154) evaluation of NPFL economic policies contradicts
Reno's pillage theory. To Chipman, NPFL's ability to manage the
economic potentials of Greater Liberia can be explained as resulting
from the credibility of management strategies of the areas under NPFL
control, and as a consequence gained the confidence of foreign
companies in dealing with the NPFL. Stephen Riley, on the other hand,
asserts that, '[t]he NPFL fuels its war effort by continuing the export
trade ... with timber still going to the European community' (1993:42).
Appearing before the Subcommittee on Africa in the U.S. House of
Representatives, Ambassador William Twaddell, Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated that Charles Taylor had
as much as USD 75 million a year from the sale of diamonds, timber
products, iron ore and rubber to markets in Belgium, France and
Malaysia. Analysing the extent to which Americo-Liberian support was
possible for the NPFL, Ellis on the other hand contends that 'most
Americo-Liberians valued their rights of entry to the USA too highly to
risk dabbling with anti-American governments'. In attaching excessive
relevance to Americo-Liberian relations with the United States, and
thus hesitant to take on board a Libyan financed and trained NPFL,
Ellis overlooks collective Americo-Liberian abhorrence with the
Monrovia regime, and thus primed to underwrite movements aimed at
bringing about societal transformation. Characteristic of embedded
disparities in Liberian society, indigenous Africans provided the bulk
of the fighting troops while the Americo-Liberians contributed
financial and leadership support (Igwebueze, 1990:22).

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6. Character of the Regional Dimension
Most
analyses of Liberia's continuing conflict have been presented within
the framework of the state and ethnicity. In this analysis, however, we
posit that any significant effort towards appreciating the dynamics of
this crisis should not only analyse the internal but also the regional
dimensions of this conflict. The following analysis will deal with the
machinations and patterns of individual state support for an armed
uprising in Liberia. In analysing the regional dimensions of internal
conflict, most analysts have either seen such conflicts as 'spilling
over' or having a 'contagion' or 'diffusion' effect. In this
sub-section, our endeavour is to analyse the activities and actions of
Liberia's neighbouring states who have extended critical patronage to
the conflicting parties. This analysis will encompass the character and
style of involvement of the following states: Burkina Faso, Côte
d'Ivoire, Ghana and Libya.
Though several instances of externally funded armed invasions of
African states have been recorded, the Liberian instance represents an
entirely new dimension. For the first time, neighbouring states
advanced patronage to a well-orchestrated act of insurrection with
strong support among the states of the region. Extending training and
financial patronage for the incursion of a member state, contravened
the rules, norms and principles of ECOWAS' emerging security-regime
(Aning, 1997), portrayed by Ajulo as 'the process of evolving ...
tradition of war-free inter-governmental relationship within the
framework established by ECOWAS' (1989:247; Sesay, 1995:212).
To Nwokedi, such significant and conscious extension of external
support, was 'the first large-scale and sustained civilian campaign
from an extra-territorial base against a government in West Africa.
This in itself represents a risk of generalized destabilization or an
example worthy of imitation by opposition groups contesting for power
were it to go unchallenged' (1992:5). Incorporating external factors of
support for the NPFL in our analysis is important for a fuller
appreciation of the dynamics of the influence of such sources on
internal conflicts (Osaghe, 1995:8). According to Donald Rothchild
(1992), external support can be either deliberate or non-deliberate. In
the case of Liberia, it is the more direct and deliberate external
influences that were most consequential for the conflict. It is within
this framework of differentiation between deliberate and non-deliberate
sources of external sustenance to conflicts that we position the
Burkinabe, Ghanaian, Ivorian and Libyan factors.

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7. The Ghanaian Dimension
The
nature and character of Ghanaian patronage and later dissociation from
Charles Taylor during his search for refuge and support, we argue,
should be situated in the context of: (i) the internal political
circumstances in Ghana; (ii) the nature of Ghana's relations with
Liberia; and (iii) Ghana's search for regional allies (Aning, 1996;
Agyeman-Duah, 1987; Chazan, 1984:95). In December 1981, the
democratically elected government of Ghana was overthrown by a radical
army group calling itself the Provisional National Defence Council
(PNDC) under the leadership of Jerry Rawlings. In immediate post-1981
coup statements, the new government stated its desire to chart a
radical revolutionary course, both internally and externally. The first
major action undertaken by the PNDC (which has an interest for the
present work) was to re-establish diplomatic relations with Libya which
had been suspended by the previous government because of official
anxiety concerning 'Libya'[s] international terrorist campaign[s]'
(ARB, January 1992). Initial responses from ECOWAS leaders were
cautious but varied as a result of the violent nature of Rawlings'
earlier four-month rule in June-October 1979.
