THE EXTREMIST ROOTS OF THE DARFUR REBELLION
“The
conflict in Darfur has nothing to do with marginalisation or the
inequitable distribution of wealth. Inherently it is a struggle between
the two factions of the Sudanese Islamist movement, the (opposition)
Popular Congress party and the ruling National Congress (party).”
Sudanese Human Rights Activist Ghazi Suleiman [1]
For
all the claims of marginalisation, there is no doubt whatsoever that
the conflict within the Sudanese Islamist movement following the
government’s sidelining of the Islamist eminence grise Dr Hasan Turabi
in 1999 is central to the Darfur conflict. Once the mentor of the
present government, Dr Turabi had long been seen by reformists within
Sudan as an obstacle both to the normalisation of relations with the
United States and a peace agreement with southern rebels. The ruling
National Congress party, al-Mutamar al-Wattani, split in 2000/2001 with
hard-liners under Turabi, many of them from Darfur, forming the Popular
Congress party, al-Mutamar al-Sha’bi, in opposition to any engagement
with Washington and the West and peace in southern Sudan. (De Waal has
observed: “It is almost unbearably ironic that just as southern Sudan
is on the brink of peace, Darfur – and with it the entire north – is
convulsed by another war. The linkage is not accidental” [2].
Sudarsan Raghavan, the Africa bureau chief for Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, a veteran commentator on Darfur and critic of the
government, has reported on the Islamist twist to the Darfur issue:
“The violence in Sudan’s western province of Darfur…is widely portrayed
as an ethnic-cleansing campaign by Arab militias against black African
villagers. But it’s also part of a long-running fight for political
supremacy between Sudanese president Omar al Bashir and an Islamist who
called Osama bin Laden a hero. [Emphasis added] For 15 years, Hassan al
Turabi was Sudan’s most powerful man, deftly manoeuvring its leaders
from his perch as speaker of the parliament. He counted bin Laden among
his close friends and once called the United States ‘the incarnation of
the devil’.” Turabi has subsequently been very critical of Khartoum for
“selling out” to Washington, including Sudan’s considerable assistance
in the war on terrorism and concessions Khartoum has made in the peace
process.
Raghavan asserts that “the government is deathly afraid of Turabi” and has noted: “many Sudanese believe…Turabi’s
supporters are the core of the rebel groups”. [3]
He also cites Ghazi Suleiman, whom he described as a “well-known
Sudanese human rights lawyer”, as saying of the war in Darfur: “It is a
struggle to seize power in Khartoum, and the battlefield is in Darfur.”
[4] In a different
interview, with Reuters, Ghazi Suleiman stated that “Turabi is the
mastermind of the existing conflict in Darfur. If he is released and if
the government tries to come to an agreement with him he will stop what
is going on in Darfur in a week.” [5] This
line of analysis has also been confirmed by other anti-government
commentators. Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, the general-secretary of the
Pan African Movement and co-director of Justice Africa, a human rights
organisation, has also said: “Darfur is a victim of the split within
the National Islamic Front personified by…Dr Hassan al-Turabi and his
former protégé, General Omar al-Bashir. Al-Turabi’s support is very
strong in Darfur…” [6]
The
Justice and Equality Movement, at the heart of the Darfur conflict, is
led by Turabi protégé Dr Khalil Ibrahim. Formed in November 2002, it is
increasingly recognised as being part and parcel of the Popular
Congress. Time magazine has described JEM as “a fiercely Islamic
organisation said to be led by Hassan al-Turabi” and that Turabi’s
ultimate goal is “the presidential palace in Khartoum and a stridently
Islamic Sudan”. [7]
Khalil is a long-time associate of Turabi’s and served as a state
minister in Darfur in the early 1990s before serving as a state
cabinet-level advisor in southern Sudan. Ibrahim was a senior member of
the Islamist movement’s secret military wing. The International Crisis
Group has noted that “Khalil Ibrahim…is a veteran Islamist and former
state minister who sided with the breakaway [Popular Congress] in 2002
and went into exile in the Netherlands.” [8]
He was closely involved in raising several brigades of the Popular
Defence Force (PDF) and mujahideen, many of them personally recruited
from Darfur tribes, to fight rebels in southern Sudan. He was known as
the emir of the mujahideen. Ibrahim recruited several hundred JEM
fighters from the ranks of those Darfurian tribesmen he had led in the
south, claiming that the Khartoum government had sold out to the
southern rebels and Washington.