During the early 1980's, Liberia had consistently accused the Ghanaian
government of subversion. Liberia's initial reaction to Ghana's
declaration of a 'Holy war' was the immediate recall of its Ambassador
from Accra in protest against the resumption of diplomatic ties with
Libya (West Africa, 25 January, 1982). Ghana-Liberia relations continued to deteriorate until Ghana's chargé d'affaires was eventually declared persona non grata in November 1983. This resulted in his eventual expulsion for 'activities incompatible with his diplomatic status' (ARB,
November 1983). Liberia subsequently accused Ghana of backing an
external invasion of the country in November 1985 (Akpan, 1986:336). It
is in this context of Ghanaian-Liberian relations between 1982-1985,
that Ghana's extension of patronage of Taylor's uprising should be
situated. However, despite the facts surrounding these relations,
Clement Adibe asserts that: 'Ghana
was one of the few supporters of the Doe coup in 1980. While it is
probable that Rawlings was drawn to Doe because of their mutual
alienation by other West African leaders, there is little doubt that
their initial relationship benefitted from the revolutionary ideas
which they both espoused. By the mid-1980's, however, a major
ideological rift had occurred between both revolutionaries.'
(1994:349). There
is a fundamental historical implausibility in Adibe's argument. Placing
Ghana-Liberia relations in a historical context highlights the
confusion surrounding the above point. Ghana's 'cautious optimism'
(Liebenow, 1987:188), to changes in Liberia was modified after the
execution of TWP leaders, to reflect the general trend of hostility
shown by regional states towards the PRC government. This resulted in
endorsing both ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity - OAU -
criticism of the brutality of the take-over, and the initiation of
ECOWAS' punitive measures embracing three sets of interrelated
gestures. First, the Foreign Minister, G. Baccus Matthews was prevented
from participating in the Extraordinary OAU Economic Summit in Lagos,
Nigeria, in April 1980 (ARB, April 1980). Subsequently, the new
Defence Minister was not invited to a meeting of ECOWAS Defence
Ministers in May 1980. The height of collective regional abhorrence
towards the new regime was reserved for the President. Samuel Doe was
refused participation in ECOWAS' Heads of States and Government summit
in Lomé, Togo, in May 1980.
By the time Ghana's own revolution occurred on 31 December 1981, a
conservative turn of events leading to major reorientations in foreign
policy had occurred in Liberia. The Libyan People's Bureau was closed
and the Soviet Union told to reduce its diplomatic staff. Liberia
ultimately re-affirmed its traditional ties to the US. This led to an
internal power struggle in the cabinet in which the radical faction of
the PRC was purged (Tipoteh, 1985:90). Liberia was subsequently
selected by the U.S. as one of twelve international bastions against
the spread of communism and was to receive support from a special
security assistance programme (Kramer, 1995:7).
Ghana's decision to support Charles Taylor, then, apart from the
regime's stated democratic revolutionary credentials, can probably be
inferred from the nature of relations between Ghana and Liberia.
According to the influential weekly, West Africa, '... The present Ghana government has no love for ... Doe (August
1990). Tarr continues in this vein and states that '[d]uring the 1980's
Doe perceived Ghana as unfriendly, frequently accusing Ghana of
supporting 'dissidents' seeking to overthrow his regime' (1993:7). It
can be argued that, though the initial Liberian responses to Ghanaian
changes were much more severe than the general regional response, they
reflected widespread regional indignation with events in Ghana.
Byron Tarr and Prince Acquaah assert that, though Charles Taylor's
initial feelers to the Ghanaian government were positively received,
this altered over time, resulting in Taylor being incarcerated twice in
Ghana. Diverse explanations have been offered by several scholars
(Ellis, 1995:181; Yankah and Maayang, 1990:39-41). Though at this
point, the essence of these imprisonments was lost on all major actors
in this fledging struggle to lead the exiled opposition movement to
resist the Second Republic, it is crucial for our later arguments and
the subsequent escalations in the Liberian conflict that we comprehend
the dynamics of this seemingly unimportant episode. The incidents are
also particularly important in several contexts. They reflect: (i) the
nature of regional politics and alliances in addition to the initial
introduction of the fledging Liberian opposition to Libya; and (ii)
these incidents' influence on the character of ECOWAS' original
response to the accelerating conflict.
With respect to Ghanaian rationales for breaking with Taylor: by 1987,
Taylor had obviously become a political and security liability as a
result of the increasingly attentive Ghanaian youth audience fascinated
by the revolutionary charisma and romanticism of Charles Taylor's
rhetoric. Situating such youthful political consciousness within the
context of the internal political climate in Ghana in 1987, it can be
argued that Taylor, in the eyes of the Ghanaian authorities, had become
a political and security liability (Richards, 1995:135; Richards,
1994:91; Opala, 1994:197). According to a defected Ghanaian
intelligence officer: 'there
were a number of Ghanaian dissidents [willing to] fight alongside
Taylor in Liberia. Rawlings was worried that if Taylor triumphed,
Liberia would be used to launch armed attacks against Ghana.' (New African, April 1991)
There
is the plausibility of yet a more substantive motivation for Ghana's
change of strategy. Ghana's revolutionary rhetoric on the regional
level and close alliance with Libya and Burkina Faso had led to
consistent regional accusations against both Ghana and Burkina Faso for
supporting regional destabilization efforts generally, and especially
against Togo (West Africa, July 1987). Ghana's increasingly weak
and isolated position in terms of regional criticism for harbouring
dissidents and consistent condemnation had, by 1987, made her a
regional pariah state. During an incident concerning alleged Ghanaian
complicity in an invasion of Togo, Nigeria, Togo's close regional ally
during this period condemned Ghana as the 'scourge of international
terrorism' (West Africa, July 1987; Luckham, 1982:61-63). It
can, therefore, not be denied that with increasing regional isolation,
internal disturbances and an economy on the verge of bankruptcy, and in
the middle of sensitive negotiations with international financial
institutions, supporting an invasion of another regional state would
have further isolated Ghana.

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8. The Burkinabe Factor
In
explaining the initial divergences between Taylor and the Ghanaian
government, and the former's introduction to Libya, Tarr asserts that: 'In
1987 Taylor approached the Embassy of Burkina Faso in Accra and
requested assistance to overthrow Doe ... Madam Mamouna Quattara, a
client of Captain Blaise Compoare, received Taylor's written proposal.'
(1993:80) Tarr
affirms that Ghana chose to release Taylor into the custody of Blaise
Compoare. Soon after these incidents, the Burkinabe Head of State,
Thomas Sankara, was assassinated. Accordingly, 'Compoare, now leader of
Burkina Faso, introduced Taylor to the Libyans' (Tarr, 1993:80).
Another perspective provided by Acquaah relates to Taylor's Accra
sojourn and search for international backing. Acquaah's version states
that 'the late Thomas Sankara, leader of Burkina Faso ... secured
Charles Taylor's release from Ghana. He was then deported and left for
Burkina Faso where he stayed before going to Libya' (Godwin, 1991:26).
The close relations between Ghana and Burkina Faso can be situated in
the post-1982 period when Burkinabe infatuation with Ghana and Libya
increased. In an increasingly unstable West African region in the early
1980's, it is believed that the conservative leaders of Côte d'Ivoire,
Mali, Niger, and Togo were incensed by the Burkinabe Prime Minister's
revolutionary rhetoric and close contacts with Ghana and Libya. Thus,
through their French and Ivorien contacts, it was ensured that the
Prime Minster was removed from power (Martin, 1985:194; Wilkins,
1989:378).
A rapid change of fortune occurred when Sankarists took over power in
August 1983. Thomas Sankara's government, characterized by
pan-Africanist fervour and revolutionary rhetoric, alienated West
African leaders who found Burkinabe and Ghanaian brands of radical
pan-Africanism untimely. Most regional leaders believed that Ghana and
Burkina Faso were instrumental in attempts to overthrow their
governments (Momoh, 1986:1712). Other perspectives can explain the
apparently hostile reaction of regional leaders to both Ghana and
Burkina Faso. This was a period of increasing political consciousness
among the youth in these two countries and of the spectre of its
possible domino effect in the region, there was regional irritation
over the politicization of the youth.