De
Waal has mentioned that the student wing and regional Islamist cells
followed Turabi into opposition following the split. Two other parts of
the Islamist infrastructure that joined Turabi virtually en masse
following the break were the financial cell and the military wing
(which continued to exist separately of the Sudanese armed forces even
after the 1989 coup which brought the present government to power, and
which had previously administered the PDF and jihad fighters). Both had
always been strictly controlled by Turabi. This military wing formed
the core of JEM and the military structures which planned and initiated
attacks in Darfur. In November 2003, the Popular Congress admitted that
some party members were involved in the Darfur conflict. [9] In January 2004 Turabi admitted supporting the Darfur insurrection: “We support the
cause, no doubt about it…we have relations with some of the leadership.” [10] In the same month, Turabi admitted that 30
members of his Popular Congress party had been arrested in connection with activities in Darfur. [11]
The
influential Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram was also explicit in its
linking of JEM to extremist Islamism: “JEM is a militant Islamist
organisation reputedly linked to the Popular National Congress Party
(PNC) of the Sudanese Islamist ideologue and former speaker of the
Sudanese parliament Hassan Al-Turabi.” [12]
Al-Ahram has also noted Turabi’s involvement in Darfur: “Al-Turabi
wields powerful influence among certain segments of Darfur society.
Darfur, a traditional Islamist stronghold…The Sudanese government is
especially concerned about the involvement of elements sympathetic to
Al-Turabi in the Darfur conflict.” [13]
The
International Crisis Group has also noted the Darfur war’s Islamist
origins: “Darfur’s crisis is also rooted in the disputes that have
plagued Sudan’s Islamist movement since it took power in 1989.
Following a disagreement with Hassan el-Turabi, the architect and
spiritual guide of the Islamist movement, a second split in the ruling
Islamist movement had an equally destabilising impact on Darfur. In
2000, Turabi, then speaker of parliament, formed the Popular National
Congress (later renamed the Popular Congress, PC) following a fierce
power struggle with the ruling National Congress Party. To broaden its
base, PC activists reached out to Sudan’s majority but marginalised
African population.” [14]
These roots have also been commented upon by human rights activists:
“The second rebel group is the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),
based mostly on the Zaghawa tribe. It is linked with the radical
Popular Patriotic Congress party led by the veteran Islamist Hassan
al-Turabi who has now fallen out with his former NIF disciples…The
relationship between JEM and SLM remains one of the obscure points of
the Darfur conflict, even if the two organizations claim to be
collaborating militarily. The JEM is by far the richer of the two and
the one with the greater international media exposure, even if its
radical Islamist connections make it an unlikely candidate for fighting
a radical Islamist government…The main financial support for the
uprising comes… in the case of the JEM, from foreign funds under the
control of Hassan al-Turabi. It is the importance of this last
financial source that explains the fairly impressive and modern
equipment of the rebel forces.”
[15]
De
Waal has also written about the split between the Islamists and the
Khartoum government: “It was a protracted struggle, over ideology,
foreign policy, the constitution and ultimately power itself. Bashir
won: in 1999 he dismissed Turabi from his post as speaker of the
National Assembly, and later had him arrested. The Islamist coalition
was split down the middle…The students and the regional Islamist party
cells went into opposition with Turabi, forming the breakaway Popular
Congress. Among other things, the dismissal of Turabi gave Bashir the
cover he needed to approach the United States, and to engage in a more
serious peace process with the SPLA – a process that led to the signing
of the peace agreement in Kenya.” [16]
The
International Crisis Group has noted that “the alleged link between JEM
(Justice and Equality Movement) and the [Popular Congress] is the most
worrisome for [Khartoum], since it fears Turabi is using Darfur as a
tool for returning to power in Khartoum at the expense of his former
partners in the ruling National Congress Party (NCP).” [17]
It has also further noted that “The belief that the Darfur rebellion
has been hijacked by disaffected rival Islamists is a main reason
behind the government’s refusal to talk to the rebels, particularly
JEM. The personal rivalry between Vice-President Taha and his exmentor
Turabi for control of the Islamist movement and the country is being
played out in Darfur, with civilians as the main victims.” [18] Dr Richard Cornwell,
the Sudan expert at the South African-based Institute of Security