Any analysis of the nature of international support for the NPFL should
also consider the role of two other West African countries, apart from
Burkina Faso and Ghana, in the initial organizing stages - Côte
d'Ivoire and Libya. In addition, there was a motley group of individual
West African nationals who came primarily from Burkina Faso, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone (Yeebo, 1991:273). In the ensuing
controversy concerning individual West African national involvement
with Taylor's insurgence, it has been asserted by Mark Hubbard, that it
was 'the
distrust between Taylor and his Gio and Mano fighters, who make up the
bulk of the NPFL force (which) has led to his(Taylor) making extensive
use of non-Liberians within the army, many of them dissidents from
neighbouring countries'. In
our later arguments, we present a different interpretation for the
inclusion of non-Liberians in the fighting force as having begun
considerably earlier, and that it was rather the recruitment campaigns
and Taylor's sojourn for support that popularized his cause and
invariably created suspicion from some West African governments as to
Taylor's real agenda.
It is our argument that understanding the rationales for Burkinabe
patronage for the NPFL especially in the post-Sankara period is best
understood through the prism of internal and regional politics. Apart
from the earlier mentioned initial contact to the Libyans, the
Burkinabes provided training facilities and troops estimated at 400
men, a position justified by Burkinabe leaders as 'moral duty' and
'moral support' (da Costa, 1990:2478) extended to the NPFL (Gbanabome,
1992:756). A conceivable logic behind dispensing political and military
patronage to the NPFL, could be NPFL complicity in the power struggles
between Sankara and Compoare and an active NPFL role in the subsequent
death of Sankara (Tarr, 1993:80).

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9. The Libyan and Ivorian Elements
A
critical analysis is also important for any appreciation of the
dynamics of the unholy alliance comprising Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire
and Libya for the NPFL insurgence. This has been characterized as 'a
particularly strange alliance of forces' (ARB, February 1990). There has been controversy concerning the entré
of Libya into this typical West African crisis. Stephen Ellis
interprets the Libyan factor in the Liberian crisis by arguing that
Blaise Campaore, who had close affiliation like his predecessor,
Sankara, with the revolutionary government of Libya, influenced the
Ghanaian authorities to release Taylor into his guardianship
(1995:181). This stands in conspicuous contradiction to the
explanations presented by Prince Eric Acquaah, who claims that the late
Thomas Sankara, leader of Burkina Faso, was instrumental in securing
the release of Charles Taylor from jail in Ghana.
Within the framework of revolutionary regional politics between
1982-1987, Ghana's Jerry Rawlings and Burkina Faso's Thomas Sankara
shared the same pan-African and revolutionary ideas which in a sense
isolated them in the region, especially due to their contacts with
Libya. Based on these close personal and revolutionary relations, it is
more likely that it was Thomas Sankara, and not Blaise Campoare, who
initiated Charles Taylor's release from prison and subsequent
introduction to the Libyans (Abo, 1993:1431).
In the subsequent power struggles between Thomas Sankara and Blaise
Compoare, Sankara was assassinated and, three months later, the new
government announced a rectification process of the revolution, and
took credit for a relaxation of 'revolutionary measures'. It can thus
be deduced that the eventual sanctuary extended to Taylor by the more
conservative post-October 1987 Burkinabe regime was a
politically-designed strategy to serve two purposes: (i) to contain the
Sankarist youth factor; and (ii) to reassure the Ivorians of the
conservative course of the new government.
In the immediate post-Sankarist period, Ghana and Burkina Faso had only
minimal contacts with Libya. An argument supporting our assertion of
the improbability of Blaise Compoare's role in the Libyan connection is
that, despite initial agreements between Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana and
Libya to strengthen their bilateral relations in the military,
political and economic fields, the first meeting among Foreign
Ministers of these countries in the post-Sankarist period ended in
acrimonious accusations and mutual suspicion especially of Libyan
efforts to control its partners (ARB, January 1988). By this time, however, the Burkinabe revolution had been 'rectified' (West Africa, February 1993; West Africa
January 1988), and Ghana's democratic revolution was increasingly being
seen as 'the lost revolution' (Ugochukwu, 1985:346; Jonah, 1984:26-30).
Apart from providing banking facilities to the NPFL in the Burkinabe
capital, regionally, the Burkinabes were dependent on the Côte d'Ivoire
for economic reimbursements by Burkinabe men employed on rural Ivorian
coffee, cocoa, banana and palm plantations estimated to be 30 per cent
of the Ivorian population (Wilkins, 1989:376-377). This point
concerning the probable rationales for Burkinabé and Ivorian
cooperation is particularly important in terms of the centrality of the
transfer of resources by Burkinabé migrants to Burkina Faso, and their
critical role in the Ivorian economy. The most recent census figure
from both Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso indicates that as late as
1988, the numbers of Burkinabés in Côte d'Ivoire amounted to 1,565,000
(Amin, 1973:52; Cordell, Gregory and Piché, 1996:71ff.). By 1990, the
World Bank estimated that 25 per cent of the total Ivorian population
were Burkinabés (World Bank, 1990 II:9), making Côte d'Ivoire the
sub-Saharan country with the largest number of immigrants.Under
Sankara's radical regime, relations between these two countries had
been strained to the extent that there had been discussion of deporting
these immigrants to Burkina Faso.
The political foci of Ivorian motivation for supporting the NPFL is
more varied and complex. Both Byron Tarr and Richards provide a
rationale interpreting the essence of such extensive patronage as
encompassing personal, economic, ideological and military factors.
These elements were critical to the Ivorien decision to provide
sanctuary, weapons, conduit, finance and diplomatic support for the
NPFL. One of the most critical factors for Ivorian extension of
patronage to the NPFL could have been the Ivorian economic crisis
resulting from the fall in commodity prices. The net consequence of
this, according to World Bank figures, was the drastic reduction in
Côte d'Ivoire's annual economic growth rates. Per capita GNP decreased
from 4.5 per cent in 1965-1973 to 1.1 per cent in 1973-1980 and -0.4
per cent from 1980 and afterwards (World Bank, 1989). By the early
1980's, a severe drop in commodity prices affecting especially cocoa
and coffee created an urban crisis which contributed to the growth of
nationalist perceptions critical of Burkinabé migrants (Chassudovsky,
1994; Pettifor, 1996; Barrat, 1995:161). To appreciate fully the
dynamics of the effects of the collapse of commodity prices on the
Ivorian economy will need a lengthier analysis than can be undertaken
here. Nevertheless, by 1987, the system of quotas established under the
International Coffee Agreement started to collapse. In June 1989, ICA
negotiations reached a deadlock, and political pressure in both
Washington and Florida resulted in an historic fall in prices by 50 per
cent. Export earnings subsequently fell drastically, while outstanding
national debts rose. International endeavours towards reviving the ICA
failed, and by 1992, the price of coffee reached a rock-bottom low.
The collapse of coffee prices was particularly critical for the Ivorian
economy and national psyche. The resultant aftermath was a financial
crisis in which growers did not earn enough to cover labour costs. This
indirectly led to the rise of xenophobia against Burkinabés. The
combination of these two issues: the contemporaneous fall in commodity
prices and the increasing sense of xenophobia generated conditions of
apprehension for Burkinabe men. In a desperate act of survival and
realpolitik, both states chose to support the NPFL in the hope of
diverting domestic attention from the critical internal crises faced by
both governments.
Another crucial factor which is normally overlooked in the analysis of
Ivorien support for the NPFL is closely related to what has been
described by Duignan and Gann as 'French appetite for African
territory' resulting from Paris' willingness to exercise military power
to procure land in the previous century (1984:198-204). French strategy
for territorial possession resulted in the acquisition of parts of
Maryland County in 1892, followed by more land around the Makona river
in 1907 (Clegg, 1996:47-49). Thus, when Liberian indigens finally took
over power in 1980, there were expectations for Liberia to pursue
efforts at reclaiming territory lost in the previous century (Clapham,
1995:67-68). The PRC's initial response was an understandable
reluctance to pursue a narrow irredentist policy of reclaiming lost
indigenous territory. This position was to change, however, as the
internal situation in Liberia worsened. In a Liberia where the Second
Republic faced increasing internal and international criticism over the
failed re-civilization programme, added to the worsening economic and
human rights conditions, there was a desire among policy makers to find
an excuse to divert public attention and arouse renewed sympathy and
support for the PRC by appealing to nationalist sentiments. Desperate
to arouse nationalist backing for government's policies, the cabinet
met to discuss 'modalities of militarily recapturing territories lost
to France. The focus was on the Ivory Coast' (Dunn and Tarr, 1987:187).