Studies, has said that many Sudanese believe that JEM was formed as
result of the power struggle between President Bashir and Hasan Turabi:
“The Turabi link is very important…there are some people who are of the
opinion that Turabi’s supporters in Khartoum and Darfur deliberately
manufactured this crisis with a view of taking power.” [19]
Agence France Presse has concluded that “disgraced Turabi loyalists of
Muslim African origin…constitute the core of the JEM’s current
leadership…More than a liberation movement, the JEM is seen as an
organisation used as a tool by members of the political opposition to
destabilise Beshir’s regime.” [20]
The
Government of Sudan was initially very reluctant to concede that Dr
Turabi and the Popular Congress were intimately involved in the Darfur
conflict. In May 2004, however, Sudanese Interior Minister Abdel Rahim
Mohamed Hussein admitted as much: “The Popular Congress is involved in
the incidences in Darfur and the JEM is just another face of the
Popular Congress.” [21] In September
2004, the Governor of West Darfur, Suleiman Abdullah Adam, stated that
the Justice and Equality Movement was the military wing of the Popular
Congress: “The JEM are the military wing of the Popular Congress and,
as the military wing of the Popular Congress in Darfur, they try to
escalate the situation.” [22]
It
is also becoming apparent that the Popular Congress has been using a
dual – interconnected – strategy in its attempts to overthrow the
Khartoum government. They have used orchestrated events in Darfur to
weaken the government domestically and internationally – perhaps even
to the extent of foreign military intervention. And they have also
attempted, in combination, to mount a military uprising. In March 2004,
military officers linked to the Popular Congress attempted a coup
d’état in Khartoum. The BBC said: “Those detained are also being linked
to the uprising in the Darfur region.” [23] They also
planned attacks on oil refineries and power stations. [24] In September 2004 the government also foiled another Popular
Congress coup attempt. [25] The Islamist plotters were accused of plotting to assassinate or kidnap government officials and
take over strategic installations, including state radio and television. [26]
The government captured a large arms cache “with which the conspirators
planned to kidnap and kill 38 government officials and destroy
strategic targets in Khartoum”. [27]
The trials of those involved in the coup attempts, including five
retired members of the armed forces and a former cabinet minister,
began in late 2004. [28] They were charged with possessing weapons, terrorism, undermining the constitutional
system and plotting war. Twenty-one serving members of the armed forces were charged separately. [29] The Sudanese
government began to move against Islamist extremists. [30]
It
is clear that Turabi and Popular Congress deliberately chose Darfur to
be the cockpit of their war against Khartoum. They also cold-bloodedly
sought to project a racial element on the issue. Popular Congress
activists originated and distributed a publication known as “The Black
Book” alleging Khartoum’s marginalisation and neglect of Darfur and
claiming that Sudan’s political elite was dominated by a northern Arab
clique – seemingly the same clique once led by Dr Turabi. The Financial
Times confirmed that the “Black Book” had been written by Justice and
Equality Movement activists. The newspaper also noted that “The
appearance of the Black Book did coincide with a deep split in the
regime, which has exacerbated tension in society.” [31]
Alex de Waal has also commented on the importance of the “Black Book”
in subsequent events in Darfur: “The Islamist split quickly took on
regional and ethnic dimensions. The west Africans and Darfurians who
had come into the Islamist movement under Turabi’s leadership left with
him…In May 2000, Darfurian Islamists produced the “Black Book”…The
Black Book was a key step in the polarization of the country along
politically constructed ‘racial’ rather than religious lines, and it
laid the basis for a coalition between Darfur's radicals, who formed
the SLA, and its Islamists, who formed the other rebel organization,
the Justice and Equality Movement.” [32]
The
intimate involvement of Islamist extremists such as Dr Turabi and his
Popular Congress party in the Darfur insurgency has worrying
implications for those eager to end and resolve the war. It is very
difficult, for example, to end a conflict said to be about
marginalisation and underdevelopment when at least one of major
participants would appear to have a hidden agenda of overthrowing the
Government of Sudan and replacing it with a more hard-line Islamist
regime. Building schools and roads and drilling more water wells in
Darfur, while doubtlessly useful, is not going to satisfy hard-line
Islamist rebels in Darfur any more than reconstruction projects in Iraq
have satisfied Islamist insurgents in that country.
Footnotes
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