Thus, to reduce a possible incidence of fighting a protracted border
war at a time when Ivorien commodity prices had crashed, in the
political and geo-strategic calculations of the Côte d'Ivoire
government, backing an insurgency sympathetic to Ivorian aspirations to
maintain their colonially inherited boundaries (Herbst, 1989:675-677)
was found a much more prudent approach than dealing with the
machinations of an increasingly erratic Liberian Second Republic (West Africa, November 1988; West Africa,
June 1988). Despite the above analysis, it has been argued that,
'Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire had no direct stakes in the outcome of
the power struggle in Liberia' (Adisa, 1992:210). Table 1
Regional Dimensions of Support Pattern to Liberia's Second Republic and the NPFL
State
|
Assess ment
of Role
|
Supported Group A
|
Level
of Support
|
Extent of Polit ical and Diplo matic Support
|
Motives for Involve ment B
|
Constraints |
B. Faso |
Crucial |
NPFL |
High |
Extensive |
Instrumental |
Political
(ECOWAS) |
Côte d'Ivoire |
Crucial |
NPFL |
High |
Extensive |
Mixed |
Political
(ECOWAS) |
Ghana |
Useful
Critical |
NPFL
ECOWAS |
Low |
Very limited |
Mixed |
Political
(domestic,
regional) |
Guinea |
Crucial |
ECOWAS |
High |
Extensive |
Affective |
Political
(domestic) |
Nigeria |
Very
critical |
Doe
ECOWAS |
High
High |
Occasional
Extensive |
Instrumental
Mixed |
Political
(domestic, regional) |
Sierra Leone |
Useful |
ECOWAS |
High |
Extensive |
Mixed |
-
|
Togo |
Crucial,
but reliable |
ECOWAS |
Low |
Mediatory |
Unclear |
-
|
Libya |
Crucial |
NPFL |
High |
Extensive |
Instrumental |
-
| a
Represents the major actors in the Liberia crisis. b
Instrumental means strategic considerations, economic gain, political
stake, domestic reasons and prestige, while affective represents such
categories as humanitarian considerations, personal links with main
allies, religion, identity, irredentism, ethnic identity.

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10. Incursion and Counter-Insurgency Measures
Having
secured extensive support from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and
Libya, the NPFL launched its invasion of Liberia from the northeastern
territory of Nimba. Diverse reasons have been abduced for the choice of
this specific county. Several scholars claim that the invasion started
here because of NPFL perception that support for the insurgence would
be forthcoming due to: (i) the level of repression meted out to the
inhabitants of this county; and (ii) the notion that the area had
received less than its fair share of national resource allocation for
development during the decade long rule of the Krahn dominated PRC and
Second Republic. But Baffour Ankomah introduces a different
interpretation for the choice of Nimba and Butuo as representing more
than sheer coincidence or nostalgic symbolism. He situates the decision
within the framework of Gio/Krahn struggles over land in the
pre-colonization period, and posits that the root causes of Krahn/Gio
animosities go much further back than the Doe period in Liberian
politics. Butuo, where the original attack took place was,
symbolically, the venue of the peace accord between the Gios and Krahns
(1992:11).
A generally overlooked perspective concerns Nimbaian response to the
NPFL. The general consensus has been that due to Nimba relations with
leaders in Monrovia, their support was taken for granted. But the
factors that would lead to extensive splits in the coalition force were
already being configured as early as January 1990. It has been asserted
that: 'the
rebels had apparently assumed that the people of Nimba ... would rally
to their side. But when Charles Taylor ... proclaimed himself leader of
the NPFL, whatever local support the rebels enjoyed largely
evaporated.' (ARB, February 1990) Probably,
the only means of appreciating this rather unexpected turn of events is
within the framework of explanations provided by new splinter groups.
Wippman asserts that the rebels involved no more than 'ill-trained
recruits, many of them in their early teens' (1993:163). The character
of government counter-insurgency measures turned the tide. Government
troops, primarily Krahn, sent to Nimba essentially perceived the
insurgence as a struggle between Nimbaians, especially the Gio and the
Krahn. As the conflict escalated, it gradually begun to loose its
broad-based nature and degenerated into reciprocal ethnocide, and a
'brutally vindictive war' (O'Neill, 1993:215; African Research
Bulletin, February 1990). The ruthlessness of government
counter-insurgency tactics led to massive flight - estimated at a third
of the country's population - into the contiguous states of Sierra
Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire (Onwuka, 1986:382; Loescher, 1989:2-3;
Shaw and Adibe, 1995/6:18). Concomitantly, these reprisals helped swell
the ranks of the NPFL. Continuing inability to contain the rebel
onslaught and the admission by captured insurgents that training and
weaponry had been obtained in Libya, led the US to extend military aid
to Liberia as a regional launch pad in US struggles against Libya's
presumed hegemonic policies (Volman, 1993:9; Leys, 1994:46). Insurgent
confessions also pinpointed Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone
and Guinea as accomplices.
One would have expected Doe to secure regional backing first, through
the organs of ECOWAS' emerging security regime. Rather, Liberia chose
to contact first the US, the United Nations and two individual regional
governments, Togo and Nigeria. An analysis of especially
Nigeria-Liberia brings to light the rationale of this action.
Comprehending the dynamics of the Samuel Doe-Ibrahim Babangida
relationship, we argue, should be situated within a reciprocal search
for regional allies by both military leaders. For Nigeria, cultivating
such an alliance was part of its long term policy of using 'spray
diplomacy' (Ojo, 1980:753) as a means of furthering its regional
interests. Liberia, regionally and internationally isolated because of
the brutality and failure of the Doe regime's re-civilization process,
appreciated such advances. There is some controversy concerning
Nigeria's response to Liberia's request for assistance. According to
Jinmi Adisa, the Nigerian media was of the view that 'Doe had come to
ask for military assistance ... [and] he was given some arms and
ammunition' (1994:222). To Gani Yoroms, the frequency of Doe's visits
to Nigeria between January-May 1990 were indicative of such urgent need
for military assistance (1991:26-29). Understanding the rationale
behind the invitation to Togo for assistance is more difficult to
fathom, except as a result of the probable military esprit de corps
between the two leaders.
As the nature of the conflict worsened, ethnic violence escalated and
insurgents increasingly targeted the Krahn and also the Mandingo
accused of having fingered members of the Gio and Mano groups after the
last realistic attempt at toppling the PRC in 1985 (ARB, July
1990:9735).

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11. Factional Splits Two
months after the coalition/insurgent forces invaded Liberia, it
achieved significant battlefield success, and stood on the threshold of
capturing Monrovia. During this period, the first of a series of splits
within the coalition emerged. By February 1990, the insurgence had
degenerated into reciprocal ethnic violence. The explanations of NPFL
splits go beyond ethnic rationalization. In February 1990, the original
NPFL coalition splintered with the leading military commander, Prince
Yormie Johnson, forming the Independent National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (INPFL). Explaining the rationale for the rift and formation of
a second insurgent organisation, Prince Johnson asserted financial
impropriety in the disbursement of Libyan finances for the NPFL, and an
apparent resurgence of the indigen and repatriate dichotomy, amid
indigen fears that 'gradually the congoes (Americo-Liberians) are going
to use us again as pawns' (Igwebueze, 1990:22). Johnson also explained
his breach with Taylor as ensuing from Taylor's alleged socialist
affiliations and increasing Libyan endorsement (West Africa,
January 1991). In the ensuing confrontation, a broad spectrum of
indigenous Liberians - together with other West African nationals
(Cleaver and May, 1995:492) - defected to form the INPFL. Thus, as at
February 1990, there were three major actors on the Liberian political
scene: the remnants of the Armed Forces of Liberia [AFL], NPFL and
INPFL. Irrespective of the superficial manipulation of ethnicity to
organize new factional groups, our argument is that the conscious
exploitation of ethnicity was employed as a facade to camouflage
political ambitions and aspirations to maintain power within a small
circle of Liberia's elites.

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12. Factional Group Initiation of Hostage Policy
With
the heightening of reciprocal atrocities, the conflict affected the
large numbers of congoes who had re-established contacts with their
original homelands and the subsequent migrants to Liberia, the majority
of whom were Guineans, Ghanaians and Nigerians estimated at being
almost about 2 per cent of the total population (Lowenkopf,
1976:23-27). According to one estimate, there were '250,000 Guineans,
200,000 Ghanaians and 5,000 Nigerians among the foreigners, in Liberia.
How many were held hostage is unknown' (Agyenim-Boateng, 1992:134). By
late January-1990, the war had generated massive refugee flows into
Liberia's contiguous neighbour states. As the NPFL conquered more
territory and Liberia slid into further anarchy (Helman and Ratner,
1992/3; Ayoob, 1995:81-86), there was growing regional concern about
the nature of atrocities being committed by factional groups in the
conflict. With the levels of refugee flows being generated by the
conflict and the fate of entrapped foreign nationals, it had become
obvious that the situation in Liberia has gone beyond the boundaries of
that country and ceased to be an exclusive Liberian issue (Erskine,
1990:67).
Intensifying public demands in West African states for action in
Liberia, and awareness on the part of regional leaders of the
appropriateness for some sort of action in Liberia, aroused different
responses from the major actors in the Liberian struggle for power. All
factions subsequently initiated policies of seizing foreign nationals
as hostages, but with diverging ulterior motives. To forestall any
situation where an externally motivated force could deny the NPFL the
results of its battlefield success, the NPFL initiated its hostage
policy by selectively targeting and kidnapping Guineans, Ghanaians and
Nigerians for use as human shields against any attack (Nwolise,
1993:58ff.). The INPFL's Prince Yormie Johnson, rationalized his
hostage policy as having arisen from the hope of provoking an
international intervention in the civil war. To that end, he selected
American, British, Lebanese and Indian civilians for detention.
According to Adibe, large sections of the media begun to demand that
their respective governments respond to factional group hostage policy.
On 2 August 1990, Ghana intimated that 'the perpetuation of violence
against nationals of other countries in the subregion resident in
Liberia could no longer be tolerated'. An implicit threat was also
included in this statement. Factional leaders were warned that 'failure
to ensure their safe passage could provoke other responses from their
respective governments' (Daily Graphic, August 1990). Against
this backdrop, ECOWAS justified its eventual intervention in the
Liberian crisis on the basis of four interrelated factors, namely:(i)
humanitarianism; (ii) the provisions of the Defence Protocols; (iii)
regional security; and (iv) on the grounds that it was responding to
the request of the 'de jure' government in Liberia. Table 2
The Regional Dimensions of Liberia's Internal Conflict
The Effects on Neighbouring States
|
The Actions of Neighbouring States |
Refugees' problems |
Humanitarian interventions |
Economic problems |
Defensive interventions |
Military problems |
Protective interventions |
Instability problems |
Opportunistic interventions |
Inter-state war |
Opportunistic invasions | Adapted from Michael E. Brown.'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict' in Brown, M.E. The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict.
(London: MIT Press, 1986), p. 592.

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13. Conclusion Thus,
by the time the 13th ECOWAS Summit meeting of Heads of State and
Government took place in Banjul, the Gambia, in May 1990, and the
Liberian crisis was inserted into the politico-military agenda of the
organization, several regional states had become involved in the
engulfing Liberian crisis to varying degrees. The conflict had
escalated both vertically - increasing the levels of violence - and
horizontally, involving the contiguous states. Among the more central
states were, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone,
Nigeria and Togo which had all become implicated in this supposedly
internal Liberian conflict.
The dynamics of both the character and magnitude of state involvement
in this conflict was to influence individual state response to ECOWAS'
strategies in dealing with this conflict, and most especially the
reactions of the major factional groups, the AFL, NPFL and INPFL to
possible ECOWAS intervention. It cannot be overlooked that the extent
of state involvement in the extending support either for the
organization of the insurgency or to the discredited Second Republic
was in a large measure to affect the response of factional groups to
ECOWAS, and has similarly affected ECOWAS' credibility in its efforts
to return Liberia to normality.
What we have managed to show here is an analysis of the different
motivations and actions neighbouring West African states have played in
the Liberian crisis. Most studies overlook the involvement of regional
states in the internal dynamics of the conflict. This paper endeavours
to enhance our knowledge of the regional dynamics of internal
conflicts.

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